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
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
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JANUARY, 1852.

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Cours de Philosophie Positive. Par M. Auguste Comte, Ancien Elève de l'Ecole Polytechnique; Répétiteur d'Analyse Transcendentale, et de Mécanique Rationnelle à la dite Ecole. Paris: Bachelier. 1830-1842. 6 tomes, 8vo.

TWELVE long years elapsed during the slow publication of the successive volumes of M. Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, and nearly ten more have passed away since it was submitted in its complete form to the tribunal of public opinion. The writings of Mr. Lewes, M. Littré, and M. Pinel, and also those of Prof. Whewell and Mr. Mill, forbid our supposing that M. Comte's views have been wholly without influence; yet, during the whole period of these twenty-one years, in which this system of Positive Philosophy has attained its legal majority, it has been but twice noticed, as far as we are aware, in the periodical criticism of Europe,* and never in that of America;† and even the name of its illustrious author would have remained a *nomen ignotum* to the large majority of the literary world, but for a cursory and unsatisfactory critique upon the work in Mr. Morell's *Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century*, and a less meagre but scarcely more adequate examination of his doctrines in Mr. Blakey's *History of the Philosophy of Mind*. From these scanty sources, but especially from Mr. Morell's very limited and borrowed criticism, have been derived the few passing observations upon M. Comte's philosophy, which have been occasionally hazarded in the ephemeral publications of the day. The comparatively recent

* Sir David Brewster, in the *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1833, No. clxxxvi. art. i; and Prof. Emile Saisset in the *Revue des deux Mondes*. This "strange silence" is noticed by M. Comte himself.—Tome vi, Préface, p. xxi.

† Since this was written an excellent article on the subject has appeared in a contemporary journal.

production of the political and social doctrine to which the speculative system of Positivism serves as a propædæutic, has recalled our attention to that elaborate scheme which constitutes its basis. We would have enlarged our rubric and our text by the addition of the "*République Occidentale*," but the fallacies of the latter can be duly appreciated only after a candid estimate of the merits and defects of the great preliminary work. Moreover, we are not disposed to increase the magnitude and diversity of a subject already too ample and complex, by connecting with its examination an inquiry into another topic which more appropriately demands independent treatment, and may receive it at our hands on some future occasion. We shall find it necessary to trim down even the contents of the volumes which form our text into manageable size and shape, by the exclusion of almost everything which is not immediately connected with M. Comte's philosophic method; and while yielding to this necessity, we cannot be guilty of the inconsistency of augmenting the range of view on another side, by bringing within the sweep of our horizon another work which can well await a separate consideration. We are anxious, *pro virili parte*, to atone for the neglect with which M. Comte's labours have been hitherto visited, and to present a sufficient and impartial estimate of that philosophic system, which forms in itself a complete and symmetrical method, and one which is assimilated so closely in many respects to the intellectual instincts and appetites of the day, that its secret influence will be almost exactly proportionate to the degree of public disregard with which it may be visited. In that struggle between religion and science, between philosophy and faith, which has already commenced, and which must play so important a part in the intellectual history of the remainder of the century, a large, ingenious, and learned party must recognise Comte as their apostle, and the Positive Philosophy as their creed; nor can the votaries of the Christian faith be prepared to resist the rising deluge of error, unless they have first patiently weighed and dispassionately appreciated the current forms of metaphysical or speculative delusion—and Positivism among the rest. For these reasons, late though it may appear to be, we propose at this time to exhibit the doctrines of M. Comte, to examine their validity, to acknowledge their occasional and limited truth, and, so far as we may be able to do so, to expose their fallacies, and refute the principles from which we conceive that their errors proceed.

In the solitary review of the work, which has hitherto appeared in the English journals, only the first two volumes were considered by Sir David Brewster. In these the philosophy of Comte was barely indicated, but by no means developed; and what was impor-

tant or original even in the fragment reviewed, was unappreciated or misunderstood in the feeble essay of the reviewer. We can scarcely conceive anything more unfortunately inapposite and irrelevant to the intellectual characteristics of the author reviewed, than the smooth, elegant, and plausible remarks with which Sir David commences his criticism. Yet, notwithstanding his limited comprehension, or, rather, total misapprehension, of the scope and nature of the treatise of M. Comte, he commends it as "a work of profound science, marked with great acuteness of reasoning, and conspicuous for the highest attributes of intellectual power." Equally strong and flattering is the testimony to its merits offered by the few other writers in England who have spoken of it. Morell admits "the admiration excited by the author's brilliant scientific genius."* Blakey's eulogy is to the like effect. Mill, who is so largely indebted to it for much that is most valuable in his own celebrated treatise on logic, frankly acknowledges his indebtedness, and constantly bestows upon Comte cordial and generous commendation. "Within a few years," says he, "three writers, profoundly versed in physical science, and not unaccustomed to carry their speculations into higher regions of knowledge, have made attempts of unequal, but all of very great merit, towards the creation of a philosophy of induction: Sir John Herschel, in his *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*; Mr. Whewell, in his *History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*; and, greatest of all, M. Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, a work which only requires to be better known to place its author in the first class of European thinkers."† Prof. Whewell, in the works to which Mr. Mill refers, has paid the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte the very significant compliment of borrowing from it to a vast extent, without making any acknowledgment whatever. These works of Dr. Whewell's were evidently suggested to him by Sir John Herschel's *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*.‡ The leading idea in the plan of the history is due partly to Victor Cousin, and partly to Comte;§ and the larger portion of the philosophy which has any appearance of novelty or depth may be traced to the more or less distinct intima-

* Morell's knowledge of Comte seems to have been taken at second-hand from the essays of Brewster and Saisset.

† Mill's *Logic*, b. iii, ch. i. See also his estimate more explicitly recorded b. iii, ch. v, ch. xxiv; b. vi, ch. x.

‡ The germs of these works may be found in a review of Sir John Herschel's *Discourse*, evidently written by Prof. Whewell, in the *London Quarterly Review* for July, 1831.

§ This fact, with respect to Victor Cousin, appears sufficiently established in the *Southern Quarterly Review* for July, 1842.

tions of Kant and Comte.* Yet his very great obligations to these authors are nowhere acknowledged further than by a rare and reluctant reference to their writings.† Mr. Mill proclaims liberally, and in strong terms, the aid which he derived in the composition of his system of logic from the above-mentioned works of Dr. Whewell; but, with the exception of a few happily invented technical phrases, all the assistance which was obtained from those sources might have been more efficiently obtained from the Cours de Philosophie Positive, either by the direct adoption or the suggested refutation of the conclusions of M. Comte.

When such high encomiums have been bestowed upon the elaborate treatise of M. Comte by the concurrent testimony of the few distinguished writers who have studied its contents and availed themselves of its results, it may appear singular that it has never, in the course of the nine years which have elapsed since its completion, been brought to the test of full and intelligent criticism in Europe or America. This may in some measure be accounted for by the immense range of varied erudition exhibited in it, which seems to require an analogous, though not necessarily equivalent, *πολυμαθία*, in any one who should undertake to give a complete analysis or refutation of its conclusions. Moreover, the originality and abstruseness of many of the speculations, which rest on the vast scaffolding of the author's acquired knowledge, can only be apprehended in their full significance, and weighed in a just balance, by a mind more untrammelled by ordinary prejudices, and less wedded to received formulas, than can be readily found in the present day. In addition to all this, the boldness, the novelty, the exhaustless variety, the copiousness, the logical coherence, and the remarkable extent of the work, combine to render a thorough examination and appreciation of its doctrines eminently difficult. It may appear paradoxical to mention its rigid logical connexion among the obstacles tending to prevent an earlier criticism of the work; but the perfect harmony and mutual dependence of all its parts necessitate the clear apprehension of the system as a whole, before any satisfactory judgment on it can be rendered.‡ And the difficulty, as

* We do not mean to accuse Whewell of downright plagiarism, though this charge might be justified by some incidents in his literary career, but only of such indebtedness as ought to have been acknowledged. His appropriations reappear as identical arguments and conclusions, as modified doctrines, or as contradictory views, all, however, evidently suggested by the writers mentioned above.

† If we remember correctly, there are two references to Comte in Mr. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.

‡ "Sans doute la nature de ce cours ne saurait être complètement appréciée, de manière à pouvoir s'en former une opinion définitive, que lorsque les diverses

well as rarity, of such apprehension may be easily estimated by any one who has noted the singular incapacity of the contemporaneous generation for enlarged and connected speculation,* and who is aware of the deficiency of modern thinkers and writers in everything appertaining to strict logical investigation and extended logical concatenation. Every one who has studied the works of Leibnitz must have observed how utterly ridiculous and anomalous his peculiar doctrines appear, when severed from that grand but fallacious scheme of which they constitute such essential details.† Eminently plausible when considered in their native setting and harmonious correlation, they excite only a smile when exhibited in naked isolation. In the same way, to understand the separate dogmas of Comte, we must contemplate them in their symmetrical correspondence with, and dependence on, that vast reintegration and expansion of the whole body of the sciences, which he has so ably endeavoured to constitute. But in order to do this effectually, we must wander through the maze of all known or conjectural science, and digest the immense mass of important doctrine which is thickly spread over the five thousand pages of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. If we judge from the long silence of the critics, this is a task almost beyond the capacity of human performance—it is certainly not achieved by Prof. Saisset—it is one which, if satisfactorily executed, would require, according to the mode of its accomplishment, either nearly equal or else greater genius and learning than have been displayed by M. Comte in the construction of this mighty monument of intellectual power. It is not always, but it certainly is sometimes true, that the correction of speculative errors and aberrations requires greater abilities and attainments than their creation. We have no hesitation in declaring that such will be the case whenever M. Comte's system of philosophy may

parties en auront été successivement développées.”—*Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome i, p. 1. The composition of a work so extensive and so closely articulated as Comte's is a remarkable anomaly in this age, and justifies his own remark: “A une époque de divagation intellectuelle, et de versatilité politique, toute longue persévérance dans une direction rigoureusement invariable, peut, sans doute, être justement signalée au public, comme une solide garantie de leur (des nouveaux principes) consistance, et même de leur opportunité,” &c.—Tome vi, p. iv.

° The contracted and limited horizon with which men of science bound their views in our day is constantly noted and reprehended by Comte. *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome i, p. 29; vi, pp. xxii, 15, 23, 289–292, 340, 643, 675.

† The mutual interdependence of the doctrines of Leibnitz is traced with some ability by Morell, *Crit. Hist. Phil.*, &c.; and better in Brucker's able summary, *Hist. Crit. Phil.*, tome v, pp. 397–446; but can be fully appreciated only from the direct study of the works of Leibnitz himself.

meet with a full, adequate, and dispassionate refutation, coextensive with the range of the heresy, equally comprehensive in its general principles, and equally complete in its details.

We have perhaps already given an ample excuse to exonerate the pericdical criticism of Europe and America from any very harsh censure for its long neglect of M. Comte; and we have assuredly said enough to manifest our full sense of our own inefficiency for the adequate performance of the task. But while the bow of Ulysses stands idle in the hall, and the twenty years of hopeless wandering and anxious expectation have been consumed before the master's hand has been extended to draw it, we may perhaps be pardoned if, as no Ulysses appears, we adapt the bow to our strength and endeavour to wield it, without laying claim to any permanent acquisition of it; for, until the bow be bent and the arrow sped to the mark, it will be the source of evils innumerable to men, instead of defending them against the calamities which it might be potent to avert.

Πολλοὺς γὰρ τόδε τόσον ἀριστῆας κεκαδήσει
Θυμὸν καὶ ψυχῆς.

We shall not attempt to review the whole ground over which the labours of M. Comte extend—a task for which we candidly confess our own incompetency, and which, even if not beyond our ability, would be precluded by the necessary limits of this article. Neglecting for the time his skilful elaboration of a new classification of the sciences,* and the valuable strictures on the several departments of human knowledge with which he has enriched his work, we will confine our attention to the examination of that system of Positive Philosophy, of which he so loftily and constantly claims to be the founder,† and whose definite establishment he boldly proclaims in his *République Occidentale*. In thus separating the leading element from the rest of these important labours, and concentrating our regards upon it, we deem that we shall be rendering better service to our readers than we should have done, had either ability or inclination permitted us to enter upon that full examination of the complete work which we recognise as beyond our strength; for thus we should only have dissipated the force of our remarks over an infinite multiplicity and diversity of details. M. Comte's contributions to the philosophy of the inductive sciences have been already in part appropriated by Dr. Whe-

* Of this Mr. Mill speaks in these terms: "M. Comte, whose view of the philosophy of classification, in the third volume of his great work, is the most complete with which I am acquainted," &c.—*Logic*, b. iv, ch. vii.

† "Le Fondateur d'une nouvelle philosophie."—*Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, préf., p. vi. "Fondateur d'une nouvelle philosophie générale, à la fois historique et dogmatique."—Tome vi, p. xxviii, cf. p. 288, and numerous other passages.

well, and, in some measure, criticised and appreciated by Mr. Mill. His systematic classification of the sciences, or, as he terms it himself, "la vraie hiérarchie encyclopédique," "cette hiérarchie fondamentale des sciences positives,"* can be more profitably estimated in connexion with the elaborate but somewhat grotesque scheme of M. Ampère,† who has been largely, but perhaps unconsciously, aided by his predecessor; and his criticisms on the separate sciences may be judiciously referred, on his own principles,‡ to the special examination of the cultivators of the several sciences respectively. His Philosophy of History, which is eminently ingenious, and in many respects profound, and which has been unjustly neglected by Ferrari,§ may occasionally furnish us with some necessary illustrations, but cannot be permitted to break the unity of our aims; while his creation of Social Philosophy, so loudly and so rightfully claimed by him as exclusively his own, is well entitled, by its extent and importance, to an independent discussion, without which its merits and its defects cannot be fairly tested. By this division of labour alone is there any prospect of the formation of a just estimate of the value and the results of M. Comte's labours; and in this way, what might be beyond the separate ability of one to accomplish, may be separately achieved by the distinct but concurring exertions of many. We have divided our strand from the cord as appropriate to the time, the occasion, and our own ability; we have taken for our text what may seem the least part of M. Comte's work, but it is the leaven which leaveneth the whole lump; and if we refute his philosophy, his errors are crushed in the germ. We shall therefore limit our view almost exclusively to the nature, value, and tendencies of M. Comte's system of Positive Philosophy. We shall, however, remember, and our readers should remember also, that M. Comte's intellectual rank is to be judged by no such partial criterion, but from the aggregate of his labours, and from the extent, compactness, profundity, and universality of his researches. Perhaps, when all that he has done is taken into sober consideration, it may be thought that he stands next to Bacon among modern philosophers—*proximus, sed longo intervallo*. He is superior to the sage of Verulam in everything but sobriety of judgment, poetic richness of imagination, and

* Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, préface, p. vii; tome i, p. 98.

† Essai de Philosophie: ou Exposition Analytique d'une Classification Naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines. Par André Marie Ampère. 2 vols., 8vo. Paris: 1838-1843.

‡ Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon lviii.

§ Ferrari, Essai sur le Principe et les Limites de la Philosophie de l'Histoire. Paris: 1843.

that first and loftiest of all gifts of genius, justice of conception. But whatever may be thought of him in comparison with the founder of modern science—and he himself pretends to no equality—he is certainly entitled to rank with, if not above, Hobbes, Descartes, and Leibnitz—perhaps we might add Kant.

Before entering, however, upon the analysis of the Positive Philosophy, some previous notice of the author, of his motives in writing this work, of the circumstances under which it was composed, and of its general character, may be acceptable to our readers, particularly as both the book and the author are so little known among us. A few brief remarks upon these topics are all that we can venture to indulge in before entering upon the character and tendencies of the Positive Philosophy.

M. Comte states, in his personal preface to the sixth volume of his work, that he was sprung from a Catholic and royalist family in the south of France, and brought up in the midst of royalist and Catholic influences. He appears, nevertheless, to have thrown himself at a very early age into the current of revolutionary feeling. From his birth and education he may have imbibed that bitter detestation of the name and fame of Napoleon which is so frequently and so singularly exemplified in his works. Educated at the Polytechnic School, he was early initiated into that mathematical and scientific discipline which he makes the basis, and we might almost say the sum, of all valuable learning. Regarding the instruction obtained at this celebrated institute as incomplete and insufficient, he prepared himself for his already contemplated renovation of sciences and societies, by sedulous application to the more recondite study of the phenomena of social existence and the phases of humanity in past ages. He was thus led to the discovery in 1812, at the age of twenty-four, of what he calls "the true encyclopædical hierarchy of the sciences," and of the complete harmony and mutual interdependence of his intellectual and political speculations. But not content with the mere repetition and extension of the accredited doctrines handed down by others, nor even with the vague fancies of possible regeneration which floated dimly before his eyes, he plunged boldly into the vortex of those wilder speculations which were broached obscurely in his youth, and he appears to have been one of the first, as he certainly was the most distinguished, of the acolytes of Saint-Simon. In that scanty band of enthusiasts and fanatics, whose reveries were barely redeemed from insanity by the high and solemn, though impracticable, nature of their aims, he seems to have rendered himself equally notorious by his talents and by his cold and sweeping infidelity. So fixed, so calm, so cold, indeed, was this infi-

delity, that it was rebuked even by Saint-Simon on his death-bed. From the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, however, M. Comte withdrew after a short period of service; and he now looks back with repentance, regret, and no slight scorn, to his former connexion with the singular founder of that singular sect.* But, notwithstanding this secession, and the bitterness which it has left behind, he has carried with him into the wider sphere of his own original speculations, the same feelings, the same objects, and frequently the same doctrines as were entertained by the grotesque and erratic hierarch whose ministry he had abjured. Certain it is that the impress of Saint-Simon is often to be detected in the most characteristic positions of the *Philosophie Positive*. It was while yet numbered among the Saint-Simonians that M. Comte gave the first distinct intimations of that colossal scheme which he has since accomplished. He had been destined for the great work of the renovation of the sciences and the regeneration of society by Saint-Simon himself; he had been by him designated as a fitting Elisha on whom the mantle of Elijah should descend; and he laid the foundation-stone of the contemplated edifice by the publication of his *Système de Politique Positive* in 1822. Perhaps dissatisfied with the mysticism which encircled the hard and practical, though fantastic, realities of Saint-Simonism; perhaps unwilling to remain trammelled by adherence to a system which, notwithstanding its tendencies to libertinism, was yet reluctant to renounce wholly the recognition of a Deity, or the necessity of religion;† M. Comte withdrew from the communion of that sect, which was ready to honour him as the anointed successor to their founder, and boldly undertook the construction of an independent system for himself.

He had scarcely, however, entered upon the oral exposition of those new doctrines which are embodied in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, when his labours were interrupted by an attack of mental derangement, which he has characterized as “une crise cérébrale,” and attributed to the combined influence of great distress and excessive labour. When medicine and science despaired of a cure, nature was left to her own unrestricted energies; and, indeed, by judicious nursing, “the inherent strength of his constitution triumphed over his disease, and even over the doctor’s prescriptions.”‡ M. Comte, after his recovery, immediately resumed the thread of his specula-

* See what he says of his Saint-Simonian fever. *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, pp. vii, viii.

† This seems to have been the principal cause of the schism. *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, p. ix, note.

‡ *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, p. x, note.

tions, and concluded, in 1829, the oral elaboration of his views, which had been broken off by his mental alienation three years before. He boasts that this terrible episode in his career in no respect affected the perfect continuity of his intellectual development; but those who are disposed to criticise his philosophy harshly, may suspect that some traces of insanity may yet be detected in some of the extravagant propositions of the Positive Philosophy, and especially in its sweeping and impassive atheism.

M. Comte informs us that he has, during his whole life, been wholly dependent on his own exertions for support; that he was entirely without private fortune at the commencement of his career; that from the age of eighteen he has been teaching mathematics from six to eight hours a day;* that it was not until 1832 that he was admitted into the faculty of the Polytechnic School, and then only as a tutor of the lowest grade; that at the age of forty-five, when he completed the publication of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, his means were still uncertain and limited; and that he was without any assured provision for his old age, though he expresses an entire confidence in the generous support of his countrymen, and appeals, for the estimation of his labours, from the neglect and injustice of his compeers, to the bar of the public opinion of France and Europe. Of the weight to be attached to his criminations of the Polytechnic School, of the Institute, of the Government, and of the mathematicians of France,—though, in regard to the last, they have been repeated by Hoéné Wrouski,—we cannot and need not judge;† but we cannot refrain from expressing our admiration of the high sentiments which are conveyed, and the lofty spirit of philosophic independence which is breathed by the language of his appeal.‡

Another appeal to the "Occidental Public," which is appended as a post-scriptum to the "*République Occidentale*," enables us to bring down M. Comte's personal history to the middle of the year 1848. It reveals a more melancholy condition than its predecessor. He says that his persecutions have extended even beyond his previous apprehensions. In the July of 1844 he was summarily ejected from his office in the Polytechnic School by the machinations and

* In singular contradiction to Comte's own declarations, Morell says: "Up to the year 1816 he was a teacher in the Polytechnic School at Paris."—*Crit. Hist. Phil.* XIX. *Century*, p. 354.

† Tome vi, pp. x-xxxiv. After the revolution of February, however, M. Comte retracted his language with respect to M. Arago, whom he had termed "*fidèle organe spontané des passions et des aberrations propres à la classe qu'il domine aujourd'hui si déplorablement*."—Tome vi, p. xvi, note. The retraction is repeated in the preface to the *République Occidentale*, pp. xi, xii.

‡ *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, pp. xxxii-xxxiv.

injustice of his scientific enemies. He has had to return to the occupation of private instruction, and "commenced his second half-century by resuming for life the humble and laborious profession which seemed appropriate only to his more youthful years."*

Notwithstanding the noble appeal of M. Comte to the public opinion of Europe, his labours remain to this day unappreciated. By some few thinkers his conclusions have been rashly adopted with indiscriminate admiration; by a few others they have been reprobated with undistinguishing acrimony; and by Mr. Mill, as far as they ran parallel with his own studies, they have been cordially appreciated: but no suitable response has been given to the manly appeal of their author. Yet, when we examine his work, it is difficult to determine whether we ought to admire most the constant industry and the unswerving perseverance of twenty years devoted to its composition, or the genius, profundity, boldness, originality, and learning displayed on every page. These characteristics are entitled to our earnest approbation, whether M. Comte's conclusions be considered accurate or not. Indeed, no more memorable instance has fallen under our cognizance of patient, continued, and logical investigation, and of unflinching perseverance in defiance of all obstacles, than is displayed in the volumes under review. In spite of his constant and common-place avocations; of the difficulties and trials of his private life; of the jealousy or animosity of men distinguished equally by their talents, their reputation, and their influence; of the interruptions of sickness, the seductions of deceptive theories, and the scantiness of leisure hours—in spite of all these things, and, worse than all, of the grinding oppression of poverty, M. Comte has pressed steadily onwards, from his youth to the turn of mature life, towards the final accomplishment of his early meditated designs, and has ultimately succeeded in completing the immense elaboration of his vast system in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. Considering this, however, as merely the necessary introduction to more immediately practical labours, he closes his long work with the promise and the delineation of those ulterior speculations, for which all that he has already accomplished is regarded merely as the indispensable preparation. It would be difficult, if not impossible, in the present age to find a parallel for the immense learning and labour of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*; it would be questionable whether in any age an analogous case could be discovered, in which such labours had been contemplated by their author as merely the scaffolding for higher and more important constructions, designed and to be erected by himself. These are con-

siderations which entitle M. Comte to our admiration, wholly irrespective of the error or the truth of his conclusions, or of the beneficial or pernicious tendency of his writings.

One of the most remarkable peculiarities connected with the composition of this work, is the singularly brief time in which its different parts were written. In the midst of all other engagements and distractions, these five thousand pages were composed in twenty-two months of actual labour, as appears from the data communicated by M. Comte in the general table of contents appended to the sixth volume. The publication, owing to a variety of delays, was prolonged through the tedious term of twelve years; but the treatise was written by scraps at different times, which in the aggregate amount to only the above-mentioned period of twenty-two months. It is true that long previous meditation had already developed in his mind the connected scheme of the Positive Philosophy, and his public lectures had in a great measure settled the form and systematized the order of its exposition; still, when we consider the range, the variety, and the learning of the work, the extreme rapidity of its composition must be regarded as not the least remarkable of its characteristics. It adds to our admiration also, that, though this hasty execution has occasioned prolixity and needless repetition, it has in no wise impaired the strict logical concatenation, the close interdependence, or the symmetry of its respective parts.

Before concluding this rapid notice of the critical merits of M. Comte, we must commend the perspicuity and translucent clearness of his style, the quaint but vigorous originality of his expressions, and the happy grace of his forcible mode of argumentation. His literary excellences are by no means inferior either to his philosophical profundity or his scientific attainments.

The motives which inspired the composition of this great philosophical system may be in some measure inferred from our previous remarks; but they are so closely connected with the satisfaction of the wants, and with the realization of the most active appetencies of the age—and, furthermore, they shed so much light upon the character of the system itself, that if we had the space, we would scarcely deem it irrelevant to accord to them a more extended examination here. Moreover, we regard the feeling which prompted M. Comte's vast exertions, guided his investigations, and determined his utterance, as being that feeling which it is most important to awaken in the minds of the passing generation; for, whatever may be our estimate of the method or of the results of the Positive Philosophy, there is no room for doubting the urgent necessity for a general intellectual regeneration, though we would have it irradiated by a very different

spirit from that which breathes through the creed of M. Comte. Nevertheless, the full and clear-sighted recognition of such a necessity has furnished the main-spring of his labours, and the desire of suitably supplying the want has given birth to his great treatise. He says of himself:—

“When I had barely attained the age of fourteen, I had already, of my own accord, run over all the essential degrees of the revolutionary spirit, and experienced the fundamental necessity of a universal regeneration, at once political and philosophical, under the active energy of that salutary crisis, whose principal phase had preceded my birth.”

M. Comte may, perhaps, have deceived himself in tracing to so early a period the origin of his particular philosophy, from the desire to assimilate his own intellectual development to that of Lord Bacon, whom he regards, most erroneously, as the apostle of Positivism;* but the anxiety to prepare the way, and, if possible, to determine the form for this second instauration of the sciences has undoubtedly been the actuating principle of his philosophical life. Our estimate of the results and aims of his philosophy will accordingly depend to no slight extent upon our agreement or disagreement with his conclusions in regard to the social, political, and intellectual condition of modern civilization.

For ourselves, we have no hesitation in declaring that we assent most cordially to nearly all of M. Comte's strictures on the present age. With him we recognise its total want of consistent principles, and the entire absence of anything like logical or philosophical sequence in its schemes, its practices, and its reasonings. We perceive most clearly the universal spirit of resistance to all authority, resulting in anarchy intellectual, political, social, and religious; the substitution of false and petty aims in life for the noble sentiments of right and duty; the degradation of all science into the mere instrument of pecuniary advancement, and the concomitant decline of science itself. Like him, we admit and lament the mammonization of all the springs, processes, and results of human action, whether collective or individual; and we regard these evils as being pre-eminently the characteristics of this self-glorifying, self-stultifying age of intellect. To these things, as not very remote causes, we trace the social and political calamities and revolutions which have illustrated the history of the recent years; and we can conceive of no remedy for the present condition of the European world, and possibly for the impending fate of America, which does not commence with a

* “Les deux éternels législateurs primitifs de la philosophie positive, Bacon et Descartes.”—*Cours de Phil. Pos.*, tome vi, p. 455; v, pp. 695, 756, 784, 886.

complete reformation and reorganization of our philosophy. Thus our opinions are in perfect unison with those of M. Comte as to the task which is proposed to the present generation, and the nature of the medium in which it is to be accomplished; and, however widely we may differ from him in our choice of the modes of procedure to be adopted, and dissent from the fundamental principles of the required philosophy proposed by him, we acknowledge the valuable services which he has rendered by precisely stating the conditions of the problem, and offer the cordial tribute of our admiration to the singular genius, learning, and sagacity with which they have been settled, proved, and illustrated.

A vague and latent feeling of these pernicious characteristics of the times, with their dependent consequences, led to the premature, fantastic, and irrational reveries of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen. But, however chimerical we may deem their views, and however delusive or demoralizing we may consider their projects, these writers are entitled to our conscientious regard for the promptitude with which they detected the obscure nature of the disease, the boldness with which they attempted to expose it, and the faithful diligence with which they endeavoured to discover and apply a remedy; for these growing evils were then imminent, and they are still impending fatally over the human race—more fatally for the recent explosion in Europe—and they demand a prompt, a clear, and a sufficient solution.

It was the common recognition of the same phenomena and the same necessities, which led M. Comte to associate himself with Saint-Simon: they were inspired with the same hopes, and actuated by the same spirit. They both saw the urgency of a complete intellectual regeneration, which might revivify every department of human speculation and practice, and might effectually reorganize the various systems of social co-ordination. M. Saint-Simon was an enthusiast, a fanatic, and the constant dupe of his own vanity: he was uneducated, and his mind was undisciplined, and consequently his refuge and his creed was mysticism. M. Comte is more learned, more sober, more practical, and more profound; but both aimed at the same end, and hoped for its achievement by analogous means. If the one degraded and the other denied religion, they both did so under the delusion that Christianity was effete or false, and proved to be so by the utter decay of its influence over the lives and actions of men, and by its apparent inefficacy to remedy those social disorders which they did not perceive had sprung from infidelity of heart, and from practical disregard of its precepts and solemn ordinances.

Out of the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, as in them, M. Comte still kept the same high objects in view. He thought, he studied, he lectured, he taught, and he wrote, to call the attention of mankind to their condition and their wants; to awaken them to the recognition of the necessity of an instant and thorough intellectual regeneration; to urge them to the laborious accomplishment of the great task; and to offer them what seemed to himself a sufficient, and the only sufficient guide for their labours, and remedy for their distempers. Whether, in this estimate, he has not deceived himself, we shall hereafter inquire: but it is to the constant stimulus of such views and feelings that we owe the composition of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*; and we freely acknowledge our deep gratitude for the gift. We shall censure as strongly as any one the fallacies and sophistries of its infidelity, and the errors which we deem its author to have committed; but, on the whole, we regard it as the great and most valuable legacy which the first half of the nineteenth century has bequeathed to posterity. M. Comte recognises, illustrates, and probes, with a delicate and faithful hand, the nature and sources of that universal distemperature of the times, which threatens to convert the human family into a pandemonium upon earth, and to render all human achievement, all human civilization, and all human science, the instruments of the most complete and wide-spreading debasement of society. He points out the gross intellectual aberrations into which this enlightened age has fallen; the deep-seated intellectual anarchy and licentiousness which prevail, to the discomfiture of science, philosophy, and social organization: to these sources he traces the revolutionary character of the day, the wants and miseries of the masses, and the advancing disintegration of all intellectual systems. But, not content with merely calling attention to the existence of evil—a mission which Carlyle has performed with the ignorance, but also with the frenzied inspiration of a priestess of Delphi or Dodona—he endeavours to characterize its nature and discover its origin; and unsatisfied even with this, he suggests remedies, and offers what he deems a panacea in a new method of science, a new instauration of learning, a new philosophy without a creed, and a concomitant and accordant reorganization of society. Such is the purpose of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*.

Referring the social difficulties and disorders of the times to the unsoundness of our intellectual principles, to the vague and fluctuating nature of all our speculations about men and states, and to the logical fallacies involved in all our scientific processes, M. Comte deems it necessary to constitute the general science of societies (*Sociology*) before proceeding to examine questions of politics

Out of the world of the *tabula rasa* as in the *tabula rasa* with
 facts the same high objects in view. He thought he should be in-
 formed, he thought and he wrote to call the attention of readers to
 their condition and their wants; to watch them in the development
 of the necessity of an instant and thorough intellectual organization;
 to give them to the laborious accomplishment of the great task; and
 to offer them what seemed to himself a sufficient and the only well-
 clear guide for their labors, and remedy for their dangers.
 Whether in this respect, he has not succeeded himself, or shall
 hereafter appear; but it is to the constant attention of such men
 and beings that we owe the composition of the *tabula rasa* and
tabula rasa; and we freely acknowledge our deep gratitude for the gift.
 We shall continue as always as any one the laborer and not the
 of the intellect, and the errors which we have in nature to have
 committed; but on the whole, we regard it as the first and most
 valuable legacy which the first half of the nineteenth century has
 bequeathed to posterity. M. Comte's philosophy, literature, and
 prose, with a delicate and faithful hand, the nature and manner of
 that universal development of the times, which the first half of the
 nineteenth century has bequeathed to posterity, and all nature
 has all human achievement, all human achievement, and all nature
 extend the frontiers of the most complete and wide-spread
 development of society. The points and the great intellectual efforts
 that have been made, the enlightened age has done, the deep-seated
 intellectual activity and development which have led to the history-
 from of science, philosophy, and social organization, to them
 must be traced the revolutionary character of the day, the spirit
 and movement of the century, and the scientific development of all
 intellectual systems. But we cannot with merely other atten-
 tion to the existence of evil—a science which Comte has presented
 with the promise, but also with the famous passage of a
 passage of *tabula rasa* or *tabula rasa*—be content to eliminate its
 nature and discover its origin; and ourselves even with this in sig-
 nificance, and offer what he himself presents to a new method
 of science, a new instrument of learning, a new philosophy, without
 a word, and a *tabula rasa* and a constant reorganization of society.
 Such is the purpose of the *tabula rasa* and *tabula rasa*.
 But the social philosophy and doctrine of the times to the
 development of the intellectual progress to the verge and the
 state nature of all our speculations about man and nature, and to the
 social philosophy involved in all our scientific progress, M. Comte
 seems it necessary to contribute the general system of science
 (sociology) before proceeding to examine problems of politics

proper, or of political economy. But, in order duly to create this social science, he examines the grounds and truth of all other human sciences, regarding them as the necessary preliminaries to the examination of the phenomena of social existence. These propædæutic studies, each of which has its own independent value, can, however, be neither criticised nor examined, except in their mutual relations and interdependence; nor can they be reformed or corrected without a constant reference to some fixed scientific method. Hence the necessity of commencing these labours by a formal classification of the sciences; and hence also the necessity of making such classification dependent upon a clearly defined method. This method must of course be determined by the nature of the faculties of the human mind, by the degree of certainty conceived to appertain to human knowledge, and by the character which belongs to all human reasoning. All methods agree in seeking their determination from these sources, and the diversities by which they may be separated from each other thus spring entirely from the different modes in which these problems are interpreted by different minds.

Under the influence of these considerations, M. Comte determines the character, conditions, and limitations of human knowledge, and the method of scientific inquiry to be pursued in accordance with such restrictions, which method he terms the Positive Philosophy. He then proceeds, by the application and development of this method, to build up the several sciences in regular order and due sequence, raising them stage by stage above each other in beautiful and harmonious co-ordination, thus constructing his new classification of the sciences, or *Hierarchie des Sciences Positives*. As he advances, he points out the peculiarities, the excellences, and the defects of the several sciences—he determines what conclusions are solid, what doubtful, and what fallacious—develops the positive method concurrently with his criticism—and thus passes through all the subordinate and interdependent degrees to those biological studies which, though not cultivated philosophically as yet, nevertheless form the indispensable link of transition to the study of the actions of masses of men, the doctrine of communities, or what he has named Social or Sociological science.

This orderly and logical mode of procedure suggests to us the course to be adopted in our examination of M. Comte's system of philosophy. Leaving out of view the application of his doctrines to the separate sciences, and neglecting his scheme of classification, as not specially belonging to the present inquiry, we shall first consider briefly his views of the nature and limitations of human knowledge; then proceed to an examination of his Method; next investigate the

character and efficiency of the Positive Philosophy; and conclude with an estimate of the validity, the tendencies, and the defects of this recent counterpart to the *Instauratio Magna* of Lord Bacon. Throughout this examination, we shall find at every step new cause for admiration, in the work, though we may ultimately conclude that the views therein set forth are imperfect, impracticable, or fallacious; and may find that the writer has overlooked many of the most vital phenomena and most important characteristics of human life and knowledge; and may even discover that the new method, as understood by its promulgator, involves such fallacies and inconsistencies as defeat its satisfactory application to the solution of the social and intellectual difficulties of the present age. Such is the mode of procedure which we shall adopt, in order to afford a critical and impartial estimate of the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte.

In a former essay we discussed the general question of the certainty and limitations of human knowledge,* and indicated the position assumed by the Positive Philosophy in regard to this fundamental point. On the present occasion, accordingly, we need only repeat briefly what we then exhibited more fully, and notice the fatal and all-pervading errors which have sprung from fallacious views on this subject.

The human mind, according to the doctrine of M. Comte, recognises the impossibility of attaining to absolute knowledge, renounces all inquiry into the origin and destination of the universe and into the intimate causes of phenomena, and seeks only to discover, by a happy combination of reasoning and observation, the laws of their action; that is to say, their uniform relations of succession and resemblance. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to precise terms, becomes thenceforward the established connexion between the diverse particular phenomena and certain general facts, whose numbers diminish with the progress of science.† The statement of these general facts, in scientific language constitutes what is habitually understood by the laws of nature.

We deem M. Comte, as we said on the previous occasion, to have taken a correct view of the nature of strict science, in considering its laws as merely the theoretical colligation of phenomena, and as possessing no demonstrative truth beyond their correspondence with the facts obtained by observation, and their conformity with the consequences developed by accurate reasoning therefrom; but he errs in ignoring and cashiering everything which

* April, 1851. Art. I., Philosophy and Faith.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 4, 5.

does not fall within the range of strict scientific demonstration. The limitation proposed by M. Comte only distinguishes scientific from unscientific knowledge; it explodes neither the existence nor the practical utility, under certain conditions, of the latter. All science, indeed, in its earlier stages had belonged to this same category of vague, undefined, unsystematized knowledge; and if the rule of the Positive Philosophy is of universal application, the existence of the grain of truth in former speculation, which has fructified into our modern science, is denied by the same negation which in our time affects to repudiate everything but that small portion of human knowledge which admits of scientific co-ordination. Every round in the long ladder of human progress by which our present advancement has been attained, would be thus proved to have been utterly rotten and nugatory, and unavailing even for those purposes which it had subserved. Yet, despite of this, we would continue to claim as valid the position to which we had ultimately arrived by their assistance. M. Comte asserts, and most justly, that the only true method of philosophical exposition must be principally historical,* and must explain, absorb, and harmonize all the previous stages of progress; but certainly the leading dogma of Positivism in regard to the conditions of human knowledge is strangely at variance with this doctrine of an historical mode of philosophy. Nevertheless, this inconsistency is by no means the sole or the principal objection to the application of M. Comte's theory to the extent contemplated by him. Its great fallacy is, that it excludes from even practical validity that great portion of human knowledge and opinion which, though not systematized into science, furnishes the sufficient and only attainable rules of our ordinary life and action, continues to supply, as it has hitherto supplied, the material for the further advancement of science itself, and affords a substitute for scientific direction in anticipation of the time when the development of science enables it to furnish more satisfactory and demonstrative prescriptions. Our life and intellect are submitted to the harmonious guidance of a self-expanding, self-expounding science, and an undefined arbiter, half-reason, half-instinct, which supplies the deficiencies of the former. This unsystematized reason is the sole guide of the untutored ages of humanity. With the advance of civilization it concedes daily more and more of its once exclusive authority to the hands of its younger, but more showy and disciplined sister; but it never entirely resigns the reins of human conduct, nor can discord be introduced between the two, or a usurped and exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the puisné sovereign, without endangering the founda-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon lvi, tome vi, p. 658.

tions of all reason, and introducing fatal schisms and inconsistencies into our whole reasoning and practice.

The ostentatious profundity of modern times, which derides as superstition all that admits not of explication by the formalism of its scientific processes, has narrowed and cramped the range of the human intellect, and palsied the play of human feeling. It has cut us off from all recognition of those vague impulses, those mystical aspirations, those prophetic instincts, and hallowed fancies, which, yielding not to the trammels of science, are sublimated by the alembic or eliminated by the calculus, but which nevertheless are calculated to sanctify and adorn our daily life and conversation, and to shed the brilliancy of a heavenly origin' around the cold formalities of the world. All that is essential to redeem science from its hard and impassive narrowness—to counteract its dangerous seductions—lies beyond its horizon. Every appeal to the imagination, the affections, and the nobler principles of our being, is drawn from springs deeper than the finite plummet of human intellect has ever sounded. There can be no sympathetic comprehension of the wide universe in which we are placed, no quickening recognition of our manifold relations to it, unless we breathe a more empyrean air than that which can be compressed by the force-pump of scientific demonstration. Nay, we must travel beyond the sphere of human systems, before we can discover those eternal founts of light, which are requisite for the irradiation, the enlargement, and the elevation of science itself. How unwise then, how unworthy of our boasted intelligence, to dwarf the undefined world of human apprehension to the straitened compass of scientific truths!

We are no advocates for the wild and feverish delusions of theoretic fantasy; no rebels against the wholesome restrictions of sober reason; no architects of unsubstantial systems framed by reasoning *à priori*. All that we maintain is, that a broad line of distinction—wide as the chasm which separates Dives and Lazarus—exists, and should be recognised, between scientific conclusions and unscientific knowledge. We agree most entirely and cordially with M. Comte in our estimate of the character of the former, but we are unwilling with him to blind ourselves to the existence and importance of the latter. We would cheerfully render unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's; but we think that the most essential part of the tribute remains unpaid until we render unto God the things which are God's, without attempting to absolve the human intellect from its highest and noblest functions.

It would not be difficult to show that M. Comte's position, so far as it is true—that is to say, when confined to the characterization of

scientific knowledge—had been in some degree anticipated by Lord Bacon himself, and indicated by him in a remarkable passage of his works, which probably suggested to our author the designation of the Positive Philosophy.* His great predecessor has, however, with his wonted comprehensive grasp of intellect, recognised also that distinction between knowledge capable of systematization and knowledge incapable of it, on which we have insisted; though he has left his views undeveloped. Perhaps we might go back three centuries in time, and find M. Comte's theory obscurely intimated in the great precursor and namesake of the sage of Verulam:—"Tota philosophiæ intentio non est nisi rerum naturas et proprietates evolvere."† If by "the nature of things," Roger Bacon contemplated only their phenomenal nature, this passage might have formed a suitable motto to the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. And that such was his intention might perhaps be safely inferred from other remarks contained in the *Opus Majus*, especially from that profound observation in which he anticipates the wisdom of Lord Bacon already referred to:—

"Sed tamen omne id super quod potest intellectus noster, ut intelligat et sciat, oportet quod sit indignum respectu eorum, ad quæ in principio credenda sua debilitate obligetur, sicut sunt divinæ veritates et multa secreta naturæ et artis completis naturam, de quibus nulla ratio humana dari potest in principio; sed oportet quod per experientiam illuminationis interioris a Deo recipiat intellectum, viz., in sacris veritatibus gratiæ et gloriæ, et per experientiam sensibilem in arcanis naturæ et artis expergefactus inveniat rationem."‡

But whether it be true or not that the position of Comte was indistinctly perceived by friar Bacon, under its due limitations, there can be no doubt that he has supplied a valid criticism on its exclusive application:—

"Non est homini gloriandum de sapientia, nec debet aliquis magnificare et extollere quæ scit. Pauca enim sunt et vilia respectu eorum, quæ non intelligit sed credit, et longe pauciora respectu eorum quæ ignorat."§

We do not mean to strip M. Comte of his laurels. He looks up to Lord Bacon as the prophet, and almost as the founder of the Positive Philosophy; and whatever may have been the views of either Bacon on this subject, they certainly never designed them to be accepted in the sense in which they have been expounded by

° ° ° "ut doctrinam quandam positivam, et tanquam fide experimentalī." ° ° °
Fab. Cupid., Bacon's works, vol. xi, p. 99, ed. Montagu. The whole passage is cited Meth. Qu. Rev., vol. xxxiii, p. 198.

† *Opus Majus*, ps. ii, c. viii, p. 21, ed. Venet.

‡ *Opus Majus*, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.

§ *Opus Majus*, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.

Comte, nor did they anticipate him in the elaboration of an entire scheme of philosophy on this basis. Moreover, Lord Bacon, with his "*natura naturans*," his "*latens schematismus*," and such technical phrases of an antiquated metaphysical system, was far from attaining the perspicuity, the accuracy, and the precision with which this great doctrine has been enunciated by M. Comte, whose sole error consists in rendering it exclusive.

But besides the general objections, which have been just stated, there are others, springing immediately from this erroneous estimate of the nature and limitations of human knowledge, which peculiarly infect the whole scheme of the Positive Philosophy. Such, for example, is the entire negation of logic and metaphysics; such is also the absolute repudiation of all religious belief, and the substitution of the adoration of a typical humanity for all forms of divine worship. These errors flow legitimately and necessarily from the fundamental fallacy which we have noticed: the latter will be more appropriately treated when we come to speak of the tendencies of M. Comte's system; the former we will discuss in connexion with the positive *method*, which we proceed at once to consider.

If science (as indeed is true) be necessarily founded upon observation and induction, and if all reliable knowledge (which, however, is not true) be that which admits of a scientific character, then all knowledge which does not possess the characteristics specified by M. Comte as essential to its validity, must be utterly unworthy of the recognition of a disciplined philosopher, and may accordingly be cashiered by him as altogether nugatory. Such an undigested body of knowledge may indeed have formed the avenue along which the human mind has advanced to the apprehension of positive truth; it may have been the sole and indispensable support of previous ages of ignorance; but its mission is wholly ended on the appearance of the new dispensation. We may, indeed, assign to it an historical and factitious value, as indicating the line of march and the stages of advancement by which the world has arrived at its present purified intelligence; we may regard it with interest and respect as the chrysalis in which the vital germ of our present glorious science lay buried until the appointed time of its manifestation: but independently of these considerations, and considerations which spring from these, it can have no claim upon our veneration, as it has none upon our credence. In characterizing the gradual progress of human intelligence, as in estimating the value of contemporary philosophy, and determining the method to be pursued, the simple thread to guide us through the labyrinth will be found in the relation which different systems bear to the fundamental principle of the Positive

Philosophy. As this aspires only to the discovery of phenomenal laws, and proceeds entirely by sensible observation and reasoning therefrom; so that doctrine which derives its facts from an unquestioning belief in the evidence of sense and feeling, draws its certitude from an unreasoning conviction, and builds its conclusions by deduction from loosely assumed premises, is most widely antagonistic to it, and belongs to the early ages of humanity, and the ruder periods of human reason. Midway between these opposing systems is a method which cautiously examines into the premises which it receives, curiously detects and exposes the weak points of the system of faith, and then diligently attempts to close up the wounds which it has made, by instituting a theoretic reconstruction of the whole fabric of human life and knowledge, which is supposed to be valid if it does not offend against any of the theories which have been established as the *abracadabra* of the creed. This manner of reasoning is the intermediate link between the other two, and furnishes the means of transition from the blind credulity of the one to the equally blind scepticism of the other. The three systems, when arranged in their logical and chronological order, have been designated by M. Comte the theological, the metaphysical or critical, and the positive methods. The first maintains a belief in supernatural agency, seeks into the hidden nature of being, and endeavours to discover efficient and final causes; the second is only a modification of the first, and consists in substituting ideal entities for the supernatural agencies of its predecessor; and the third is such as we have already described it.*

In the above remarks we have attempted to exhibit the chain of reasoning by which M. Comte appears to have been led to the specification and adoption of the positive method. It will be observed, that the application of the names or epithets to the three successive systems is a piece of philosophical legerdemain, designed to excite prejudices for an ulterior purpose; and that the links of the deduction are by no means free from flaw; while the whole chain is dependent upon an hypothetical premiss which we have shown to be fallacious.

But further: although the reasonings of the human mind may be justly distinguished into these three classes, the distinction is valid only in regard to its progress in particular and often fragmentary branches of inquiry. In the individual intellect, as in the history of humanity, all three modes exist concurrently together, and are concurrently applied to different subjects, or different members of the same subject. We do not drive the sciences abreast—such an

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon i, tome i, pp. 2, 3.

idea is admissible only in the magnificent hyperbole of Fontenelle;* but the sciences themselves, and their different subdivisions, always exhibit diverse degrees of advancement, and a coexistent subordination to all of these methods. It is true, indeed, that the employment of the one or the other may so far preponderate as to give a prevailing tinge to the procedure of a system, the philosophy of a period, or the reasonings of a man. Still, such prevalence by no means indicates the exclusion of the other modes; nor is it in contravention of their validity within their own appropriate range. In the darkest infancy of civilization, so far as history or tradition can inform us, some rude arts were possessed, and consequently there must have been some exercise of positive reasoning. In the enlightenment of modern times, some entities and some supernatural powers are still recognised, although M. Comte and M. Strauss would explode them by the establishment of their own foregone conclusions. M. Comte perceives that the contemporary character of different sciences is analogous to the historical development of a particular one—that all three modes of philosophy coexist in the different conditions of distinct bodies of contemporary learning, as they have succeeded each other in the evolution of a special department of knowledge. Indeed, much of the positive method, and the whole “*Hiérarchie fondamentale des Sciences Positives*,” spring from this basis. Yet, apprehending this truth, he fails to see how fatally it is at variance with the supposition of the exclusive validity of any one method. The truth is, that the various modes do not succeed each other in their systematic integrity: such succession reveals merely the course pursued in the attainment of each separate acquisition. The tendency of the human intellect is undoubtedly to render scientific all the conquests of reason which can be co-ordinated under general laws; that is to say, to bring all its information under the category of positive philosophy. In its advances towards this goal, it passes through the two other previous stages; and so far the positions of Comte are correct. The positive method is correct and exclusive so far as it is applicable, but it is not of universal application; for much of our knowledge still remains in the transition state, and may never pass beyond it, though the domain of this intermediate system must shrink up with the progress of science. But that large portion of human knowledge or conviction which, as friar Bacon says, we believe but do not understand, may continue in the unresolved nebulous form of its primitive condition,

* “*Parcil en quelque sort aux anciens qui avaient l'adresse de mener jusqu'à huit chevaux attelés de front, il mena de front toutes les sciences.*”—*Fontenelle Eloge de Leibnitz*. *Leibn. Œuvres*, vol. ii, p. 1.

and may admit of but partial conversion into either of the other states, although one has attempted to absorb and transmute it, and the other to supplant or deny it. Supposing that the scientific progress of man was complete—as complete as human faculties and a finite intelligence would permit—all knowledge would not even then be scientific or positive, but much would still remain in that vague and indistinct state, out of which all our science had been tediously evolved. Even then we should not be justified in abusing the authority of science to abjure that whole body of knowledge, without which science itself could never have been. In such an event, the intermediate philosophy might relapse into its earlier condition in part, and in the main become blended into science, and so vanish; but then, as now, our life would be regulated and illumined by the two great lights of heaven—the sun of faith to rule by day over our earthly duties and heavenward aspirations, and the moon of science to rule by night over the darkness of human reason and human achievement.

It is a vain effort to endeavour to reduce all knowledge to a single precise and unvarying form. As it is in its nature relative, both in its subjective and objective respects, both with respect to the mind which knows and the thing which is known, it must of consequence vary in a manner corresponding with the different relations which subsist between both. Hence our convictions are founded upon different kinds and degrees of evidence, which must produce a characteristic difference in the nature of the conviction itself. The principle of belief may be the same, but the certainty exists under a difference of form. The ancients, and the earlier philosophers of modern times, in their recognition of distinct species of intellectual apprehension, were wiser in the vagueness and uncertainty of their language, than the great reasoners of our own day in that attempted perspicuity which is attainable only by the sacrifice of some of the most important forms of truth. Valid objections may, indeed, be raised to the various modes in which it has been proposed to distribute human knowledge into its species. With the scholiast David, we may admit five powers or faculties of knowledge—perception, conjecture, opinion, understanding, and pure reason;* or, with Olympiodorus,† we may prefer a novenary, or with Aristotle,‡ a septenary, or with Spinoza,§ a quaternary, or with Hobbes,|| a binary

* πολλοῖς ἀναβαθμοῖς κέχρηται τις ἵνα γνῶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· θέλει γὰρ γινώσκειν τὰς πέντε γνωστικὰς δυνάμεις· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐταὶ αἰσθησις, φαντασία, δόξα, διάνοια, καὶ νοῦς. David Prolegomena Philosophiæ, ap. Schol. Aristot., p. 14, b. 30.

† David, *ibid.*, b. 33.

‡ Eth. Nicomach., lib. vi, c. iii, p. 1139.

§ De la Réforme de l'Entendement. Œuvres, ed. Saïssset, vol. ii, pp. 280, 281.

|| Ap. Morell, *Crit. Hist. Phil.*, &c., p. 73.

division of knowledge: but whichever mode we adopt, we cannot, unless blinded by the partiality of system, fail to recognise that no single form will embrace all the specific characteristics of knowledge. To attempt, then, to restrict the sphere of human belief, and to limit the circle of valid knowledge merely to that which has attained, or is capable of attaining, a scientific or positive form, is the fallacy of mistaking a part for the whole, and is equally erroneous as to suppose, because some truths must be received by faith and are incapable of demonstration, that therefore all must be so. Both errors spring from the same defective view: the former is the error of M. Comte; the latter, that of the narrow-minded theology which generates an hostility between science and religion, by utterly denying the independent validity of scientific reasoning, and has led, as a consequence of the same fundamental sophism, to Comte's utter negation of religion itself, and his repetition of the assumption of his adversaries, that science and religion are incompatible with each other.

May it be permitted us here to remark in all humility, and without pretending to except ourselves from the censure, that these errors, and nearly all others connected with the abstruse questions regarding the foundations and characteristics of knowledge, arise from the almost hopeless incapacity of the human mind to contemplate in their coexistence and interdependence the complex multiplicity of natural phenomena, whence men are driven to seek for a delusive simplicity by a necessary exclusion of those data which refuse to be systematized, and to forget in the pride of their own labours that such exclusion has prevented the results obtained from being anything more than a partial representation and explication of the facts, and thus to mistake their imperfect systems for a complete, all-comprehending exposition. This is the great danger of scientific systems—a danger which justifies, if it did not suggest, Lord Bacon's reprehension of systematic science.

Having shown, by these general considerations, the invalidity of the exclusive claims of the Positive Philosophy, as a complete system or method of universal application, we proceed to examine more closely the characteristics of the Positive *Method* itself. The development of each individual mind being analogous to the progressive development of humanity, or the human mind in its totality,—a doctrine borrowed from Hegel, and true under certain limitations,—and the logical construction of science corresponding with its chronological improvement, a correct philosophy must rest upon a wide induction from the phenomena of human progress. Those stages, then, through which the intellect of humanity has passed, may be regarded as the

landmarks for determining the facts, and, consequently, the *positive* laws of philosophic advancement; and the goal towards which this progress tends, will exhibit the essential condition of a valid philosophy. In this manner M. Comte is led to the institution of the Historical Method of Philosophy, as it has been well termed by Mr. Mill; and from this method springs, by an easy and legitimate descent, that beautiful and admirable classification of the sciences, which even Mr. Morell acknowledges to be "unquestionably a masterpiece of scientific thinking, as simple as it is comprehensive."*

But the question next arises, What are the stages of historical progress? or under what general and characteristic heads may the successive conditions of the human mind, in its onward march, be appropriately classified? They are, according to M. Comte, those already discussed, and termed by him the *theological*, the *metaphysical*, and the *positive*. The whole of the fifth and nearly half of the sixth volume of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* are devoted to the proof of the justice of this division, which is there endeavoured to be deduced from an examination of the whole stream of human story. With this Philosophy of History, admirable as it is in many respects, singularly acute, ingenious, and sagacious as it nearly always is, we shall not concern ourselves in the present essay, as it would require too much space, and too seriously interrupt the continuity of our exposition of the system. But in the classification which it is intended to support, there is so much truth mixed up with a fatal leaven of error, that, even at the risk of some delay, we must stop to estimate its value. We might object that the terms employed are metaphysical in their application; that they extend to a whole period that which is but partially characteristic of it; that they are indistinct, uncertain, and inapposite; and that they rather convey such meaning, and just so much, as the loose imaginations or the prejudices of the reader may be disposed to attribute to them, than any determinate idea. But, though much might be appropriately said upon these points, we are not disposed to avail ourselves of any arguments having the semblance of a quibble in the discussion of so important and vital a feature of the Positive Philosophy, or in the confutation of an author for whose sincerity and profundity we entertain so high an admiration as we feel for M. Comte's. We shall, therefore, endeavour to estimate the value of the ideas rather than of the terms; to show in what respect they are vague and shadowy, even as conceived by the great founder of the system; and to detect the germ of subsequent and consequential fallacies in this very obscurity.

* Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., p. 356.

M. Comte says,* that the attraction of an unlimited empire over the external world, considered as designed for man's use, and linked to his existence by intimate and continual ties; that the chimerical hopes and exaggerated ideas of the importance of man, which are incident to the earliest ages of society, give birth to theology and the theological character of all knowledge or speculation in those ages. We would deny the existence of the causes alleged, and the connexion between the assumed causes and the supposed effects. M. Comte has represented the retrospective judgment of the philosopher, looking back from the vantage ground of modern science, on the primitive condition of society, rather than the feelings of the society itself: he has learned the destiny from the event, and attributed the same knowledge as an anticipation present to those who commenced its fulfilment. The history of the early ages of humanity, and the early condition of societies, represents them as possessed by sentiments utterly at variance with these views. A crushing, despondent subjection to the unseen powers of nature; an unquestioning belief in a supernatural decree; an indisposition to look into the future, and a reckless contentment with the present; a belief in the almost hopeless inutilty of human effort, and the absolute dependence of man on supernatural authority; a humiliating sense of individual insignificance—such are the characteristics of the earliest centuries of humanity of which tradition or history gives us an account. We can readily conceive how such feelings as these might generate a blind, unreasoning theology, with which they would certainly be in harmony; but we cannot, in the slightest degree, comprehend how the theological character of early times could arise out of the causes supposed by M. Comte. We admit this theological character, though we think it requires to be guarded with precision; but we think it is due to the simplicity of the rude and uninformed mind, susceptible to all the terrors and impressions of the natural world, and the unstilled murmurs of the mystic voice within, still unweaned from its divine original, which gives birth to the religious character of these times. It is the vague, undefined mystery of confused feelings, struggling to realize and embody itself in the world without, which gives rise to that low type of religion which M. Comte not inappropriately terms fetichism; for, in such ages, man humbles himself before the god whose presence he beholds in the cloud, the sunshine, or the shower, and whose anger he hears in the thunder and the tempest. The great secret, however, is that then the mind of man, and his wild untutored nature, yield themselves facile to his instinctive impulses, which have not yet learned

to analyze themselves, or to clothe themselves in the barren precision of metaphysical expressions. Under these circumstances, all the relations of life, all the phenomena of nature, are supposed to be under the immediate governance or agency of supernatural powers. The human mind has not yet claimed its due participation in the changes which take place around it; and every action, even the simplest, becomes connected more or less with religious observances. Religion—a blind superstition, in great measure it may be, but hardly a theology—religion thus engrosses all of human life, claiming not merely what is its due, but what awaits the development of the human mind to become legitimately dependent upon other control. When this period arrives, religion is only relieved of the superintendence of a domain which did not rightfully belong to her,—not exiled from her own: her eternal rights remain unimpaired, though some temporary usurpations she may abandon.

It will thus be observed, that what M. Comte terms the theological state, or the theological period, is that in which an unreasoning superstition absorbs the whole domain of human intelligence, and perceives the imminent agency of the divinity in every phenomenon of nature. That there is such a condition, both in the progress of society and in the development of the human mind, is indisputable; but the abuse of the religious feeling is not religion, and a blind superstition is not theology, no matter how closely or how frequently it may appear to be connected with it. Let us add here also, *en parenthèse*, that theology presupposes metaphysics,* as it is the union of religion and metaphysics, the systematization of religious creeds and doctrines by metaphysical reasoning. The important truth contained in M. Comte's view is, that the faith which is essential to religion exists in excess in that particular state or era, and is equally characteristic of all belief; and that an immediate divine agency is then employed to explain everything, even those things which in more enlightened ages are justly referred to the operation of natural laws. The vital fallacies consist in confounding religion with its aberrations; in failing to perceive that religion, in a narrower or wider sense, is characteristic of all ages, and cannot therefore be assumed as the specific difference of one; and in supposing that its restriction within due limits is a virtual demonstration of its absolute falsehood and inefficacies.

We may make nearly the same observations in regard to M. Comte's conception of the *metaphysical era*, for the fallacies

* So recognised apparently by Aristotle and the ancients. Arist. *Metaph.*, v. i, p. 1026, a. 24, and Schol. Alex. *Aphrod.* ad loc.

involved are similar. The cultivation of the reasoning faculties of man soon brings him to the recognition of intermediate links of causation; and the difficulty of grappling with the shadowy forms of undefined causes, induces him to give a name and an independent existence to these causes. Thus arises the doctrine of entities, and the whole framework of the Realistic philosophy. The habit of mind producing these results, when it pursues its logical evolution to extremes, undermines the foundations on which religious belief is supported, by hypostatizing all things, and reducing all entities, even the being of God, to the mere creations of the human intellect. Thus it constitutes the transition stage to the entire negation of all religion. But observe, that these entities do not necessarily appertain to metaphysics, but are characteristic of only one form of metaphysical philosophy—Realism. It is true, that it is with great difficulty that the passage from Realism to Conceptualism or Nominalism is effected. It is equally true, though we need not dwell upon it here, that these other forms of ontology lead, in like manner, to scepticism, when developed to their ultimate consequences. But the point to be noted is, that the characteristics which M. Comte assigns generally to metaphysics are incident to merely one form of it, and cannot therefore be assumed as the properties of the science itself. It must be further remembered, that before religion is systematized into theology, it must be moulded into that form by union with metaphysics; and it might be shown, though we may not have the time to do it on the present occasion, that even science must be fallacious unless it rests upon a correct basis of metaphysics, and recognises its dependence thereon, so that even in the Positive state the concurrent existence of metaphysics is required.

We might again repeat nearly the same observations in passing to the consideration of the Positive state; but as the Positive Philosophy is the subject of this essay, their repetition is unnecessary, and we may safely leave them to be more particularly gathered from our general criticism, which must be deferred to the next issue of this journal.

ART. II.—LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

A Copious and Critical Latin-English Lexicon, founded on the larger Latin-German Lexicon of Dr. William Freund : with Additions and Corrections from the Lexicons of Gesner, Facciolati, Scheller, Georges, etc. By E. A. ANDREWS, LL. D. Pp. 1663. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1851.

LEXICOGRAPHY is a branch of literature of comparatively modern origin. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans had anything like dictionaries. Indeed, the terms *lexicon* and *dictionarium* are not found in the classic period of their literature. The *De Lingua Latina* of Varro, who bore the title of the "most learned of the Romans," (Cic. Acad. i, 2, 3,) is the nearest approach to a dictionary that we find. This originally consisted of twenty-four books, only six of which are extant, and these are imperfect, and injured in their value by numerous corruptions. Still the remains of this treatise are of much importance; for many terms and forms which would otherwise have been lost or have remained unintelligible are here preserved and explained. The subject of the first seven books was the origin of words and the application of terms. The plan which Varro adopted, of referring Latin words, as far as possible, to the old Italian dialects, instead of the Greek, was correct, and as applied by modern philologists has led to some very satisfactory results. But in carrying out his plan he seems to be guided by no philosophical rules, and falls into many absurd derivations. For example: *canis* is from *cano*, because dogs give signals by barking at night and in the chase, as trumpets give signals (*canunt*) in battle; and *agnus* (a lamb) is so called because it is *agnatus*, connected by birth with the sheep. Similar examples may be found on almost every page. Indeed, the Latin authors who venture into the province of etymology often suggest very improbable derivations.*

The first that can properly be called a dictionary of the Latin language was the *Catholicon* of John Balbus, of Genoa, who died 1298. This contained between seven and eight hundred folio pages, and was first printed at Mentz, 1460, by Gutenberg. Several editions of this work were published. Though it was very imperfect, and contained many errors, yet it was not without merit, especially in terms relating to theology.

Calepin, an Italian monk, prepared a Latin dictionary, which was first published at Reggio, in 1502. This edition was so full of errors as to be of comparatively little value. It passed through quite a

* Thus Cicero connects *fides* with *fio*. (De Officiis, I. 7, 23.)

number of editions, and was so much improved as to become almost a new work. We have a copy of the edition printed at Basle, 1584, before us. It is a polyglot in eight languages. The first Aldine edition of Calepin bears the date of 1542.

The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* of Robert Stephens, the celebrated scholar and printer, was published in 1531. It was a work of great value. Two editions were subsequently published by the author, and in 1735 a corrected and enlarged edition was issued at London.

Facciolati, of the University of Padua, assisted by Egedio Forcellini, prepared an edition of Calepin, which was published in 1731. It was while engaged in this work that Forcellini projected a Latin lexicon on an entirely new plan; and to the preparation of the work, which bears his name in connexion with Facciolati, under whose direction it is probable that he acted in a great measure, he devoted the best energies of his life. He writes that he spent three years and a half on the letter A; and on the whole work he spent forty years. At the close of the preface he says: "By God's permission I have brought this book to an end; and now, if my life is granted to me, I shall re-read and then deliver it to another to copy." He read it a second time in two years. The copying occupied eight. Forcellini did not live to see it completed. Both the plan and execution of this work are admirable: its vocabulary is full, and it well deserves the name it bears, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*. The definitions are precise, their classification systematic and philosophical, the citations of authorities are abundant, and arranged in chronological order.

Very soon after the revival of learning, the German scholars gave their attention to Latin lexicography. In 1571 Faber's *Thesaurus Linguae Scholasticae* was published at Leipsic. This was a work of much learning, and valuable for the time of its publication. It entered largely into geography, history, and mythology, as well as peculiar idioms and unusual constructions. Gesner published an edition of this work in 1726. About twenty years later, Gesner, taking the *Thesaurus* of Robert Stephens, correcting its errors, and making many additions, produced a lexicon of great value to the student and to subsequent lexicographers. His definitions are accurate, and his authorities abundant. The vocabulary is fuller than that of Forcellini. This *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* of Gesner was published at Leipsic, 1749, in four vols. folio. Scheller's *Lexicon*, which was published in 1783, was better adapted to the wants of students. The alphabetical arrangement is employed instead of the etymological. The whole work is carried out with

more than ordinary completeness of detail. It was for a long time in general use in the schools of Germany. A valuable Manual Lexicon was prepared mainly from this by Lünemann.

As we do not intend to write the history of Latin lexicography, we have omitted all notice of the labours of the English classical scholars in this department. Not that their labours were without some valuable results, but we only design in this sketch to refer to the lexicons that have furnished materials for those hitherto in use among us. Leverett's Lexicon, which has been in general use in our schools for the past fifteen years, was based on Forcellini, with additions from Scheller and Lünemann.

The publication of Freund's *Wörterbuch der Lateinischen Sprache*, marked a new era in Latin lexicography. This work is in four volumes, the first of which appeared in 1834, and the last in 1845. As it forms the basis of the lexicon we have placed at the head of this article, we shall notice somewhat at length the plan of the work, and the general principles upon which the author proceeded in its preparation.

No one seems to have had a better idea of what a Latin lexicon should be, in the advances philology had made, than Freund; and we may safely say that no previous lexicographer possessed superior fitness for the work, or had such abundant means for carrying out his plan. Other lexicographers had gathered materials, and some had systematically arranged them; but many new facts had been developed, and the general impulse given to philological pursuits in the early part of the present century, had brought about results that demanded, to some extent, new methods in lexicography.

A complete lexicon of the language, no longer spoken, of an intellectual and highly cultivated people, must be the product of the scholarship of different ages and different nations: for the lexicographer who designs to give the full history of every word of a language, will find it demands a range of inquiry for which human life seems too short, and that it requires a combination of qualities rarely seen in any one man. To define accurately the words of any language in the terms of another, requires not only extensive reading to be able to seize the exact force of the word, but also nice discrimination to express its meaning. Often it is not possible to find terms exactly equivalent in signification: and this difficulty is felt not only in those expressions which are idiomatic, but also in such as mark the peculiar mental character of a nation. Take the word *honestum*, for example. It often has a signification that can be expressed by no one English word: for *honourableness*, *honesty*, and *virtue* are defective renderings, not giving the full meaning. It

rather denotes whatever 'is becoming to a man, or moral excellence. It is said, that while the Greek viewed moral excellence under the aspect of beauty, τὸ καλόν, as was natural to their taste, the more grave Roman looked at it as connected with dignity and propriety.

Freund lays down in his preface the general principles of his work. He gives his views, 1, of the *idea* and *elements* of Latin lexicography; 2, the compass of his dictionary; 3, the method of handling the several articles; and, 4, the arrangement of the articles.

The object of the lexicographer is to give the history of every word of the language. "The history of a word consists in unfolding its outer nature, that is, its form, class, syntactical connexions, and the like, together with its inner nature or meaning." Since in all cultivated languages every word has not a form peculiar to itself, but belongs to a class of words presenting similar meanings and undergoing like changes; and as it is the province of grammar to classify the forms of words and mark their changes, the lexicographer is only required to designate the class to which a word belongs. Thus, when he adds *ae* to *mensa*, he uses a convenient abbreviation which renders it unnecessary to mention the other inflections. However, when a word deviates from the regular form, that should be noticed, otherwise the external history would be incomplete. This is called the *grammatical element of lexicography*. The word *capió* will illustrate the author's method of treating this element. Thus:—"capió, cepi, captum, 3. (a very old form of the *fut. exact.* capso, Plaut. Bac. 4, 4, 61: capsit, id. Pseud. 4, 3, 6; Att. in Non. 483, 12; cf. Fest. p. 44: capsimus, Plaut. Rud. 2, 1, 15: CAPSIS, acc. to Cic. Or. 45, 154, erroneously treated by him as if contracted from cape si vis; Quint. 1, 5, 66 Spald.—Old orthog. of the *perf.* CEPET=cepit, like EXEMET, DEDET, etc., Columna Rostrata.)"

As languages of much cultivation are made up of derivatives, it belongs to the external history of the word to show from what root it is derived. This is the *etymological element*. It is no easy matter for the lexicographer to treat this element satisfactorily. Compound words, and derivatives from simpler forms of the language, are readily disposed of. But scientific etymology aims to discover the origin of these simple forms. It becomes, then, a question of great practical importance to the lexicographer, how far he shall attempt to develop this element. The early etymologists seem to have no definite rules of procedure, and refer the words of one language to another most arbitrarily, from some resemblance in sound and signification.* But a more philosophical spirit pervades

* In Minshen's "Guide to the Tongues," ed. 1617, tallow is derived from *tollo*, to take away, because it is taken away from the flesh!

the new system; and the philologist, instead of accumulating hundreds of vocabularies to compare together, sits down to investigate thoroughly the whole structure of a single family of languages.

It was once common to refer, as far as possible, all Latin forms to the Greek. But later and more extensive researches showed that the Sanscrit was a language of high antiquity, and capable of explaining many Latin forms far better than the Greek. And yet the question of the Sanscrit origin of the Latin is by no means settled, for there are advocates for its Teutonic or German origin. Hence Freund thought he might be "called over-hasty if he allowed the Sanscrit or the German element to have the predominance." The course he adopts seems to be the only practical one.

The internal history of a word consists in giving its meaning. This is the *exegetical*, and the most important element of lexicography. Freund lays it down as a settled principle, that among the several meanings of a word, the one which has been obtained from its etymology should be assumed as the original. This has not, however, been generally acted upon by Latin lexicographers; for they prepared their lexicons generally for the study of works of a particular period of the language, and therefore gave prominence to that signification of a word in which it was most frequently used. They paid hardly any attention to the remains of old Latin—to the fragments of the Twelve Tables, the remains of Ennius, Pacuvius, and Cato; and comparatively little to the Latinity of Plautus, Terence, Lucretius, and Varro. Their sources of authority for the significations of words went back only to Cicero and Cæsar. Freund, on the contrary, introduces the oldest remains of Latin literature from the *Leges Regiæ*, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, down to Lucretius and Varro.

A second principle adopted is, that in the order of meanings the proper meaning, as the original, should precede the tropical, as the derived. In order to make clear distinctions it is also necessary to make subdivisions of the tropical meanings. An example will most readily illustrate this. *Arena* is used in four different senses in the following passages:—(1.) *Magnus congestus arenæ*, *Lucr.* 6, 724; (2.) *Missum in arenam aprum jaculis desuper petiit*, *Suet. Tib.*, 72; (3.) *Vectio Prisco, quantum plurimum potuero, præstabo præsertim in arena mea, hoc est apud Centumviros*, *Plin. Ep.* 6, 12, 2; (4.) *Quid facies, Oenone? Quid arenæ semina mandas?* *Ov. Her.* 5, 115. In the first passage it means *sand*, in the second the *amphitheatre*, in the third the *sphere of one's calling*, and in the fourth is a proverbial expression for something *unfruitful*. If these meanings were classed under the head of literal and tropical,

as the terms have hitherto been applied by lexicographers, we should have one literal and three tropical, thus: (1.) lit., *sand*; (2.) trop., (a) the amphitheatre, (b) the sphere of one's calling, (c) proverb., for something unfruitful.

Such an arrangement is clearly unphilosophical: for the meaning, *the sphere of one's calling*, is evidently derived from that of the *amphitheatre*; hence it is not co-ordinate with it, but subordinate, constituting a trope within a trope. In the second place, the derived meaning *amphitheatre* "has quite another relation to the simple one *sand*, from that of *one's sphere* to *amphitheatre*." In the first instance, the general notion, *sand*, is individualized into a certain sandy place, sandy path, &c.; but it is not taken out of the class of concretes. In the second instance, the concrete notion of *amphitheatre* is changed to the abstract one of a place of contest or exercise, sphere of vocation. This distinction between individualizing a general notion and spiritualizing a physical one, Freund considered to be of too much importance to be lost sight of in lexicography. He has therefore given to the signification arising in the former way the name of metonymic; to the latter that of tropical. With this distinction the first three senses of *arena* may be classed thus: (1.) lit., *sand*; (2.) metonym., the place of contest in the amphitheatre bestrewed with sand. Therefore (b) tropic., every place of contest, place of exhibiting any kind of activity, place of exercise, &c. And so *arbor*, used for *navis*, is a metonymy, since the physical meaning is individualized; while *calor* for *amor* is a trope, since the physical meaning passes into an abstract and spiritual one. The proverbial use of words is placed under the literal signification, for in classifying proverbial expressions lexicography and rhetoric must be guided by different rules. As the rhetorician takes into view the sense of the whole expression, he classes it with the tropical use of language. On the other hand, the lexicographer, having to deal with the single word, finds nothing in it to remove it from the sphere of the literal. Thus *arena*, in the proverbial expression *arenæ semina mandare*, has received no signification foreign to its literal meaning, as it has in the phrase *præstabo in mea arena*. In the latter instance *mea arena* cannot mean my sand, while *arenæ semina mandare* always means to commit seed to the sand.

In order to make the origin of some significations clear, Freund compares the usage of other languages. This is a department of lexicography that requires to be most judiciously handled; and in different methods in different languages. In a language whose literary monuments are few, some words may occur so seldom that the lexicographer cannot satisfy himself as to their true import without

reference to cognate languages. Gesenius, in his Hebrew Thesaurus, has pursued this course with most satisfactory results. We do not now allude to the comparison of corresponding forms, but to the illustration of words by the analogy of signification. This comparison is not to be confined to cognate dialects, for languages of a different class often furnish striking analogies. Thus אֵיִשׁוֹן, diminutive of אִישׁ (man), is used with עֵינָּה (eye), to denote the pupil, the apple of the eye, literally *the little man of the eye*. The Arabic, the Persian, and several other languages use equivalent terms. And somewhat analogous is the Latin *pupilla*, a diminutive of *pupa*, (a girl,) in its literal sense used to denote an orphan girl or ward, in its transferred, the pupil of the eye. Freund does not give this illustration, but he has a number like it. Thus *Calendæ*, (from *calo*, to call,) in the sense of proclamation-day, is compared with the Hebrew usage of קָרָא מִקְרָא; and the syntactical construction of *cavere*, even to the unusual form *cavere cum aliquo*, is illustrated by the analogous use of the Niphal of פָּחַד.

In some instances erroneous explanations have been corrected as the result of such comparisons. For example: *bidens*, as applied to a sheep fit for sacrifice, has been referred to *bis* and *annus*. Thus Facciolati, under this word, says: "Primo bidennis, *d* littera immissa quasi biennis a *bis* et *annus*." He also gives another view of its derivation, as if from *bis* and *dens*, and sustains its application to a sheep fit for sacrifice, by a passage from Higinus in Aulus Gellius (16, 6): "*Bidentes* hostiæ quæ per ætatem duos dentes altiores habent." Freund, however, says it is more correct to understand by *bidens* an animal for offering, whose *two rows* of teeth are complete, as פֶּה, *tooth*, in the dual denotes the two rows of teeth. Many other analogies are noticed which are interesting to the scholar, not as pointing to a common origin of languages, but as showing that the human intellect, in unfolding identical notions, falls into parallel expressions, even in languages most diverse in their structure. If the student will compare the various meanings of *cornu* with קֶרֶן, *vertex*, (from *verto*,) as applied to the top or crown of the head, with קֶרֶן, (from קָדַד,) and the expression *ferire fœdus* with בָּרַח בְּרִית, he will be struck with the fact, that in the diversity of language there is a certain unity in the operations of the human mind.

We consider the special attention which Freund bestows upon the historical development of the Latin language as one of the prominent excellencies of his lexicon. The Latin was not gradually and systematically unfolded from a single germ, as seems to have been the history of the Greek. The different tribes of Italy originally

used dialects doubtless having a common origin : and as Rome successively conquered these different Italian tribes, there would naturally be a gradual combination of these elements, the various dialects modifying the common language of Rome. After the Roman conquests in Southern Italy had made them acquainted with the Grecian arts and literature, the language received still greater modifications. Not only may we suppose that many words were borrowed from the Greek, but a new impulse being given to the cultivation of letters, the Latin tongue began to develop more symmetrically, and to be more carefully guarded from corruption. The results of this were not few nor unimportant. The language of the capital became the standard, to which every educated man must refer. The general principles of the language became settled, anomalies were no longer prevalent, and the foreign elements were united into a consistent whole.

In the time of Cicero the Latin language had reached a high state of cultivation : and to Cicero, more than to any other one writer, it is indebted for its copiousness. He brought into use many words of the old poets, that had become almost obsolete, and coined new words after the analogy of the Greek. Yet, while he increased the vocabulary of the language by a number of abstract and philosophical terms, he jealously guarded its idiomatic structure and opposed unnecessary innovations. Though in his philosophical works he was often obliged to have recourse to the Greek, from the paucity of abstract terms in his own tongue, yet the construction of his sentences is purely idiomatic, and very few Græcisms occur in his writings. His style is remarkable for its clearness ; and in his effort to secure this there is often a redundancy of expression, very different from the studied conciseness and pregnant brevity of Tacitus. But we ought to bear in mind that Cicero was writing upon philosophical subjects that were comparatively new to his countrymen, and that his perspicuity was carefully studied to avoid obscurity. He found that many of the views of the Greek philosophers could be expressed only by circumlocutions—that his own tongue was poor in philosophical and scientific terms. Even a century later, after the Romans had given more attention to philosophy, Seneca says, “I have never felt more sensibly than now the great indigence, or rather the abject poverty of our language. When we speak of the doctrines of Plato, a thousand ideas present themselves for which we have no name.” So that what has been called the diffuseness or too extended amplification of Cicero’s style, was a necessary result of the character of the language, and of the state of philosophical studies among his countrymen.

We attach much importance to the influence of Cicero in developing the resources and perfecting the structure of his native tongue, but we must consider it as reaching its highest point of cultivation in the reign of Augustus. The civil commotions that had preceded this period were far from being favourable to the general cultivation of letters. The camp and the forum were the fields that called for the efforts of the noblest intellects. But a change in the structure of the government produced great effects in literature. After the downfall of the republic, the administration of public affairs being entirely in the hands of the emperor and his creatures, men of genius, whose ambition in preceding times would have led them to seek for the high offices of state, devoted themselves to the pursuit of letters. This was the age of the first among the Latin poets, Horace and Virgil, when purity of diction and elegance of expression were especially sought for, and the Latin tongue, while it was free from the rigidity of its early forms, had not yet degenerated into the turgid and declamatory style prevalent in its decay.

Freund arranges the Latin authors into the following periods:—
 1. Ante-classical, extending from the oldest fragments to Lucretius and Varro. 2. Classical, from Cicero and Cæsar to Tacitus, Suetonius, and the younger Pliny, inclusive. 3. Post-classical, embracing the writers from the last period to the fifth century. Classical Latinity is also subdivided into (a) the Ciceronian, (b) the Augustan, and (c) the post-Augustan. The post-classical, notwithstanding the length of its period and the difference of its character during the progress of the decay of the language, is not subdivided. Only the term, "late Latin," is given to the language of the fourth and fifth centuries. According to this arrangement, every word—and, if its different meanings belong to different periods, each meaning—has appended to it the general remark *in all periods*, or the special one, *ante-classical, Ciceronian, Augustan, post-Augustan, post-classical, late Latin*. As it sometimes happens that words and significations current in one period have been disused in the next, and then employed again in the succeeding,* the terms ante and post-classical, ante-classical and post-Augustan, are attached to the signification of a word. An examination of almost any word will show with what fidelity and patience Freund has developed this element of lexicography.

And equally careful attention is bestowed upon the *rhetorical element*. The kind of composition in which a word is used is stated, whether in prose and poetry, only in prose or poetical, in the poets or in the higher kinds of prose, peculiar to the comic poets or

* Multa renascuntur quæ jam cecidere, cadentque

Quæ nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus.—Hor. Ars. Poet.

to the epistolary style. In no other lexicon have the technical terms of the language been so clearly marked. And this is a matter of especial importance in the Latin, for one of its most striking peculiarities is the prevailing use of concrete forms. The Roman mind was eminently practical, and the Latin is better adapted to represent objects of perception than impressions and emotions. As we have already said, there are but few abstract terms. Seneca complains that he can find no equivalent in Latin for the $\tau\omicron\ \delta\upsilon$ of the Greeks.

In the best productions of Roman literature we find many terms of art taken from the temple, the tribunal, and the camp, which have transferred their significations to other relations of life. As Freund says, "Many Latin words take a circular path in the historical progress of their meanings. From common, every-day life, they pass over into a definite practical sphere, and after almost losing their identity by means of the secondary notions attached to them, are taken up again by common life, and employed in quite another than their original import. Thus the word *arbiter* denotes, etymologically, an eye-witness. Together with this signification, which was in use in all periods and in all kinds of style, it obtained in the language of the law, even as early as the Twelve Tables, that of an *umpire*: from this legal sphere the poetry of the Augustan age adopted it in the sense of a *commander* or *master*, and imparted it in this sense to the post-Augustan prose."

The frequency or rareness of the use of a word is denoted by the terms, "*very frequent*," "*frequent*," "*rare*." This, which Freund calls the *statistic* element, can of course only reach approximate certainty; but in such words as we have had occasion to examine with this in view, we have been struck with the discriminating accuracy of the author. Words which occur only once, or which are used only once in a particular signification, or by a particular author, are specially designated. Of course it is hardly possible to decide in every instance with confidence.

In the arrangement of the articles of a lexicon different methods are pursued: some lexicographers, as Gesner and Stephens, adopting the etymological, and others the alphabetical. Freund follows the latter method, with only such deviations as the grammatical and exegetical element demand.

It only remains for us to notice how far the work we have placed at the head of this article, which purports to be "founded on the Larger Latin-German Lexicon of Freund," represents the results of his labours. At first sight it seems hardly possible that all of real value to the student in the four volumes of Freund, con-

taining about four thousand five hundred pages, could be comprised in the single octavo of the American edition. The real difference in amount of matter is not so great as the apparent; the German being printed in a very open type. Nor is there any systematic deviation from Freund's method. Indeed, in some particulars his plan is more fully carried out. All the definitions and philological remarks are retained, together with the references to Latin authors. The examples cited are retrenched by dispensing with such parts as did not tend to illustrate the particular signification for which the citation was introduced. Some citations of minor importance are wholly omitted. But in every case, both of omission and retrenchment, the full reference to the original Latin author has been retained; so that the student can readily refer to the author for the particular use of the word, and for the connexion in which it occurs.

It seems to have been the design of the translators not merely to give an English rendering of the German definitions, but to adapt them to the peculiar genius of our language, so as to furnish the student with idiomatic renderings of the Latin terms. One who is constantly using this lexicon will see how successfully this has been accomplished. In accuracy of definition and clearness in expressing the nice shades of meaning, which are among the peculiar excellencies of Freund, the American edition can be favourably compared with the original. In the treatment of the particles, Freund is confessedly superior to any preceding lexicographer. He most fully elucidates their various shades of meaning, and especially notes the force of the prepositions that enter into the composition of words. And these excellencies we find reproduced in the work before us.

But Freund is not faultless. He retains, in some instances, old and erroneous definitions, and in others admits new and incorrect ones—the result of too hasty conclusions. The editors have aimed to correct such defects, and have, we believe, generally succeeded. To do this it was found necessary, in some instances, to entirely remodel an article. We should have been glad if they had allowed themselves more latitude in supplying deficiencies in the original work. We have found some judicious additions, and we think the number might have been increased. Thus, among the ἀπαρ λεγόμενα might be placed *lureo*, a conjectural reading of Heinsius, in Hercules Furens of Seneca.* This reading is adopted by Bothe and also by Beck. That such a verb as *lureo* was once in use, seems probable from analogy. The adjective *luridus*, and the noun *luror*, appear, which could be referred to *lureo*, just as *lucidus*, *liquidus*, *lividus*, *timidus*

* *Concavæ lurent genæ*, 767 v. The common reading is *lucent*.

have the verbal roots, *luceo, liqueo, liveo, timeo*. That it is found only in this instance, need not be a reason for rejecting it. According to Dillenburger, there are seventeen ἄπαξ λεγόμενα in Horace. We do not find *reliceor*, although it occurs in one MS. copy of *De Officiis* (3, 15): *contra reliceatur*. As this reading is adopted by Zumpt and Bonnel, it is entitled to some consideration. Under *profugio*, the signification, *to flee from or before, to flee, to fly from anything*, is marked *post-Augustan*. But Cicero, in his oration *Pro Sextio*, (22, 50,) has *vim profugisset*. It is also said that *timeo* is not used with an object-clause by Cicero; but in his oration *Pro Roscio* (1, 4) we find *quo nomen referre in tabulis timeat*.* There are some other articles that are not as full in their treatment as we could wish: among them are *albico, copulatus exulco*, and *refragor*. But in a work of such a character, embracing so many thousand articles, we must expect to find some omissions.

As we have made almost daily use of this work since its publication, we are prepared to appreciate its excellencies. The thanks of scholars are due to the pains-taking editors who have so faithfully reproduced the merits of the German edition, and to the publishers who have issued the work in a form at once elegant and substantial.

ART. III.—DANTE.

1. *La Divina Commedia di Dante Alighieri con Spiegazioni tratte dai Migliori Commentarii e colla Vita di Dante*. DA GIOVANNI BOCCACIO. Paris: Firmin Didot Frères. 1844.
2. *The Vision; or, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise of Dante Alighieri*. Translated by Rev. HENRY FRANCIS CARY. Illustrated by designs by John Flaxman, R. A. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

SELDOM has a work gone through more editions in its native tongue than Dante's *Divina Commedia*; and our French publishers have, from the best of these—viz., the *La Minerva*, (Padua, 1822;) that of Ciardetti, (Florence, 1830;) and that of Nicolini and Bezzuoli, (Florence, 1840)—produced, by critical collation, an edition superior to any of them,—certainly the best specimen of the Italian classics within the range of our acquaintance.

Two translations of the *Commedia* have appeared in English. One, by J. A. Carlyle, a brother of the well-known essayist and historian, has been put forth in England, and immediately republished in this country. It is a respectable work, and had no other been

known, or had an inferior one preceded it, doubtless it would have received a high place among our translations of foreign authors. But it does not give us DANTE, and on this ground we lay it aside.

Cary's translation has been the work of his life. In 1797 he was at his task, and seventeen years rolled away before he completed it. The edition then published was small, and its readers were few. Some of them, with Coleridge at their head, called for another edition, which appeared in 1819; a third was issued in 1831; and in 1844 the present one was published. The translator, now grown gray in service at the library of the British Museum, has enriched this edition with the fruits of a life of study. Aided by such men as Thomas Carlyle and Darley, he has criticised his own suggestions, and reviewed and passed mature sentence on his former opinions. He evidently looks to this work as the monument of his reputation: and not without reason. The student, however versed in modern Italian, finds it no easy task to render Dante even in tolerable English prose; but Cary has executed the work in blank verse with a vigour and fidelity to which no other version in a modern tongue can pretend. The labour has, indeed, been to him a continual feast. "He has felt his individual recollections suspended, and, as it were, lulled to sleep amid the music of nobler thoughts." Conscious of his proud office in introducing to his countrymen the great Italian epic, he looks for his own reward in being named when Dante shall be admired by Englishmen. And such a reward he has most unquestionably earned.

No book, since the revival of letters, has received more attention than the "Vision" of Dante. It is indeed no wonder that the world pays good heed to its epics, for they form the noblest department of its literature. Of all artists in other forms—orators, moralists, historians, nay, even of poets, lyric, tragic, or miscellaneous—we may say, to use Dante's own expression, that they are all in the outer circles of art. The inner parts are more thinly peopled, candidates for entrance there being rare as the slowly-recurring epochs of entire social revolutions. We count but four as having, in the course of literature, risen to the first class of epic poets—Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Milton. Nor are we too exclusive. It is impossible for us here to discuss the individual pretensions of the crowds of fine poets who may apply for admission. Klopstock is a candidate for the place; but, besides that the detail of the "Messiah" is too tedious for any but German patience, the very conception of it is faulty. The story of the cross admits no burnishing from art, nor can men of letters improve what inspiration has pronounced sufficient. Camoens, with his many beauties, is too often servile. Such power as appears in many parts

of the *Lusiad* should never have been bent to minister to the crude taste of Portuguese or even of European society of his time. The true epic poet feels himself secure of approbation, because he has reached its permanent source in the depths of human nature. Confident that hence a stream of praise must sooner or later flow, he awaits quietly his time, seeking no adventitious fame, nor condescending to pander for present popularity. For his failure here, we condemn the author of the *Lusiad*. Ariosto is perpetually trifling; Tasso is deficient in character.

In the true epic rank, then, we place but four. The *Iliad*, the *Æneid*, the *Vision*, and *Paradise Lost*, exhaust our catalogue. And this scarcity is unavoidable. To the epic poet must belong a mind of such endowments as are not often allotted to man, and the spirit of the age must be fitted to stimulate such a mind to its utmost. When these conditions exist together, there may be an epic: the former without the latter may produce excellent poetry, indeed, but not of this highest rank. Homer's inspiration was the universal idea of his age—gods and demi-gods mingling with men in human form, and with household language; Virgil was moved to song by the sublime spectacle of the world resting in solemn slumber on the arm of a Cæsar; Dante touched his harp when life and order were emerging from the social chaos of deluged Christendom; and Milton arose when liberty was gilding earth's hilltops with its new-born radiance. Each found inspiration in his time.

The epic, therefore, becomes a key to its age. In modern science, the comparative anatomist takes from the rock a fossil, and determines the frame of which it is a relic. He goes farther, and from this as a type, he depicts the forms and habits of contemporary monsters, peopling with corresponding natures the primeval landscape. So from the true epic the critic reads the entire character of society at the time when it was produced—its laws and institutions, its progress in refinement, the manners and thoughts of public and private life. What copious schemes of history have been filled out to fit the framework of Homer's historical allusions! True, we may, through his medium, sometimes see things obscurely—"men as trees walking"—but without him all the period now partially enlivened, would be an unpeopled desert, wrapped in a gloom as profound as covers the kings before Agamemnon.

Epic poetry has another characteristic. It combines nearly every other style of composition. Other poetry exhibits one form, this all the forms of feeling. The epic poet must glow in description, must melt in love, must sting in sarcasm. He must reason, declaim, and criticise. Other writings may give a single picture of life—the epic

must furnish a gallery. Is it strange that such talent as it requires is rare—that to the honours of its first rank but four are really admitted?

In turning our attention especially to the great author before us, we must first glance at the spirit and history of his time.

When the northern deluge prostrated and overwhelmed the Roman Empire in the West, one part of it, the municipal towns, appeared to offer substantial resistance to its fury. The hordes might sweep and pillage them, but their pent-up walls offered to barbarians no inducement to a permanent residence. They had too recently been the denizens of wide plains and forests, to relish the confinement or the pursuits of the towns. If, then, these were plundered, the frightened inhabitants soon returned, and their industry repaired the devastation. Clustering around the ruins, they plied the arts or practised commerce, until, by degrees, their streets were rebuilt, their walls restored, their prosperity re-established. But these towns gradually became not only the seats of opulence, but of patriotism and refinement, and the meanest burgher felt something of the aggregate dignity of his city. A spirit of life and enterprise, which afterwards led to voyages of distant commerce and discovery, pervaded all ranks.

It was beyond their limits that the *dark ages* were in reality found. There the feudal landholders, the descendants of the conquerors, lived in gloomy seclusion within their fortresses. At the foot of the castles were the villages of the serfs, the humble tillers of the soil; and often in the same picture might be seen some convent, to which the chieftain gave patronage, in return for the keeping of his conscience, and the absolution of his sins. These barons were absolute despots, and their power was supreme up to the limits of the towns. Clad in steel, they could ride with impunity over the ranks of the burghers; holding the soil, they could cut off their supplies, and keep them hemmed within their gates. The towns, at first, as might be expected of a weaker party, sought alliances with the landed nobility.

In the progress of events, however, the scale began to turn. Commercial wealth outweighed lands and castles, and freemen proved superior to vassals. If the cities furnished no lances of their own, adventurers from the north were glad to enter their service. Situated happily for trade, they accumulated what has been, in every age, "the sinews of war." Now the nobility became the party out of power, the ones to sue for alliances, and offer concessions; and so plain was this, that at one time, in the middle of the eleventh century, there could be found, of the Italian nobility, only the Marquis of Montferrat, who had not submitted to some town, his rival.

The inhabitants of these cities had liberal views of the arts, and honoured the success of artists. They were vigilant, enterprising, skilful in business, patrons of letters, lovers of liberty, and jealous of its infringement. Here their good qualities terminate, and the reverse of the picture is gloomy. The student will recognise, in the history of these cities, that of Greece previous to Philip; for, though the lapse of centuries and the waves of the Adriatic separate the theatres, and the Italian actors are less illustrious than the Grecian, yet the tragedy throughout is the same. Hatred, jealousy, and atrocious revenge, are the ingredients of every character. Feuds, springing often from false or trifling causes, revolve within feuds, and faction subdivides factions, the small and great being alike implacable. Does one city triumph over its weaker neighbour? The latter is perhaps razed, and its inhabitants reduced to a state little short of helotism. So Milan treated Lodi in 1111. Does a sedition prevail in a city? Its adversaries are put to death or banished—having lost their property—to nurse their wrath and await their time of vengeance. Are the parties of equal strength? They waste each other in a struggle of irreconcilable animosity.

Such was the state of Italy from the tenth to the fourteenth century. The great parties were the Guelphs and Ghibellines—the adherents, respectively, of the Church and the Emperor. The Guelphs were the natural Italian party; but many opposed the claims of the pope, and many more loved the protection of the German crown. From these causes, the Ghibellines gained adherents in every city—in some, even the majority. The Guelphs were torn with dissensions, and the enmity of the black and white Guelphs was as merciless as that between both and the Ghibellines.

Before leaving the politics of Italy, which we have traced thus far, in order to make Dante's fortunes intelligible, we may glance at the peculiar character of the Italian patriotism. Each man gave his whole heart to his city, while, perhaps, half of its people were his deadly enemies. The sound of its name awoke in him, at once, the keenest emotions of tenderness and vengeance. Thus Dante sheds a patriot's tear at the sound of "*la bella Firenze*," while vengeance clouds his spirit, even in the depths of eternal light, as his thoughts rest for a moment on her citizens. We may see, too, why this land is,

"Conquered or conquering, still alike a slave."

And, indeed, if Italy is, in our day, to be free from both the triple and the iron crown, she must first become—what for more than a thousand years she has not been—a unit.

The last scholar of the ancient world was Boethius. At his death, beneath the relentless hand of Theodoric, though he were not to be ranked with those who had preceded him, we date the extinction of literature; for henceforth the language of Cicero and of classical learning were silenced. The northern hordes despised what they had neither leisure nor inclination to acquire. The clergy, by their prejudice against profane literature, completed its overthrow; the monks alone, with humble industry, collected and hoarded its ruins. Learning had sunk to reappear; but what prophet could have foretold the place of its rising? Not on Greece or Italy, but on the Ultima Thule of its former territory, did it throw the early beams of its second dawn.

The monasteries of Ireland, even before the end of the sixth century, drew students from the continent, and sent teachers thither. Under the care of Theodore, the first primate of England, learning flourished. Bede and Alcuin soon after did it essential service: the latter, passing over to the continent, contributed effectually to its establishment in the empire of Charlemagne. Aristotle and the scholastic philosophy gradually gained the attention of ecclesiastics. Meanwhile, from the fertilizing dust of perished literature, there was springing in the south a new species of composition. Provence led the way in developing the poetical capacities of a native dialect; France, Castile, and Italy followed.

This employment of vernaculars is an era in literary annals. The Provençal dates from William Duke of Brienne, in 1096; the Spanish, from the Cid, in 1150; the Italian, from Dante, in 1304. These are the leading dialects of the Latin, derived from it mainly by marking oblique cases with particles rather than endings, by modifying *ille* and *unus* into articles, and by dropping or making silent the verbal terminations. Two of these dialects, it will be noticed, containing as yet no literature but poetry, had appeared when Dante arose. Even he, at first, reluctantly attempted the creation of a language for his use, since few Tuscans had thought of such a thing as possible. Happily, however, he laid on a master's hand, and fixed the sweetly noble dialect of Florence. His workmanship was often rough, and many of his words have since been discarded from the language; but it was effective, and its best monument is the *lingua Toscana*.

Much obscurity hangs over the life of our poet. Boccaccio, who lived near his time, is the worst of biographers; giving rhapsodies for facts, and for incidents, epigrammatical comments on his own conceits. Other writers, Aretino and Vollutello, have done better.

There was a brave knight of Florence, who fought under Conrad III., and perished in the holy wars. This knight, Cacciaguida, hav-

ing married one of the noble family of the Alighieri, his descendants adopted their maternal as their family name. The name Dante, generally supposed to be an abbreviation of Durante, Boccaccio claims to have been conferred by a special providence; inasmuch as its possessor was to be "*di maravigliosa dottrina datore*"—a punning fancy that fairly represents its author. Dante was born in Florence, in May, 1265. Every burgher of the Italian cities was a soldier, and Dante was early inured with his fellows to every military exercise. His first literary preceptor, Brunetto Latini, was a man of reputation and of real acquirements for his time. By him Dante was initiated into all the learning then in vogue. Brunetto was a "greedy-tempered" man, for which he was afterwards assigned by his scholar to a place in hell, whence he dispenses to his pupil, *en passant*, much wholesome advice, which his own example pointedly enforces.

Very little is definitely known of our poet's history until after his twenty-fourth year. He appears to have studied with great credit in some of the universities of Italy; and it is claimed that he visited Paris, and even Oxford. One thing all allow, that he lost his juvenile heart at the tender age of nine years. His Beatrice, afterwards his guide through Paradise, was the daughter of Folco Portinari, a respectable citizen of Florence, and at the time of her conquest had not passed her own eighth year. Dante, as might be expected, now grew poetical. Boccaccio says that no one ever enacted the part of a lover better than he. His canzonets were touching and appropriate; his raptures at her smiles, his tearful sighings at her cloudiness or absence, were "*onestissimi*." But, alas! the halcyon days of human life are ever few! As our poet approached his twenty-fourth year, his "*donna eccellentissima*" died. Copious was his grief, and even his life was endangered by its depth and continuance. This sad event coloured the whole subsequent career of Dante. His dreams for this life were ended; the susceptible boy and ardent lover is known henceforth as the deep-feeling, melancholy, unforgiving man. He next appears as a soldier. At the battle of Campaldino, where the Guelphs with the Florentines, defeated the Ghibellines with the Aretini, he took a fearless part. In the next year he was with his countrymen in an engagement near Pisa, when they took from the Pisans the castle of Caprona.

Grief for Beatrice still weighing heavily upon him, his friends urged a marriage with a member of a family who were afterwards his most bitter political opponents. It was a matter of expediency; the lady of their choice had no place in Dante's heart. Some, at a loss to account for this, have tried to paint her as a Xanthippe.

This is wrong. She did not—probably no one could have done it—fill the place of the lost Beatrice; but she was a tender, faithful wife. She withstood the influence of her family, and was true to her husband in all his fortunes. She managed to rear, and even educate respectably, her children on the most limited means. Must so devoted a woman be accounted a savage in temper, to explain why her husband felt not for her the ardour of *first* love? If there be fault anywhere, it is his. What he says of her is, indeed, equivocal; yet, for a hundred years after, no one speaks of her as harsh or violent.

In 1300, Dante was made chief of the Priors, then the ruling party at Florence. The black Guelphs having triumphed over the white, who were, in secret, Ghibellines, the latter, with Dante, who had been suspected of favouring them in his administration, were banished from the city. From this hour he was a man of sorrows, an exile, and a wanderer. An attempt, on the part of the exiles, to restore themselves by force, failed, and Dante went to Verona, where he spent some years under the protection of the munificent Can Grande. Dependence was a cruel thing to his spirit. It mortified him to "climb the stairs of other men;" their "salt" was "bitter" to his taste. He strove again to obtain by entreaty what he could not get by force; and even took the desperate resolution of renouncing the Guelphs, and joining the Ghibellines under Henry of Luxembourg, hoping thereby to return to Florence. Every effort was vain. On leaving Verona, he wandered from one city to another, until a proposal for return was made to him by the Florentines, on the condition of a confession of ignominy and the payment of a heavy fine. Any offer, on such terms, he proudly rejected. He saw his rising fame. He declared that he would one day return

"In other guise, and standing up
At his baptismal font, should claim the wreath
Due to the poet's temples."

Bright visions of his future reputation now reconciled him to even an exile's lot. His last sojourn with Guido Novella di Polenta was his happiest one; for his patron was himself a poet, and could sympathize with another.

But his career drew to a close; and in July, 1321, the sorrows of his exile, and the gratulations of his fame, were hushed in death. Guido honoured his remains with a magnificent funeral. And now the Athenians of Florence awoke to the value of what they had so wantonly lost. More than once have their posterity petitioned for the ashes of their banished poet; but these, for more than five hundred years, have rested in their costly sepulchre at Ravenna, while

a cenotaph is the boast of ungrateful, too late repentant Florence.

In the summer of 1840, as workmen were removing a part of the ancient chapel of the Podesta, now long used by the Florentines as their city prison, a portrait was discovered in the plaster, purporting to be that of Dante. It might have been identified from Boccaccio's description. It represents a man of middle stature and solemn deportment; the eyes large and dark, the cheek bones prominent, and the beard black and curly. The original of the portrait was a man of few words, of inelastic temper, given less to mirth than to melancholy, often sarcastic, but always plain and prudent.

In reviewing the intellectual character of Dante, we cannot but wonder at his immense erudition. The treasures of classical learning, the philosophy of Aristotle and the schools, and the literature of the Church, were his own property. Towards whatever point he directs his attention, the resources of his mind, well marshalled and brought to bear, make his sweep irresistible. From the dim illumination which truth cast upon his age, it was not to be expected that he would always shun errors; and to judge him by the light of *our* day, would be uncandid. Suffice it that he was very far in advance of his contemporaries, as well as of his predecessors. His delighted countrymen almost regarded him as one of the "old prophets risen again;" and his titles, "*Il Divino*," "*Il Teologo*," testify their reverence. "It was as if, at one of the ancient games, a stranger had appeared upon the plain, and thrown his quoit among the marks of former casts, which tradition had ascribed to the demi-gods."

His moral character, also, must be judged with charitable reference to his time. He was a Catholic, and saw in the Church, which, with all its errors, then commanded almost universal acquiescence, the direct institution of Christ and his apostles. He believed that the spiritual authority of fathers and councils gave to its figments the sanction of inspiration. Deeply impressed that much in the Church was utterly wrong, he, with a true Romish discrimination, absolves *her*, and arraigns her administrators. He distributes popes and prelates freely along the gulfs and sounds of perdition, and inveighs against them with all the truthfulness and intense energy of a reformer; but spares the most abusive, as well as the most trivial, usages of the Church. Yet such has been the inconsistency of many good and earnest men, and such was for a while that of Luther. We may regret that such power as Dante displays was not exerted against the whole scheme of papal error; while we must grant that he did well, where he had no predecessor, in rebuking what he judged to be within the scope of human disapproval.

In private life his manners were pure, and, if we except his unforgiving sternness, in harmony with religion. How much of this single unpleasing trait must be pardoned, in view of an inveterate national constitution and habit, and how much may be resolved into a reasonable resentment, we dare not say. We can find but one act of his life,—his adoption of the Ghibellines,—over which it was suffered to cast a shade of dishonour. In his great work, he appears not more a poet than a teacher of sound theoretical and practical morality.

Besides his epic, he was the author of several prose works, famous in their time. Of these, a Treatise on Monarchy, and two books on the Common Use of Language, are in harsh Latin. The former is now of questionable value; the latter give a philosophical and comprehensive view of the rise of the vernacular literature. His best prose works are in Tuscan. One, the *Vita Nuova*, is a history of his love for Beatrice, containing many valuable things, particularly a plaintive and beautiful sonnet, written after her death. The *Convito* is principally devoted to a justification of his employment of the Tuscan, rather than of the Latin or Provençal; an excuse for which may to us appear needless, but the Tuscan, until he adopted it, had neither dignity nor compass. Of his lyric poems, some are sportive, but the greater part solemn and earnest. Their diction is often purer than that of the *Commedia*.

On this last production, however, rests Dante's fame. The criticism of ages has approved it, and it has given character to the poetry of modern Europe. The plan is that of an allegory, which often admits of both an historical and moral interpretation; and is often confessedly obscure, as, indeed, are all allegories, except the matchless *Pilgrim's Progress*. In the opening, the poet is lost in a wood,—Bunyan's "wilderness of this world,"—where, coming to a mountain, he is prevented from ascending by a beautiful leopard, symbolical of pleasure:—

"The hour was morning's prime; and on his way
Aloft the sun ascended, with those stars
That with him rose when Love Divine first moved
Those its fair works: so that with joyous hope
All things conspired to fill me—the gay skin
Of that swift animal, the matin dawn,
And the sweet season."

Other terrors awaited him: a lion, ambition, came against him so fearfully that

"All the air was fear-struck;"

and a she-wolf, avarice, appearing in his way, he sinks back in despair, when

"The sun in silence rests"—

a metaphor for darkness, which occurs again in the poem, and is copied in Milton's *Samson Agonistes*. The historical interpretation makes the three animals here introduced represent, successively, Florence, the king of France, and the court of Rome; but as this involution of allegories is dependent on the ingenuity of commentators, and is often fanciful, the reader of Dante need pay it no attention.

Virgil, commissioned by Beatrice, who is sent for this purpose by Divine mercy and a heavenly dignity, sympathizes with him, and offers to guide him from the wild by a path which shall lead through the abode of those who "invoke a second death," and of those who "dwell content" for their allotted time, "in fire." Hell and purgatory passed, he will resign his charge to a "worthier spirit," the description of whom is truly beautiful, who shall be his guide through paradise. The tuneful pair pass the gate of hell, the last line of whose inscription chills Dante's heart:—

"All hope abandon, ye who enter here."

They are met by

"Outcries of woe,
Accents of anger, voices deep and hoarse;"

which, with

"Palms together smote, that swell'd the sounds,
Made up a tumult that forever whirls
Round through that air, with solid darkness stain'd."

The dwellers here were

"Too bad for a blessing, too good for a curse;"

and while

"Fame of them the world has none,"

they never pass the border of hell, lest the "accursed tribe" should glory at receiving men of a respectable negative goodness to their company. Here they live, while

"Mercy and justice scorn them both."

Farther onward they find a crowd, among whom is Pope Celestine V., awaiting their passage across "the woful tide of Acheron," one of the few borrowed ingredients of the poem.

Beyond this are the spirits of those who have died "subject to the wrath of God," dwelling in the *regio propria* of hell. This is divided into twenty-three distinct compartments, comprised in nine

regions or circles. It may be presumed to require no small effort of genius to maintain even a tolerable interest throughout so attenuated and detailed a scheme; but in reading the *Inferno* the attention never lags. Every grade of guilt, from lack of baptism to treason towards benefactors, here receives its demerit; and offenders of every rank and time, from Sinon of Troy to Mohammed and Nicholas V., from the age of Homer to that of Dante, undergo the penalties of their crimes. Every variety of punishment—despair, remorse, “fierce heat and ice”—is employed in the different circles. The imagery employed has no parallel. The classical *hades*, the revelations of Scripture, and the boundless fancy of the poet, are all laid under contribution. At every step we are melted in pity or chilled with terror.

It may be a fault of the *Inferno*, that the writer, in order to people with different characters his numerous scenes, is occasionally forced to employ a minuteness of description almost grotesque. Usually, however, no writer uses fewer strokes than Dante. His Ugolino and Francesca cannot possibly be abridged, yet their portraiture is perfect.

The immediate and amazing popularity of this part of the work is attributable to a cause independent of its real worth. Italians of the thirteenth century figure in it. The Florentines saw their late rulers,—their characters vividly drawn, and their eternal state powerfully defined. The scholar beheld characters of his day, grouped with those from early and even fabulous history, according to general standards of merit. This interest, which pervaded Dante’s contemporaries, is lost to us; but there is enough in his masterly use of language, his life-like portraits, and his condensed sublimity of rhetoric, to interest and repay the reader of every age.

A noble company majestically moved through Limbo, composed of the classic heroes, the good Saladin, and all the unbaptized noble ones, who, dwelling in calm indifference,

“Spake

Seldom, but all their words were tuneful sweet.”

In the second circle he meets Francesca. She was the daughter of Guido of Ravenna, and was given in marriage to the lord of Rimini; but, charmed by the superior accomplishments of his brother, proved faithless, and being taken in adultery, was slain, together with her paramour, by her enraged husband. On being interrogated by the poet, she proceeds,

“As one who weeps and tells his tale. One day,
For our delight, we read of Lancelot—

How him love thrall'd. Alone we were, and no
 Suspicion near us. Ofttimes, by that reading
 Our eyes were drawn together, and the hue
 Fled from our alter'd cheek. But at one point
 Alone we fell. When of that smile we read,
 The wished smile, so rapturously kiss'd
 By one so deep in love—then he who ne'er
 From me shall separate, at once my lips
 All trembling kiss'd. The book and writer both
 Were love's purveyors. In its leaves, that day,
 We read no more."

Who does not detect in the abashed and delicate language of this episode the gem of Leigh Hunt's Rimini?

Passing through the various regions of hell, he finds the ninth circle to be its frozen zone—ice here replacing the fire of other circles. Among the traitors to whom this is appropriated, there is one worthy of special notice. Count Ugolino had betrayed a faction of the Guelphs in Pisa, but himself, in reverse of fortune, had fallen into the hands of Archbishop Ruggieri, who, though a Ghibelline leader, was the Count's personal enemy. Being given back by him to the Pisans whom he had betrayed, he, with two sons and two grandsons, was starved to glut their vengeance. He ceases from the ghastly retribution which he is inflicting on his foe, now his eternal companion, to tell a tale of horror unrivalled in any language. After their confinement, he says:—

"I wept not, so all stone I felt within.
 They wept; and one, my little Anselm, cried:
 'Thou lookest so, father, what ails thee?' Yet
 I shed no tear, nor answer'd all that day,
 Nor the next night, until another sun
 Came out upon the world. When a faint beam
 Had to our doleful prison made its way,
 And in four countenances I descried
 The image of my own, on either hand
 Through agony I bit; and they who thought
 I did it through desire of feeding, rose
 O' the sudden, and cried: 'Father, we should grieve
 Far less if thou wouldst eat of us: thou gav'st
 These weeds of miserable flesh we wear,
 And do thou strip them off from us again!
 Then, not to make them sadder, I kept down
 My spirit in stillness. That day and the next
 We all were silent. Ah, obdurate earth!
 Why open'dst not upon us? When we came
 To the fourth day, then Gaddo at my feet
 Outstretch'd did fling him, crying, 'Hast no help
 For me, my father?' There he died; and e'en

Plainly as thou seest me, saw I the three
 Fall one by one, 'twixt the fifth day and sixth.
 Whence I betook me, now grown blind, to grope
 Over them all, and for three days aloud
 Called on them, who were dead. Then fasting
 Got the mastery of grief."

The poet utters a terrible invective on the cruel Pisans, and passes on.

We feel a relief, as we arrive with him before dawn among the fresh breezes that play about the isle of Purgatory. A strain, too, of more cheerful verse, welcomes us to the region,

"In which the human soul, from sinful blot
 Is purged, and for ascent to heaven prepared."

The inmates of purgatory suffer indeed, but "dwell content in fire;" for hope, assurance, beams in every heart. They know that they shall issue forth to eternal life; they feel that each pang purifies, each toil brings them towards their goal. They live quite like Protestant saints on earth, rejoicing that

"Their suffering time will soon be o'er;"

or, perhaps, like the elect of a certain creed, fail they cannot, prevail, at some time, they surely will; therefore they make tolerable shift for the present. A very fair place is purgatory; and one of its inmates, Casella, an old friend of the poet, would entertain him by singing one of his own canzoni,—

"Love that discourses in my thoughts."

But here stern Cato of Utica, who, though unbaptized, is here, by special commission, to introduce our wayfarers, bids him better mind the dignity of the place. Occasionally an impatient soul importunes Dante to procure additional prayers and pious acts from its friends on earth, in order to hasten the time of its release.

A greeting given to Virgil by a fellow Mantuan, goes to the heart of the poet, as it reminds him bitterly of his own state, an exile, driven from his home by his own citizens. He breaks out against the ruinous factions of Italy and Florence, comparing the latter to a poor wretch who

"Finds no rest upon her couch, but oft
 Shifting her side, short respite seeks from pain."

As they proceed, the discourse turns on the different modes of violating the laws of Christian morality, pointed illustrations of which are constantly occurring, while characters illustrious for the opposite of such vices, are mentioned by way of praise. Kings and

hermits, the great and the humble, appear here as their respective moral characters require them to be placed. The poet summons them with earthly differences laid aside, and nods them with unflinching discernment to their appropriate stations, forming of them a splendid historical gallery. Warmth and glow increase in the poem, as we draw near the terrestrial paradise. Objects of lustre gleam in the growing light, fair young forms appear, and strains of melody float on the fragrance of zephyrs. The terrestrial paradise is not unlike the land of Beulah.

Virgil now resigns his charge to another being, Matilda, who guides the poet through scenes that we will not mutilate, until he finds Beatrice. The sight of her awoke his "ancient love." The long-restrained influence that had thrilled his boyish heart in the halls of Portinari, streamed anew on his spirit. His vision faltered, and he would have hid himself; but Beatrice chided and encouraged him—still he could not lift up his eyes. A choir of virgins carol out a prayer:—

" 'Turn, Beatrice,' was their song; 'O, turn
Thy saintly sight on this thy faithful one,
Who, to behold thee, many a weary pace
Hath measured. Gracious at our prayer vouchsafe,
Unveil to him thy cheeks, that he may mark
Thy second beauty, now conceal'd.' "

A draught from a heavenly stream gives him power sufficient "for mounting to the stars."

The Paradise is the feeblest of the divisions of the Comedy. We think the reason lies in the subject, rather than in the poet. It is a law of nature that sweet things pall the sense. A succession of terrors keeps us awake, while we grow weary of the unalloyed beautiful. The sweet draught must be relieved by an ingredient of bitter, or it loses its relish. To maintain a high interest throughout a poem of thirty-five cantos, filled with forms of unmixed happiness, is beyond the capacity of any human genius. The *Inferno* seizes on the heart by the two great emotions of pity and terror. It brings at every step some new and startling object of sympathy. There is no repetition, there is no stagnation: it is the master-piece. The *Purgatorio* sends forth the cheerful influence of hope. We see pain alleviated by the certainty that each moment diminishes its duration. Amid the groans of toil, we fancy that we hear the infant accents of praise. Over the gloom of sins unforgiven, we see the dawn of peace, of pardon, and of heaven. But in the *Paradiso* we are affected by contentment alone. The pleasurable emotions which arise at seeing felicity made perfect, admit of few varieties. We gaze,

we are pleased; but our complacency becomes fatiguing,—we are restless, and wish to avert our vision. Dante has exhausted his subject. Nothing could have been done, which he has left undone; yet, before we finish reading it, a sense of satiety comes over us. Still, had Dante written nothing else, the *Paradiso* would have established for him no common fame. The first seven cantos are a constant flow of soft and brilliant poetry. No language can furnish their superior. They are gentle without being sluggish, and tender without being feeble.

As he proceeds on his way, the saints whom he meets explain to him the rites of the Church and the mysteries of faith and providence. Cacciaguida, the knight already named, recounts to his descendant his own history and that of his native city, and advises his future course. Firenze, that loved, yet hateful name, comes in once more, while stern remembrances darken the exile's heart, even in the glories of the heavenly vision. His spirit nowhere forgets its burning wrongs. Still he ascends, and the Church triumphant bursts upon his view; its glorified Lord pouring the full beatitude of his presence upon the faithful, toilworn host. Farther on, St. Peter catechises him on faith, St. James on hope, and St. John on charity. They are satisfied with his answers, at which he takes courage to hope that he shall one day prevail over the cruelty

“That bars him forth
Of the fair sheepfold where, a sleeping lamb,
The wolves set on, and fain had worried him.”

St. Peter adds the weight of his own authority to what saints of less degree have already abundantly said; inveighing against the prevailing wickedness of prelates and priests, from his own representative in the Vatican down to the humblest curate.

Beatrice finally takes him into the empyrean, and shows him, at one grand view, the blessedness of angels and perfected saints; then she resigns him to St. Bernard, who inducts him into the climacteric of mysteries, that of the Holy Trinity:—

“Here vigour fail’d the towering fantasy,
But yet the *will* rolled onward like a wheel,
In even motion, by that love impell’d
Which moves the sun in heaven and all the stars.”

The Vision is concluded. We may be pardoned for passing the other works of Dante with no other criticism than has already been given.

His claim to originality deserves more notice, inasmuch as it has been often and closely questioned. That he has borrowed much

from Virgil, is not denied. The fate of his suicides, for instance, is clearly taken from the Polydorus of the *Æneid*. Some other features of the scenery of *Inferno* are also borrowed. Much of the Vision has been attributed to the *Somnium Scipionis* of Cicero. But by far the greater part has been credited to the Vision of Alberico, a monk who, two hundred years before, had seemed to behold the mysteries of the future worlds.

We do not claim that Dante employed an entirely new method of communication, or ventured upon wholly untried subjects, or introduced perfectly unique conveyances of thought. We claim, however, that if the conception be not novel, yet the grand and magnificent outline, the tremendous and unparalleled framework, the unwearied train of appalling or lovely, terrific or tender images and incidents that fill it up, the prodigious and comprehensive erudition that displays itself on every page—these are Dante's own; and they constitute him an original poet. They who expect more than *these* from an author, before they consent to rank him among creative minds, expect what Shakspeare, perhaps even Homer, cannot furnish. They seem to seek, without knowing it, an intellectual monster, not a man.

It is no small proof of Dante's merit, that he has filled so large a place in the world of letters. We have remarked his influence on his native language. Soon after his death, Florence established a professorship to expound his poem; and Boccaccio, the first poet of his age, was proud to occupy the chair. We think that no Italian poet can be found who does not exhibit traces of Dante—some marks to show whom he regards as his master. No writer has so affected English literature, as has Dante that of Italy. Nor was his influence confined to the south of Europe: Milton and Chaucer worshipped at this shrine, and culled many a gem from the writer

“Whose rhetoric so sweet enlumined Italy.”

Later still, German research has found a rich field for its toil in the Florentine's pages. Such influence must have a source adequate to its issue, and that source is the work

“With which all Europe rang from side to side.”

In every part of the work appears the author—in hell, in purgatory, and in paradise—the same searching student, the same tender, melancholy, unforgiving man. A person of different temperament would never have written the Vision. To compare him with Milton, is a work to which the accurate judgment of Macaulay has been incidentally directed. The decision of the English critic is brief,

and it seems to us unfair. He had Milton in his vernacular. Dante, if we may judge by a quotation in his essay on Milton, he seems to have known, either by an imperfect acquaintance with Tuscan, or by a bungling prose translation. Now there are two methods by which the sublimity of Dante may be reached. One is, to think and feel with him as Milton did, in his own rich tongue—a work for which few have leisure or inclination; the other is, to read Cary's translation, the fruit of a long life's toil, and of a genial sympathy with the poet and his times. We cannot see that Macaulay has employed either mode. In the true sublime, Dante is inferior to Milton. He has nothing equal to Milton's Satan. Yet he falls short only a little; the *Inferno* is full of a well-sustained sublimity. The sublime in Milton is often like the deafening peal, which ceases, and we breathe again; in Dante, it is like a heavy roar, varying its tone, but never parting with its strength. If Milton is more impressive, Dante is more copious; if the former has a loftier, the latter has a stronger and more even flight. The fertility of the one could not sustain the *Paradise Regained*, the latter keeps up an equal interest through nearly a hundred cantos of his poem. On the whole, we think that in originality and fertility of mind, Dante is superior to Milton; while in true sublimity and poetic power, he is below him.

Among the ranks of feeble men that filled the earth in the thirteenth century, one reared himself like the forms of earlier times, and Homer and Virgil had a companion. Farther down, Milton arose, a companion to the three. When shall we see the fifth? We shall see men of science, of art, and eloquence; we shall see bards of honourable fame; but we may wait long, yet never see another of the great creative minds—the true epic poets.

ART. IV.—METHODIST PREACHING.

WE sit down, in a somewhat desultory mood, to pen some thoughts for the leisure reading of our Methodist patrons, and our ministerial brethren in particular, on the subject presented in the above title. We consider the peculiarities of Methodist preaching as not a little distinctive of our history—as important denominational characteristics. Their very importance, however—the boldness of their relief—has rendered them obvious and familiar; while, then, we offer our readers other articles sufficiently elaborate, we may in this indulge, perhaps not without advantage to them and ourselves, in the freedom of spontaneous reflections—reflections which, though

cursorily uttered from the heart, may not be without their lesson.

The old Methodist preaching! We do honestly confess a sort of pride for its noble naturalness, its moral power, and the grandeur of its results, and somewhat of a tinge of denominational bigotry in favour of the unadulterated preservation of its essential qualities. If that apparatus is best which best accomplishes its ends, who will say that Methodist preaching has not been the best preaching extant in our world for a hundred years? Denominations which had been in the American field a hundred years and more before Methodism had an adherent; denominations having the essential truth, and an educated ministry, and traditional prestige, and the influence of popular respectability, have been left a century in the rear of Methodism; and some of the single annual additions of the latter have equalled the whole numerical strength of the former. This is a point to be touched delicately, we know; but we would here hold in abeyance our aforesaid bigotry, if possible, and present the striking fact as full of significance, not to gratify our denominational vanity, but to teach us an admonitory lesson; for let us be assured, that the *preaching of the word is the great means of evangelization in the earth*, and that the peculiarities which have given pre-eminent success to our preaching should be held with an unyielding grasp.

Doubtless our denominational progress is attributable to a great many conditions, but our preaching has been the chief one; it has been related to, and has empowered all others. Suppose we had had our itinerancy, and even our wholesome doctrines, but a stereotyped, lifeless, however refined, preaching—a ministry with even the culture of education, but heartlessly lisping manuscript essays from appointment to appointment—would our cause have broken out on the right and on the left, overwhelming the land, as it has through the labours of the men who have made it a glory in the world? And does any one doubt, that if all the Christian preaching of the earth were conducted in the same style of directness, energy, and unction that these men used, the gospel would overflow the world, as Methodism has so rapidly its own immediate fields in Great Britain and the United States? Notwithstanding all the drawbacks which the sectarian delicacy of such illustrations must present, even to many not over-fastidious Methodist readers, yet the actual force of them is felt immediately and conclusively. Turn all the pulpits of Christendom into such batteries as were the original pulpits of Methodism, and the evangelic combat would soon resound through the world. Hesitate as we may at the apparent boastfulness

of the remark, we Methodists who have known that ministry, feel "the full assurance of faith" in its truthfulness.

From the very nature of the subject, it is impossible for us to speak of it justly, without this apparent sectarian egotism. We must be permitted, therefore, to make another laudatory assertion respecting this ministry, namely, that it not only excelled in the legitimate results of the office, but has been marked by an unusual amount of genuine talent, using this word in its popular acceptance.

Taken as a whole, the English Wesleyan ministry is not only the most effective, but the most able body of men in Great Britain, and if we were to express fully our own personal opinion, we should add, in the world. They are the best sermonizers, and the best pulpit speakers (being, besides the Roman priests, the only extemporizers) in the United Kingdom; and if once in an age the Kirk presents a pulpit prodigy like Chalmers, or the Baptists a Hall, cases which admit of no denominational comparisons, yet English Methodism, in the number, if not in the genius of its "first-rate" men, has stood pre-eminent. More masterly minds have not been connected with the religious affairs of modern England than the Watsons, Buntings, Newtons, Jacksons, Dixons, Hannahs, and others who have managed the interests of Wesleyan Methodism during the last fifty years.

In this country, our ministry has never been destitute of masterly intellects. Asbury will yet be placed, if not at the head, yet among the foremost ecclesiastical characters in American history. Our early bishops, M'Kendree, George, Roberts, Soule, Hedding, have been men of the highest pulpit power—such power as results not merely from the moral peculiarities of Methodist preaching, but from commanding faculties and great personal characteristics. Meanwhile, there have ever and anon appeared in our pulpits rare lights, which have hardly found contemporary rivals elsewhere, such as Summerfield, Ross, Bascom, Ruter, Emory, Fisk, Olin, and not a few others dead or alive. It is our sober opinion, that if we take the aggregate of "first-rate" pulpit men of all American Christian sects, Methodism would be found to have decidedly the largest proportion. We speak not now of learning, but of great pulpit ability, and great personal traits.

It has not been for want of superior men that Methodism has not commanded more public respect; it has been chiefly because of its rigorous peculiarities, which have repelled the world, and adventitious circumstances connected with the social sphere, to which it has chiefly directed its labours.

The mass of the Methodist ministry has not been able to compare

with that of other sects in education ; but this is the only point (and we acknowledge it to have been a very material one) in which the comparison is disparaging to it. In natural talent, in sound Scriptural knowledge, in all the great traits of individual character, what body of men has ever surpassed them? "Their works do follow them;" and these are the best criterion of their capacity.

While, however, we unreservedly contend for thus much, we do not hesitate to admit that our claim may not have been equally high in respect to the lowest rank of the American ministries. With the exception of one or two other denominations, education has been a general prerequisite for the pulpit among American sects. This condition alone would be sufficient to preclude from them almost entirely a certain class of labourers, of which Methodism has availed itself with great advantage among the popular masses. While this class has perhaps been the occasion of a lower estimate of our ministry generally, it has really been no ground of comparison with other sects, as it constitutes a peculiar rank, almost entirely exceptional in their ministries. The question, as we have been reviewing it, is not whether taken aggregately, but taken proportionally, Methodism has had as competent a ministry, or, if you please, a more competent ministry, than other sects.

It would not be just for us to leave this admission respecting the very lowest rank of the ministry, without a qualification. We would not disparage it by saying that (with one or two exceptions) it is peculiar to ourselves. This is a fact, but it is no disparaging fact; on the contrary, were it demanded of us to say which class of our labourers has actually most extended Methodism in the land, and most peopled heaven with its converts, we should hesitate to award the honour to any other than this very class. Our world has need of such a class of evangelical workmen, and it will always have this need; and God grant that Methodism may always perceive the fact, and provide for it! We are known to all our readers as the advocate of education and ministerial improvement, but we should consider it most consummate impolicy—an act of ecclesiastical *felo de se*—for Methodism to adopt any exclusive standard of ministerial qualification. Let it have its standard, and a good one, and constrain all to it whom it can; but keep also that discretionary liberty of judgment, by which Wesley founded the modern lay ministry, and without which Methodism would probably have been unknown as a distinct body at this day.

Now, what is the purport of all these remarks, trenching so much as they of necessity have had to, on the modesty with which collective, as well as individual men should speak of themselves? Have

they been written for self-gratulation, for invidious disparagement of sister Churches? Verily not; we have set out to present some views on the peculiarities of *Methodist Preaching*—peculiarities which we fear need to be somewhat renewed and vindicated among us; and we hope our readers will, with ourselves, deem these introductory observations on the character and usefulness of our denominational ministry, not irrelevant to the design. Let us now look at some of these characteristic peculiarities.

One of them, and doubtless the most important one, was the fact that the *saving elementary truths of the gospel were continually reiterated*. Our primitive preachers were great readers of the Scriptures, and of their own theological standards; their range of study was limited, but it was fertile. It afforded them resources for varied preaching, and they did preach variously; they had also provocatives enough to lead them into polemical discussions; but, whether preaching polemics or didactics, or pouring forth their favourite, general, and rousing exhortations, they had the happy art of mingling the essential doctrines of grace with all. Seldom did the man who was inquiring "What shall I do to be saved?" hear a Methodist preacher, without bearing away with him the precise answer. The lost condition of the soul by nature, repentance towards God, faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ, justification, sanctification, the witness of the Spirit—such truths seemed to make up the alphabet out of which the very syllabification of their discourses was formed; so that it may be said, with but little qualification, that whosoever heard an ordinary Methodist sermon, however casually, thenceforward knew most, if not all, of the doctrines of grace.

This very excellence may not have been without a fault—the excess of a good thing; but if faulty, its error was on the safe side. Considering, however, the circumstances of those times, the necessity of direct saving preaching, amidst the universal declension of piety, it may well be doubted whether this general uniformity was in any wise a defect.

There was a generousness, a sort of evangelical liberalism, about the subject-matter of the old Methodist preaching, which could not but inspire both the preacher and his hearers. It repelled everywhere the dogmatic restrictions which the prevalent creed had put upon the promises of the gospel. God had concluded all men in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all, was its affirmation, in the face of all teaching to the contrary. Where sin abounds, grace much more abounds, it asserted. Universal redemption, the universal help of the Holy Spirit, free, present, perfect, and eternal salvation for all men who would accept it—this was its

grand predication; and men bearing such a message could not but proclaim it as with the sound of trumpets.

There were, doubtless, many other elements of moral force in the preaching of our fathers, some of which we shall proceed to mention; but we cannot refrain from pausing here to put unwonted emphasis on the one specified. The saving truths of revelation are the great elements of moral power in the world. God's word is "God's almightiness" among men; and he that invests himself with its great essential energies, is the mighty man in the moral world. Michael or Gabriel wielded no mightier sword in the wars of the angels. If nine-tenths of all the dogmatic theology extant were at once extinguished from the earth, and the doctrines immediately related to conversion and sanctification were brought forth in our pulpits and religious literature with proportionately more fulness and frequency, who doubts that all the energies of Christianity would be redoubled? The early Methodist preachers, being mostly men who were powerfully converted from down-right sinfulness, went forth with their souls imbued and flaming with these powerful truths, and, with whatever inability otherwise, preached them in demonstration of the Spirit and power. The hardened multitude hailed them with shouts of derision; but listening, wept, fell often like dead men to the earth, and went to their homes praying, and exclaiming "These are the men who show us the way of salvation!"

As we prize our ministerial vocation, let us study well this example of our fathers, and learn well its lesson. Woe to us when the generalities or moralities of religion, however glorious, shall take the place of those direct, soul-quickening doctrines which were the chief themes of our first ministry.

So much for the main themes of Methodist preaching. We do not affirm that these were peculiar to it, but that this habitual reiteration of them was. Other ministries preached them; but it is, we suppose, quite generally acknowledged, that when Methodism went forth through the land, the stated ministries of the country dealt mostly in the general didactics of religion. When Jesse Lee entered New-England, a half century had passed since the last extensive revival—that of Edwards's day.

But not in its themes only was Methodist preaching peculiar: it was notably so in its *style*. Our fathers, more than any other modern ministry, preached *ad populum*. They came out from the people, and knew how to address the people; and the popular effects of their preaching, the great massive ingatherings of the people into their communion, are a demonstration of their power nothing short of magnificent—proof of character and capacity, above all polemic

tomes or literary demonstrations which ever proceeded from clerical heads. In referring to their *style* of preaching, we speak comprehensively, meaning not only their *verbal* style, but their mode of illustrating the truth, and their style of elocution; and in all these respects we have the presumption to say that, take them as a whole, they had more manly genuineness, more practical adaptedness, and therefore more effectiveness, than any other ministry since the days of the apostles. The sectarian egotism of this remark *must* be excused, for the fact is, to our vision, an outstanding one, and may be seen and read of all men, in the results of their labours.

In regard to their verbal style, we are prepared to admit the charge that they were generally unlettered, and therefore unprepared to present their public instructions with those traits of literary purity and elevation which education alone can confer, and which we acknowledge to be desirable in public religious teachers, both as befitting the exalted character of moral truth, and as an auxiliary means of the elevation of the popular taste. We would not, in the least, depreciate any genuine accomplishment which can be brought to the aid of religion. With the lack of literary polish, however, our early ministry had those advantages of the simple, direct, and often strenuous speech of the people, which educated men are too apt to lose, but ought not to lose in their professional diction. The true purity of Saxon consists not merely in its simple words, but also in a sort of colloquial facility and aptness of phrases, of sentences. Addison's contrast with Johnson is not in words only, but in their collocation. Now, what we would remark is, that the untutored style of our early ministry had this great excellence—this *colloquial directness and force*. And this is an inestimable excellence in popular address. It brought the truth not only to the hearing of the people, but to their comprehension; and not only to their comprehension, but to their interest. Men will readily fall asleep under the literary style of a manuscript sermon, but an earnest conversational style keeps the attention; it leads the mind of the hearer into a sort of interlocation with the speaker, and thus the truth insinuates itself into the conscience and the heart. This was the style of the Great Teacher himself.

Their mode of *illustrating* the truth was of similar character. Similitudes drawn, like Christ's, from familiar life, allusions to local or passing events, the thrilling anecdote—these were the staple of their expositions. We do not deny that in individual cases they were excessive, and became too characteristic, so as to change the preacher somewhat into the anecdote-monger; but such were exceptional to the general character of the ministry. While the great

mass of the itinerancy avoided this abuse, they traversed the land, wielding, in their homely, earnest speech and popular illustrations, a power over the common mind, compared with which the customary and more refined prelections of the pulpits of the day were only as the music of the piper compared with the wind abroad in its strength—the “mighty rushing wind.”

One of their characteristics, seemingly at first view a fault, but really a great excellence, ought to be more particularly noticed; we mean the almost general habit of giving *experimental illustrations* from their own personal religious history. The egotism which would seem to accompany this course under more stately circumstances, could hardly suggest itself to them or their hearers in the simplicity of their primitive assemblies—held often in barns, kitchens, school-houses, or under the trees of the forest. Studying the truth in their Bibles, these laborious men found its appropriate comments written by the Holy Spirit, as in lines of fire, upon their own souls; and when these comments were read aloud, with tears and sobbing adoration, the effect was resistless. How often, when the rest of the discourse has apparently failed of impression, have we seen the multitudes melt with emotion when these experimental attestations have been adduced! Such references to their own history, could not fail to kindle their religious feelings, and to spread an intense sympathetic emotion through their assemblies.

As to the oratorical style of the early Methodist preachers, much might be said, though we doubt not the phrase is looked upon at this moment, by some of our readers, with quite equivocal thoughts. None, however, share such thoughts who lived in their day and heard them often; we doubt, indeed, whether any such one now reads these lines who is not ready to affirm, that, whatever literary improvement may have since been made by our ministry, in genuine oratory it cannot now pretend to rival its earlier periods. We speak of the average ministry—there are exceptional cases of pre-eminence now, and there were then; but we doubt much whether the mass of the ministry now equals in genuine pulpit eloquence our preachers of thirty or forty years ago.

There was an unusual proportion of strong, stout-bodied men among them; their itinerant habits gave them robust frames, and trumpet-like voices; and their popular mode of addressing the masses, gave them the right command of their vocal powers, the right modulation and the right gesticulation. What preachers now extant among us surpass, in personal dignity and vocal power, Jesse Lee, Bostwick, Ruter, Beauchamp, Roszel, Merwin, Brodhead? Not only the dignified mien, but the sonorous and eloquent

tones of these men are remembered throughout the Church. The last of them, especially, was a noble specimen of manhood and oratory; he often preached on the final judgment, and usually with a dignity of bearing and a sublimity of voice which comported even with that lofty theme. Those who heard him could hardly have been more awe-smitten if they had seen the heavens fleeing away at the approach of the Judge; and often scores fell to the earth, and lay as dead men, while "the trumpet waxed louder and louder."

The naturalness, the colloquial facility of which we have spoken, were adapted to true oratory. Introducing their discourses thus, our old preachers usually rose with the subject to higher strains, until the sublimest declamation was often reached, and the awe-struck people wept or groaned aloud. There were doubtless faults about them, excesses of good qualities; but these defects were but exceptional, and were always preferable to the opposite ones.

The traits already enumerated tended to produce another characteristic, namely, *direct results*. Our fathers expected to see men awakened and converted under their sermons, and the expectation led to an adaptation of their discourses to this end. A sermon that had not some visible effect was hardly satisfactory, whatever might be the hope of its future results. It was usual with them to end the discourse with a home-directed and overwhelming application, and often to follow it immediately with exercises of prayer, that they might gather up the shaken fruit on the spot. Hence revivals flamed along their extended circuits. They were *workmen*, and workmen that needed not to be ashamed.

This aim at direct results was the secret of one half the success of Methodism—it is the explanation of most of our history. Men actuated and thrilled by such a purpose—how could they be otherwise than eloquent and demonstrative? It would make ordinary talents extraordinary, and convert weakness itself into strength.

Now take a corps of robust men, possessed of good strong sense, the vigorous vernacular of the people, staunch sonorous voices, and sanctified hearts, and inspire them with the purpose and expectation of *immediate results* from their labours, and you will have a specimen of the old Methodist ministry. How, we again ask, could such men be otherwise than eloquent and genuinely great? As a man thinketh, says Solomon, so is he; much more may it be said, as a man purposeth, so is he. Of the truly great men of the world we suppose it can be proved, that more owed their success to energetic purpose than to great faculties. One thing, at least, seems certain, namely, that good ordinary faculties being given, and a determined purpose added, success is certain, except where some adven-

titious obstacle, beyond all human control, intervenes. The will is a presiding, a pervading faculty. The other powers are individually independent, to a great extent. A man may have a strong imagination, and be an intellectual coxcomb; or a strong memory, and be a blockhead; or a cautious judgment, and be a granite post, at once as insusceptible and as immovable: but an energetic will seems related to all the other faculties, and energizes them all. There are exceptions, to be sure: the ass may sometimes be determined, but the hero is always so.

Bring a man, in we care not what position, whether a mechanic at his bench or a captain at the head of hosts, to concentrate his endeavours on one absorbing purpose, and you add to all his resources for that purpose an energy, which, if history is not wholly a lie, is more important than they all; and which, in some cases, when the destinies of states have impended, and all other resources have been confounded, has seemed like God's own fiat, to evoke a universe of means out of nothing. He *must* be the great man who manfully and persistently keeps his soul up to a great purpose. If even uncontrollable circumstances interdict to him great achievements, still his soul will be great within him.

Our fathers, like the apostles, had the sublimest aim possible to man—the eternal redemption of human souls. They made this an *immediate* work, and directed every energy to it. A sermon with them was not an entertaining exposition, to be heard by a self-complacent audience through a leisure hour, nor an expert polemical dissection, nor a didactic example of clerical scholarship: others could so preach, for they had qualified themselves for it; but the untutored, earnest-hearted Methodist ministry would have converted itself into a herd of ecclesiastical apes, by attempting to assume such a character. Preaching, on the contrary, was with them “sounding the alarm” through the land. They were as men standing on the heights of the shore, and crying out and pointing out to wrecked mariners the way to the land, amidst the tumults of the storm. What, under such circumstances, could they do with rhetorical expletives, with circumlocutory descriptions, or finical gesticulations? They would point immediately and energetically to the place of safety—they must speak in the directest and most urgent terms.

Now, though there is some qualification to be given to this description, though there were occasionally circumstances in which a different style of discourse was adopted and was suitable, yet we contend that this was the usual character of the old Methodist preaching, and also that it is the legitimate style of the ambassador

of God—that it is not only what the moral wants of the world demand, but that, more than any other mode of preaching, it naturally tends to true eloquence—not only the eloquence of earnest thought and feeling, but to that simple, direct, urgent style which always accompanies the highest order of oratory, and to that natural but energetic manner which secures the right modulation, both of voice and gesture.

The subject suggests a practical remark which we cannot forbear uttering. This energetic *directness of aim* furnishes a rule of success almost infallible, and one that is *practicable to all men*. No ambassador of Christ should be content to be an ordinary man. He professes to believe himself armed with a preternatural authority, and supplied with preternatural endowments. These, if nothing else, should give him an extraordinary character, based upon an extraordinary, a pure and sublime self-consciousness of his official position. Yet how often do we find in the sacred office men who pass through year after year of sheer ineffectiveness, uniform only in their lack of positive traits, or positive results. This should *never* be the case. We care not what want of marked ability, or what inopportune circumstances there may be, a man of piety and of but ordinary faculties, should, in such an extraordinary function, be an extraordinary man; and he needs but one additional quality, and that, as we have said, a universally practicable one, to make him so—he needs but this resolute directness of purpose. Let the unsuccessful young man, that now, perchance, sits in his study reading these lines, and desponding, it may be, over the failure of his course, the declension of his congregation, the absence of conversions, the dispirited temper of his official supporters—let him, upon his knees, vow that he will now, by the help of God, begin his work anew, with an energetic aim at appreciable and immediate results; and what, if he persists in his resolution, will follow? Why, immediately this new purpose will change his own mood quite visibly—he will become inspired,—and soon all around him will catch the salutary contagion of his example. His subjects will now be chosen with more reference to their direct impression; his illustrations, his whole train of thought, his very words, will take somewhat of a new character, from the energetic purpose which sways him—a purpose which he recognised always, to be sure, but which has now become ignited and luminous in his soul. Thus, resolutely reaching beyond all factitious or secondary appliances, and bearing down with all his might on the one design before him, he will assuredly become a mightier man. If he is so naturally destitute of talent, as not, even under such an impulse, to be able to develop any new or higher ability than before, yet

will his small talents, more earnestly used, become more interesting to his hearers. They will feel the power of his heart, if not of his head. An earnest character in a good cause can never fail to command the sympathy of the great popular heart. Put such a man anywhere, and he will carry with him the popular respect, if not the popular applause,—nay, he will, sooner or later, compel along with him, to no small extent, the popular co-operation. Can we not recall facts in proof of these remarks? How often have we known preachers who, with very ordinary abilities, were, nevertheless, always received well, and who have sometimes been in general demand? And why? The only answer is, they were earnest, hard-working men, good visitors among the people, assiduous in the Sunday-school interest, energetic in social meetings, sympathetic with the sick and poor—men, in a word, who are intent on their one work—the rescue of souls.

Whatever then may be your talent, rouse yourself, O man of God, to a renewed and soul-stirring consciousness of your high calling! If you have brilliant endowments, remember that their direct appropriation to the single ultimate purpose of your office will only exalt and improve them. If your gifts are small, remember your graces and energy need not be so. Open your Bible and select subjects which will lead men directly to God. Go into the pulpit expecting, intensely praying that souls may be rescued under the discourse of the hour; go into the prayer-meeting urging the people unto the cross; go forth into the streets, not to idle away time with colloquial common-places, or twaddling jokes, but, like Paul, to “warn” the people “from house to house with tears.” Act thus, and heaven and earth shall pass away rather than the word of God fail in your hands, or you be an ineffective man.

But is there no considerable qualification to be admitted here? Is it the case, that the Christian teacher does not need the more indirect and collateral modes of labour as well as this energetic course? The fallacy of the question consists in the tacit assumption that the earnest, direct aim we contend for, cannot apply to such collateral modes; and what is most deplorable is, that this assumption is generally practical, as well as tacit. How common is it that doctrinal or ethical preachers assume a distinctive character as such, sacrificing to their elaborateness or their apathy the force that awakens souls and quickens the Church! We must indeed preach doctrines, and morals, and the generalities of religion, and we may do this, too, with all intellectual and literary appliances; but a direct and even intense aim at what we have called the “single ultimate purpose” of our office, may modify and thrill with power all such

topics and appliances. This is what we contend for; and we contend that the characteristic effectiveness of our early preaching consisted in this; and that the great reason of the comparative ineffectiveness of the pulpit, throughout the world, arises from the want of it.*

Another characteristic quite peculiar to the early Methodist preaching, in this country at least, and an almost necessary counterpart of the excellencies we have described, was its *extemporaneous delivery*. We are inclined to speak with some emphasis, and yet with care, on this subject. The tendency to a contrary mode of preaching, which is incipiently developing itself among us, we deem not so much a fatal, practical heresy as an unwise policy. Some very excellent and influential brethren encourage it by their example, at least; we would not give them provocation by unnecessary severity. We propose to offer a few reflections on the subject, which may commend themselves to their candid consideration.

Extemporaneous preaching was, until lately, the universal usage of our ministry. It was more than this,—it was, as we have intimated, a *necessary* characteristic of the kind of preaching we have attributed to them. We cannot, indeed, *conceive* of the preaching we have described as other than extemporaneous. Reading never could be preaching, in this sense, any more than the letters of the one word spell the other. How those heroic men could have gone thundering through the land, prostrating multitudes to the earth, or melting them to tears, by the reading of manuscripts, is a problem which certainly no experiment ever solved, and no logic can show. It is, in fact, quite clear, *a priori*, that they would have been an entirely different class of men, and Methodism a quite different affair, if they had been readers instead of what they pre-eminently were—preachers.

Not only is extemporaneous preaching adapted to the *themes*, the *style*, and the *immediate* effect which we have attributed to our primitive preaching, but we contend that it is consistent with the best style of public discourse—with just thought, accurate instruction, and a sufficiently accurate verbal style. These latter excellencies, of course, depend largely upon previous training, and the preparation of the discourse; but it must be remembered also, that this is the case in regard to written sermons,—a speaker, without previous education and immediate study of the discourse in hand, would hardly succeed better in reciting it, than in delivering it extempore.

* The late lamented President Olin, was a notable example of such a union of effective directness with all the traits and topics of an educated preacher. He could preach on no subject without immediate and profound effect; and had his health permitted, he would have stood forth before the American public a national model of pulpit effectiveness.

He that would be a successful extemporizer should have a well-stored mind, and should thoroughly meditate his subjects—so thoroughly, indeed, that the whole perspective of the main ideas of his discourse, from the exordium to the peroration, shall be clearly open before his mental vision when he rises in the pulpit. This is requisite, for two reasons: first, that he may have something to say; and secondly, that he may have the confidence which will enable him to say it with self-possession and force. Self-possession, based upon a sufficient preparation, is the whole secret of success in extemporaneous speaking. A speaker thus sustained can hardly fail to have, spontaneously, the right language and due emotion; he has incomparably more facilities for them than the manuscript preacher. We say *right* language; and that is right which is appropriate to the occasion. It may not be as precise as the pen would afford,—but ought it always to be so? Would it be desirable, that the free, irregular but idiomatic facility of ordinary conversation should be superseded at our hearths by the prim precision and literary nicety of book-makers? There is a style for books, a style for conversation, and a style for the rostra or the pulpit. He who rises in the latter, with his mind fraught with the ideas of his subject, and his heart inspired with its spirit, will, in most cases, spontaneously utter himself aright. If he is occasionally diffuse or repetitious, yet it may be legitimate to the occasion or the subject that he should be so. If his style may not *read* as well as it was heard, yet even this may be because of its peculiar adaptation to be heard rather than read.

We affirm further, that both the design and history of preaching are in favour of extempore delivery. The earnestness and directness for which we have contended may consist, as we have shown, with all varieties of talents and topics, but it is hardly compatible with pulpit *reading*. Very rarely indeed does a powerful reader, like Chalmers, appear in the pulpit. We know not another case like his in the history of the Christian ministry. Chalmers tried the experiment of extemporizing in his country parish, but prematurely abandoned it; yet when in his full splendour at Glasgow, his biographer says, that his occasional extempore discourses, in the private houses of his poor parishioners, teemed with more glorious eloquence than ever dazzled the crowded congregation of the Tron kirk.

The two greatest preachers of modern times, Whitefield and Robert Hall, were extemporizers—their written sermons were composed after delivery. We have said that the Wesleyan preachers of England are, as a body, the best sermonizers, and the most successful speakers, in the United Kingdom; and they are the only extempo-

rizers in it, except the Roman Catholics. Such a thing as a manuscript sermon is never seen in the pulpits of the continent, except when American or English clergymen happen to ascend them. If the European clergy, Catholic or Protestant, write their discourses, they have, nevertheless, the good sense to deliver them *memoriter*, and thereby save them from the dulness of reading. In like manner did the old and unrivalled pulpit orators of France, Massillon, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Fletcher, Fenelon, eschew the manuscript. The latter, in his "Dialogues on Eloquence," contends for extempore speaking; he argues that even the classic orators were mostly extemporizers.*

The Anglo-Saxon pulpit, against all the predilections of that race, is, in fine, the only place where reading is tolerated, as a mode of popular address. The member of parliament, or of congress, who should attempt to read his speech, would almost inevitably break down. The advocate at the bar, contending for the life of his client, would be considered recreant to all the urgency of the occasion were he to stand up before the jury to read his plea. The popular orator who should attempt to *read* the masses into enthusiasm, on some high occasion of national exigency, would be dubbed a jackass. Why can manly and powerful eloquence be successful everywhere else but in the pulpit? The pulpit is its most legitimate arena. The themes and aims of the pulpit are all adapted to it. The religious congregation is the true popular assembly, and there, if anywhere, ought eloquence to appear in all its liberties and powers.

So almost intuitive is our perception of the inappropriateness of manuscript preaching to the popular religious assembly, that we cannot conceive of Christ *reading* his discourses to the multitudes of Judea, or St. Paul preaching on Mars Hill from a scroll. We *know* this could not have been, not from any historical testimony, but from the manifest absurdity of the supposition. For the same reason we cannot associate it with the old powerful Methodist preaching, nor, indeed, with any really popular and demonstrative preaching.

We cannot conclude these remarks without deprecating most earnestly any considerable deviation from this excellent custom of our fathers. Be assured, that he who can preach at all, can preach extemporaneously, if he will but persevere in the experiment. The young man of good education, who, from his academic habits or natural diffidence, or any other cause, is now addicting himself to pul-

* There is much to be said on both sides of this question. The most probable supposition is, that the classic orators wrote their discourses, memorizing their substance, but delivering them without much regard to the written language. See Fenelon.

pit reading, is putting his whole professional life under a servile restraint, which will not only consume unnecessarily large amounts of his time, but trammel the development of all his pulpit powers. Let him study thoroughly his subjects; but let him devote to the storing of his mind the time now spent in mere verbal preparation for the desk; let him resolutely stumble along through whatever embarrassments till he acquires the confidence which habit will surely produce; let him understand well that what he wants for the pulpit is thought and sentiment, and that these secured, direct unpretending utterance, right home to the souls of the people, is the only true style for him—the noblest eloquence. If, in the experiment, he sometimes falls below the tame mediocrity of his former manuscript efforts, yet will he oftener rise transcendently above it, in the exulting freedom of an inspired and untrammelled mind.

One fact let him be assured of, namely, that whatever uniform and respectable character his manuscript preaching may have, the *maximum* power of preaching can never be attained by the sermon reader. He sacrifices all hope of this; and no young man should ever make this sacrifice. With God's commission upon him, with the Holy Spirit within him, with all the assistance of books and nature about him, with the solemnities of eternity before him, let him throw himself with all directness and energy into his work, speaking to the people in their own strong and simple speech, seeking not to ape the rhetorician, but to save souls, "pulling them out of the fire;" he will then speak from his heart with infinitely more eloquence than he could utter from his manuscript.

We contend then for the old Methodist school of preaching—not because it is *old*—traditional authority weighs little with us; but traditional success does weigh with us; and our whole denominational history is a demonstration of the utility of extempore preaching.

Such were some of the characteristic traits of the preaching which has made Methodism what it is in this land. We have not referred to the peculiar piety, the special anointing, which some of us claim for our early ministry; this, if not taken for granted, might be deemed invidious. With this, however, the traits enumerated were, in our estimation, their marked distinctions—the right *themes*, the right *style*, energetic *aim at direct results*, and popular or *extemporaneous* addresses. We have not said how far these characteristics are yet retained by our ministry; this has not, thus far, been relevant to our purpose. We may hereafter give a frank opinion on the subject in an article on what modifications of the primitive school of Methodist preaching may be rendered desirable by the progress of the times.

ART. V.—TENDENCY OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE MORAL
AND MATERIAL WORLD.

DR. CHALMERS, in his work on the Romans, says: "There is a sort of vague, undefinable impression, we think, upon all spirits, of some great evolution of the present system under which we live—some looking towards, as well as longing after, immortality—some mysterious but yet powerful sense within every heart, of the present, as a state of confinement and thralldom; and that yet a day of light, and largeness, and liberty is coming. We cannot imagine of unbelievers, that they have any precise or perhaps confident anticipation on the subject, any more than the world at large had of the advent of our Messiah—though a very general expectation was abroad of the approaching arrival of some great personage upon earth. And, in like manner, there is abroad even now the dim and the distant vision of another advent of a brighter and blander period, that is now obscurely seen or guessed at through the gloom by which humanity is encompassed—a kind of floating anticipation, suggested, perhaps, by the experimental feeling that there is now the straitness of an oppressed and limited condition, and that still we are among the toils, and the difficulties, and the struggles of an embryo state of existence. It is altogether worthy of remark, that in like manner as through the various countries of the world there is a very wide impression of a primeval condition of virtue and blessedness from which we have fallen, so there seems a very wide expectation of the species being at length restored to the same health, and harmony, and loveliness as before. The vision of a golden age at some remote period of antiquity is not unaccompanied with the vision of a yet splendid and general revival of all things. Even apart from revelation there floats before the world's eye the brilliant perspective of this earth being yet covered with a righteous and a regenerated family. This is a topic on which even philosophy has its fascinating dreams; and there are philanthropists in our day who disown Christianity, and yet are urged forward to enterprise by the power and the pleasure of an anticipation so beautiful. They do not think of death; they only think of the moral and political glories of a renovated world, and of these glories as unfading. It is an immortality, after all, that they are picturing. While they look on that gospel which brought life and immortality to light as a fable, still they find that the whole capacity of their spirits is not filled unless they can regale them with the prospect of an immortality of

their own. Nothing short of this will satisfy them; and whether you look at those who speculate on the perfectibility of mankind, or those who think, in economic theories, that they are laying the basis on which might be reared the permanent happiness of nations, you see but the creature spurning at the narrowness of its present condition, and waiting in earnest expectancy for the manifestation of the sons of God."

These words speak for themselves. They are introduced as well for the high authority of the sentiments they contain as for their eloquence and beauty; and as opening an attractive vista to the thoughts and events to which the reader's attention is invited.

Hope, that passion of the human heart, or power of the mind, or both united, so indispensable to our every-day comfort, so needful to make our toils and struggles endurable, is ever urging us to look forward to the future. It either paints for the fascination of the mind's eye, with prismatic hues, the scenes which revelation has opened to our view, or in the wide blank of uncertain futurity it creates lovely scenes of its own. St. Paul asserts, that "we are saved by hope." Whether we shall ever enjoy, as precise realities, the splendid visions it unfolds in perspective, or shall find on a nearer view the gilded spots of the landscape, as we pass along, dimmed of their lustre, the influence of hope on our spirits is yet the same. It bears us patiently, or vigorously, or cheerfully onward, to the discharge of new duties; to the enjoyment of new privileges; to the endurance of new toils; to the encounter of new perils. The present only contents us for the passing moment; the future is made tolerable or pleasant by hope. Or, if the present, by unwelcome vexations, may with difficulty be borne, it is a merciful arrangement of a benevolent Providence, by which the mind turns with confidence to the future to rid it of its ills.

To a mind accustomed to close examination of evidence, and earnest in the pursuit of truth, the comfort derived from the expectations of futurity is in proportion to the reasonable probability on which such expectations rest. If promises of reward or of gratuity are held forth, the encouraging trust of realizing a fulfilment in due time depends on the proof which is obtained of the integrity and power of the source from which they emanate. Fancies, it may be, no less bright to the vision, often play before other minds, neither used to careful investigation nor anxious to ascertain what will be like to take place. There are myriads of men whose talents are buried in the earth; whose walk is not on the highway of honest and sober reflection; who are taking no pains so to improve the present that they may enhance the value of the future; who, nevertheless,

in the indolence of an intellectual sleep, dream golden dreams, which they hope to enjoy as waking realities, after the existing contest with evil shall end. It is true the feeling is a vague one, whether it relate to the anticipation of individual joys, or to the expectation of more general good to the race at large. But Christians—they who have adopted as their guide the word of authenticated revelation—have a better defined field of observation before them. They are not left to the ambiguity of impulsive and extravagant imagination, as the sole monitor of things to come, while threading their way through the straits and windings of this mortal career. A messenger, invested with the authority of a higher and diviner world, has been amongst them. "God manifested in the flesh" has tabernacled on earth, and spoken, "as never man spake." Besides accomplishing by the united agency of divine and human nature, in the joint person of the God-man, the glorious work of atonement, through which God can be just and yet the justifier of all who believe in Jesus, he has given lessons of profound wisdom to direct the movements of humanity through the intricacies of an evil state, and uttered predictions of events yet to come, with which the most splendid achievements of human sagacity, and the happiest condition "mortal ever dreamed of," may not compare. Besides the fresh predictions of future glory which Messiah announced during his earthly sojourn, he confirmed, by his reverent allusions, the divine authority with which Moses and the Jewish prophets wrote; thus making *their* promises his own, and stamping, with the indubitable seal of divinity, those visions of more than poetic beauty and bliss, which Isaiah and his inspired fellows had held up to awaken the hopes of mankind. From the time Jesus said, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead,"—if there had been any lack of evidence *before* to give a divine sanction to their words, which there had not been,—from that time the pictures which they alleged had been drawn by a divine hand upon the canvass of the world's future history, rely, for their truth and exactness, upon the authority of Jesus himself. And the same divine authority affixes its seal to the predictions which were *afterwards* uttered by the apostles—those holy men, upon whom he breathed, and to whom he said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." We are permitted, then, in the spirit of humble and docile disciples, to avail ourselves, for brightening our hopes, of all that prophetic illumination which centres in the Son of God, and radiates through those inspired men, both before and after his advent, who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

While "the times and the seasons," as well as the *precise* form of the fulfilment of the grand events to which they awaken our atten-

tion, are concealed from our view, a conspicuous outline of the general character of these events is yet given. It may be for the purpose of heightening the value of those circumstances with which the divine goodness designs to surround our ransomed race in the fulness of time, that this partial obscurity is kept up. If all the particulars of this map of approaching blessedness were minutely traced out, it would be invested with such an air of familiarity as would strip us of that wonder, and curiosity, and longing desire for the unenjoyed good, which yields us now so many a pleasant emotion, and which, giving place to the freshness of novelty, will add so much to the rapture of enjoyment. "It doth not yet appear *what* we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be *like him*, for we shall see him as he is." Amid the ambiguity of our anticipations, enough of certainty is afforded us to animate our hopes, and make us willing to substitute the renovated condition which is promised for the mixed state of good and evil which is endured. But on this side of the consummation of the promises of Christianity, *before* the unchangeable and immortal state shall be entered upon, there are predictions of a vast and glorious change in the aspect of society. A great enlargement of knowledge and piety is to take place on the earth. The time is coming when neighbour shall not say to neighbour, Knowest thou the Lord? but all shall know him, from the least unto the greatest. Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased. Righteousness shall cover the earth, as the waters cover the place of the great deep. Abundant prosperity shall attend the labours of the husbandman; and with gladness and gratitude shall men eat the fruits of the earth. The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad; and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. They shall rejoice with joy and singing; the glory of Lebanon shall be given to it—the excellency of Carmel and Sharon. The obscure and long-neglected regions of the globe shall be sought out, and exchange the grossness of barbarity for the refinement of civilization. The humane precepts of Christian kindness and forbearance shall enlighten the dark places of the earth which have been the habitations of cruelty. And instead of lust, and wars, and rumours of wars, love and peace shall prevail among individuals and nations; and they shall learn war no more.

Let us now look abroad at what is doing in the world. Let us see whether "the signs of the times" are favourable to the approach of that meliorated state of human history which we have been led to anticipate,—whether the tendency of current events in the moral and material world really opens to our view the prospect of the improved and elevated condition of mankind, indicated, as well by the

vague impressions and desultory fancies of the thoughtless and unconcerned, as by the more definite hopes of the serious and considerate.

That survey of the condition and prospects of human society is too limited which looks only at existing evils, and at the possibility of future relief. The whole ground of a probability of improvement cannot be taken into the estimate without comprehending a far wider field. In order to ascertain with what likelihood the expectation of removing present ills may be entertained, we must glance at the numerous ills of a by-gone age, and the vigour and success with which they have been encountered and overcome. The observing eye must fix itself upon the struggles and victories of successive generations in the past, in order to collect the data for a nice calculation of the future. If, indeed, the first half of the present century, which has just expired, has been crowded with startling facts, no less important than unexpected, so as almost to bewilder the imagination of living observers; we and our successors may draw a fair inference therefrom, that surprising, nay, overwhelming disclosures, changing in equal proportion the drift of human thoughts and habits, and quickening the speed of human operations, must not be regarded as impossible. Meantime such exhibitions of ingenuity as have already happened, and as are likely, in a ratio of geometrical progression, yet to happen, may be regarded rather as developing the power of man to carry forward the purposes of his being and destination, than as affecting the fundamental principles of his nature, or the desires of his heart. So that no new discoveries of the hitherto latent springs of physical force will, in any degree, lessen the wish and aptitude of the human species for increasing moral melioration and greater material comfort.

The world (including that part of mankind who have and profess neither love to Christ nor fear of God) and the Church (including all the other part) occupy peculiar relative positions, either to the other. While the two may be regarded as antagonist forces—as arrayed on opposite sides of the greatest practical question in morals, whether it is right and expedient to regard the Divine will as the highest rule of life or not—neither is ever insensible of a powerful influence which is wielded by the other. Few things are ever undertaken by the one, or by any of its individual members, without a considerable solicitude to know in what estimation these things are held by the other. Nor does this anxiety imply a renunciation of integrity of principle—an abandonment of allegiance to authority already acknowledged and submitted to, for allegiance to a hostile authority. It implies merely that outside of the by-laws and tech-

nical regulations by which either, for itself, holds itself to be bound; there are many *things lovely and of good report* which may not, without harm, be overlooked; and that none are so apt to detect a deficiency of accomplishment in these things as those whose attitude of hostility naturally hinders lenity and forbearance. The first of these parties aims solely at the well-being or enjoyment of the present life; the other connects the transient enjoyment of the present life with the ever-during enjoyment of a future, and is careful to make no sacrifices to the demands of passion here, which might mar the prospect of greater good hereafter.

Our Saviour has not left his disciples without the sanction of his divine wisdom, in looking to the successful achievements of the children of the world in their own sphere of operations, as a stimulus to greater diligence and activity. And we should lose much of the force of this lesson if we failed to calculate the impulse which mere worldly enterprise has given, and which it is destined yet to give, to the kindly aggressive movements of the Church, in performing its mission of mercy. In this way may the spirit of rivalry, so natural to the heart of man, so difficult, perhaps impossible, to be wholly eradicated from it, find an ample and glorious field for the exercise of its largest powers. To a no less important use are the labours of *the world* to be turned by the vigilance of *the Church*, in the grand project of abating the evils, both moral and physical, which lie in its path. It so happens, that many of the enterprises which are undertaken for the purpose of abetting the convenience and the comfort of mankind, are not so exclusively confined to the acknowledged domains of either of these great parties, as to deprive the other of a share both of the labour and the benefit. And while it must be admitted that the vicious spirit of the former, invariably tends to corrupt whatever it touches or has to do with, it must also be conceded, that the pure influence of the latter exerts a restorative power upon every person and society in the range of its operations. Which of the two counteracting forces is destined ultimately to predominate over the affections and habits of the race, and conquer the globe as a field of undisputed occupation, is the very theme of our present inquiry. To those of us whose hopes are strong in the gracious promises of revelation, the risks of the remaining conflict present no appalling aspect. With the utmost composure can we survey the positions and outposts of the embattled legions, and form our conclusions as to the issue of the struggle; and this, too, with so much the more freedom from anxiety, as designs of good to the vanquished are so deeply lodged in the bosom of the Church.

Among the things of which the people of the world take an im-

portant part, and which are made auxiliary to the furtherance of the gospel, *commerce* and its great ally, *facility of travel*, are to be taken largely into the account. In respect to both of these, the improvements of the present century have been immense. Since its commencement the circle of commercial reciprocity has been vastly enlarged, and the rate of locomotion has been almost miraculously increased. The primitive branch of the Anglo-Saxon family, so long the commercial mistress of the world, has kept its place in advance of old, and new, and zealous competition. Our own branch of the same family, partaking the spirit and activity of the original stock, though still somewhat in the rear of British enterprise, bids fair to lead the way in this busy rivalry. Most of the inferior commercial States, allured by our splendid success, are bestirring themselves with redoubled diligence. Russia, the Dutch, France, Turkey, and China, are expanding the markets of the world by new and more energetic movements. And the eyes of the curious and the enterprising are intent upon the discovery of the secrets of science and wealth hidden in distant regions long unexplored. The unworked and undug treasures of Africa and Australia are already beginning to swell the list of the great prospective assessment which is to be levied for the comfort and the luxury of the four quarters of the globe. New and ingenious machinery is, time after time, improving the quality and value of old fabrics, and multiplying, to an almost incredible degree, the elements of trade. And, such is the cupidity of man, the demands for other means of indulging his desires and supplying his wants increase in exact proportion to the frequency of their gratification. The necessities of commerce, as well as the desires of mankind to widen their sphere of observation and intercourse, are constantly suggesting new and swifter methods of locomotion. It is barely requisite to refer to this great fact, so distinguishing to the character of the present generation, in order to bring into view all its magnitude and importance. Such have already been the mighty results of mechanical genius applying itself to this branch of labour, that journeys of thousands of miles are now performed in less time than a century ago would have been taken to travel as many hundreds. And the electric speed with which news is transmitted between any given points, however distant, which are connected merely by a metal string, is awaking the inquiry in the active minds of the day, whether masses of matter may not be propelled with a somewhat similar rapidity; whether a costly freight, with its attendant supercargo, may not be despatched to the market, where it is already sold, at nearly, if not quite the same rate at which an ethereal agent went to make the

bargain. In very deed, the men who are favoured with a birth in this *golden* age are witnesses to the fulfilment of Shakspeare's prophetic words,

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in *your* philosophy."

How long the secret of air-navigation—a secret in possession of millions of the feathered tribe during thousands of years—shall keep itself hid from the scrutiny of an age which has invaded the lightning's sanctuary, and led captive the *primum mobile* of material nature, the future will unfold. The power of elevating and sustaining aloft, for considerable periods of time, vessels of imposing dimensions has been long known and practised. The facility of steering and moving these vessels at the joint will of a helmsman and engineer, awaits only the unlocking of a few more modes of motive power. The power already is proven to exist. To get it within the grasp of human ingenuity is the only part of the problem remaining to be solved, before fleets laden with cargoes and men shall plunge into the hazardous element above us and outstrip the tardy motions of steam, which are now frisking so merrily across the briny deep, as far as the flight of "the falcon, towering in his pride of place," exceeds the trot of the elephant or the gallop of the steed. We do not utter this as prophecy; but such further practical demonstration of the forces lodged in the arcana of tangible nature around us will not be a whit more astounding to us or our successors, than the present operations of steam and electricity would have been to our progenitors of the eighteenth century. Scores of comforts and conveniences have ever lain unenjoyed within the reach of mankind. Difficulties, it is true, have generally hedged them about; but these difficulties have yielded their long-forbidden treasures to the ardent desire and determined will and earnest efforts of man awakened to a knowledge of his power, and athirst for nobler enjoyment.

Achievements in physics, as well as in morals, seem to lie within certain spheres prescribed by the creative hand. Faith, or confidence of the possibility of success, is a necessary preliminary and adjunct to successful labour in either. It is very true, indeed, that impracticable schemes in both, without any other foundation than the visions of overheated imagination, have been attempted and have failed. And the past would cease to afford any index to the future, if in the time to come similar experiments should never be made. It would, however, be bad philosophy and economy too, to suffer these "baseless fabrics of a vision" to deter sober minds from those grand exploits which are likely to illustrate yet further the power of genius

and of faith. Without controversy we must expect, as a matter of entire probability, that the goodly price which recent success has paid to the confident and active labours of ingenious mechanism, will offer a boon which cannot fail to stimulate to the highest degree of intensity the intelligent and resolute workers of the present and a coming age. And with the most reverent use of the words of Holy Writ, are we warranted, by what has already occurred, in believing that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things" which are yet to be discovered and enjoyed in the possibilities of surrounding nature.

Not to anticipate too eagerly the competition of the balloon with the eagle in graceful and rapid flight through the azure firmament, let us admit into our meditations the projects of merchants, statesmen, and topographers, for the enlargement of human happiness—projects which are based upon the certain ground of successful experiment—projects which are only the repeated continuous application of mechanical organization already in use.

It is now in contemplation by many of the leading spirits of this republic to traverse the wide plains between the Mississippi and the Pacific by a highway and railroad. Nothing stands in the way of reducing this splendid idea to reality but a national resolve *to do it*, or to confer a charter of permission, with a slip of vacant land, upon an enterprising citizen. Ocean steamers are paddling regularly every week between Europe and our eastern shores. Similar vehicles of rapid transmission are connecting the Sandwich Isles with our western shores. Commerce is already calling for an extension of this route from the Sandwich Islands to China. It is hardly probable that twelve months twice told will pass before these packets will be plying between the bay of Canton and the bay of Francisco. A railway or ship-canal across the isthmus of Suez—a project already in earnest contemplation in Europe—is all that will be wanting to complete a belt of steam travel, not very far from being a direct line around the globe. A *perfectly* direct line of highway, crossing the continent of Asia from east to west, will be regarded as a commercial desideratum not long to be postponed.

Happy for the spiritual prospects of our species it is, that all these gigantic conveniences of intercommunication between tribes and nations, created for the purpose of exchanging material commodities, and thus ministering to the gratification of luxury, or to the relief of pressing want—that all these gigantic conveniences of intercommunication should bring the Bible, and the Sabbath, and the preaching of the gospel, into the dark regions of heathenism and idolatry—that the flash of the engine's fires, and the roar of its impetuous

speed shall bear along with them the heavenly light of truth, and the loud and distinct call, "Come, and be ye saved, all ye ends of the earth." Faith cometh by *hearing*, and hearing by *the word* of God. To come in contact with the heralds and ambassadors who are commissioned to utter it, is needful, in order to the production of its appropriate fruits. For centuries insuperable obstacles have interposed between those who have possessed the advantage of the oracles of God and those who have been perishing for lack of knowledge. The concealed and cruel devices of the prince of this world have long hedged in the habitations of his too willing subjects with barriers which have too effectually obstructed all intercourse with others favoured with more light and liberty. It is lamentable, indeed, that so much of the earth's surface should, through such a series of ages, have been subjugated and oppressed by this gloomy despotism. But the time for a general revolt—for an universal uprising against that dark and cruel sceptre—would seem to be not far off; avenues of communication and approach are steadily and rapidly opening into the heart of heathen territory, through which are to issue hosts of Christian warriors, strong in the strength of their invincible Captain, and fraught with every implement to aid the oppressed millions to throw off their yoke, and assert the rights and privileges of redeemed men.

In the work of diffusing evangelical knowledge and its regenerating influence throughout the wide regions of idolatry, in different quarters of the world, it would be contradicting well-established facts to deny that great conquests have yet to be achieved. With many encouraging exceptions skirting the coast of Africa, vast portions of its sun-burnt territory are still blackened by a far more desolating barbarism. And over the outstretching plains of Asia—the *officina virorum* of the human race—the oriental garden, perfumed with fragrant spices—the site at once of man's earliest being and of his earliest sin, the spirit of disaffection to the sovereignty of almighty grace still wields a potent sceptre. But there, too, many a strong post has been carried by the arms of the cross, and over many of its most fertile fields the Christian banner spreads its ample folds.

Counting the number of years that Christianity has been "afield" against its numerous and resolute foes, and comparing the conquests of territory gained with those which are yet to be gained ere every antagonist "principality and power" shall be subdued to the truth, it would be both a dull and unscientific calculation to suppose that a *proportionate length of time* must still elapse, before all the people, and the nations, and the kingdoms of the earth shall be subjected to the dominion of the Saviour. To dispel the illusion of so common

but erroneous an estimate, we must take into the account, as overbalancing the opposite probabilities, the immense experience which the tedious toils and desperate struggles on the enemy's ground have added to the strength of our ranks. It must also be borne in mind, that in the invasion of an enemy's territory every success inspirits the aggressor, and proportionately disheartens the foe; and that when a firm foothold has been obtained, furnishing a radiating centre for convenient hostile excursions; and much more, when such radiating centres are so multiplied as to alarm the apprehension and distract the attention of the force which at first concentrated its efforts and vaunted in the confidence of an easy triumph, the work of finishing the aggressive onset, or of completing the victory, is comparatively light. This is precisely the relative situation of Christianity in view of the hostile moral forces of the world which remain to be subdued.

Christianity has fought its way from the smallest and most discouraging outset to large conquests and very commanding positions. It numbers among its votaries the mightiest and most civilized nations of the earth. The people who, at this day, are most renowned for arts and arms, whose explorations in science and enterprises in commerce have surpassed the energies and the skill of every competitor, unfold to the admiring gaze of millions of spectators as the most auspicious insignia of their escutcheon, the LION and the CROSS; at the same time, that they are the most busy, and the most successful in conveying to distant realms the precious realities of which those insignia are the symbols. And while England, the presiding genius of the *eastern* hemisphere, whose dominions, domestic and colonial, extend so far that the sun never sets upon them, and whose political influence is as dominant as its commercial, is alike active in diffusing Christian principles at home and abroad, America, the junior branch of the same great family, holding the same position of relative importance in the *western* hemisphere, is active too, according to the ratio of its advancement in the qualities which adorn and the virtues which strengthen the civilized state: at the same time, the feebler and less enterprising, but yet the mighty and the enterprising secondary powers of Europe, except a single state, and all the states on our side of the Atlantic, except the vagrant aboriginal tribes, whose very being is held by a precarious tenure, boast of their right to the Christian name. Such is the ascendancy of Christian nations at this very day, that their united voice on any question affecting the political welfare of the world would hush into silence every pagan murmur of dissent. With this reckoning on the balance sheet of the probable future, the hopes which revelation inspires may well be cheerful.

There are two prominent historical events pertaining to our age and country, very different, indeed, in the sensations which they have excited, yet bearing with great weight upon the destinies of the two continents, Asia and Africa, which supply the largest fields for the further extension of civilization and Christianity. The first of these events is the perplexed and perplexing question of negro slavery existing in the southern part of the United States. The second is, the hitherto unheard-of rapidity with which a long hidden and lately developed source of wealth has brought into existence a new and important State on our Pacific coast, giving, at the same time, by its vicinity, a fresh impulse to the energies of the Oregon settlements, which are probably destined to take rank in future political and commercial usefulness with California itself. As already intimated, this occupation of the extreme western limits of our extended territory, which is now busily arranging a swift transit across the entire breadth of the continent, is pointing to a frequent and steady communication between the United States and China—a great Christian and a great pagan nation—a communication which is indispensable to that interchange of commodities which the increasing wants of mankind, in an era of progressive civilization, imperiously demand.

Difficult as is the solution of the problem which the first of these prominent events holds forth, yet we think the principle of its solution is not wholly obscured from our view when looked at through the medium of those declarations and promises of the mighty Arbiter of nations which He has vouchsafed to open to us in the inspired record of his will. We are there informed that it is in just such perplexities as this, whether in individual or national history,—when the boasted wisdom of man is at a stand; when the web of his ingenuity is hopelessly tangled; when, whether his pride will acknowledge it or not, it is apparent to all observers, that he knows not what to do,—it is just then that the Father of mercies stoops to aid his impotence and clear away the obstructions from his path.

At a time when the bosom of the nation is still heaving with emotion from the excitement of an intense strife between conflicting parties on a kindred topic, or rather on a certain aspect of this very topic, instead of any *proposition* which might tend to renew the strife and keep up the excitement, it may not be amiss to take a hasty glance at a few of the leading facts which the topic includes, and to see whether some hopeful inference may not fall within the range of vision likely to augment our confidence in His overruling wisdom, and goodness, and power, who “makes the wrath of man to praise him, and restrains the remainder of it.”

There are now under the civil and religious influence of this

Christian nation between two and three millions of the descendants of African parents. Without stopping to take into view the mixed feelings of avarice and recklessness of human suffering which had to do with the forcible abduction of the ancestors of these millions from kindred, and home, and country, with all the pleasant associations which the most degrading barbarism cannot destroy, and with their subjection to severe and unaccustomed labour in a foreign land, under the rigid discipline of the planters on our Atlantic coast, it is not to be denied that, to the extent of these two or three millions, there are so many of the sons and daughters of Africa rescued from the hideous barbarity and shameless idolatry of their fatherland. It is not to be denied, that this great multitude of men, and women, and children, (inferior as is their social condition to the European descendants around them,) have, to quite a respectable extent, been polished by contact and intercourse with superior manners and enlightened piety. It is not to be denied that the Americanized African finds the climate and the soil of his ancestral home an abode congenial to his nature and his wants,—that under the warmer suns of the country of Ham, where the white man faints and dies, the American negro lives and thrives. It is matter of history, that under the patronage of a benevolent association in America a promising republic of colonized negroes has within a few years sprung up on the shores of Africa—that with more than the wonted success which has accompanied the growth of states having a colonial origin, the new Americo-African empire is increasing in importance, in all the modes of political prosperity, in agricultural industry and production, in commerce, in piety, in literature, and in the culture of peaceful relations with the neighbouring tribes, and offering to them the benefit of its power to improve and elevate their condition. It is alike beyond dispute, that it has advanced with vastly greater celerity in all these respects than did the first British colonies in America, the forerunners of our great republic, within the same space of time.

With strong hopes and unshaken confidence in the perpetuated union of these States as at once an asylum for the oppressed and a beacon for the guidance of the world, and as yet in the dark as to the methods to which political wisdom will resort to give back to a benighted quarter of the earth its exiled sons, and however patiently the desires of the philanthropist may have to wait amid sectional jealousies and acrimonious struggles ere it witness this “consummation, so devoutly to be wished,” we cannot but anticipate its occurrence, as most likely to be suggested to our rulers, as the best arrangement for both the dominant and the subjugated race. We

cannot but look for the deepening conviction, as events glide along, that the crippled energies and depressed prosperity of the sections where the proprietors of the soil rely upon the labours of those whose bondage is an inevitable clog to forethought, and industry, and enterprise, can find no relief so effectual as loosening the bonds and letting the oppressed go free to the home of their fathers and their brethren. Contrary, too, to much narrow-minded prejudice, and to many short-sighted calculations of interest, it is gratifying to believe that this view of probable events is beginning to be entertained by leading American statesmen and patriots; and that the project before congress, of a line of ocean steamers to ply between Liberia and this country, will be an important step toward the accomplishment of this grand design. And to do away, as far as possible, with an unwelcome use of power in compelling the gradual emigration of so many people from our shores, the prospects are daily brightening that the fertile soil of Ethiopia will furnish as many attractions to the oppressed in the United States, as our own rich plains and valleys furnish to the oppressed in continental Europe, and in Great Britain and Ireland. So that, after all, the beneficent wisdom of Him who educes "good from evil," is likely in the issue to pour into a benighted land a stream of civil and religious influence of great power, which a protracted bondage in a distant realm had been preparing for the work. How rejoicing to every humble believer's heart the persuasion, that the centrifugal force of our Southern slavery, no less than the centripetal force of Californian gold, is appropriately working in the system of moral harmonies, and tending to the more rapid and certain triumph of Christianity over the whole earth!

There are many relevant facts of recent date and continuous existence which might well be interwoven in an essay on the tendency of current events in the moral and material world. Among these might be enumerated the Evangelical Alliance—a great convention of Protestant Christians, held in London, in 1846, for the arrangement of a better understanding between the various branches of the Church; and a correlative project in political circles, receiving, we would fain trust, more and more consideration year after year, for the institution of a common centre of arbitration between the different nations, by which a peaceful instead of a military adjustment of all national disputes may be made. These, and a multitude of inferior, though important topics of meditation might be well introduced; and they may yet be the basis of another and similar argument. At present we forbear taxing further the patience of our readers.

ART. VI.—RECENT EDITIONS OF THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOKLES.

[FIRST PAPER.]

1. *Sophoclis Antigonæ Codicum MSS. omniumque Exemplarium scripturæ discrepantia enotata integra, cum Scholiis vetustis, Virorumque doctorum curis presse subnotatis, emendatio atque explicatio edita a FR. CAROLO WEX.* 2 vols., 8vo. Lipsiæ. 1829, 1831.
2. *Ad Sophoclis Tragicæ Annotationes GULIELMI DINDORFII.* 8vo. Oxonii: e Typographeo Clarendoniano. 1836.
3. *Des Sophokles Antigone, Griechisch und Deutsch, herausgegeben von AUGUST BOECKH.* 8vo. Berlin. 1843.
4. *Sophoclis Tragicæ.* Recensuit et explanavit EDUARDUS WUNDERUS. Vol. I., Sect. IV. Continens Antigonam. Editio tertia multis locis emendata. Gothæ et Erfordiæ. 1846.
5. *Sophoclis Tragicæ superstites ex recensione G. DINDORFII.* Editio secunda emendatio. Oxonii. 1849.
6. *The Antigone of Sophocles, in Greek and English.* With an Introduction and Notes by J. W. DONALDSON, B. D. London. 1848.
7. *Adolphi Imperii Opuscula Philologica et Historica amicorum studio collecta edidit F. G. SCHNEIDEWIN.* Gottingæ. 1847.
8. *The Antigone of Sophocles.* With Notes, for the use of colleges in the United States, by T. D. WOOLSEY, President of Yale College. Boston. 1852.

SO MUCH during the last twenty years has been effected for the literature of the Antigone of Sophokles, that we consider no apology due to our readers for calling attention to a brief critical investigation of those more important and valuable editions which are placed at the head of this article. We have no hesitation in confessing at the outset that our principal aim will be to defend, as far as we are able, the traditionary and manuscript readings from being entirely overwhelmed by that rage for conjectural criticism which we shall find, as we proceed, too frequent occasion to notice and rebuke. Whilst condemning, however, the licentious extravagance of those commentators whose design apparently is to shine as authors rather than as editors, we frankly concede that the established proprieties of form, sense, syntax, and metre must not be surrendered too hastily to the fluctuating authority of manuscripts so mutilated and corrupt as those of Æschylos and Sophokles; and that, in instances too numerous to mention, the whole learned world has had abundant reason to rejoice in the beneficial results which have followed acute and rightly regulated criticism. Still we believe that, other things being equal, the tenacity with which the best manuscript authority is adhered to, the ability with which the accuracy of the old readings is vindicated or upheld, the success with which intentional ob-

scurity, scholastic subtlety of allusion, and bold strokes of diction or metaphor are elucidated and confirmed, will furnish us with the best criteria we can hope to attain of the precise merits of each book we are now about to review. We assume it to be undisputed by all who are competent to form an opinion on the subject, that there are but three sources to which a discreet editor of any classical author can resort for the restoration of a corrupt or imperfect text:—the MSS. copies, citations in the old lexicographers and grammarians, and the commentaries of the scholiasts. How slight an influence the remembrance of a fact, whose truth is apparent on the surface, has exerted upon the minds of recent critics, must have attracted the notice and stirred the indignation of all who are familiar with their labours. To state that many of them employ the text of the classics as a mere “paxillus” on which to suspend some “novam hæresim,” in the shape of the so-called “higher criticism,” or lengthened disquisitions upon laws, customs, arts, domestic life, philosophy, in a word, upon everything that is foreign to their own proper task of throwing light upon the *language* of the Greeks, (by far the most important occupation of the scholar,) is to affirm what is true of almost every commentary that in these later days has reached our hands. To assert, again, that many evince as much anxiety to illustrate their own skill in that which has been termed the “much neglected art of emendation,” and busy themselves in attempting, with a measure of success that corresponds but poorly with their energy and zeal, to prove their own judgment, taste, and mastery of the language to be infinitely superior to those of their author, is to advance an accusation which they would hardly care to repel, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνῃν τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον. In these respects, as in many others, the work which we have placed *last* upon our list deserves our marked and especial commendation; and we most heartily wish that all succeeding editors, who have profited by the former labors of Prof. Woolsey to a much greater extent than the learned public are aware, had imitated the caution and conscientiousness with which he invariably treats all suggestions of alteration. We have neither space nor inclination to display to our readers how greatly such criticisms as “locus valde corruptus,” “aliquid turbatum,” “hoc vocabulum pro additamento imperiti librarii habendum,” “error librarii,” and the like, have multiplied since the publication, at Oxford, in 1826, of Elmsley’s collation of the readings and scholia of the best Sophoklean MS. (we mean that generally known as the Codex Laurentianus A);—every such observation being, of course, the precursor of some fresh “attempt at emendation.” Nor does this folly seem likely to

suffer an immediate abatement: for the wisdom of the course pursued by Mr. Badham in his recent edition of the *Helena* and *Iphigeneia in Tauri* has been endorsed in high places; and in the last edition of our play, that of Mr. Donaldson, no less than a hundred and thirteen alterations, of which more than thirty are his own, have been inserted in the text. We by no means seek unjustly to detract from the general value of his book. Some of his translations are ingenious; many of his criticisms, although somewhat too much in the "Sir Oracle" style, both useful and profound; and we have ample reason to believe his own assurance in the preface:

"T is not the hasty product of a day,
But the well-ripen'd fruit of wise delay."

The text of Mr. Dindorf, whose edition can alone claim the distinction of being a new recension of the text of Sophokles, besides retaining a great number of unnecessary conjectures of Brunck, is distinguished, beyond all others, by its perpetual and profligate deviations from the authorized readings; whilst his commentary, which does little or nothing in the way of enlightened criticism or explanation of his author, abounds in still more numerous proposals of emendation—many of them so hastily conceived as to furnish convincing proof that he is far more ready to assume the existence of interpolation, than to ascertain, by careful comparison and investigation, the exact value and authority of manuscript evidence. The edition of Mr. Wex, undoubtedly the most complete, is highly valuable, not only as containing the results of all that has been done for the elucidation of our play up to the time of its publication, but for some original and very meritorious criticism of his own. Its greatest error is, perhaps, the diffuseness of its commentary; in reply to which it may reasonably be urged, that it has been prepared as a manual for the scholar rather than the student, and that fulness is, in this view, preferable to obscure brevity. We are disposed to pronounce the edition of Mr. Wunder as likely to prove, next to that of Prof. Woolsey, the most serviceable and acceptable to the bulk of our students. It affords us indeed the highest pleasure to offer our testimony to the very great obligations under which he has placed every lover of Sophokles by the preparation of his edition, not only of this, but also of all the remaining plays of our poet; and we rejoice that the rapid succession of new editions, and their very extensive circulation both in England and Germany, supply signal and conclusive proof of the high appreciation with which his labours are regarded. We must notice in terms of especial approbation the compression of his notes. It is their distinguishing excellence to

have hit the right mean between too much and too little, contrasting, in this respect, very favourably with the reputation which English annotation has acquired for prolixity, and which, judging from the book of Mr. Donaldson, it seems determined to retain. We cannot, on the other hand, refrain from observing, that a more precise rendering of the words of the poet would sometimes be preferable to the periphrasis of his thought which is given in its place; and that many verbal interpretations, which can readily be obtained from any good lexicon, might be advantageously omitted. There is also too much translation, if we may be permitted to regard his book as designed chiefly for the upper classes of the school-room. We indeed agree most thoroughly in opinion with Mr. Donaldson, that nothing is wanted by the tyro who enjoys the advantage of oral instruction from a competent teacher, except a good text of the author he is reading; but as the majority of those who profess to teach Greek are themselves unfortunately destitute of the requisite appliances for communicating a thorough knowledge of this most difficult poet, we are unfeignedly rejoiced that their pupils may obtain, at an extremely moderate cost, the results of long and careful study by a scholar who is, to say the least, both learned and accurate. The value of the book would have been materially enhanced by the addition of a brief development of the idea which lies at the foundation of the tragedy, and of which it is to be considered the artistic realization. It is no small recommendation of the work of Prof. Woolsey,

— μικρὸς μὲν ἐὼν δέμας ἀλλὰ μαχητῆς,

that it is adorned with a concise and carefully written analysis, not merely of the *οἰκονομία* of the play, but also of the impressions created by its perusal, and the important advantage of a distinct and luminous apprehension of their origin and character insured to his readers.

Before addressing ourselves to the task more immediately before us, a few observations upon the subject to which we have just alluded, and upon some other considerations in connexion with this drama, will not, we trust, be wholly unacceptable to our readers. Without denying the right of every individual to express his own subjective opinion upon the ethical ground-work of this tragedy, unquestionably not far removed from that which still keenly agitates the breasts of mankind,—we mean the antagonism between the duty of obedience to the positive ordinances of the constituted authority of a State, and the duty of obedience to that still higher law of religious and family piety, whose seat is not in the written parchment, but in the consciences of men,—we must still caution the student

that all such opinions must not usurp the name of real criticism, or be regarded as of universally acknowledged and binding authority. And it is from this circumstance that we derive our justification in venturing to express, with that degree of self-distrust which is becoming, our dissent from the view of those eminent scholars, who seem inclined to favour the notion that the self-sacrificing death of Antigone, purely on account of her sublime intrepidity in standing forth, like some early Christian martyr, as the defendant of the higher law, and the punishment of her murderer for his cruel and contemptuous disregard of all that Greece and humanity held holy, is the fundamental thought which was present to the mind of the poet, and evoked the sympathies of his Athenian audience. We need scarcely remind our readers that the burial of the dead, although imperatively required at the hands of surviving relatives and friends, in order that the soul of the departed might obtain a peaceful entrance to the mansions of Hades, was, nevertheless, in the heroic age frequently forbidden by the conqueror, in wars especially that were attended with unusual exasperation of feeling, or were undertaken for purposes of vengeance. Taking, then, our standpoint from the period referred to, can it be denied that, in conformity with Greek usage, no less than with that principle of Greek ethics which enjoined unflinching vengeance upon the enemy of the State, Kreon was abundantly justified in promulgating his edict that the remains of the man who had led the Argive array against Thebes should be deprived of the honours of a tomb? So far there can be no doubt that his conduct was consistent with precedent and the authority he held. His *fault* consists in his forgetfulness of the fact that Polyneikes was, after all, his near kinsman,—in the intemperate passion with which a one-sided view of his duty as a ruler hurries him onward to a complete disregard of far higher and holier behests,—in the immovable and obdurate rejection of the subdued and respectful warnings of the chorus, the impressive and sublime justification of Antigone, the calm and dignified intercession of Hæmon, as the exponent of the unanimous opinions of the citizens,—in the mental blindness engendered by his dogmatism, and the absurd persuasion that those who differ from his opinions must necessarily be hypocrites or traitors,—in the fierce and unmeasured denunciations he heaps upon the watchmen, the murmuring citizens, the guileless Ismene,—in his unnatural treatment of Hæmon, and frantic invectives against Teiresias, the representative of the gods. It is, in fact, the self-will and unmeasured passion with which Kreon strives to maintain and enforce an edict not tyrannical or illegal in itself, that overwhelms him in ruin.

The same faults, although less in degree, are also perceptible in the conduct of Antigone. Animated by the most pure and sisterly affection for the deceased Polynikes, and strong in the consciousness that she is intent upon a deed whose fulfilment is a duty alike to the departed and to the infernal gods, she wholly overlooks the fact that the counter-resolution of Kreon admits in its turn of reciprocal justification. Taking at the outset an attitude of unpromising antagonism to the ruler of Thebes, she denounces him as a foe and a tyrant; in all he does, discerns evidence only of cruel and rancorous hostility; disdains the suggestions of milder counsels, of leaving the burial of her brother to the care of the gods; rushes into the opposite extreme, (ἐπ' ἔσχατον θράσους,) and repels with words of haughty loathing the affectionate pleadings of her sister, that she would remember the ancient evils of her house, the prescribed limits of her station and sex, the duty of obedience. With unmaidenly violence and impetuosity she glories in the manifestation of her opposition to Kreon, exasperates him still more by her scorn, courts death without one thought of her sister, her lover, or her own real inferiority to that "goddess-born" stranger, with whose most piteous death she identifies her own. From these, and numerous other facts which we forbear to specify, the inference seems to us unavoidable, that no Athenian hearer could have supposed it the intention of the poet to represent Antigone, who, in speaking of her own deed, calls it "a pious *crime*," as entirely free from guilt; but rather, that in her case, no less than in that of Kreon, the φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἀμαρτήματα were the direct and real cause of her destruction.

In the same way, moreover, the death of Hæmon, in a large degree attributable to the violence and scorn of his father, is nevertheless exhibited as really his own act, and deserving reprehension. With admirable moderation and self-control, and from wise prudential and political considerations, he had opposed the destruction, without bringing prominently into view his own love for Antigone; but failing of success, with dark, vague threatenings, which excite anew the furious resolutions of the monarch, he hurries away, and avenges his disappointment by the fatal ἀφροσύνη of a suicidal death.

From these considerations, then, we think it will be hardly doubted by our readers that the tragic pivot in the Antigone is not so much the strife of the principles of government and duty abstractedly considered, as the collision of divine with human law in the motives which impelled the conduct of two persons of self-willed and passionate natures.

So far, then, with respect to the ethical basis of this tragedy.

Let us now direct our attention to the external and political influences, which, at the period of its production, must have produced no small impression upon the mind of its author, and are, as we believe, the subject of constant and multiplied reference in the plot no less than in the diction and sentiments of the play. From the testimony of Strabo, Suidas, Aristophanes of Byzantium, and other sources of information, there seems no reason to question the statement that the *Antigone* was exhibited shortly before the outbreak of the Samian war; and that the public enthusiasm with which it was received, led to the nomination of Sophokles as one of the ten generals appointed to conduct hostilities against that island. Hence the important inquiry, What could have procured for Sophokles a reward so different from that usually paid to the successful competitor in a mere dramatic contest? Can we suppose that this was due solely and entirely to the poetical superiority of his drama, or shall we not find, upon a closer investigation of the circumstances of the times, that reasons of a far different nature must have inspired the minds of his countrymen when they conferred upon him so extraordinary a distinction?

The early youth of Sophokles (born about B. C. 496) was spent in that exciting and buoyant period when Athens passed so resplendently through the fiery ordeal of the first and second Persian invasions; and when upon its young democracy had first dawned that idea of a higher and nobler destiny, which, coinciding with the sudden expansion of their maritime activity and the overthrow of the Peisistratidæ, was to open up a new career for themselves and their country. His later youth and ripening manhood belonged to those stormy times in which Athens, fully aroused to the consciousness of its strength, broke down the supremacy of the long dominant Sparta, pursued its victories abroad with untiring energy, converted the *Ægean* into an Attic lake, and acquired supreme dominion over numerous cities on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor. This extraordinary development of its foreign power, with which we must closely associate the no less surprising progress of liberal opinions at home, the consolidation of the power of the democracy, and the general diffusion of comfort, intellectual culture and art, was effected in spite of the most bitter party conflicts and opposition of almost every description. At the head of the movement or progress-party stood Themistokles, the victor of Salamis, whose intuitive sagacity and far-sighted views of foreign policy led him to press the adoption of every means which could insure for Athens ascendancy at sea, obtain her recognition as head and protectress of the Greeks of the islands and Asiatic cities, and by fleets and colonies secure for her citizens at home a life radiant with delights and replete with every

earthly enjoyment. His opponents, on the other hand, that grand conservative party, whose leader was Aristides, and whose inspired priest-poet was the tragedian Æschylos, viewed with strong disapprobation all these and similar projects, declaimed earnestly against the supposed necessity of augmenting their naval force, and sought rather to convert their country into a strong land-power, which, standing aloof from the perils and vicissitudes necessarily attached to schemes of more extended dominion, should remain peacefully contented with the acquisitions it had already won. The conflict was maintained with varying success until Themistokles succumbed to the oligarchical party, who were mainly indebted for their triumph to the military exploits, splendid liberality, and personal popularity of Kimon. The victory thus attained was, however, of short duration; for as Kimon had overthrown Themistokles so he and his party were, in their turn, compelled to submit to the rising influence of Perikles, who, equally great as statesman, orator, and commander, acquired and exercised power solely through and for the benefit of the people. In the year 440, in the early spring of which Sophokles produced the *Antigone*, Perikles, by devoting his eloquence to the promotion of the general good, by a munificent but judicious expenditure of the surplus revenues in the fortification and sculptural and architectural embellishments of the city, by the celebration of magnificent games and religious festivals, by his brilliantly successful labours for the enlargement of the political influence of Athens, his thoughtful and disinterested care for the liberties and material well-being of all classes of the citizens, had just succeeded in breaking down that great and firmly united aristocratical party which, under Thukydides, son of Melesias, had so long opposed and embarrassed his movements. How decisive was his victory is shown, not merely by the circumstance that we hear, during the remaining career of Perikles, of no other individual really formidable as a leader of opposition, but also by the fact that the great statesman suffered his fallen adversary to be recalled, and to be subsequently sent with two colleagues to his assistance in the war against Samos.

We have thus attempted to present to our readers some of the more salient and general features of the times of the *Antigone*, and, in especial, to indicate the profound influence which the immense expansion of trade and navigation, the rapid succession of dazzling conquests abroad, the triumphs and constitutional consolidation of the power of the democracy at home, the embellishment of public and private life with every adornment of art, luxury, and learning, and the splendour of that patriotic oratory which created and sustained the widely-diffused and magnificent public spirit of the Periklean

age, must have exerted upon the mind of every imaginative and cultivated Athenian. Alas! that amidst all the grandeur and glory of the scene, his countrymen's injustice and tyranny abroad, their insatiable ambition and inordinate love of enjoyment at home, their ungrateful depreciation of the disinterested purity of the great statesman, whose eloquence, sagacity, and victories had contributed so largely to the ascendancy of their city, should reveal to his gaze the first germs of decay.

In the sixth year of the thirty years' truce, (B. C. 440-439,) the Milesians, having been vanquished by the Samians in a contest respecting the possession of the little town of Priene, implored help of Athens, among whose tributary allies they had been previously enrolled. Their prayer was seconded by some Samian democrats, who had been banished from their homes by the power of the oligarchical faction then dominant in that island. Samos was, at this epoch, next to Athens, the most important naval power in the *Ægean*, and threatened, by a slight extension of its fleet, to become a dangerous and formidable opponent of Athenian ascendancy. The Athenians required the contending parties to refer their dispute to arbitration at Athens—a behest with which Samos refused to comply. In this dilemma Perikles was compelled to choose between the immediate humiliation of Samos, and the abandonment of the policy which Athens had hitherto invariably pursued with respect to her allies. His decision could not be doubtful; war against Samos was felt to be an imperious necessity, and an armament decreed to be despatched to the island. Among the opponents of his administration, however, men were not wanting who attributed the war to a wholly different motive, with which Perikles was directly and personally interested. That gifted and accomplished female, whose name is still recognised as the ideal of all that is externally lovely and graceful in woman, Aspasia, the friend and counsellor of Perikles, was a native of Miletos. Who could doubt that she had exerted the whole weight of her personal influence over the mind and heart of the great Athenian in favour of her countrymen? How plausible the assumption, that no motives of political foresight or anxiety for the interests of the State, but love and compliance with the prayers of so beautiful a petitioner, had drawn upon the Samians the hostile fleet of the Athenians! The specious but unfounded calumny was publicly uttered and extensively circulated; vainly, as it seemed, for the war was commenced, and Perikles, with the poet of the *Antigone*, nominated as commanders.

If we consider this tragedy with relation to the circumstances thus briefly recounted, and to the growing conviction of the more sober

and patriotic party represented by Perikles, that a curb must be put upon the extravagant lust of a large number of the Athenians for new, distant, and uncertain conquests—that a period had arrived when the ambition of the people must be repressed rather than encouraged, we cannot fail to discern a multitude of allusions which prove that Sophokles was, to say the least, as keenly interested in the politics of the day as Æschylos, when he sought in his *Eumenides* to defend the Areopagos from the attacks of those who were labouring to weaken its aristocratic character and influence. The constant reiteration of its fundamental maxim, that reason and moderation are the highest good, passion, pride, and excess, the greatest evil to a people, must have been well understood by the audience to whom it was addressed, in its direct and practical bearing upon the views that were rife in regard to the extension of Athenian empire, and the treatment of the *debris* of that great aristocratical party which had so long sought the restriction of their rights. The language of the chorus in the second stasimon (vv. 617–625, ed. Woolsey) must have been received as a marked and palpable hit, by those among the audience who, unsatisfied with the thousand tributary cities which bowed to the yoke of their city, were still busied with projects of more unlimited aggrandizement. And what Athenian could have heard the first stasimon sung by the chorus, (vv. 332–375,) without the instantaneous conviction that the almost miraculous growth of his native Athens, her mastery at sea, and the beneficence of Demeter, who at Eleusis had first bestowed upon mortals the fruits of the field, were immediately present to the thought of the poet? Who could have been so blind as not to perceive in the same choral song the numerous references to the party strifes of the day, to the relative situations of the rival leaders, Thukydides and Perikles, (vv. 367–375,) and to the inventive genius of Artemon, that Lacedæmonian mechanician, whose military engines were soon to lay in ruins the proud walls of Samos?

Again: there can be little difficulty in recognising the political predilections of the poet, his ardent admiration and warm attachment to Perikles, in the opening address of Kreon to the chorus. The sentiments there enunciated are far less suited to the character of a tyrant than to the FIRST CITIZEN (Thuk. 2, 65) of a free State; whilst all that Kreon utters respecting the duty of the ruler, the necessity under which he lies to sacrifice personal interests and private friendships to considerations of public welfare and advantage, is precisely in harmony with the actions, no less than the opinions, of Perikles. So, too, the lofty and unsurpassed disinterestedness of Perikles, his magnanimous contempt of all opportunities to enrich himself or his

friends at the expense of the national treasury, or from the profits of office, must have been the subject of the poet's reference in the noble words:—

“For there is nothing
Of all the coinage current in the world
So base as silver. This it is, naught else,
That sacks the city; this it is, naught else,
That parts the goodman from his hearth and home;
This too unteaches and perverts the minds
Of upright mortals, till they take their post
Upon the side of ignominious actions;
This points the way of knavery to mankind,
And finds a school for every deed of sin.”

The statement of Hæmon, that the eye of the ruler alone restrained the utterances of disaffection, (vv. 690, 691, cf. Ai. 167, seqq.) must have been coupled by every Athenian auditor with the majestic form of the great orator, of whom it is recorded, as a special characteristic, that he disdained to flatter the people, but maintained a proud and cold demeanour to the masses; and who, to quote the language of Thukydidēs, “whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, so shaped his speeches as to alarm and beat them down.” The reiterated assertion of Kreon, abundantly verified by his action and conduct, that he would never submit to the influence of a woman, and the no less emphatic assurances of Hæmon, that love to Antigone was in no respect the mainspring of his opposition to his father's decree, could not be viewed as anything else than an unmistakable allusion to the relations existing between Perikles and Aspasia, and the rumors in circulation with respect to the action of the latter in supporting the cause of Miletos against its opponents. In the same way, the following words in the choral invocation to Eros,—

νικᾷ δ' ἐναργῆς βλεφάρων ἡμερος εὐλέκτρον
νύμφας, τῶν μεγάλων πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς
θεσμῶν. ἄμαχος γὰρ ἐμπαί-
ζει θεὸς Ἀφροδίτα,—

must have been understood to point clearly to the not unserviceable or feeble influence of the beautiful and accomplished Milesian upon the great legislator of the day. Lastly, the words of Kreon: “There is no greater ill than disobedience,” (v. 672, seqq.) have a direct and obvious allusion to the obedience which Perikles so rigidly enforced at home, and to the strict subordination which he exacted from the tributary dependencies abroad.

We have said, we trust, enough to demonstrate how simply and naturally the political ethics of the *Antigone* may be explained by a reference to immediately antecedent and contemporaneous events, and to explain the connexion between the publication of the play and the appointment of its author as one of the ten *strategoi* in the Samian war. Here, then, we would rest, merely guarding ourselves from misapprehension, by disavowing all sympathy with the notion that Sophokles has sought simply to unfold his political preferences under dramatic drapery in the tragedy before us, that we are to regard Kreon in his pride of power as Perikles in his unbounded influence over the minds of the Athenians, and to see in the care of Antigone for the burial of her brother, nothing more than the earnest interference of Aspasia in support of the prayer of her fellow-countrymen, the Milesian envoys.

We now proceed to the more immediate object of this paper, and respectfully invite the attention of our readers whilst we journey onwards through the "critica dumeta salebrasque grammaticas," which spread themselves before us.

V. 2. ἄρ' οἷσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν
ὅποιον οὐχὶ νῶν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;

Such is the reading which, after Hermann, all recent editors have adopted, and which Mr. Donaldson pronounces to be "now established in the favour of the critics." Mr. Wunder explains the construction by asserting that *τί οὐχί* might have been substituted, without essential difference of meaning, for *ὅποιον οὐχί*, and that the language of the poet is simply a "more vivid" form of expression for *πάντα τὰ κακὰ τελεῖ*. In this opinion he was formerly supported by Lobeck, who, in his note on *Ai.* 1416, maintains that *ἔτι* and *ὅποιον* are of almost identical signification, and that *ὅποιον οὐ* follows *ἔτι* in the sense of *πάν ὅτιοῦν*. Upon this "somewhat fragile foundation," as Emper rightly terms it, he proceeds to compare our passage with those of which *Æd. Kol.* 1135, *Eur. Phæn.* 892, and other examples cited from Demosthenes by Boeckh, are appropriate specimens. The only really analogous example is that long ago quoted by Hermann from the *Ædipus Rex*: ἄρα μὲν μένησθ' ὅτι, οἱ ἔργα δράσας ὑμῖν εἶτα δεῦρ' ἴων ὁ ποῖ' ἔπρασσον αὐθις. The validity of any inference from this isolated passage (in itself somewhat doubtful) is greatly shaken by the fact, pointed out by Emper, that it may be explained as an asyndeton. The common reading (*ἔτι*) must indeed be abandoned, if explicable only as a double interrogation with the omission of *καί*, like the Homeric *τίς πόθεν ἐσσί*. To this explanation the wide separation of the two interrogative

pronouns, no less than the absence of any just ground of comparison between the stereotype formula alluded to and an artistically elaborated construction like our own, present formidable, if not insuperable opposition. Prof. Woolsey explains upon the supposition that Sophokles forgot the commencement of his sentence while inditing the end, as in those numerous instances, both in poetry and prose, in which the causal particles *ὅτι* and *ὥς* are joined by a blending of two constructions, with the infinitive: e. g., *Νομίζω ὅτι ὅστις ἐν πολέμῳ ὦν στασιάζει πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, τοῦτον πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν στασιάζειν*. As we are reluctant, however, to admit two anacolutha (for another is assumed at v. 4, below) in the very commencement of a tragedy so austere and finished as the play before us, and as the sentence apparently owes no small portion of its significance to the very peculiarity of its construction, we prefer, with the same scholar in his *second* edition, to retain the vulgate. Antigone opens her communication with the passionate inquiry whether Zeus is not accomplishing in the life-time of herself and Ismene, *every* evil which can happen from their relationship to Œdipus; a thought which, had nothing more been intended, might have been expressed without the introduction of *ὅποιον*: — *ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπῳ κακῶν — οὐχὶ νῦν ἔτι ζῶσιν τελεῖ*. But, in addition to the statement that no one of these evils fails to reach them, she expresses, by the insertion of *ὅποιον*, the further notion that in point of *kind* or specific character, no less than in point of number, these misfortunes are in course of fulfilment. Both these ideas are carefully reiterated in the lines which immediately follow, — “*for there is no single circumstance of wretchedness or ruin, of inward degradation or external dishonour, of such sort, that in thy and my misfortunes I have not seen it manifest*,” — where *ὅποιον* is repeated. In support of this view we may quote the words of Hermann: “*ὅτι ad summam malorum, ὅποιον ad genus refertur, in quibus non magis quidpiam vitiose dictum, quam si cui omnia omnis generis mala evenisse dicatur*.” The well-known canon of Dawes, that *ὅποιος* cannot be used as an interrogative, is refuted by several passages in the Attic poets. Cf. Eur. *Rhes.* 702: *τίς, πόθεν ἢ ποίας πάτρας; ὅποιον εὔχεται τὸν ὑπατον θεόν*; upon which passage Lobeck, on Phryn., p. 57, remarks: “*Neminem hodie viventium relativum (ὅποιον) offendet in directa interrogatione positum*, v. Brunck ad Ar. *Plut.* 392, *qui quod dicit ὅποιος, ὅπως, ὥς, ὅστις centies apud Atticos poetas occurrere in interrogatione, idem valet de scriptoribus cujusvis generis et in relativis omnibus*.” So Heliod. 7, 14: *ὅποιοις συνευξόμεθα*; Plat. *Rep.* III., p. 414, D: *οὐκ οἶδα ὅποια τόλμη ἢ ποιοῖς λόγοις χρώμενος*.

4, 5. The commentators are justly offended with the form no less than the sense of the words *ἄτης ἄτερ*. Wunder, Schæfer, and Emper approve the emendation of Coray. Mr. Donaldson edits from his own conjecture *ἄτην ἄγον*, tending to calamity, which we deny to be Greek. Porson surmised that *ἄτερ* originated in the gloss *ἄτηρ* for *ἄτηρόν*, written over the words of the text as explanatory of some periphrase with *ἄτη*, and hence proposed *ἄτης ἔχον*, whilst Brunck conjectures *ἄτήριον*,—unfortunately a “vox ignota” to the Greeks. In his second edition Prof. Woolsey followed Boeckh and Wex in considering the clause parenthetical, and in giving *ἄτερ* the same force as *ἄνευ* and *χωρίς* in similar collocations frequent in Plato and the orators. Now he observes that “the sense thus elicited is not good. Why should not Antigone speak of the *ἄτη* of her race? Perhaps it is hardly necessary to add Dindorf’s explanation: ‘*id est οὐτ’ οὐκ ἄτης ἄτερ, negatione ex præcedente οὐδέν repetenda.*’” As we do not understand how the intolerable construction (or to use the more euphemistic expression of Dindorf, the “negligentior orationis conformatio”) of the verse as it stands, can be excused by the “*tanta perspicuitas sententiæ*,” we believe the reading to be corrupt, and admit that the learned have here legitimate grounds for illustrating their skill in emendation. It is to be regretted that the metre will not allow us to read *ἄτιετον*, as in Æsch. *Eum.* 385: *ἄτιμ’ ἄτιετα δόμεναι λάχῃ*.

19. Mr. Donaldson, referring to his New Cratylus, p. 358, has edited *εἵνεκα*. We are aware that it has been proposed by several scholars to write *εἵνεκα*, wherever *οὐνεκα* is used as a preposition, and that this suggestion has in one or two cases, e. g. Æsch. *Suppl.* 185, the consent of the MSS. [In Thuk. 6, 56, Demosth. p. 1358, 11, Krüger properly restores *εἵνεκα*.] Since, however, Sophokles may be said, from the unanimous testimony of the codices, never to have employed either *εἵνεκα* or *οὐνεκα*, whilst he is in the frequent habit of constructing *οὐνεκα* with the genitive, (in precisely the same way as Herodotos joins that case with the words *μέχρις οὗ*,) we need hardly express our disapproval of any change in the common reading of this verse.

20. Emper observes correctly that *ἔπος καλχαίνειν* does not mean *propter aliquod dictum perturbatum esse*. Equally inaccurate is the supposition of Wex that *ἔπος* signifies *aliquid* or *res*. On the contrary it refers plainly to some communication Antigone is about to make to Ismene, and must be rendered *propter aliquod quod dictura es*.

21. We differ from Mr. Wunder in referring *τάφον* to *προτίσας*, and from Mr. Donaldson in considering it a genitive of relation

dependent upon both participles. The connexion of ideas has been excellently pointed out by Emper. "The primary thought, on which all the emphasis lies, is clearly the non-burial of Polyneikes; and the secondary or subordinate thought, subserving merely the purpose of heightening the outrage enjoined to be practised against *his* remains, the sepulchral honours of Eteokles. This is shown by the very form of the expression; for τὸν μὲν προτίσας is evidently inserted parenthetically, or *extra constructionem*." Hence τάφον must be joined with ἀτιμάσας, as a genitive of privation.

24. χρησθεῖς. "Supply αὐτῷ. *Treating him according to righteous justice and law.*" Hermann, on the other hand, properly remarks that χρησθεῖς cannot be taken for χρησάμενος. The objections to his own emendation are well stated in the note of Mr. Donaldson, who, comparing *El.* 933, where προσδεῖναι is used of additional honours, paid to the tomb of Agamemnon, substitutes in its place the words προσθεῖς δίκαια. Mr. Wunder gets over all difficulty by omitting the verse, and is followed by Dindorf, who contents himself with a mere reference to the authority of his predecessor. Such a proceeding in opposition to the testimony of the MSS., all of which exhibit this line without the slightest variation, cannot be too severely censured. To Mr. Wunder's assertion that the conjunction of δίκαιος with the substantive δίκη is wholly inadmissible, we oppose the more accurate remark of Prof. Woolsey that this epithet is added "because the decree against Polyneikes might be called δίκη, but was yet very far from being δικάα, (δίκαιον scil. κήρυγμα? cf. v. 8,) while it was according to law and justice for Kreon to inter the deceased as next of kin." It is, moreover, in entire accordance with such combinations as γάμος ἄγαμος, πόνος ἄπονος, and the Latin *jus justum* and *jus injustum*. All necessity for alteration in the common reading is superseded by regarding χρησθεῖς as passive, not only in form, but also in sense, as in *Dem. Mid.* 16, *Herod.* 7, 144. Referred to Kreon, it would, according to Prof. Klotz, signify *den, der gebraucht wird*, in a meaning equivalent to the German expression, *der sich so brauchen, der sich so finden liess*, and the Latin *usi eo sumus, habuimus eum*. Such a rendering *dum se justa cum justitia ac lege exhibet*, harmonizes very well with the "faint praise," which, even in the matter of Eteokles' burial, we may suppose that Antigone would be disposed to assign to Kreon.

40. We are happy to find that Porson's elegant emendation λύουσ' ἂν εἰδ' ἄπονσα —, which best preserves the symmetry of form characteristic of proverbial expressions, has been preferred by Wex to λύουσ' ἂν ἡ φάπονσα, as edited by all the rest. That

εἰτε may stand in place of *ἤ*, is clear from *Ai.* 178, *Æd. Tyr.* 517, *Æsch. Ag.* 1404.

48. Mr. Dindorf edits *μ' εἰργεῖν μέτα*, with Brunck. Unnecessarily, for the personal pronoun, omitted in all the MSS., is fully implied in the construction,—the genitive *τῶν ἐμῶν* being unquestionably masculine.

57. The expression *μόρον ἐργάζεσθαι ἐπὶ ἀλλήλοις*, and the position occupied by *χεροῖν* have proved great stumbling-blocks to the commentators. To remove the first, Hermann proposed *ἐπαλλήλοις*, which adjective, although used exclusively by later writers, and only in the sense *one upon another, continuous*, (*Polyb.* 2, 11, 7; *Diod.* 3, 35; *Herodian* 2, 7, 6,) is nevertheless received by Dindorf and Donaldson. Cf. Klotz in *Jahn's Jahrb. f. Phil. B.* 21. S. 162 fg. Mr. Wunder proposes the transposition of the words *μόρον* and *χεροῖν*, which few, we imagine, will approve. The datives *χερί, χεροῖν χερσίν* are frequently so placed in the tragedies, (cf. 1281, *Ai.* 1047,) and were used in a quasi-adverbial sense, almost = *βιαίως*. Boissonade conjectures *ὑπ' ἀλλήλοις*, Emper *ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*, for reasons which, he says, may be seen in the context. With Prof. Woolsey we see no necessity for change. Emper objects to the construction *μήδεσθαι τι ἐπὶ τινι*, quoted by Wunder in support of the expression *μόρον κατεργάζεσθαι ἐπὶ τινι*, that in *μήδεσθαι* the notion of purpose or intention (*consulere in aliquem*) is mainly, if not exclusively, conveyed. A reference, however, to *Hom. Il.* 10, 52, 22, 395, *Od.* 24, 426 will satisfactorily show that *κακὰ μήδεσθαι τινα* is certainly equivalent to *κακὰ δοῦν τινα*. So, too, in *Æsch. Choëph.* 991 with *ἐπὶ* and the dative. We think, therefore, that the illustration is in point; but should it still be objected to, the employment of the preposition may be justified by numerous other passages, such as *Philokt.* 197, 1138, *Eur. Med.* 1262, *Phen.* 629, where see Porson. If, lastly, Hermann's correction should be preferred, it will be better to take it in its usual meaning, *continuis cædibus* (in reference to the outrage just before stated to have been committed by *Ædipus*, and to the suicide of *Iokasta*), than in the sense of *ἀλληλοφονοῖν*.

63, 64. Mr. Donaldson explains the construction: *ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖν χρὴ τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι ἐφυμεν γυναικε, ὡς —, ἔπειτα δὲ οὖνεκα ἀρχόμεσθα [ὥστε] ἀκούειν*. In this way *οὖνεκα*, as at *Philokt.* 232, is a simple synonym for *ὅτι*. Assuming this to be correct we still think Prof. Woolsey's explanation, that the employment of the infinitive is due to a construction *κατὰ σύνεσιν* (the verb *ἀρχόμεσθα* involving here the notion usually expressed by *ἀναγκαζόμεσθα*), in every way preferable to the supposition of an ellipse of *ὥστε*. We would,

however, understand *οὐνεκα* in its causative sense, *quia*, and supply *χρή* to *ἀκούειν*, as suggested by Jakobs.

70. Prof. Woolsey properly supplies *ἐμοί* from *ἐμοῦ* with *ἡδέως*, the adverb being referred in a general way to the subject of the principal clause. Mr. Wunder periphrases: *οὐκ ἂν εἶη μοι ἡδύ, εἰ μετ' ἐμοῦ δρώης*. Quite right, says Emper, as respects the sense, but whence the necessity for the periphrase? To the precisely analogous illustration cited from Eur. *Bacch.* 796, add Plat. *Theæt.* p. 161, C: *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνν ἡδέως εἶρηκεν*, and v. 436, below. Mr. Dindorf, while censuring Brunck's version *lubens te utar adjutrice*, has shown, by his absurd rendering *lubens mecum facies*, that he has himself wholly misconceived the meaning of the poet.

71. Wunder and Donaldson follow Hermann in reading *ὅποια*. Mr. Dindorf edits *ἀλλ' ἴσθ' ὅποια*, which coincides with the scholion: *τοιαύτη γένον, ὅποια καὶ βούλει*. But as the preponderance of authority is in favour of *ἴσθ' ὅποιά σοι δοκεῖ*, and this yields an excellent sense, we cannot see that any change is required. *ἴσθ'* is the imperative of *οἶδα*, but *decide on such things* as —.

83. Mr. Dindorf retains the common reading *μή μου*, but the antithesis requires *μή 'μοῦ*.

88. We prefer Erfurdt's explanation to that of Hermann. Ismene is transported by the taunt of her sister beyond her accustomed gentleness, and indulges in something like sarcasm at the passionate impetuosity of Antigone. The phraseology is doubtless proverbial, for the Greeks called that which was vain and unprofitable *ψυχρόν*. See Eur. *Alkest.* 363, a passage best explained by *Hel.* 35. The sense of our verse will therefore be: *thou art fervid and rash in a matter which can come to no profitable end*.

93. Mr. Donaldson has admitted a conjecture attributed by Emper to Prof. Lehrs, according to which *ἐχθρᾶ* (*sic scriptum*) is joined with *δίκη*, his reason being that *δίκη* without any epithet is an "awkward and languid" termination to the line. "*Ἐχθρᾶ δίκη* is *jus inimicorum*, and the meaning thus imparted to our passage is *jure inimicorum apud mortuum eris*." These are the words of Emper. The common reading gives, nevertheless, as good, if not a better sense, whilst the emendation and its interpretation appear to us equally destitute of credit. The dative *δίκη* has here an adverbial force, as at *El.* 70, 561, 1212, 1255, where it occurs, as in our own line, without a preposition. Its position in the verse is justified by the emphasis attached to its notion. Very dissimilar, therefore, is the Æschylean expression: *δίκη δ' ὁμαίμων κάρτα νιν προστέλλεται*.

100. Mr. Dindorf reads with two manuscripts ἀκτὶς ἀελίοιο, omitting the article before κάλλιστον. The common reading ἀκτὶς ἀελίου τὸ κάλλιστον is defended not merely by the majority of the codices, but by the scholiast and Eustathius. Cf. Pind. *fragm.* p. 231, ed. Dissem, Eur. *Med.* 1218. The article, so far from being "*inepte additum*," is required to isolate and heighten the force of the superlative. — The construction of a partitive genitive, involving the notion of *time antecedent*, with superlatives whose subject is referred retrospectively to the whole circle of objects denoted by the former, is frequent in poetry and prose. The tyro may compare the following examples from Thukydides and Xenophon: πόλεμος ἀξιολογώτατος τῶν προγεγεμένων, ἱεροπρεπέστατος δοκεῖς εἶναι τῶν προγεγενημένων, Ἀθηναῖοι ἀρχὴν τὴν ἤδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κέκτηνται.

106. Mr. Dindorf completes the measure by reading with Hermann Ἀργοθεν ἐκ (scil. ἐκβάντα). We prefer Boeckh's correction Ἀργείων. The same diæresis occurs in vv. 971, 984, 1115.

108. ὀξυτέρῳ κινήσασα χαλινῷ. Mr. Wunder approves Musgrave's explanation *celerior reditus fuit quam accessus*, a harsh and unsatisfactory mode of accounting for the employment of the comparative. Mr. Donaldson asserts that Emper alone has seen its full significance. "The defeated Argives marched away during the night. The beams of the rising sun, which the chorus here addresses, impel them to a swifter flight, i. e. swifter than their retreat during the darkness, for with the advance of day the peril of pursuit became more threatening." That Mr. Donaldson, who confidently affirms that certain works in a list subjoined to his introduction supply "either at first or at second hand every original observation respecting the Antigone which has hitherto been given to the world," should be ignorant that precisely the same explanation, by far the best that can be given of ὀξυτέρῳ, had been brought forward long previously to the publication of Emper's criticisms by Prof. Woolsey, is in no degree surprising. We are, however, disposed to prefer ὀξυτέρῳ, the reading of the three best manuscripts, explained by Welcker as equivalent to the *fræna lupata* of Horace and Virgil. Hermann ἔχων τούτων θυμὸν ἵππογνώμονα, urges in opposition to this view that *fræna lupata* are better adapted to restrain than to accelerate the speed of a flying horse, and that the contrary notion *frænis remissis* would be far more suitable to the routed Argives.

110. That the common reading is corrupt is shown by both syntax and metre. The accusative ὄν has no verb to which it can be referred, and a dipodia is wanting in the anapaestic system.

Mr. Dindorf thinks that the first difficulty is due to an anacoluthon. The poet having written the accusative as if ἤγαγε was to follow, has substituted in place of the finite verb the fuller description: ἀρθεῖς — αἰετὸς ἐς γὰρ ὑπερέπτα. Kühner considers ὃν to depend upon κλάζων, as in Æsch. Ag. 48: κλάζοντες Ἄρη.—but this explanation will hardly meet acceptance. Mr. Wunder, followed by Prof. Woolsey in his second edition, pays little heed to the metrical difficulty, and edits with Brunck ὃς — Πολυνεῖκους. Conceding to these scholars that anapæstic verses, when introduced between the strophe and antistrophe, do not always correspond very precisely either in number or composition, we, nevertheless, believe with Mr. Wex that the equilibrium of the anapæstic system in this Parodos must be strictly maintained. We are strengthened in this conviction from observing the close connexion both in sense and construction between these verses, the close of the strophe, and the anapæstic antisystema. If it is correct we must then admit a lacuna, and restore the construction by supplying a finite verb. For although the participles συναγείρας and ἀγαγὼν would meet the want of the syntax, they would make Polyneikes the principal subject, whereas it is clear that the metaphor of the white-winged eagle is intended for the Argives, whose white shields are most assuredly the ground of the comparison. The deficiency in the text will for these reasons be best supplied in the way proposed by Mr. Wex:—

[ἤγειρεν · ὁ δ'] αἰετὸς εἰς γὰρ ὥς
ὃξέα κλάζων ὑπερέπτα.

This highly ingenious emendation is derived from the words of the scholiast: ὅτινα στρατὸν Ἀργείων ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων νεικέων ἀρθεῖς ἤγαγεν ὁ Πολυνεΐκης, where the word Ἀργείων is probably a corruption of ἀγείρων, so that the scholiast was explaining the ἤγειρεν of his text by the periphrase ἀγείρων ἤγαγε. Cf. Hom. Il. 4, 377, CEd. Kol. 1306.

117. Prof. Woolsey has received Boeckh's emendation φονώσαισιν. This is unquestionably correct, and may be inferred from the annotation of the scholiast to have stood in his copy. The common reading is opposed to both the sense and the metre.

130. All the MSS. exhibit ὑπεροπτίας, a "vox nihili," as Ellendt rightly terms it. Mr. Wunder assumes from the words of the scholiast that Sophokles wrote some such word as ὑπεροπτοτέρους in this sense: ὑπεροπτοτέρους ἢ κατὰ καναχήν, insolentiores quam pro fragore, for this is the meaning of ἢ κατὰ καναχήν after the comparative. Mr. Wunder would probably object to this explanation, and direct us to understand χρυσοῦ καναχῆς not in a general sense,

but of the rattling of the Argive arms: *their arrogance surpassed the (proud) rattling of their golden weapons*. But this thought seems too recondite and far-fetched. Emper, from whose note we have taken the preceding observations, suggests *ὑπεροπλῆντας*, a contracted form of *ὑπεροπλήεντας*. Mr. Donaldson reads *χρυσοῦ καναχῆ θ' ὑπερόπλους*: but however admirable the sense yielded by his suggestion, its lack of authority ought to have forbidden its insertion in the text. We prefer with Mr. Dindorf to adopt the word *ὑπερόπτας*, which is written between the lines in the Cod. Laur. d, and in one of the Parisian MSS., is supported by the explanation of the scholiast, and is well adapted to the sense and the metre. The authority of Thukydides is against the supposition of Wex, who infers from *Œd. Tyr.* 883 that this word may be constructed with the dative. As we can find no support for a collocation so harsh as *ῥεῦμα καναχῆς*, we would connect *χρυσοῦ* with *ῥεῦματι*, and from the words of the scholiast, *μετὰ χρυσοῦ καὶ καναχῆς*, feel no hesitation as to the propriety of inserting *τε* after the second genitive. Read, therefore: *χρυσοῦ καναχῆς θ' ὑπερόπτας*.

133. *ὀρμώντα*. Mr. Donaldson is, doubtless, correct in condemning Wunder's translation, *eum, qui parabat*, but goes greatly too far in receiving a mere inadvertence, for so we must regard it, as one of the "numberless instances of inaccurate syntactical knowledge on the part of professed scholars in Germany." The Latin *is, qui* is, it is true, generally expressed in Greek by the participle with the article, but there are many exceptions both in poetry and prose. Eur. *Phœn.* 270: *ἅπαντα γὰρ τολμῶσι δεῖνα φαίνεται*. Plat. *Gorg.* p. 498, A: *νοῦν ἔχοντα (οὐπω εἶδες) λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα*. Id. *Legg.* p. 795, E: *διαφέρει δὲ πᾶμπολὺ μαθὼν μὴ μαθόντος καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου*.

138-140. The common reading *τὰ μὲν, ἄλλα τὰ δέ*, is evidently corrupt. Boeckh emends *τὰ μὲν, ἄλλα δ'*, and this correction has been received by all subsequent editors. Mr. Wunder explains: *vertit autem aliorsum hæc, alia vero mala aliis inferebat Mars*, i. e., Ares averted mischief from the Thebans by turning aside the danger threatened by Kapaneus, and overwhelmed the Argives with destruction in other parts of the field. Against this emendation, as Emper says, a two-fold objection may be urged. "The first is that the metre requires a long syllable instead of *μὲν* at the end of the verse; the second, that the removal of the danger menaced by Kapaneus cannot possibly have been attributed to Ares, since the preceding verses expressly represent his overthrow to have been effected by the thunderbolt of Zeus." To translate *εἶχε δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν*, with Mr. Donaldson, *some things happened in one way*, i. e.,

Kapaneus was destroyed by Zeus in the manner just mentioned, removes certainly the second objection, but seems to us very frigid. We believe that the poet wrote as follows: εἶχε δ' ἄλλα μὲν ἄλλ'. || ἄλλα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις κ. τ. λ. The corruption of the vulgate arose, doubtless, from the circumstance that some interpreter having appended τὰ μὲν — τὰ δέ as a marginal explanation of ἄλλα μὲν — ἄλλα δέ, this gloss crept subsequently into the text. The ἄλλ' (i. e. ἄλλα) at the conclusion of the first line is for ἄλλως, as at Æsch. *Eum.* 533: ἄλλα δ' ἄλλ' ἐφορεύει, and the sense is: *some things Ares restrained in one way, or differently; but upon others bestowed other things.*

156. Mr. Dindorf edits from his own conjecture νεοχμοῖσι for νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι, and is, as usual, followed by Wunder. On the other hand we believe, if the common reading is inaccurate, the corruption is not to be sought in the thoroughly tragic collocation suspected by Mr. Dindorf. The majority of modern critics, considering the verses antistrophic, suppose that some words have perished from the text, and hence Boeckh introduces the words νέον εἰληχῶς ἀρχήν between Μενουκίως and νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι,—a supplement which Mr. Donaldson has printed in his text. The supposition of a lacuna is highly probable, but we have no hesitation respecting the propriety of retaining νεοχμὸς νεαραῖσι, which the scholiast found in his copy. In favour of Boeckh's emendation it may certainly be urged that it leaves the reading of the MSS. unaltered, supplies a sense which harmonizes excellently with the evident intention of the poet to portray strongly the novelty of the circumstances under which Kreon is just about to make his appearance, and derives some little countenance from the language of the scholiast, which, as Erfurdt pointed out, warrants the inference that he found a participle in his text.

158. Hermann's emendation τίνα δὴ is preferable to the reading τινὰ δὴ of the common copies. It is supported by two manuscripts, one of which exhibits ποίαν as a gloss. The vulgate represents the chorus as saying: I conclude from the convocation of the Gerusia that Kreon has *some plan* or *a plan*. This is opposed by the position of the particle δὴ, which, when used with indefinite pronouns or with ποτε to increase the notion of indefiniteness, is always placed first: δὴ τις, *quidam nescio quis*; δὴ ποτε, *quondam nescio quando*. According to Hermann's alteration the chorus expresses a desire to learn *what plan* he entertains; and this accords with its almost constant habit of questioning every new-comer, in order that certain necessary information as to the subsequent action may be imparted to the spectators. This inquiry meets a direct response in the words

of the monarch, and it is no trifling argument in favour of the interrogative pronoun that it establishes a direct relation between the antecedent and subsequent language.

186. From the use of *ἀντί* in comparisons arises its notion of *substitution* or of *value*. Render, *at the cost of my own safety*; for there is here an antithesis between the individual *σωτηρία* and the public *ἄτη*.

203. Most editors adopt Musgrave's reading *ἐκκεκέρυκται* in place of the common *ἐκκεκηρύχθαι*. Some critics assume an anacoluthon, and refer the infinitive to *κηρύξας ἔχω*. Thus Prof. Woolsey observes that "such tautology can only be accounted for by the poet's having forgotten the structure and supplied *λέγω* before the infinitive." We think that Erfurdt and Wyttenbach are right in maintaining that an absolute ellipse of such a verb, which, by the way, is inconsistent with the notion of the poet's having *forgotten* the construction, is wholly unsupported by authority, and believe that the infinitive is here used for the imperative: *hunc ne quis sepeliat jussum esto*,—in which view, the employment of the perfect is very appropriate.

211. Mr. Dindorf emends *κὰς τὸν εὐμενῇ πόλει*, the common reading being *καὶ τὸν εὖμ. πόλει*. The preposition is inserted to connect the line with the clause *σοὶ ταῦτ' ἀρέσκει* in the preceding verse. But this, to say nothing of the omission of the preposition before *τὸν*—*δύσθουν* and the very doubtful construction *ἀρέσκει τινί τι εἰς τινα*, is inferior in emphasis to the MSS. reading, and more difficult to be understood. The dissatisfaction of the chorus is apparent from the studied brevity of the language.

213. The vulgate *παντί πού τ'* is given up by all the critics, except Klotz, who thinks that *πού τ'* is for *καὶ ὁποιοῦν*. In this view the *plena locutio* would be: *νόμφ δὲ χρῆσθαι ὁποῖφ θέλεις ἔνεστί σοι*. Mr. Dindorf edits *παντί που πάρεστι*, Hermann *πάντι πάντ'*, and Donaldson *πανταχοῦ πάρεστι*: but these suggestions are exceedingly harsh, and diverge too widely from the reading of the MSS. We believe with Boeckh that Erfurdt's conjecture *παντί πού γ'*, although denied by Hermann to be a Greek collocation, is a genuine restoration of the original writing; and that the omission of *που* or *γε* would be altogether destructive of the ethos of the passage. The words of the chorus imply dissatisfaction with the mandate of Kreon in conjunction with a carefully subdued and almost imperceptible irony. We must protest against the statement that this reply of the chorus is to be understood as the expression of its servile and unconditional acquiescence in all that had just fallen from the lips of the king. Submission to authority is, indeed, expressed, in accordance with the

lesson universally inculcated in the days preceding Sophokles, that deference to the ruling powers was the highest virtue. For Greek philosophy and Greek ethics viewed men principally as constituent parts of a πόλις, considering this to be the real end for which all should live, and in which alone the individual could attain his highest and most complete development. Hence there is no just cause for offence in finding the chorus, with a proper appreciation of its own personality and subordination to the leading personages of the play, always disposed to uphold, or at least not openly to contravene, the authority of Kreon. At the same time the Sophoklean *ειρωνεία*, as the critics have observed, is palpable and clear. The words of the chorus neither unreservedly approve nor openly contradict the γνώμη of its ruler, but refer everything and all responsibility to his own will and pleasure.

215. We are surprised, with Mr. Donaldson, at the favour shown by better men to Dindorf's conjecture, πῶς ἂν σκόποι νῦν εἴτε. The chorus had just professed its submission to Kreon and his edict. The king replies to the protestation, the ironical character of which he doubtless detects: What your opinion upon the subject of my authority may be, I neither know nor care; think upon that matter as pleases yourselves, *dummodo nunc custodes sitis eorum quæ edixi*. See the scholiast and Elmsley on *Æd. Kol.* 156. The conjunctive with ὥς ἂν has, in this passage, a quasi-imperatival force; or, to speak with greater accuracy, an antecedent clause is implied in the very nature of the construction.

218. The reading ἄλλω, which has the support of the best MSS., is rejected by Donaldson in his text, but preserved in his translation: *What further office hast thou for another?*

220. Prof. Woolsey's note upon the construction is as follows: "Ὅς sometimes follows οὕτως instead of the usual ὥςτε. Comp. Matthiæ's Gr. Gr. 478, Obs. 1." If the student has the authority referred to, he will find the same fact pointed out in almost the same phraseology. Our objection to this kind of annotation is, that it teaches the student nothing more than he has already learned, from a mere perusal of the passage before him. If comment is necessary, the principle by which the Greeks (chiefly with a negation or in an interrogative sentence) substituted a relative clause with ὅς or more usually ὅστις in place of ὥςτε after οὕτως, should be stated and enforced. "In the same way," says Krüger, "as they said μῶρος ὅς θανεῖν ἐρά, so also, omitting the demonstrative or some antecedent general notion, did they say: (οὐδεὶς) τίς οὕτω μῶρος ὅς θανεῖν ἐρά." Examples abound in Demosthenes and Xenophon.

(Conclusion in the April Number.)

ART. VII.—WILLIAM PENN.

1. *William Penn : an Historical Biography, from New Sources, with an extra Chapter on the "Macaulay Charges."* By WILLIAM HEFWORTH DIXON. 12mo., pp. 353. Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea. 1851.
2. *The History of England from the Accession of James II.* By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Vol. I., Chap. IV., 8vo. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1849.

IN 1644, according to Mr. Dixon, there were two great events in England: the first was the birth of Quakerism; the second, the birth of William Penn. The first happened after this wise. Three Leicestershire rustics, one of whom was a rude and saturnine lad of nineteen, met at a fair, and resolved to have a stoup of ale together. After exhausting the first supply, two of the bumpkins feeling somewhat mellow called for more, and vowed that he who would not drink should pay the score. The other, who neither relished deep draughts himself nor paying for them for others, demurred, and taking a groat from his pocket laid it on the table, and said, "If it be so, I will leave you,"—which he did, and went home filled with strange and gloomy thoughts. "This simple village ale-house incident," says Mr. Dixon, "was one of the most important events which had yet happened in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race; for out of it was to come Quakerism, the writings and teachings of Penn and Barclay, the colony and constitution of Pennsylvania, the republics of the west, and, in no very remote degree, the vast movement of liberal ideas in Great Britain and America in more modern times." Now we mean no disrespect to Mr. Dixon when we say that we do not believe a word of all this twaddle. We believe that both Quakerism and modern liberty in England and America had a much deeper and more dignified origin than the empty breeches-pocket of George Fox. The burning of the Ephesian temple may have caused the fiery energy of the Macedonian madman, the silence of the Delphic oracle may have been occasioned by the yet greater birth to which it is sometimes referred; but the day for such marvels is passed, or at least, with our knowledge of the facts, we cannot compress all the great events to which Mr. Dixon alludes into these empty ale-pots of the Leicestershire fair. We believe Quakerism to have been a phenomenon of not only interest but importance in the world's history, whether we look at its religious or political results; and we believe its actual origin to have occurred in the labours of George Fox; but we can neither regard the fountain to be so small, nor the stream so large, as represented by the enthusiastic biographer of Howard and Penn.

Quakerism is simply one of the manifestations which the human mind will put forth, under the influence of Christianity, in an age of religious earnestness. There are three prominent forms in which the religious element of the race is prone to manifest itself, all of which are exaggerations of a portion of truth. These forms are scepticism, formalism, and mysticism: the first an extravagant assertion of the rational or logical powers; the second, of the sensibilities, which demand something tangible and visible for their excitement; and the third, of the moral or spiritual powers, which isolate the soul, and link it directly to God. These typical forms we have in the Sadducee, who believed too little; the Pharisee, who believed too much; and the Essene, who did not believe at all, so much as feel, and in whom the intense action of the moral element subordinated both the natural reason and the natural emotions in one eager desire after a species of absorption in the divine essence. Now, of the three we are free to confess that our sympathies are mainly with the last. If we must have an exaggeration at all, we think that of the mystic decidedly to be preferred to that of the sceptic or formalist, as it rests on a higher and nobler element of our nature than either of the others. It is not, therefore, with any depreciating estimate of Quakerism, that we rank it among the manifestations of mysticism in Christianity. The essential principle of mysticism is a belief in, and a reliance upon, subjective rather than objective manifestations of God; and a consequent tendency to regard as at least of co-ordinate, if not of paramount authority to the written revelation of the Scriptures, the revelation that is made by God in the soul. Believing in a direct communication of the divine nature to the human, it makes these inward revelations the standard by which to interpret and decide upon the outward, rather than the outward to be the rule by which to try them. It is to this general principle that we must refer the Quaker doctrine of an inward light, as far as it is peculiar to their creed. As sometimes explained, it is difficult to discriminate between it and the common doctrines of union with Christ, the inhabitation of the Spirit in the soul, and the universal grace of the Remonstrants. But as held by those most deeply imbued with the essential principles of the system, it really embodies all that is peculiar to mysticism, as a distinctive manifestation of the religious element in our nature. Hence the written revelation is neither called the word of God, nor is it regarded as the sole and supreme rule of faith and practice. The Scriptures, being themselves only the records of that portion of the divine light that was imparted to their writers, whilst they are regarded with reverence as the testimony which these men gave to the nature and reality of this inward shin-

ing of the Godhead, are yet deemed only as co-ordinate manifestations of this light, which is given to each man to profit withal. There is a more sure word of prophecy, to which all must give earnest heed, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn and the Day-star arise in their hearts. This is the real light to our feet and lamp to our path which is given to guide us on our pilgrimage through life. Hence we are urged by Quakerism to look at the light within, rather than at that without; to seek the Christ revealed in the soul, rather than the Christ revealed in the Scriptures. This we believe to be the fundamental principle of Quakerism, and to be essentially identical with that of mysticism as we find it existing under the action of Christianity.

It is curious to see the affiliation between apparently remote forms of thought. It requires but a few steps of logical induction to develop from this principle all the creed of modern scepticism, which admits an inspiration and a revelation, but affirms that they are not peculiar to the writers of the Scriptures; that they did not reach their highest or most authoritative form in them; and that they cannot be ascribed to a writing at all; and, therefore, that no writing can claim from the human mind that submission which we are bound to give to a clear revelation of God. Now, so far as Quakerism has given currency to these principles, its influence as a theological element has been of the highest importance. The mythical theory of Strauss, has been anticipated by some of the early Friends; and it is worthy of inquiry whether the system of Schleiermacher, which is now working its way so widely in the new school of theological thinkers, had not its origin in the mystical leaven that was instilled into or evolved from his mind by his early Moravian training.

The causes that gave occasion and success to this movement are not obscure. It was an age of deep religious earnestness, and men were asking, with a real and profound anxiety, "What shall I do to be saved?" The establishment of the great doctrine of justification by faith through the Reformation had disfranchised the Church of that plenipotentary power which she once wielded in the matter of salvation, and made it an individual transaction between the soul and God. But such was the deadness and corruption of the Reformed Church of England, that the gospel itself had lost its vitality and heart, and become a mere system of formalism. Now there were two possible directions which an awakened religious earnestness might take,—the one an objective, which would strive to breathe into the Church and the Bible their ancient and real significance, and make the dead letter of each a living word; the other a subjective, which, by a more intense development of that earnestness itself,

should evolve somewhat that should in a measure take the place of both, and be a birth of the new rather than a resuscitation of the old. The first direction was taken by Puritanism, the second by Quakerism. The first made Cromwell, Owen, Baxter, Hampden, and the stern colonists of the Mayflower; the second produced Fox, Barclay, Keith, Penn, and the quiet settlers of the fertile fields of Pennsylvania. The first, from its very objectivity, and consequent necessity of being embodied in fixed forms, had an element of hardness, which was also an element of firmness and permanence; the second, from its subjective character, and its existence as a life rather than as a system, was more vague and indeterminate in its manifestations, and had less enduring activity in the original forms in which it was embodied. The first was the system from which William Penn received the early mould and impulse of his character, the second the result to which the peculiarities of his individual nature led him in the circumstances in which he was placed.

There are three aspects in which Penn presents himself to us, which, although not the successive phases of his character in exact chronological order, yet in the main appear in the three great divisions of his life. These aspects are, as *a courtier, a Christian, and a colonist*. We propose to consider him briefly in each of these characters, in the first of which he was the representative of the state of things from which Quakerism had its origin, its necessity, and its conditions of success; in the second, the type of Quakerism as a religious life; and in the third, the embodiment of Quakerism as a political system, or at least as an element in civil life. We shall probably discover that all these combined influences are perceptible in the resultant of the forces exhibited in his life; and that whilst he did not cease to be a Christian when he became a colonist, neither did he entirely cease to be a courtier when he became a Christian. The best influences of both his courtliness and his Christianity appear mingled in the policy and tone of his colonial life.

To those who have formed their notions of Penn from that fat old gentleman with a broad-brimmed beaver and all the orthodox habiliments of Quakerism, who flourishes in West's painting and the various engravings of the Shakamaxon treaty, it may seem almost an irreverent abuse of terms to speak of William Penn the courtier. And yet it is nevertheless true that, whilst not open to the charges that have been made against him of the courtly vices as well as the courtly graces, he was for a considerable period of his life, and that not the least important in its influence on his subsequent history, a courtier.

His father, Admiral Penn, was one of the most sagacious and suc-

cessful of that long line of heroes that adorn the naval history of England, although in his loyalty he was a sort of quarter-deck Vicar of Bray. The successor of Blake and the conqueror of Van Tromp, he excites our admiration by his prowess and abilities; but the proffered betrayer of Cromwell, who was willing to be the Arnold of the great rebellion, and the secret correspondent of Charles whilst he ate the bread of the Commonwealth, he calls forth our commiseration and contempt. But as treachery to the Protectorate was construed to be fidelity to the Restoration, the return of the profligate Charles brought the admiral again in connexion with the court, and opened dreams of ambition for his family, that he might make it one of the patrician races of England. To attain this end, it was necessary that his eldest son should be brought under such training as would fit him to maintain the honours of his father's house. For this purpose a university course was essential, and he was accordingly sent to Oxford, at the age of fifteen. Unfortunately for the admiral's purpose, there sat in the dean's chair the form of John Owen, whose high-hearted Puritanism was too earnest and real a thing not to prove contagious to sympathetic natures. Penn, having but a few years before been led by his father's imprisonment under Cromwell to serious reflections, and even to a supposed vision, soon became deeply susceptible to the Puritan influence, and plunged profoundly into the great theological controversies of the day. Hence, when Owen was displaced by the Restoration parliament, the sympathies of Penn and others were all arrayed strongly and indignantly against the new *régime*. At this critical juncture there appeared at Oxford a Thomas Loe, who came to proclaim the new doctrines of George Fox, and who found in the excited minds of these recusant adherents of Owen a ready sympathy with his own protest against prevalent spiritual wickedness in high places. A furious crusade of the enthusiastic reformers against the unscriptural abomination of gowns, very naturally procured their expulsion from the university. The ambitious admiral was horror-struck at the thought of the heir and hope of his house becoming a ranting fanatic, and received him with cold and angry contempt. But finding this course unavailing, he determined to try what has cured so many of all taint of seriousness or sobriety—a tour of continental travel, which should expose him to the brilliant seductions of courtly life in Paris and elsewhere in Europe. The plan was so far successful that the silent and almost saturnine boy became somewhat of a polished man of the world, adopting the dress and manners of the fine gentleman, disarming his antagonist in a street duel with rapiers, and able to utter those soft and elegant nothings that formed the staple of fashionable conversa-

tion in that frivolous age. But there were two circumstances that deposited counteracting influences in his mind, the effects of which were long afterwards developed. The first was a course of theological study under the direction of the celebrated Amyrault, of Saumur, whose name is so prominent in the controversies of the Reformed Church of France. Those who have looked into these controversies, will not wonder that, under the guidance of this subtle and powerful intellect, materials should have been accumulated in the mind of Penn which afterwards were used with such force upon Hicks, Kiffin, Baxter, and others whom he met in his countless controversies. The second circumstance was the acquaintance of Algernon Sidney, from whom he imbibed notions that were afterwards attempted to be realized in "the holy experiment" that was made on the fertile banks of the Delaware. But in spite of the theological and political elements that were then infused into his mind, he returned to England, and made his appearance in the gay court of Charles, a finished cavalier. But again were his old Puritan longings awakened by that terrible visitation on London, the plague, in which the phantom of the pale horse and the thirsty dart made many a godless and thoughtless heart tremble; and again did the admiral interpose to save his heir apparent from fanaticism. He therefore sent him to Ireland, where the scheme seemed likely again to be crowned with complete success. The brilliant but virtuous court of Ormonde presented so many counteracting influences, that, having tasted the excitement of military life in an insurrection at Carrickfergus, he became anxious to enter the army, and actually had himself painted, the first and only time in his life, in the costume of a soldier. His father refused his consent to this scheme, supposing that all was going to his mind in regard to his son. But a seeming accident dashed all these expectations, and settled the destiny of Penn. Hearing, on a visit to Cork, that his quondam apostle, Thomas Loe, was to preach that night, he went to hear him, rather from curiosity than any deeper emotion. The fiery words of the earnest Quaker fell, like living coals, on the smouldering elements of religious fervour that yet slumbered in his heart; and inspired with a new purpose, he turned his back on the peerage and splendour intended for him by his father, and identified himself with the followers of George Fox. His father, hearing of it, sent for him, and being unutterably scandalized by his adherence to a sect that would not doff the hat, even in the presence of monarchy itself, the indignant old admiral turned him out of doors. Although readmitted to his father's house, an impassable gulf existed between the two, which continued to separate them, until the admiral was enabled to

judge of the wisdom of his son's choice in that solemn and searching light that falls on earthly things from a death-bed, when his heart relented, and he left his son his fortune and his blessing. Thus ended the courtier epoch of Penn's life; and though, like the rushing tide of the Missouri, after mingling with the placid Father of Waters, we may trace its turbid elements long afterwards in the flow of his life, yet at this point it loses its separate character, and is joined by another set of influences, which bring before us William Penn *the Christian*.

When we pronounce Penn to be a representative of Quakerism as a religious principle, we are not to be understood as affirming that he was a complete type of this movement. Indeed, there was something in the original bent of his mind that did not wholly sympathize with the essential character of Quakerism. Penn was by nature an enthusiast, but not a mystic, and it is in the combination of the two that we find the genuine representation of their religious movement. There were two facts in his nature that drew him toward Quakerism. The one was his Puritanism—the deep and solemn impression of spiritual things that possessed his soul, and prepared him to unite with any class of men, who could share these profound and powerful emotions. The other fact was, his English love of fair-play, and sympathy with the oppressed, who were aiming to establish some great principle. We firmly believe that had Cromwell lived, and given, as he desired, free toleration to all religious professions, —had Quakerism been allowed without opposition to lift up its voice against steeple-houses, mass-houses, taking off hats, and wearing Babylonish apparel, Penn never would have been a Quaker. There was in him, however, a John Bull honesty, with a spice of obstinacy and pugnacity which belongs to the same type of character, that drew him to the persecuted followers of Fox, with all the kindling sympathies of a noble nature hating unfairness and oppression of the weak. Hence his services to the cause were mainly of a polemic character, and he was rather the Ulrich von Hütten or the Theodore Agrippa D'Aubigné of this movement, than the type of its spiritual character. It is perfectly obvious that his sympathies were even stronger with such men as Sidney, Hampden, and Locke, than with Fox, Loe, or the noisy peripatetics who shocked drowsy hirelings in steeple-houses, or fulminated to gaping crowds in market-places, with their testimony against the evil of the times. There is no evidence that he was ever very fondly regarded by Fox, but rather the contrary, in the absence of all confiding and commendatory allusion to him in Fox's private journal, such as we should expect to find with regard to one who rendered the cause such good service. Nor is there any-

thing in this fact that is surprising. Quakerism, from its origin in such a man as Fox, was a protest against all that was esteemed conformity to the world in dress, deportment, and manner of living; and with that pertinacious magnifying of little things, which our nature is always prone to when we lose sight of sober reason and revelation as our guides, it became fiercely intolerant about trifles, whilst denouncing an intolerance about matters of greater importance. This strain of opposition was entirely in accordance with the tastes of many of the early converts, but could not be fully embodied in the son of Admiral Penn, and the friend of Rochester and the two monarchs of the Restoration. He always retained a weakness for the creature comforts and even the elegancies of life, that was sorely scandalizing to his more cynical brethren, and was made the ground of bitter accusations. It is very easy to see that other feelings besides those of a holy indignation against worldly conformity might arise in the lean and gaunt apostles of Fox, when they saw Penn decked out in periwigs of the finest curl and powder, against which they had borne special testimony, and, together with his family, indulging in the gaudy superfluities of silk, and gold, and silver in their apparel; living in a house whose furniture had an elegance that made it vie with a palace; and keeping up a table that not only groaned with the dainties and delicacies of the palate, but also glittered with the elegancies and splendours of the side-board. Mr. Dixon himself, whilst attempting to deny this want of sympathy with his brethren, furnishes unconsciously at once the proof and the explanation of the fact in his own statements. He tells us distinctly that the men who stood by him in his misfortunes were not his fellow-Quakers, but such men as Rochester, Ranelagh, Tillotson, and Locke. And it is only this fact that can redeem the whole sect from a verdict of the most infamous ingratitude in thus forsaking him after his eminent services and sufferings for them. Did we believe that he enjoyed their sympathies and confidence wholly, as one of them in every respect, we should denounce them with indignant severity for thus deserting him in his hour of need. Admitting the fact we allege, we have an explanation of their conduct, which, whilst it cannot justify its ingratitude, yet relieves it from the charge of monstrous and unmitigated baseness.

The service rendered by Penn to his sect was very considerable. With that restless activity and enterprise that belonged to his English nature, he went forth as a missionary to proclaim these new doctrines on the continent. Here he at once gave and received impulses that continued to act long after his missionary tour was ended. In visiting Holland, he came in contact with some of those exiles for

conscience' sake who were looking to the New World as the theatre for the establishment of their principles; and dreams of a holy commonwealth began to arise in his mind, which were afterwards to be embodied in the experiment of Pennsylvania. His labours also at home, in battling for the new faith with his tongue and pen, were by no means inconsiderable. His fluency and ready memory gave him great advantages in oral discussion, whilst a smooth, and at times somewhat energetic style of expression, in spite of his tendency to what Burnet calls "a tedious, luscious way of talking," gave fitting expression to his thoughts. Here also he used to great advantage the treasures that he had accumulated, and the polemic subtilty and skill he had acquired under Owen, at Oxford, and Amyrault, at Saumur; and the *Catenæ Patrum*, and *Loci Communes*, which now seem to us such stores of learned lumber, were wielded with no small effect in that age of theological dialectics.

But, perhaps, his greatest services were rendered in the social and civil relations of the new sect. The public adherence of such a man tended to redeem the new movement from the character of absolute vulgarity, and shield it from that utter contempt with which men generally would be disposed to regard it. But contempt was not the only influence to be dreaded. Hatred and open hostility, the more intense because of the mingling of political and religious feelings so closely in that day, were visited on the Quakers, not only in acts of popular violence, but also in the rigorous enforcement of laws, which, however at variance with English liberty in its essential principles, yet found their place on the English statute-book. And whilst we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, consider Penn as placing the rights of juries, and the guarantees of prisoners, in the commanding position which they now hold, by his own individual trial, yet we must admit that it was one of the battles that was fought for these great principles, and that in contesting the positions taken by the court, he did a valuable service not only to his sect, but also to his nation. And whilst we cannot fully reconcile his course with his principles of passive non-resistance, yet this is but in accordance with the general view we have taken of his Christian and Quaker character. That he was not bound by his principles to obey a bad law is true, but that this unresisting passivity, which his sect proclaimed as Christian meekness, was consistent with an attempt to induce, first the court, and then the jury, to set aside the law, and assume the power of annulling and virtually repealing it, whilst they had sworn to decide under and according to the law; and also with his influence in prevailing upon the imprisoned jurors to sue out a writ of *habeas corpus* for their discharge,—that such sturdy and man-

ful battling for victory, even in a good cause, was exactly Quakerish, is a fact which many will be slow to perceive. But the world owes many of its greatest blessings to the inconsistency of its benefactors, and will judge much more leniently of the man who is inconsistently right, than of him who is always consistently wrong. But, however we may decide the questions of casuistry that arise here, it is obvious that the bold and successful stand that was taken by Penn in regard to this species of legal persecution, was the means of saving his compeers from much petty annoyance and harassing difficulty.

The connexion of Penn with James II. presents nothing which, with our view of his Christian character, was inconsistent with his duties or relations. It is true, that had he been a disciple of the grain of blunt old Fox, there might have arisen between the Quaker and the Papist some exciting discussions about mass-houses, rag-religion, and unseemly vanities, if not on graver topics; but we regard the absence of these things in the connexion between the monarch and subject, as equally consistent with the good sense and good manners of both, and not inconsistent with the sincerity of each in his religious professions. The relations between James and Penn were produced by two causes, the first of which was highly honourable to both, and the second at least highly natural in view of the circumstances of the case. Admiral Penn was the friend of the Stuarts in their exile and misfortune, and descended even to treachery to advance their interests, and after their restoration to power continued their loyal and devoted subject in a department of service in which his eminent abilities were peculiarly valuable, and in which England had a special pride. It was, therefore, natural that he should be regarded with special favour, and that when, on his death-bed, he commended his son to the royal favour, James, then Duke of York, should undertake his guardianship out of affection to the dying hero. This guardianship he exercised before he ascended the throne, and before his patronage could be referred to any motives of state policy. This was the first and main cause of the intimacy thus so strangely existing between the republican Quaker and the despotic Papist. The second cause was one which cannot be regarded as seriously open to objection. Penn was contending as a Quaker for liberty of conscience, because he believed that it was sinful to repress the manifestations of the inward light, and unjust to deprive an Englishman of the power of doing what was not morally wrong. James was desirous of obtaining this liberty because he himself needed its protection, and because thus his designs in introducing Popery could the more effectually be promoted. Different, however, as were their motives, the

result aimed at was the same—the abolition of all penal restrictions on religious belief; and therefore it was not surprising that both, feeling themselves to be weak, should seek mutually to strengthen one another in attaining a common end. As Quaker and Papist were classed together in common hate and hostility, and oppressed by common disabilities of law, it is not matter of surprise that they should unite in striving to obtain common safety and protection. Such a union was, under the circumstances, natural in the highest degree.

Mr. Dixon devotes an extra chapter to “the Macaulay charges,” which he denies, and tries to disprove with great spirit, and as to the most serious of them, with success. But with that proneness to hero-worship which seems to be strong in his nature, he thinks it needful to show that, because Macaulay is wrong about some things, he is wrong about everything, and that his hero is the very Bayard of the broad-brimmed chivalry. This claim, however, has certainly not been made out either by Dixon or Forster for William Penn.

Mr. Dixon reduces Macaulay's charges to five; the first of which is, that Penn's connexion with James in 1684, caused his own sect to look coldly upon him. Mr. D. replies to this, that “his only authority for this statement is Gerard Croese, a Dutchman, who was never in England in his life,” and that the records of the society show that he was in good standing. Now it so happens that Mr. D. has wholly blundered in replying to this charge, missing its vulnerable point, replying to a charge which was not made, and asserting a fact which was not true. It is not only not true that Croese was never in England, but the evidence of this fact is found in the very passage quoted by Macaulay. And the fact exhibited from the Society Records does not bear on the charge, any more than the fact that Thomas Jefferson was elected to high office and never impeached proves that there was no suspicion and dislike felt toward him. The allegation is not of anything publicly and formally expressed, but of coldness and dislike, which would naturally take a less open form. The proof that this feeling exists is spread out on Dixon's own pages. The only point where the charge is really vulnerable is overlooked by Mr. Dixon. It is in assigning the cause of this want of cordiality solely to his connexion with James. It had other causes, as we have suggested, more creditable to Penn, and perhaps less creditable to his associates, although not involving anything in them at variance with the common laws of human nature.

The second charge, that Penn “extorted money” from the girls of Taunton for the maids of honour, is the most serious, and is fully

set aside by Mr. Dixon. He gives eight reasons against this charge, the first of which is, that the letter on which it was based was directed to George Penne, and not to William Penn. Now this is really all that is needed, and the other points raised are like the twelve reasons that were proffered for the absence of a juror, the first of which was that he was dead—a reason which was deemed wholly satisfactory by the Court, and the others were dispensed with. Mr. D. having clearly made out that it was Penne, not Penn, who was engaged in this mean business, the charge must be withdrawn, and we believe has been withdrawn by Macaulay himself. That it should ever have been made by one who had studied the high and honourable character of Penn in all pecuniary transactions, is certainly somewhat surprising.

In regard to the other charges, we believe that Mr. D. has adduced proof that satisfactorily establishes the substantial innocence of Penn, although in some cases he does not fairly meet the statements of Macaulay. In the transaction with Kiffin, all that Mr. D. adduces is negative, as far as respects the charge that James prevailed on Penn to use his influence with Kiffin to accept the aldermanship, and that this influence was ineffectual. It may be true that Penn did advise Kiffin to the step, and yet that his advice was not at first followed, whilst afterwards, when stronger influences were brought to bear, the office was accepted. But the charge itself really involves no guilt on the part of Penn, considering his relations with the king.

Mr. Dixon also indulges in the heroics somewhat, at the remark of Macaulay that Penn had become “a tool of the king and the Jesuits,” and utters some very indignant bursts of eloquent interrogation concerning Penn’s boldness and decided Protestantism. Now the remark of Macaulay contains no imputation on either, for his employment as a tool of Jesuitical intrigue was not with his complete knowledge of the extent of the designs which he was employed to further. He was an unconscious instrument, and unconscious because of the very unsuspecting nobleness of his nature, and the more effectual because of the simple integrity of purpose with which he acted. The crafty Jesuits used him as they have so often used noble natures, and are using them at this hour, by playing upon the very excellencies of their character, and enlisting them in their service. All that is proved there, by such a charge, is, that Penn was not as wily or profound a plotter as those with whom he was associated by circumstances; a fact which few persons will regard as much to his disadvantage.

As far, then, as these charges seriously affect the Christian char-

acter of Penn, we believe they have been successfully answered by his defenders; but as far as they show him to be a man of like weaknesses and foibles with his fellows, we regard the effort at vindication as at once unnecessary and unsuccessful. Penn, although a decided Quaker, was neither an ascetic nor a mystic, nor did he deem it necessary to become a bare-footed friar because he had become a Christian. His aim was not to go out of the world, but to be delivered from its evil; and whilst, according to the rules of St. Dominic, and, indeed, according to the rules of honest old George, as expounded by such teachers as Bugg, (the man with the unsavoury name, as Southey calls him,) he cannot be canonized as a saint, yet, according to the broad and liberal canons of the word of God, he can be welcomed and loved by us as a Christian.

The third aspect in which we see him is, as a *colonist*. This portion of his life is set forth in ample detail by Mr. Dixon, and the perusal of it will excite feelings of the liveliest admiration for the energy of the colonist, and of the profoundest melancholy in view of the obstinacy and ingratitude which he encountered in his great enterprise. His thoughts were directed to this work by his disappointments in England. An ardent friend of liberty, and trembling for its fate in the feeble hands of Charles II., he strained every nerve to have Algernon Sidney returned to parliament, and succeeded, but was disappointed by the treachery and intrigue of the royalists, who procured his rejection from the house, although twice legally elected. Disheartened by these iniquitous measures, he began to look around him for some more hopeful field for the culture of these great principles of liberty. His eyes were naturally directed to that land of hope, the New World, concerning which his youthful enthusiasm had been kindled by his father's stories of the tropical splendour of the West Indies, and his later expectations excited by the Holland emigrants, who sought on the shores of New-England "freedom to worship God." Fortunately circumstances opened up a way by which these longings could be gratified. His father had bequeathed to him claims on the government for money lent, and arrearages of pay, amounting to fifteen thousand pounds, equivalent to near fifty thousand in our day. The empty exchequer of Charles was of course unable to meet such a claim, after its lavish squanderings on scandalous and worthless favourites, and hence payment was from time to time postponed. Penn now proposed to take in satisfaction for his claim a portion of the crown lands in the New World. This claim was opposed by the royalists, because of the republican notions he meant to ingraft on the colony; and a thousand delays, and vexations, and disappointments were invented

to baffle and defeat the project. At length, however, he succeeded, and a charter was made out for a tract of land, which Penn wished to name New-Wales, or Sylvania, but Charles, in honour of his father, called Pennsylvania. Of the vast region thus deeded away, he was made absolute proprietor. His next step was to devise a plan of settlement and government for his new colony, which he did, with the aid of his friend Sidney; and although we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, find in this the germ of the United States and the fountain of American liberty, yet we can unite with him in regarding it as a remarkable proof of the sagacity and political wisdom of its framers. To which of them it owes most, we cannot now decide; but there is honour enough for both, thus to throw themselves so far in advance of the ideas of their generation, and embody so fully the great principles of civil and religious liberty. Having determined the plan, the next step was to obtain suitable emigrants, which, in that restless and dissatisfied age, was not a matter of much difficulty. When it was understood that the enthusiastic follower of Fox, and the high-hearted friend of Sidney, had matured the plan of "a holy experiment" on the virgin soil of the west, in which the dreams of Harrington, More, and Locke should be gloriously embodied, many were found ready to flock around his standard. Accordingly, expeditions were soon fitted out, and in due time the proprietor himself followed, and began his noble and arduous work. He organized the government, embodying in it his principles of peace and justice; laid out a great city; made treaties with the Indians, of which Voltaire sarcastically said, that they were the only ones never sworn to, and never broken; and founded his new republic on principles the most wise, equitable, and comprehensive. Having finished this work he returned to England.

Now, however, his days began to be darkened with thick and gloomy clouds. The scenes that followed the accession and expulsion of James, and the breaking out of the French war involved him in great trouble. Under pretext that his Quaker principles were incompatible with the safety of the colony, and the military defence of the country, he was deprived of its government by an order of council, which annexed it to that of New-York. The blow was a sudden and crushing one. His whole fortune had been expended on his colony, so that one hundred and twenty thousand pounds would not cover the loss. The cherished dreams of his life were embodied in this "holy experiment," which now seemed about to be wrested from his hand. His Irish estates were ruined by the war of the revolution. His English property was covered up with fraudulent claims by the villanous Fords, whom he had so confidently trusted.

He was thus reduced to poverty from an unbounded affluence, menaced with disgrace, threatened with illegal prosecutions, harassed with perjurers and slanderers, robbed of his proprietary rights, and to crown the crushing weight of misfortune, his high and noble-hearted wife, the lovely Guli, died, and left him to struggle with the gathering sorrows that thickened around, in loneliness and bereavement. We know of few sadder sights in history than Penn at this midnight of his life. But the cup of his bitterness was not yet full. In consequence of the resistance offered by the colonial government to Col. Fletcher, the royal deputy, it was actually proposed to withdraw the charter, and thus rob him of his land. He was aroused from the depth of his grief by this new outrage, and desirous of going to America to adjust the difficulty. But he was actually too poor to pay the outfit. He bethought himself of his colonists on whom he had expended a princely fortune, and who were at that time owing him a large amount of quit-rents. He therefore wrote a letter, in which he touchingly laid bare his poverty, and asked those who were in his debt to loan him a few thousands, that he might come out and shield them from this threatened outrage. To their eternal disgrace, they refused the loan, and even made his misfortunes the occasion of trying to exact new privileges from his generous and yielding nature. We wonder not that this utter baseness called forth such indignant complaints from him, and disturbed the quiet placidity of his usual mildness. That the colonists should be ever grasping increased grants of power, disputing his authority over them, and striving to limit his prerogative was the natural result of the unnatural mixture of feudalism and democracy that existed in his constitution; but that they should refuse to pay their lawful dues, neglect him in his misfortune, decline even a loan in his poverty, when they had in their own hands security for repayment, and make his very weakness the pretext for fresh rapacity, shows a thorough meanness and ingratitude of nature that hold them up to execration and contempt.

But matters began soon to brighten somewhat, as this chequered life wore nearer to its sunset. His government was restored to him by an order in council, and the sunshine friends who forsook him in his adversity began to return as the clouds dispersed. But his troubles were still not ended. He returned to Pennsylvania, intending to spend the remainder of his life in elegant retirement at *Pennsbury*, on the Delaware. But before he had been long there, he was alarmed by hearing of a new attempt in England to wrest from him his charter, and thus rob him of his property. Calling the colonial assembly together he urged them to take such steps as would remove

all pretext for this high-handed outrage, promising them all aid in his power in placing the colony on a permanent basis. Instead of responding to his generous patriotism, they again attempted to wring out of his misfortune some gain for themselves, and presented him a long list of the most exorbitant and exacting demands, as insulting as they were unjust. Penn, however, calmly reasoned with them, until they became ashamed of their most rapacious demands, and were reduced to less outrageous terms; but to the last they refused to take on themselves the expenses of their own government, which he had all along borne from his private means, and forced him to the necessity of selling land to raise the means of returning to England. At length he returned; and although the project of wresting the charter from him was abandoned, other troubles met him. The Fords, his sly and villanous agents, trumped up an enormous account against him, which, proven as it was by perjury, was forced to extreme process, and the generous old man, by whose unsuspecting confidence they were enabled to defraud him so basely, was arrested in meeting, and in his old age thrown into prison, because of his inability to pay an unjust debt. At length this matter was adjusted; but new difficulties appeared in the colony. Penn desired to return, but could not because of his poverty. Again he asked them for aid, desiring only the settlement of a stated salary upon him as governor. But again, with consistent meanness, his brethren refused to grant his request. He then wrote them a calm and touching letter, reciting his sleepless anxieties, his sacrifices, and his poverty, all endured for their sakes, and then offered to transfer them to the crown, if they desired the change. His letter seems to have produced a good effect, and the next session of the assembly was more rational and grateful, so that the old man's heart was gladdened by the evidence of returning reason, before he passed away.

But before a second assembly could convene he was beyond the influence of earthly trouble. Repeated strokes of palsy reduced him to a second childhood, and although for five years he lingered on, enjoying comparatively good health, the free and manly intellect was gone. His sole employment was gambolling with the children, and gazing at the beautiful furniture of his mansion with infantile delight. The powers of speech and memory gradually left him; and although there lingered a sweet and holy radiance about his wrecked nature, like a twilight on the columns of the Parthenon, yet it only made the more touching and mournful the shattered nobleness that it illumined. At length, after the columns of his earthly tabernacle had been gently taken down one by one, the final summons came, and without a struggle, or a gleam of conscious recognition of the weeping ones

who hung above the shattered ruins of the weary and wayworn pilgrim, he fell asleep, as the first gray dappings of the dawn were brightening in the sky, on the morning of July 30, 1718. His end at least was peace.

Such was William Penn, the courtier, the Christian, and the colonist, whose life, though stormy and eventful to a degree unusual even in an age of event and storm, yet may be said to have had two childhoods and two deaths. Without being intellectually great, he did that by the unity, energy, and directness of his purposes which greatness failed to accomplish; and without being that faultless monster which his eulogists endeavour to depict him, he was a high-souled, manly, and open-hearted Englishman, a friend who never shrank from avowing his affection, a patriot who scorned to conceal his sentiments, and a Christian who was never ashamed of his cross. Although we cannot, with Mr. Dixon, make him the Romulus or Lycurgus of American liberty, yet we recognise his wisdom, pacific policy, and liberal views as among the most important elements that go to form the inheritance we enjoy, and his embodied influence in the colony he founded as giving marked and decided tone to many of our institutions. Without being either a myth, a hero, or a martyr, his rare combination of excellencies has exalted him into a species of mythical apotheosis, his success has invested him with a halo of heroism, and his sufferings have imparted to his life some of the sublime interest of martyrdom. Inferior to many of his contemporaries in separate qualities, he yet combined the available in faculties with the advantageous in circumstances, so as to accomplish that which they attempted in vain. Of his biographer we have only space to say, that he has done a good service to the memory of his hero, although failing to accomplish much that he has attempted. But we are bound in justice to add, that this failure arises from the impossibility of the case rather than from the inability of the writer; and our only objection is that he has had the folly to attempt what was impossible, and thus to render a partial failure certain. If he has not made a hero out of a warm, noble-hearted, and active Englishman, he has at least shown us that, in the various aspects under which we see William Penn, he was a man to be admired, loved, and even revered, and one whose memory the world will not, soon or willingly, permit to die.

ART. VIII.—POSITIVE SCIENCE.

Vestiges of Civilization; or, the Aetiology of History, Religious, Aesthetical, Political and Philosophical. New-York: H. Bailliere. 1851.

THE work before us is the first-fruit in this country of the *Positive Philosophy* of Auguste Comte, of which a survey is given in a former article in our present number. The author admits that he owes his "fundamental principle" to M. Comte, whom he styles the "greater Newton, succeeding the greater Kepler, of social and universal science." But the disciple is not only bold enough, like his master, to differ from all previous thinkers, but also to extend the views of the master himself, if not to forsake them in a most important application of the fundamental principle, as will further appear in our brief analysis of the work.

But before entering upon this analysis, we must characterize the work briefly, at least in some of its more prominent, though accidental, attributes. The task of the book is no less than to constitute a scientific theory (*the scientific theory its author would say*) of universal nature and universal knowledge, by which both are brought under *one and the same law of progressive evolution*. It is, in a word, the great project, so often essayed by philosophers, both ancient and modern, from Thales and Xenophanes down to Fichte and Hegel, of explaining and determining the *knowable*. And yet the author concludes, in his introduction, that "a theory, thus comprising all principles and comprised in all experience, may be made evident and irresistible to the plainest understanding;" and he hopes "to give the largest generality of readers a conception, clear and consecutive, of both the natural laws of civilization and the essential conditions of science!" A more conclusive proof could hardly be furnished that he belongs to the

Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimæris.

And like all the rest of the tribe he dogmatizes throughout with the loftiest confidence that *his* theory is *the* theory—that the organism of the universe is in his hands, and that the law of development, for man and nature, after struggling through the darkness of ages, has at last found its expounder—not even in Auguste Comte, but in the author of the "Vestiges of Civilization!" To this complexion the thing comes at last, notwithstanding the author's disclaimer—repeated at intervals through the work when some new burst of his own arrogance or irreverence has awakened even his slumbering modesty—of individual claims to pre-eminence, except of position.

Quite consistent with this self-assumed superiority, as the oracle of the new and final *instauratio scientiarum*, is the writer's systematic depreciation of theology, of theologians, and of spiritual religion, throughout the work. No possible opportunity for a sneer is ever lost; and when the finer edge cannot be employed, the writer does not disdain to employ ribaldry as thorough, and, we regret to say, as vulgar, as that of Paine. The Hebrew Bible is for him "a crude miscellany," less ripe than the collections of Trismegistus—"a far-rago of nursery tales, imagined two or three thousand years ago, by a handful of scrofulous barbarians." The "priesthood" were the "professional executioners of early days, and are, in *all* days, too full of the *afflatus* of divinity to have place for humanity in their hearts. It is upon society, alone, that the holy men in question feed, and feast, and fatten." The apologist for the Bible must either justify it on the ground of the infantile imbecility of the Jewish mind, or "excuse it for indecencies which would be thought too disgusting, by a voluptuary of any refinement, to insert in a book of obscenity." The writer who can thus insult the cherished convictions of millions of his fellows—nay, of the wisest and best among those millions—shows himself as destitute of discretion as he is of decency. His whole procedure in this regard seems to us to lack few of the elements of madness. Even the heathen oracles were too sane to disgust their auditors: this climax of folly remained to be achieved by the hierophant of the "Age of Science."

But the theologians may take comfort; the blows of our author's ponderous bludgeon fall as heavily upon all other classes of thinkers. According to him, the "historians" have never produced anything but "a jumble of opinions without consistency and of facts without cohesion;" Niebuhr is but a "reputed reformer," and Prescott writes history "with the philosophy of a fairy tale." The metaphysicians have produced nothing but "reveries;" Mr. Whewell sets up "the conceptive capacity of a clergyman as the model of all truth and the measure of all creation;" the sphere of philology "has never yet been penetrated by a steady ray of science." These are but slight indications of the spirit of the book throughout—a spirit unworthy of the genuinely scientific mind which the author of this book unquestionably possesses.

Another feature, so prominent as to force itself upon our attention everywhere, is the writer's almost servile deference to the French mind, and his consequent depreciation of the English and the German intellect. The Frenchman not only speaks "the most perfect, without a second, of human tongues," but is, *eo nomine*, a philosopher: while the English mind is essentially unscientific and unconstructive;

and the German "wallows in a chaos of crudities."* Injustice to the German mind is flagrant on almost every page of the work; and this, too, while the writer is obviously ignorant of a sentence of the language, and owes his half-knowledge of the theories he dismisses so summarily wholly to French or English translators or expositors! To this ignorance he is indebted for one of his "pregnant and pertinent proofs" that the French mind is now ripe for philosophical history:—"The word *historical*," he says, "is not used in French, as in our own and other idioms, to denote a mere matter of record, but is now become significant of matter of fact, in contradistinction to matter of fable!" How long the German language preceded the French in this use of the word we leave our author to find out; while we beg to assure him, that inaccuracies like this, so positively offered, go far to weaken our confidence in his verifications in general. And in quitting these general views upon his book, we tell him also that if we were disposed to retort upon him even the slightest measure of the sarcasm he so lavishes upon Christianity and Christian ministers, it would be the easiest thing in the world to draw from his own book materials enough so instinct with the *ridiculous*, that no skill of ours would be requisite to barb the arrow—no malignity to poison it. But

Non tali aſſilio nec defenſoribus iſtis

is the sacred cause of truth and of God to be defended. The author is a man of profoundly scientific mind—his work is one of the most logically concatenated treatises we have ever read—and we trust, spite of all the provocations he has given us, to treat both him and his book as they deserve to be treated—on scientific grounds. We proceed then to our summary analysis, only regretting that our limits bind us to the closest brevity of exposition.

The *object* of the work is, as we have stated, identical with that of those philosophers, in all times, who have sought to construct universal systems. But all previous systems, according to the Positive Philosophy, rested upon assumptions which were, moreover, metaphysical or negative phantasies, such as the Universal Unity, the Ego, the Absolute, the Forms of the Understanding, &c. And they were not only chimerical, but incomplete—leaving unbridged the gulf between Man and Nature. Thus Schelling's notion of the *Absolute* implies an opposition between Man and Nature not less than does the all-creative Ego of Fichte; for it, too, makes mind and man the measure of the universe. All these theories (hypothe-

* Strange that the French mind, all scientific as it is, should have paid so little heed to the new Apostle of Science, that M. Comte's great work on Sociology (his crowning task) cannot find a publisher in Paris!

ses, rather) are well compared by our author to "a squirrel in a revolving cage." Unlike these, or any other attempts of the kind, the work before us attempts to reduce the two elements of mind and nature to the same genetical laws, under a conception of real or *positive objectivity*—and this, too, the objectivity not of *entities*, material or mental, but of *relation*. And, what is still more strikingly characteristic of the work, it seeks to found this law upon a *pure induction of facts*, in all the sciences and to all the senses.

To *Sense* there are two facts indubitable and fundamental: 1. The existence of what we call *matter*, or, more strictly, its impression upon, or rather its *relation* to the percipient. 2. The *changes* of such relations, as continuous, or as recurring after intervals of disappearance. But these last form the group of conditions which we name *Motion, Space, and Time*. So certain are all and each of these, when properly viewed as *relations*, that it is absurd to deny and impossible to disbelieve them. Moreover, each member of this group implies the other; and while *they* presuppose no special object or phenomenon in the universe, there is no known or even imaginable object in which they are not presupposed. These three are the only postulates of the new theory; and it must be owned that few demonstrations could offer a more simple and reliable basis. So much for the facts of *sense*.

The facts of *Science* on which the theory is finally rested, are the same elementary facts of Sensation, generalized into the abstract conceptions termed Laws. In this maturer form, they are recognised in the triad of sciences called Mathematics—in the laws (or general relations) of Number, Extension, and Figure. The certainty of these is axiomatic and proverbial. And with these few and familiar elements the theory is ready to proceed on its adventurous way. Motion passing Matter by progressive preponderance from the primordial state of indefinite diffusion (Number) into a state of special direction, (Extension,) and bringing inevitably two or more such formations into opposition (Figure)—in other terms, Gravitation, Affinity, Polarity—this is the triad of forces by whose incessant revolution upon its previous results, accumulating through an eternity of ages, the theory before us pretends to evolve the whole fair universe, in all its past history and in all its present phases—including the Human Mind and the Social System, its highest development! It is the very Gospel of Materialism.

The writer puts the system to a crucial test in boldly applying it to the Social System, which is, as we have said, the last development of the human mind. The highest term of an organic series includes and images all the rest; and so the history of Humanity, in its aggre-

gate evolution, must reproduce, though of course on an enormously complicated scale, the successive triplicity of the three laws of *all* formation as above given. This three-fold division is supplied to the author in Comte's law of historical progression or of social evolution, viz., that the human mind, science, and society, pass through three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive.* The author divides his work, according to this law of evolution, into three cycles, which, by a modification of Comte's nomenclature, he calls the Mythological, the Metaphysical, and the Scientific. This modification, however, implies no substantial change; but in the use of the term Metaphysical our author somewhat differs from Comte, who characterizes the Metaphysical epoch as philosophizing upon "entities," whereas in the work before us these entities themselves are resolved into the type of Will. So, also, the "divinities" and "laws" of Comte's theological and positive eras respectively, are here resolved into the subjective principles of Sensation and Reason. But, as we remarked in the beginning, the writer essays a far bolder flight than even Comte, in the full establishment of his theory. The French philosopher discovered his law, and still maintains it, upon purely empirical grounds. He does not attempt to explain *how* things came to be as they are, but confines himself to their actual existence and operations. He formally disclaims all *genetic* causation—not that he denies it, but only insists that its mode and conditions are unattainable to the human faculties. This *petitio principii* is the fatal flaw in Comte's system; and our author attempts no less than to remedy it by *supplying* the genetic causation or explication, which he not only seeks to carry down through the mental elements and epochs of civilization, but also to extend back through all physical creation.

The three-fold arrangement of the work is, according to our author, "a compound and necessary result (1) of the logical organization of the mind conceiving, (2) of the cosmical order among the things to be conceived, and (3) of the consequent Modes of the Conception." These three factors are explained in a preliminary Part, which treats, in three chapters, I. of the Human Mind, II. of Cosmical Nature, III. of Method. All these are treated *analytically*; and herein the author differs from most system-makers, who generally, after fixing their principles, proceed dogmatically upon them. Nay more, as if in bravado of confidence in his theory, he gives his analysis in the order above stated, though, according to the law of evolution, he should have begun with the World instead of the Mind. His first attempt then is to detect the normal triplicity of his general law in the recognised attributes of the mind, which he resolves into the one

* See page 30 of this Review.

single faculty of Perception, developing itself progressively under nine processes in passing through the triple formulas as repeated in the three cycles. These processes are

- 1st. Cycle Sensation, Memory, Imagination,
 2d. do. Reflection, Abstraction, Generalization,
 3d. do. Reasoning, Comparison, Method.

To complete the furniture of the mature intellect, you must add the *generic* or *conceptive* principles of which these triads are species; and these prove to be the types of the three cycles, viz., Sensation, (or Life,) Will, and Reason. To corroborate these analytic results the author goes into a wide induction of facts, from Mathematics even up to Theology; for the theory, be it remembered, is to *solve all questions within the sphere of the human intellect*. The mathematical corroboration is drawn from Plato's doctrine of the triangle: the moral, from the stages of individual growth, viz., Infancy, Adolescence, and Maturity, (animal, moral, rational :) the physiological, from the three centres of vital organism—the stomach, the heart, and the brain: the historical, from the traditional attribution of the mental functions to each of these organs: the theological from the trinities of all duly developed religions. We need hardly recall Schelling to the minds of our philosophical readers while they survey this universal evolution of triplicity. Schelling proved it as well from his stand-point of objective idealism, as our author from his bold materialism. But in point of logical skill, the latter is certainly equal to the former. The second chapter of this first part treats, as we have said, of the Constitution of Nature, and the third, of Universal Method. The double mode of procedure before indicated is carried through both these chapters; but our space forbids us to enter upon their details. The result of the second chapter is a resolution of the external world into the sole agency of Motion, disposing matter under three progressive combinations of attributes, and composing each upon three subordinate but similar forms of existences—both resulting in three predicables and nine categories, as follows:—

Predicables.	Categories.
Co-existence, ...	Number, Quantity, Figure,
Co-occurrence, ...	Force, Mixture, Structure,
Co-operation, ...	Growth, Life, Mind.

In the third chapter Method is defined to be “the means of placing the perceiving mind upon the track of creative nature.” Its type or fundamental form is found in Induction. Here, again, unable to follow the steps of the analysis, we can only state its results, viz., that “the universal method of Induction, in leading the human mind throughout the labyrinth of nature,” accomplishes the route by three

systematic surveys, with three similar and subordinate stages to each as follows, viz. :—

Systems.	Methods.
Logic . . . Enumeration :	Analogy : Syllogism :
Analytic . . Observation :	Instrumentation : Experimentation :
Synthetic . . Deduction :	Classification : Taxonomy.*

In the conclusion of the chapter the results are brought together and verified by a classification of the sciences, which consists, in fact, in little more than changing the terms employed in the different categories into technical forms, and subordinating them all, in strict accordance with all previous developments of the system, into a final formula, the science of humanity, viz., CIVILIZATION. And here he goes beyond Comte (who refers the moral and intellectual operations to the category of mere natural or physical man, but under the term *Social Physics*) in placing Humanity at the head of the scale as an organic unity,—“a *being* whose constituent elements are the mass of human individuals; whose distinguishing attributes are language, reflection, reason; and whose organic structure is composed of arts, institutions, and sciences.”

The fourth chapter gives an analysis of Motive, which, quite consistently with the character of the whole system, makes Pain and Pleasure, in reference to individuals, Evil and Good with reference to society, the supreme, nay, the *sole* motives of the human mind.

After having thus constructed, and, as he supposes, established his system, our author proceeds in Part II. to apply it to the history of all arts, institutions, systems, and religions through what he calls the Mythological and the Metaphysical ages successively. As for the Scientific age, he only claims to be its herald, not its historian. His course is marked, throughout, by the same acuteness that we have so freely accorded to the former steps of the investigation. It is out of the question for us to attempt even a summary of the procedure. Our imperfect analysis of the work will suffice to show to all who are interested in such speculations, that no such comprehensive attempt at the construction of a scientific system has ever been made on American soil—nor, indeed, upon English. Purposing to return to the work, if possible, for a more full examination than is now possible, and for such a refutation of its errors, both of theory and of application, as we may be able to offer, we can only now make a remark or two upon its tendency.

The whole scheme, as we have seen, is materialistic to the highest

* For *taxonomy* we suppose the author meant to coin the word *taxinomy*. The book abounds in inaccuracies of typography, and in inaccuracies, besides, for which the author is responsible. For many of these the undue haste with which the book was written offers no apology. The book and the world could both have afforded to wait a little longer.

degree. On its basis the conception of Deity is a mere generalization of experience—and the last work of the human mind, in clearing its way to *science*, is to get rid of that conception entirely. The idea of a Divine Designer of the universe is but a relic of the superstitious infancy of the human race. Of course, the notion of final causes is absurd. The morality of the scheme is, as is quite necessary, the lowest and meanest sensualism. The freedom of the will is a chimæra—the will itself “is a mere effect.” Human *rights* are “entitled appetites.” Romanism is the true type of Christianity; and the Jesuit maxim, that “the end sanctifies the means,” has “never been refuted on Christian principles, and never can be.”

Can that system be *philosophical*, which leads to these results? No—it is the negation of philosophy—it is, in fact, the assertion that philosophy is impossible, for it ignores all the *real* questions of philosophy as out of its sphere. It declares that *all* knowledge is limited to the recognition of phenomena, and to the explanation of merely phenomenal laws. The consequences of this position were fully set forth in the article on Philosophy and Faith in our number for April, 1851, and we need not repeat them here. The fundamental vice of the exclusive procedure of the Positive Philosophy is abundantly exposed in that article, and in the first of our present number; and to these, with the one to follow in our April number, we commend our readers for a full exhibition of the limits and the faults of that philosophy. We do not fear any harm to Christianity from the widest application of the Positive Method to the world of *phenomena*. But so miserable is the failure of the grand attempt before us, when the author seeks to apply it to subjects beyond its sphere, that a sentence or two will suffice to indicate it. The Bible, according to this writer, is a “farrago of nursery tales,” originating in the “infantile imbecility” of the Jewish mind. Now *monotheism* is the turning point from the “Mythological” to the “Metaphysical” cycles, and the author himself employs the first chapter of Genesis to inaugurate the advent of his second epoch. The “infantile” mind of the race of “scrofulous barbarians” had anticipated the progress of the universal mind of the race by fifteen hundred years! How does our author account for this? Why, by the vague assertion that Moses “*might have imported a species of personal monotheism, then breaking upon the van of the Egyptian intellect!*” That the human mind has a range of thought *beyond* phenomena, and independent of them—so far as its sources are concerned—this is the indestructible position on which we rest: a position confirmed at once by the consciousness, and even by the experience of mankind, and verified by the failure of *every* system of metaphysics or of science which has sought or claimed to be universal.

ART. IX.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) IT is seldom we have the gratification of calling the attention of our readers to so important and valuable a work as "*The New Testament Expounded and Illustrated, according to the usual Marginal References, in the very words of Holy Scripture, together with the Notes and Translations, and a complete Marginal Harmony of the Gospels*, by CLEMENT MOODY, M. A." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 1852; royal 8vo., pp. 655.) Every student of the Bible knows what floods of light the comparison of scripture with scripture throws upon the sacred text; the juxtaposition of parallel passages is often the best of commentaries. But the trouble and delay of making this comparison prevent ordinary readers from enjoying its benefits to the full extent; and besides, when one has turned to several passages, it is difficult to bear them all in mind at once. The work before us is designed to meet these difficulties, and does it most effectually, by *printing the parallel passages* in full, or so much of them as may be necessary to illustrate the text, at the foot of each page, in the form of a commentary. The sense of each reference is made complete in itself, so as to save all further search on the part of the reader, except only in those places where the text and the parallel are *identical* both in sentiment and language, where it would have been obviously useless to encumber the page with anything more than a reference. We shall be greatly mistaken if this does not turn out to be one of the most popular as well as most useful works ever issued from the Methodist Book Concern. It meets a want which is felt alike by the theologian, the ordinary reader of Scripture, and the Sabbath-school teacher—and we cordially commend it to *all* who really desire to "search the Scriptures."

(2.) WE have called the attention of our readers from time to time to the successive issues of the "*Iconographic Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art*," (New-York: Rudolph Garrigue,) as they have issued from the press; but our notices, given in this way, have been necessarily fragmentary and imperfect. The complete work now lies before us, and we must give it a more extended survey, though we regret that our space will allow us, even now, to give a notice by no means commensurate, either in extent or minuteness, with the magnitude and importance of the work.

The work is founded upon the "*Bilder Atlas zum Conversations-Lexicon*," just published in Leipzig, and edited by J. G. HECK. The American edition, which is in many respects a modification of the original rather than a translation, comprises four large 8vo. volumes, containing over 3,200 pages of text, with five hundred steel plates in quarto, including 12,000 separate figures. The title is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the whole range of human knowledge, but Biography, Speculative Philosophy, and the Abstract Sciences in general, are expressly shut out; and even with this exclusion, it is obvious that the utmost power of compression must be employed to give even a sketch of the vast field of human knowledge in so compendious a form. Accordingly, the work is confined pretty strictly to a clear statement of the ascertained *facts*

of human knowledge, with the view of furnishing a book to which the general reader may safely apply for an explanation of the principal physical facts which come under his notice. The arrangement adopted is not alphabetical, but that of a systematic grouping of distinct treatises, according to their natural affinities. The work thus contains, in part, a series of text-books, many of which "are fuller in their details than most of the popular treatises of the day." Full tables of contents and indexes are given with each volume to facilitate occasional reference, giving the work all the advantage of the alphabetical arrangement.

The supervision of the whole work has been carried on by Professor S. F. BAIRD, formerly of Dickinson College, and now Assistant-Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute. We assured our readers, in our first announcement of the work, of Professor Baird's ample qualifications for the task of editing it, and we find all our promises more than confirmed by the result. Indeed, there has been no instance in this country in which a great literary task, involving the labour of many hands, and extending necessarily over a large space of time, has been so promptly completed according to its original promise, with so much credit both to editor and publisher, as the Iconographic Encyclopædia. The labour, in addition to actual translation, which has devolved upon the editor and his coadjutors, may be best learned by the following extract from the preface:—

"In undertaking an English version of the Iconographic Encyclopædia it was soon found that a literal translation of the original would not satisfy the wants of the American public. Written in and for Germany, the different subjects were treated of much more fully in relation to that country than to the rest of the world. In some articles, too, owing to the lapse of time or other causes, certain omissions of data occurred, which did not allow of their being considered as representing the present state of science, or as suiting the wants of the United States. This, therefore, has rendered it necessary to make copious additions, alterations, and abridgments in the respective translations; while, in some instances, it has been thought proper to rewrite entire articles. Several of these original papers have been prepared by the Editor, and the remainder kindly furnished by some of his friends. Some of these again have relieved him of the burden of translating, and have added much to the merit of their work by judicious alterations and additions; while others have revised his MSS. and enriched them with important suggestions. The authority and value of the assistance thus obtained will be sufficiently evident from the names of those who have so kindly rendered it. To all he here takes the opportunity of returning his warmest acknowledgments.

"The second volume, or the one containing Botany, Zoology, and Anthropology, has been entirely rewritten. The articles in it not prepared by the Editor are *Invertebrate Zoology*, by Prof. S. S. HALDEMAN; *Ornithology*, by JOHN CASSIN, Esq.; and *Mammalia*, by CHARLES GIRARD, Esq.

"The friends to whom he is indebted for careful revision of his MSS. are Prof. WOLCOTT GIBBS, (*Chemistry*); Prof. J. D. DANA, (*Mineralogy*); Prof. L. AGASSIZ, (*Geognosy and Geology*); Dr. ASA GRAY, (*Botany*); Dr. T. G. WORMLEY, (*Anatomy*); and HERMAN LUDWIG, Esq., (*Geography*).

"Those who have assisted him by translating and editing entire articles are, WM. M. BAIRD, Esq., (*Ethnology of the Present Day*); Major C. H. LARNED, U. S. Army, (*Military and Naval Sciences*); F. A. PETERSEN, Esq., (*Architecture*); Prof. CHAS. E. BLUMENTHAL, (*Mythology and Religious Rites*); Prof. WM. TURNER, (*Fine Arts*); and SAMUEL COOPER, Esq., (*Technology*)."

It is not possible for us to go into a separate examination of the different divisions of the work. Suffice it to say, that while some are more carefully

elaborated than others, all are prepared with general fidelity and accuracy. The *plates* are far beyond anything heretofore given by way of graphic illustration to works of this class, and constitute, in part, a pictorial cyclopædia of human knowledge. We commend the work to all our readers who can command the money to buy it.

(3.) ON no subject are instruction and reproof more needed by the American people—line upon line and precept upon precept—than on the training of children. We welcome every book resting upon sound principles that treats of the topic, and none has appeared in which the fundamental grounds are sounder, and the practical advice clearer than "*The Government of Children*," by JOHN A. GERE, of the Baltimore Annual Conference." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 157.) If one lesson of this book,—viz., that the child's obedience must be secured in the first months of its conscious being,—were but sufficiently impressed upon the minds of parents, and wrought out in general practice, there would be more hope for the next generation. The work is divided into five chapters, of which the first treats of the government of habit, the second of government by the intonations of the voice, the third of government by authority, the fourth of government by reason and motives, while the fifth gives valuable miscellaneous advices. The book is a *practical* one, we have said; for Mr. Gere has himself done in his own household all that he advises others to do. We should rejoice to learn that the book had found its way into every Christian family in the land.

(4.) MRS. TUTHILL's story books are of a class that may in general be freely recommended. They all aim, if not to diffuse pure religion, at least to inculcate the virtues, and to impress them upon the minds of youth. Such a book is "*Braggadocio, a book for Boys and Girls*." (New-York: Charles Scribner, 1851; 18mo., pp. 227.)

(5.) THE tide of emigration to California has abated, but yet there are, doubtless, multitudes still eager to seek their fortunes amid her golden sands. All such aspirants would do well to read "*Sixteen Months at the Gold Diggings*," by DANIEL B. WOODS." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 199.) The book gives a graphic account of the labours and privations of the miner's life, and answers, quite satisfactorily, the practical question, "*Who should go to the mines?*"

(6.) "*Rambles in Europe; in a Series of Familiar Letters*," by Rev. M. TRAFTON, M. A." (Boston: C. H. Peirce & Co., 1852; 12mo., pp. 377.) The substance of this book appeared originally in "*Zion's Herald*" and the "*Ladies' Repository*." The letters were worth gathering into a volume, and we are glad to welcome it. Mr. Trafton observes well, and writes in an easy, spirited style, which always carries the reader along without weariness. The following is a specimen at once of the American "*go-aheadativeness*" of the writer, (to use his own phrase,) and of his style of writing:—

"I was very anxious to visit the House of Lords, as, indeed, all are who come to this city of wonders. But, then, you must know it is not an easy thing to get in; not that the entrance is so difficult, so narrow, or so steep, but the *rules*, my

friend, the *rules*. You do not expect to visit any *show-place*, or menagerie, without a permit, nor can you here. You must have a pass from a *peer*, or some grandee, or from your minister. And now, I had called on Mr. Lawrence, at 133 Piccadilly, but he was out of the city, and I had not the honour of an acquaintance, *then*, with any lord, and as Victoria and Albert were both out of the city, I was in a strait. But I must go in, for I could not return and be obliged to say I did not visit the House of Lords. My host sympathized with me, and so did my fellow-boarders. But, said I to them, I shall get into the House *to-day*! I feel thankful for that characteristic of the Yankees—*go-aheadativeness*.

"At twenty minutes to five I found myself opposite the Parliament House; a crowd was gathered to witness the gathering of the *lords*, temporal and spiritual, as they severally arrived and were set down at *their* door. Some in coach and outriders, some on horseback, attended by their grooms, some in a *dog-cart*: let not my readers imagine this a burlesque; a dog-cart is a most fashionable carriage, on two low wheels, with a box under the body for dogs, when going on shooting excursions.

"I directly saw the crowd running toward a particular point, and, turning my eyes in that direction, saw coming towards me an old gentleman on a bay horse, his knees drawn almost up to his saddle-bow, his chin dropped upon his breast, with an enormous excess of nose, projecting far ahead like the cut-water of a canal boat, his body, lank and lean, swaying right and left, a dull gray eye, and sunken cheeks, plainly dressed, with a silver star on his coat collar—and the *conqueror of Napoleon* rode past me! England's idol—the *iron duke*. Waterloo, with all its horrors, its thunder, its flames, its shouts, its furious charges, its shrieks, and groans, and agonies, its destinies, and results, all came floating past. How many wives has that feeble old man made widows—how many mothers childless! Look at him, as his well-trained horse walks slowly past; it was next to seeing Napoleon. You see only a man, and one of no remarkable talents; cool and self-possessed—his great quality obstinacy. You can almost hear *that*, as his head drops upon his breast at each step of his horse—'I won't.' I was glad to have seen this man on horseback for the first time; I saw him next in the House of Lords.

"It was now full five o'clock, and the House opens at this hour. But I am not yet in.

"I decided the matter at once. Taking one of my cards from my pocket, I hastily wrote under my name the magic words, 'Boston, United States;' then marching boldly up to the sentry at the outer door, I handed it to him, remarking, 'Send this card to Lord Brougham.' He passed it to another, and I followed it into the ante-room; in a few minutes out came the noble lord; I bowed—he seized my hand and shook it with great cordiality. 'I am happy to see you, sir; I will introduce you to the House, sir; come in, sir.' I followed him, of course, supposing he would give me in charge of some lacquey, who would conduct me to some quiet place in the gallery, where I could see without being seen; but ah,

'The plans of mice and men
Gang oft awry,'—

and I found myself on the floor of the *House of Lords*. I had more faith in *mysterious influences*, for it must be that seeing *Wellington* had inspired me; for never man attempted more rash things than that same duke, and he succeeded by *perseverance*. He conquered Napoleon—why should not a Yankee conquer that greater tyrant, *etiquette*?

"The rules require that you be 'in full dress.' Well, I was fully dressed. I had on a Quaker frock-coat, buttoned up to the chin, gray pants, black satin vest, black stock, with a *green cotton umbrella* under my arm!

"I marched in; the gallery was filled, but the House was thinly attended. Immediately Lord Brougham commenced making a speech of about twenty minutes, as I supposed for my especial benefit, as it related to nothing then before the House, but something he had done sometime before. Not more than twenty members were present, with but two bishops. Wellington was walking around, with his hands behind him, but in a few minutes he left. It is, I suppose, some time before they get fairly under way; and the session runs far into the night.

"One of the gentleman-ushers came and made himself sociable, pointing out to me the notable characters present. After standing until I was weary I sat down on the steps of the throne, a little elevated platform with crimson hangings, such as I think you often see, or may see, in Odd Fellows' halls.

"I was not struck with the appearance of 'the lords.' I have seen a gathering of country farmers, to discuss some agricultural project, whose appearance was quite as respectable and intelligent. Lounging on the benches, chatting about the recent races, or the coming shooting season, they seemed to take but little interest in what was going on.

"Brougham is the master-spirit, and the working man; busy, bustling, cross—he keeps something moving. Look at him, as he stands there by the wool-sack, addressing 'my lord,' the speaker. He is about five feet ten inches in height, spare, straight, and nervous. His head is not large, and covered with gray hair, which needs a brush. His forehead is low and narrow, his organs of perception large, and his firmness rises up like a small tower. His eyes, gray and twinkling, retiring far back into his head. His nose, small, thin, and turns up at the end, as though designed for rooting up evils. When he walks, his heels come down upon the floor earnestly, saying thereby, 'I am here.' He speaks quick, and his voice drives into your ear like a jet of water. You can see his wonderful powers of sarcasm all over his face; he looks as though he would bite. The members are afraid of him. He is a great man. I wished to hear him on some great question, but could not."

(7.) "*The Gospel Harmony Chronologically arranged in Separate Lessons, for Sunday Schools and Bible Classes*, by WALTER KING, A. M.," (New-York: M. W. Dodd, 18mo., pp. 235,) is, as it appears to us, a work judiciously prepared on an excellent principle. A digest of a Gospel harmony is given in lessons, with careful questions on each, carrying a class regularly on through the life of the Saviour and the record of his teachings. It is well adapted for use in families as well as in Sunday schools and Bible classes.

(8.) "*Hungary and Kossuth: or an American Exposition of the late Hungarian Revolution*, by REV. B. F. TEFFT, D. D." (Philadelphia and New-Orleans: John Ball, 1852; 12mo., pp. 378.) This book, timely as it is, is not the result of hasty preparation to meet Kossuth's arrival, but is the fruit of years of interest in the subject, and of earnest and faithful study. As a repository of facts in the history and geography of Hungary, it has no rival among American publications. The first two chapters treat of the character of the country and the origin of the people; the third, of the religions of Hungary; the fourth, of the language and literature of the Magyars; the fifth, of the Hungarian Constitution. After this exposition of the internal state of the country, Dr. Tefft proceeds to set forth its external relations, and gives, in three closely written chapters, a clear history of the development of the Hungarian nationality, and of the various attempts to overthrow it before the recent revolution. The ninth chapter, under the title of the "Austrian Revolution," traces the recent movement from the seed sown by Luther up to the general movement of 1848. The remaining chapters give the history of the late Revolution and of its great hero, Kossuth, with great clearness, directness, and impartiality. The absurd statements of some American (!) writers, taken from Austrian and English sources, that this Magyar movement throughout has been an aristocratic one, and that its success would have been in fact the enslavement of the whole non-Magyar population of Hun-

gary, find ample refutation in these lucid and accurate pages. One can hardly avoid believing that the Austrian government, poor as it is, has found gold enough to set the pens of hireling writers at work in England, as well as on the continent of Europe, if not in America, to turn back, if possible, the tide of popular sympathy, which now, through all the free nations of the earth, runs so strongly in favour of Hungary and Kossuth. It is all in vain. The day hastens on—may God speed it!—when both England and America will rise to “the height of the great argument” embodied in the concluding words of Dr. Tefft’s able and excellent work:—“Hungary has a future; and when her hour shall come, as surely it will come, the civilized world will have a duty to perform. By that time the free nations of the earth will have learned the rights and the wrongs of this race of self-sacrificing democrats. The American Republic will have learned them; and whatever it may be wise and prudent for the government to do, or not to do, when the next crisis comes, the people will not fail to show themselves the enemies of oppression and the friends of universal freedom.”

(9.) “*Excerpta ex P. Ovidii Nasonis Carminibus*” (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 1851; 18mo., pp. 245) is another of Schmitz and Zumpt’s classical series, edited in the same judicious spirit, and got up in the same neat and cheap style as the books of the same series heretofore noticed.

(10.) COLERIDGE tells us that he found no book so unfailing a source of enjoyment as Southey’s *Life of Wesley*; and the interest of the story is, in fact, inexhaustible. It must and will be written, and rewritten, over and over again, to meet the wants of successive generations and of different classes of mankind. “*Wesley and his Coadjutors*, by Rev. W. C. LARRABEE, A. M.,” (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 2 vols., 12mo.,) is a series of graphic sketches of the prominent events in Wesley’s wonderful career, with notices of the more remarkable of his co-labourers. Like everything else which Dr. Larrabee writes, it is clear, easy, and natural in style, while the writer’s love for his theme warms his writing at times into a genial glow of eloquence. We bespeak for the work a wide circulation.

(11.) WORKS on Ecclesiastes have multiplied greatly of late, but they have been mostly critical and exegetical. We have now before us a practical one in “*The Royal Preacher: Lectures on Ecclesiastes*, by JAMES HAMILTON, D. D.” (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 353.) The style is animated and generally chaste, and the spirit of the work is excellent.

(12.) A FULL account of the doctrines and polity of Methodism in a compendious form has long been a desideratum. The want is now to a great extent supplied by “*A Compendium of Methodism*, by Rev. JAMES PORTER, A. M.” (Boston: C. H. Peirce & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 501.) The work is divided into four parts, of which Part I. gives a *historical* sketch of Methodism from its rise to the present time, both in England and America. A large amount of information is here condensed into a comparatively small compass.

Part II. sets forth the *doctrinal* views of Methodists as distinguished from those of other denominations. Part III. treats of the *government* of the Church, with a preliminary exhibition of various systems of Church government, which is very well drawn up. Then follow a statement and defence of the peculiarities of our own system—especially of our Episcopacy. In Part IV. the *prudential* arrangements peculiar to the different sects of Wesleyans are set forth. Two of our most marked peculiarities—Itinerancy and Class-meetings—are exhibited and defended with skill and force. The work, throughout, is *not* a criticism on Methodist usages, but a statement and defence of them. As such we trust it will meet with the wide circulation it deserves, both in and out of the Church. We are sorry to see so good a book disfigured by so many typographical errors.

(13.) "*The Christian's Daily Treasury*, by EBENEZER TEMPLE," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851; 12mo., pp. 431,) contains a religious exercise, in the form of a brief exposition of Scripture, for every day in the year. The utility of such manuals, for family worship as well as in private devotion, is unquestionable; and this one has the merits of brevity, simplicity, and directness. The work manifests neither remarkable power of interpretation, nor profoundness of thought; but it abounds in proofs of Christian feeling and of reverence for the oracles of God.

(14.) "*A Concise History of England, from the first Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of Queen Victoria*, by W. CLARK, Esq., edited, with additions, by J. C. MOFFATT, M. A., Professor of Latin Literature in Miami University." (Cincinnati: Moore & Anderson, 1851; 12mo., pp. 344.) This book answers a good purpose in presenting a continuous outline of English history in chronological order and in compact form. It was originally issued in England; and the American editor has made a number of useful and judicious additions. The book is well adapted for use in schools. It is strange, however, that neither the author nor the editor should have given us—what are indispensable appendages to such a work—a chronological table and an index.

(15.) "*Duties of Masters to Servants*" (Charleston, 1851; 18mo., pp. 151) contains three premium essays, by Rev. H. N. McTycire, Rev. C. F. Sturgis, and Rev. A. T. Holmes, published under the auspices of the Southern Baptist Publication Society. The first essay is the best of the three. If slaves were to be treated universally as these writers recommend, slavery would soon come to an end.

(16.) ONLY within the last quarter have we received a copy of "*Lectures on the Scientific Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, by W. C. LARABEE, A. M.," (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, pp. 395,) though the work was issued more than a year ago. It is an excellent summary of the argument from design, extended through a great variety of illustrations from the natural world. The style is easy and agreeable, and the book is one calculated to be very useful.

(17.) MESSRS. HARPER & BROTHERS have commenced a reprint of Jacob Abbott's series of books in practical religion, of which we have before us the first volume, viz., "*The Young Christian, very greatly improved and enlarged.*" (12mo., pp. 402.) The wide circulation of this book, not merely at home, but in almost every civilized country in the world, is one of the best proofs of its excellence; books of this class do not gain such circulation without, at least, the merit of adaptation to their end. The present edition is carefully revised, as the title-page states, and is, besides, illustrated by numerous engravings. Of all Mr. Abbott's writings these volumes will doubtless be those on which he will look back with most pleasure in old age, or from heaven: and their reissue, in their improved form, is for him, no doubt, a labour of love, as it is for others, most assuredly, a work of blessing.

(18.) "*The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, practically explained*, by AUGUSTUS NEANDER, translated by Mrs. H. C. CONANT." (New-York: L. Colby & Co., 12mo., pp. 140.) A beautiful exhibition of Neander's great power of exegesis—not in the way of critical discussion, but of the profoundest sympathy with the spirit of the text and the fullest comprehension of its scope. This practical exposition rests upon a thoroughly scientific ground, but is free from any scholastic forms, and is adapted to the general reading of Christians. A few passages are not interpreted as we understand them—but that does not hinder us from commending the work to our readers as a precious one. The style of the translation is admirable.

(19.) "WE make too little of our HOMES; and one reason of this is that the Pulpit holds itself so much aloof from the common routine of domestic life." These truths led to the preparation of a course of lectures now embodied in "*The Bible in the Family, or Hints on Domestic Happiness*, by H. A. BOARDMAN, Pastor of the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia." (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 341.) The lectures set forth, in a plain, sensible, and practical style, the scope of the family tie in all its ramifications, and the duties that spring from it, as taught in the Bible. It is worthy of general circulation.

(20.) COLLECTIONS of select poems have long been a favourite style of fancy books, and one that does not seem to go out of fashion. Among the most recent of these we have "*Blossoms of Childhood*," just issued from the press of Carter & Brothers of this city, consisting of nearly two hundred short pieces relating to childhood and children. These poems are generally by modern authors of established reputation—many of them Americans. In style and literary character they are respectable, though not in all cases above criticism, or perfect models of their kind. The moral character of the pieces appears to be unexceptionable, and the book may be safely commended to public favour.

(21.) "*Christianity Tested by Eminent Men*" is a series of brief sketches of Christian Biography, originally made by the late Professor CALDWELL, of

Dickinson College, and edited, with an introduction, by Rev. S. M. VAIL, Professor at Concord. (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 216.) It was a distinguishing trait of Professor Caldwell's eminently Christian character, that he was ready to work in *any* department of labour for the moral welfare of mankind, and especially of the young: and the volume before us is a specimen of how much good may be done, by a wise and thoughtful mind that will employ itself for a good purpose, even in an humble species of authorship. The work gives sketches of a number of the world's greatest men—such as Franklin, Davy, and others, in the sphere of science; Hale, Richelieu, Washington, and other statesmen and jurists—all testifying to the truth and power of Christianity. So far as the evidence from human authority can go, this volume is a valuable book of "Christian Evidences," and we trust it will be widely circulated.

(22.) "*The Merchant's Daughter, and other Narratives*, by Rev. J. T. BARR," (New-York: Lane & Scott, 1851; 18mo., pp. 228,) is a series of sketches for the young, illustrating the fatal consequences of sin and the happy effects of true piety even in this life. Extraordinary as some of the incidents related in this volume are, every one of them is a well authenticated fact. Truth is, indeed, stranger than fiction. The book proves a valuable addition to that array of good books for the young furnished by the Methodist Book Concern.

(23.) AMONG the most valuable issues in Bohn's Standard Library is "*Neander's History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Churches by the Apostles, with his Antignostikus*," (2 vols., 12mo.,) edited by Dr. J. E. RYLAND. In this new edition of the Planting and Training all Neander's corrections and additions to his third and fourth editions are given—not, however, wrought into the text, as we could have wished, but given as a pendant to the work. The *Antignostikus* appears for the first time in an English dress. Another of the recent issues is the first volume of "*Christian Iconography*," by M. DIDRON, translated by E. J. MILLINGTON," being an illustrated history of the image-system of the Roman Catholic Church in the middle age. These, with all the other valuable works of Bohn's-series, are kept on sale by Messrs. Bangs, Brother & Co., New-York.

(24.) "*The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to Waterloo*, by E. S. CREASY, M. A." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 364.) The *taking* title of this book, as well as its subject, was suggested to the author by a remark of Hallam's upon the battle of Tours—"It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes." To determine what battles should fall into this decisive class is no easy task; indeed, hardly any two inquirers would be likely to coincide in a decision. Certainly we cannot agree that all or even the greater part of the battles cited by Mr. Creasy were of such moment to the world's history as he supposes. The battle of Marathon might have been decided in favour of the Persians without affecting the tenor of human events very greatly. The fate of Carthage was

sealed before the battle of the Metaurus. Blenheim signalized the shame of Louis rather than any vital change in the history of mankind. Had Burgoyne conquered at Saratoga, he would have united with Clinton in vain. Indeed, we cannot see that Mr. Creasy has been guided by any philosophical principle in his selection of decisive conflicts. But he has certainly chosen fifteen important battles, and described them with a good deal of graphic power. His style, however, is ambitious and inelegant—a bad imitation of a bad model. Alison.

(25.) WE have received the second volume of "*Lives of the Queens of Scotland and English Princesses connected with the royal succession of Great Britain.*" by AGNES STRICKLAND." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 402.) In this volume the sketch of Mary of Lorraine (second queen of James V.) is completed, and a pretty full biography is given of the Lady Margaret Douglass, Countess of Lenox.

(26.) "*Sketches of the Life and Labours of James Quinn*, by JOHN F. WRIGHT, of the Ohio Conference." (Cincinnati: 1851; 12mo., pp. 324.) Mr. Quinn was for nearly half a century a minister of the gospel in the Methodist Episcopal Church, and this book is a record of his labours, and at the same time a sketch of the growth of the West not only in Methodism but in population and power. The world has yet to learn what the early pioneers of Methodism on the American frontier have done, suffered, and achieved, in behalf of religion and civilization. To this band of heroes Mr. Quinn belonged, and it was fitting that this memorial of him should be preserved. The work is sold for the benefit of his aged widow; and on this account, as well as in view of its intrinsic merit, we commend it to our readers.

(27.) BISHOP McILVAINE'S "*Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Ohio, in St. Paul's Church, Cleveland, October 11, 1851*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, pp. 50,) is, in the main, a sensible protest against Romanizing views, in an exposition of the necessity, the nature, and the means of regeneration. While the good bishop's productions, in general, are not remarkable for scope or vigour of thought, and always show traces of a narrow theological training, they are yet so thoroughly imbued with Christian earnestness as to form valuable contributions to practical theology. The appendix contains a parallel between the *revival* measures adopted in some of the Protestant Churches, and the recent operations of the Redemptorists in the Roman Catholic Churches, which is a curious mixture of sense and prejudice, of discrimination and simplicity.

(28.) ALMOST simultaneously with Keys's "*Class-Leader's Manual*," of which we gave a notice some time since, there appeared in Cincinnati a "*Treatise on Class-Meetings*, by REV. JOHN MILEY, A. M.," (18mo., pp. 224,) with an introduction by Bishop Morris, written in his usual style of clear and manly simplicity. The book treats, in order, of the social principle of class-meetings,

their design, and their obligation. The objections to such meetings are then considered, and their benefits set forth. The work concludes with a chapter upon the mode of conducting class-meetings, and upon the duties of leaders and members. All these topics are well and carefully worked out, and the book throughout is eminently adapted for usefulness.

(29.) "*Moby-Dick; or the Whale*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 634,) is the latest effusion of HERMAN MELVILLE's versatile genius. It is a wonderful mixture of fact and fancy—of information about the whale and its habits, and of the wildest whimsies of a seething brain. The book displays the same power of dashing description, of vivid picture-painting, which characterizes all the other works of this writer. We are bound to say, however, that the book contains a number of flings at religion, and even of vulgar immoralities that render it unfit for general circulation. We regret that Mr. Melville should allow himself to sink so low.

(30.) THE question of the recognition of friends in the future life is one involving our human affections so deeply that hardly any discussion of it can fail to be interesting. Quite a copious treatise on the subject is given in "*The Heavenly Recognition; or, an Earnest and Scriptural Discussion of the Question, Will (shall) we know our friends in Heaven*," by REV. HENRY HARBAUGH, A. M." (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston; 12mo., pp. 288.) The writer first looks among the pagans for glimpses of the belief, not merely in a future state, but in the joys of friendship and love there. The question is then examined in the light of reason and history; and the final appeal is made to the teachings of Christ and the apostles. The views thus obtained are confirmed by the teachings (incidental rather than direct) of the Fathers of the Church, and of many eminent theologians of ancient and modern times. Finally, the common objections to the doctrine are cited and refuted at length. Mr. Harbaugh writes with a warm Christian feeling; and although his treatise is unnecessarily diffuse, it is, perhaps, the best extant upon the subject.

(31.) THE third volume of "*Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers*," by REV. WILLIAM HANNA," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; pp. 530,) brings the biography up to the year 1835. According to the original announcement the work was to have been completed in three volumes; but Dr. Hanna, it seems, miscalculated the amount of his material, and finds that he must issue a fourth as the final volume. A little more compression would not only have fulfilled the first intention of the writer, but have made the book a better and more useful one. There are many pages of matter in this volume quite as worthless as the following about a sloop that contained Dr. C.'s furniture:—

"December 4th.—This morning I was put into a sad alarm before breakfast by the information that a sloop had been stranded overnight, and was now among the rocks.

"December 5th.—I have been tantalized with two appearances to-day in the offing, neither of which turned out as I had hoped for; and as yet there is no

thing within verge of the horizon that can be interpreted into our vessel. The weather, however, has become moderate, and the surf on the beach has abated greatly. The water looks quite calm in the bay; and should this fair and yet gentle breeze continue, it may cast up in the course of to-morrow. am in great peace and comfort. I am floundering on through my course of moral philosophy, and I think that I can see how, helter-skelter, I shall arrive at the termination of it.

"December 8th.—There was a vessel this day reported to have turned Fifeness, and which beat against the wind, as we all thought, for St. Andrews. It went by the name of Dr. Chalmers's sloop, and when on its last tack, as we thought, to the pier, a pilot-boat went out, on which she turned immediately for the West Sands, where she lies at anchor. The inference is, that she is a vessel which has just come in for shelter. The weather is more moderate to-night, and we shall be looking out to-morrow.

"December 9th, Tuesday,—Five o'clock.—No appearance yet of our vessel. I came up from the shore before dinner with the impression that it was really unaccountable now; but Mr. Duncan tells me that he held conversation with a fisherman about it, who said that, from the direction of the wind, there was still a difficulty in turning the point.

"December 10th.—I make no delay in informing you that the sloop arrived this morning, and is lying aground off the harbour. There will be no unpacking till to-morrow."

Think, too, of the folly of printing such "diary-work" as the following:—

"Thursday.—Got up between eight and nine. Family worship and breakfast. Have rather fallen behind in my pulpit preparations, but I hope to do something to-day. After breakfast I wrote a little. The chaise came to the door and took me and two of the Misses Oliphant to Freeland, where we called on Lady Ruthven. Lord R. was at Perth. Her ladyship is remarkably clever, and was remarkably kind. She has been much in Greece, and showed me many admirable drawings. Her mother, Mrs. Campbell of Shawfield, was there, who appears a remarkably wholesome and well-disposed person; but the most interesting of the whole was Miss Ruthven, a sister of his lordship, and a most saintly and admirable person. She lives in Perth, but was at Freeland for a day or two. Freeland is quite a paradise of beauty.

"Friday.—Got up at eight. Expounded at family worship for the first time. After breakfast two horses arrived at the door for an equestrian excursion between me and Mr. James. Previous to that, however, I composed somewhat, and had an interesting conversation with Mr. Oliphant, the invalid, more satisfactory than before. Were soon overtaken with rain, and so stopped in our excursion, but had a very good refuge in the manse of Mr. Young the clergyman, with whom we sat an hour. As the rain continued, we walked home with umbrellas, and sent a servant from the house for the horses."

The chapter on the Collegiate session of 1824–25 at St. Andrews is very good, affording additional illustration, if such were necessary, of Dr. Chalmers's immense capacity for work. The journal of 1825–26 is much more spiritual, and contains less twaddle than that of the preceding year. The volume increases in interest as it proceeds—but the general impression it makes is that of regret that Dr. Chalmers's papers have fallen into the hands of so incompetent a biographer.

(32.) JUDGE HALYBURTON has appeared in two new characters—of statesman and plagiarist—in "*Rule and Misrule of the English in America*." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 379.) The statesmanship is of a very humble sort—the plagiarism may stand in the front rank, according to Mr. Hildreth's showing.

(33.) "*Death-Bed Scenes; or, dying with and without Religion, designed to illustrate the truth and power of Christianity*, edited by DAVIS W. CLARK, D. D." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 12mo., pp. 569.) This book belongs to an unpretending but useful class of compilations. It is divided into two parts: I. *The Dying Christian*, containing a number of examples of the power of Christian faith in sustaining the soul of man in the dying hour: II. *Dying without Religion*, giving accounts of the death-beds of a number of persons of remarkable character but destitute of faith. The subordinate classification under each of these heads is clear and useful, and in this respect the work is better than any compilation of the kind that we have seen. The book combines attractive and useful qualities to a remarkable degree, and we trust it will have a large circulation.

(34.) No science has sprung more rapidly into notice and extent than Ethnology. Everywhere active minds are engaged upon it, and books about it, of more or less value, are issued constantly. Among the latest is "*The Natural History of the Human Species*, by Lieut. Col. C. H. SMITH," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1851; 12mo., pp. 423,) which we cannot recommend to any one who wishes to understand what he reads. A more clumsy and obscure book, in all respects, we have seldom seen. The introduction to the volume (by Dr. Kneeland, of Boston) is the only part of it worth reading; and its value consists in a tolerably distinct statement of the arguments, *pro* and *con.*, on the question of the unity of the human race. We are more and more disposed to wonder *why* it is that naturalists, in these days, cannot write intelligibly.

(35.) WE have before announced Mr. Putnam's contemplated series of encyclopædic volumes, each complete in itself, and designed to form compact manuals of the *most* useful knowledge. Two of the series are now before us, of which the first is the "*Hand-Book of Literature and the Fine Arts*, compiled and arranged by GEORGE RIPLEY and BAYARD TAYLOR." (12mo., pp. 647.) The work comprises "complete and accurate definitions of all terms employed in Belles-Lettres, Philosophy, Theology, Law, Mythology, Painting, Music, Sculpture, Architecture, and all kindred arts." Nor is this ample promise of the title-page belied in the book itself. So far as our brief examination enables us to judge, the work is as complete a vocabulary of art and science, brought up to the latest periods of knowledge, as could be furnished in so portable a shape, and should find a place on the table of every student and in every library. The other is a "*Hand-Book of Universal Biography*, by PARKE GODWIN." (12mo., pp. 821.) The book is prepared on the basis of Maunder's Biographical Treasury, but most of the articles have been rewritten, and a vast number of names have been added, especially in American biography, which is almost wholly neglected in Maunder, as indeed in all works of foreign origin. Such a book has long been needed, not only for the use of literary men, but of the general reading public, and the appearance of this is therefore most timely. If the other volumes of Mr. Putnam's series approach in excellence to those already issued, its success cannot be doubted.

(36.) THE American press has seldom produced a more beautiful book, in all exterior qualities, than "*The Nile-Boat, or Glimpses of the Land of Egypt*," by W. H. BARTLETT." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1851; 8vo., pp. 218.) The engravings are so abundant as to make the book a complete picture gallery of Egyptian scenes, and the text is a well-wrought and graphic commentary upon them. All the illustrations were drawn upon the spot by Mr. Bartlett, and afford a series of illustrated sketches of the monuments of Egypt as they are, and of the manners and customs of its present people, as well as of the characteristic scenery of their ancient ruins. No man exceeds Mr. Bartlett in the power of combining pen and pencil to produce distinct impressions of natural objects, and this work is quite as successful as his former ones. A more beautiful book for a present could not be found.

(37.) "*My Youthful Days; an authentic Narrative*," by Rev. GEORGE COLES." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 18mo., pp. 267.) The excellent author of this work is well known throughout the Church as a former Editor of the *Christian Advocate and Journal*, and as a writer of books specially adapted to the youthful mind. "That an account of the youthful days of such a man, written by his own hand, will be interesting and instructive to thousands, cannot be doubted." Mr. Coles was born in England, and his account of his early home, of the village sports of Old England, of the Church service, and of Methodism in England, is full of interest. The concluding chapters give a graphic account of his voyage of emigration and of his first impressions in America. We commend the book not only to the young, but to *all* readers, as an entertaining and instructive narrative.

(38.) "*The Life of a Vagrant*," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; pp. 164,) is the simple story of a poor boy, brought up in an English workhouse, who led the life of a common trampler for years, and was finally brought to experience the truth and power of the gospel to reform and elevate even the lowest of mankind.

(39.) "*The Rainbow in the North*," by S. TUCKER," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 308,) is a brief account of the first establishment of Christianity in Rupert's Land by the Church Missionary Society. It is a very interesting narration of missionary labours, privations, and success. The book has several very fine illustrations.

(40.) OUR missionaries in Germany continue their activity in printing as well as in preaching. We have just received a copy of our German Hymn Book, "*Sammlung von Geistlichen Liedern für Kirchlichen und Hauslichen Gottesdienst*." (Bremen: J. G. Heyse, 1851; pp. 544.) It is neatly printed and bound, and sold at a very low price.

(41.) No purely American work of art, so far as we can remember, has equalled in magnificence "*The Home-Book of the Picturesque*." (New-York: G. P. Put-

nam, 1852; 4to., pp. 188.) The book contains thirteen engravings on steel, from pictures by American artists, illustrating some of the finest and most picturesque spots in our wide land—so fertile in scenes of beauty. The engravings are all well done, and although, as remarked in the preface, they are perhaps of too moderate size to do justice to the original pictures, they are yet highly creditable specimens of that branch of art. The letter-press consists chiefly of descriptions of the scenes illustrated in the engravings, by such writers as Cooper, Irving, Bayard Taylor, Bryant, and Bethune. It is a good omen to see such noble works taking the place, as gift-books, of the empty "annuals" of former years.

(42.) MESSRS. R. CARTER & BROTHERS have just issued a new and neat edition of the well-known book "*Decision, or Religion must be all or is nothing*," by GRACE KENNEDY." (18mo., pp. 98.) Its dramatic form gives it great attraction for young readers.

(43.) "*Memorials of the Life and Trials of a Youthful Christian*" (New-York: C. Scribner, 1851; 12mo., pp. 355) is a touching tribute of fraternal affection, as well as a remarkable record of Christian resignation under long-continued disease. The subject of the memoir, Dr. Nathaniel Cheever, was an invalid almost from his birth, and his whole life was a continued struggle with persistent and painful infirmities. Under these trials his mind grew and his heart was disciplined: devout love to God, and a tender, submissive spirit, breathe through all the journals and letters of the youthful and suffering saint. The memoir is prefaced by Rev. H. T. Cheever, with an introduction by Dr. G. B. Cheever,—both brothers of the subject of the narrative.

(44.) "*The Sheaf*" (Boston: H. V. Degen, 18mo., pp. 155) is a highly-wrought account (written much in the mystical vein) of the religious experience of Mrs. Cordelia Thomas. Mrs. Thomas believed herself at one time to be the subject of "special spiritual manifestations," and, in reading an Adventist tract, "containing their arguments to prove that the Sabbath of the world was at hand," she "felt, from an inward experience of the Spirit, that it was even so." She soon commenced (if we correctly understand her somewhat vague and cloudy statements) proclaiming the second advent. That she was mistaken soon appeared—but she does not seem to have drawn from her experience its proper lesson. We cannot recommend the book, nor any book of its class, as tending to wholesome Christian culture.

(45.) THE fourth volume of "*Daily Bible Illustrations*," by JOHN KITTO, LL.D., (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1851; 12mo., pp. 438,) completes the series of illustrations founded upon the historical books of the Old Testament. We have before spoken of this excellent series of daily readings, in its special adaptation to use in the family—and we now renew our commendation of the work to all our readers.

(46.) "*Olive-Leaves*, by Mrs. SIGOURNEY," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers, 18mo., pp. 301.) is a series of beautiful narratives, with a few poetical pieces, intended for the young. The name of Mrs. Sigourney is at once a pledge of their excellence, and a sure passport to public favour. The volume is beautifully illustrated.

(47.) OUR Sunday-School Press, under Dr. Kidder's energetic hand, has been prolific of good issues of late. Among the books laid on our table we find "*English Country Pictures*, by OLD HUMPHREY," (18mo., pp. 182,)—a series of sketches of home and country scenes in merry England by a well-known writer. "*Village Science*" (18mo., pp. 285) contains simple and familiar explanations of a number of physical laws, by the author of "*Peeps of Nature*." "*Memoir of Eliza M. Barker*, by A. C. ROSE," (18mo., pp. 108,) is designed to encourage parents to teach religion to their children when very young. But we think it no merit in the parents of the good child whose memoir is given in the book, that "at the early age of five years and ten months she had read her New Testament through," and this, too, while she was in very feeble health, and should, in fact, not have even learned to read at that age. "*Memory's Pictures*" (18mo., pp. 69) contains a number of pretty incidents. "*Good Health; the possibility, duty, and means of obtaining and keeping it*," (18mo., pp. 214) is an excellent little treatise on diet, regimen, &c., giving principles rather than precise rules of living. "*Female Dead*" (18mo., pp. 355) consists of short sketches of departed Christian females, and of their last hours upon earth. "*Sunday among the Puritans*" (18mo. pp. 95) is a record of how the Puritans spent their first twenty Sundays in New-England, with the just inference that the noble elements of Puritan character were not a little due to their Sabbath-keeping. "*Christian Love, contrasted with the Love of the World*," is a narrative in a series of letters, designed to illustrate the contrast stated in the title-page. "*Senior Classes in Sunday Schools*" contains Cooper's Prize Essay, and several other treatises, on the importance of such classes, and the best method of conducting them. "*Iona*" is a history of the famous Druids' Isle, and of the changes to which it has been subject in the course of years. The "*Sunday-School Anniversary Book*" gives much good advice with regard to Sunday-school celebrations, with copious exercises for such occasions.

Among smaller books we find the following neat issues in Library B., viz.: *Cecil, or the Boy that did not like Work*, the title of which indicates sufficiently the nature of its contents; *Up and be Doing*, and *Everything has its Price*—two nice little pictorial stories; *The Sun-beam*, translated from the French; *Simeon Green*, a man that cured his bad neighbours, by Rev. J. A. James; *Passing Clouds*, and other stories, by Old Humphrey; *Jennie Duncan, or the Young Dressmaker*; *Ingratitude*, being the story of Asa Trott, in verse; *Ishmael, the Abyssinian Boy*.

ART. X.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

THE death of CHARLES GUTZLAFF should not pass without some notice in these pages, of a man whose name has been so long before the religious and literary world. As scholar, traveller, and missionary, he laboured long and faithfully, and though his career was marked by not a few indiscretions, we think that, now that he is dead, all men will unite in honouring him for what he intended, and, in some respects, for what he accomplished. Born at Stettin, in Pomerania, in 1802, he attracted attention at an early age by his zeal in study, and by the promise of activity which his youth afforded. The way was open for him to posts of usefulness at home, but "having resolved to devote himself to missionary labour in foreign parts, he volunteered to go to the Dutch settlements in the East, under the auspices of the Netherlands Missionary Society." Before proceeding thither he came to England, where he met Dr. Morrison, the eminent Chinese scholar and missionary, and received a strong bias toward China as his ultimate field of labour. In 1823 he proceeded to Singapore, and it is said that before he had been there two years, he was able to converse fluently in five Eastern languages, and to read and write as many more. In August, 1828, in company with Mr. Toulmin, Gutzlaff went to Siam, where he remained more than a year. In 1831 he went to China. Between 1831 and 1834 he made three voyages along the coast, and published a journal of his observations in 1834. He subsequently published a "History of China," and also "China Opened: an Account of the Topography, History, Laws, &c., of the Chinese Empire," (2 vols.) From 1834 to the time of his death he held office under the British government, as interpreter and secretary to the Minister. He died on the 9th of August, 1851. Of his way of life, the *Literary Gazette* gives the following account:—

"The whole of the early morning was devoted to the religious instruction of successive classes of Chinese who came to his house. From ten till four he was occupied with government duties. After

a very brief interval, he went out for the rest of the evening, preaching in public places, or teaching from house to house. He also, from time to time, made excursions to different places, accompanied by native teachers. All this toil was voluntary and unremunerated, for, except when he first went out to the East, he was not connected with any missionary society. A few friends in New-York and London sent occasionally, we believe, some contributions for purchasing books and medicines, but the work was mainly carried on at his own cost. He was a man of generous, self-denying spirit, in zeal for every good work untiring, and in labour indefatigable. He early inured himself to hardships, and in his devotedness to his work of spreading Christian truth, he was regardless of privations and dangers. His medical skill and great learning often opened a way for him where few Europeans could have gained access, and wherever he was known he was beloved by the natives. They used to say sometimes that he must be a descendant of some Chinese family, who had emigrated to the Isles of the Western Ocean."

Of the results of Gutzlaff's labours we are not yet sufficiently informed to speak with any certainty; but his efforts for the cause of religion, and of Christian civilization in China, deserve to be held in the grateful remembrance of the Church.

THE first volume of the Rev. Henry Alford's edition of the Greek Testament was severely reviewed last year in the *Christian Remembrancer*. The author has answered his critic in a very able and temperate pamphlet, entitled "*Audi Alteram Partem*." The second volume of Mr. Alford's work is now announced as ready for publication.

THE fourth and concluding volume of the Rev. Dr. Peile's Annotations on the New Testament is announced as in the press in London.

WE see announced in London (Bagster & Sons) two elementary works which, if well executed, are likely to be useful, viz., "*Syriac Reading Lessons, with the elements of Syriac Grammar*," and "*Chaldee Read-*

ing *Lessons*, consisting of the whole of the Biblical Chaldee, with a grammatical Praxis and an interlineary translation."

A NEW edition of Stier's *Reden des Herrn Jesus* (6 vols., 8vo.) is soon to be issued.

MR. NEWMAN (the pervers) labours at his unhappy work with indefatigable activity. He has lately issued a volume of "*Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*," the scope of which may be estimated from the following summary of contents:— "Lecture I. Protestant View of the Catholic Church. II. Tradition the Sustaining Power of the Protestant View. III. Fable the Basis of the Protestant View. IV. True Testimony unequal to the Protestant View. V. Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View. VI. Prejudice the Life of the Protestant View. VII. Assumed Principles the Intellectual Instrument of the Protestant View. VIII. Want of Intercourse with Catholics the Protection of the Protestant View. IX. Duties of Catholics towards the Protestant View."

WE see flattering mention made in English journals of "*The Bible Student's Guide*" to the more correct understanding of the English Translation of the Old Testament, by reference to the original Hebrew. By the Rev. W. Wilson, D. D., Canon of Winchester," (demy 4to.: price, £2 2s.) "The object of this work is to furnish the accurate student of the Bible with an *immediate reference to the original of every word in our version of the Old Testament*; at the same time, an opportunity is afforded of comparing the original with all other words similarly rendered, and of so attaining a more distinct apprehension of words which appear to be synonymous. If the reader were guided in his understanding of a phrase simply by the idea conveyed by the one English word, he must necessarily fall short of an accurate knowledge of the inspired meaning, and probably may put an import on the word which is not warranted by the original language. The knowledge of the Hebrew language is not necessary to the profitable use of this work; and it is believed that many devout and accurate students of the Bible, entirely unacquainted with it, will derive great advantage from frequent reference to these pages."

In the *Theologisches Literaturblatt zur Allgemeinen Kirchenzeitung* (No. 103, August, 1851) we find a highly laudatory review of a brief life of Wesley, published at Halle

under the title "*Des Johann Wesley Leben und Wirken*, von K. C. S. Schmidt, Prof. in Naumburg." The reviewer remarks that "no phenomenon, since the Reformation, can compare in religious and ecclesiastical importance with Methodism." Of Wesley himself the reviewer says, in view of his immense activity in preaching, in writing, and in the superintendence of a great religious body, that "perhaps the world has never seen a more useful man."

THE name of Abelard, full of interest to all mankind from his guilt and his sorrows, as well as to the theologian and the philosopher, from his learning and his genius, has been brought before us anew of late years by M. Cousin's edition of his before-edited works. Among them was republished his collection of "*Sentences*," but the editing of the work was not satisfactorily done. A new and careful revision of the text has been made by two German theologians, and is now before us under the original title, "*Petri Abaelardi Sic et Non* — Primum integrum ediderunt E. L. D. Henke et G. S. Lindenköhl." (Marburg, 1851. 8vo. 440 pp.)

Die *Evangelische Lehre auf dem Grunde der Heiligen Schrift*, von W. Kritz, Pastor in Leipzig," (1851, 337 pp., 8vo.,) is an exhibition of Christian doctrines in their connexion, drawn from the Holy Scriptures, for the use of the laity. We need books of this class sadly in our own language.

A NEW version of the Bible (undertaken for the use of the British Jews) is now in progress. Part I. having appeared, under the title, "*Jewish School and Family Bible. Part First, containing the Pentateuch*," by Dr. D. A. BENISCH," (London.) The editor states that "while, in the ceremonial law, the translation is a faithful exposition of Jewish opinions, in every other respect it is a strictly impartial performance, embodying the results of long-continued studies and numerous patient researches, the labour of many years."

WE have received a copy of "*Neue Propheten — drei historisch-politische Kirchenbilder*, von Dr. Karl Hase." (Leipzig, 1851. 12mo., 367 pp.) The "three pictures" are The Maid of Orleans, Savonarola, and the Anabaptists. The text is marked by Hase's usual sarcastic keenness and beauty of style — and the notes are full of literary and historical information.

Too late for any examination we have received a copy of "*Theologie*, von Dr. L.

J. Rückert, Erster Theil," (Leipzig, 1851. 8vo. pp. 378.): also of "*Dr. Chlud Harm's Lebensbeschreibung, verfasst von ihm selber.*" (Kiel, 1851. 250 pp.): of a treatise, "*Ueber den Einfluss der Palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik*, von Dr. J. Fränkel (Leipzig, 1851. 8vo. 254 pp.): of "*Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der modernen speculativen Theologie in ihren Principien beleuchtet*, von C. A. Thilo." (Leipzig, 1851. 344 pp.)

We have noticed in this number of our journal the American translation of Neander's "Practical Exposition of the Philipians;" and we have since received the German edition of his exposition of 1 John, ("*Praktische Erläuterung des ersten Briefes des Johannes.*") Berlin, 1851. 258 pp.) which is executed in the same spirit, and will, we hope, be translated by the same admirable hand.

The complete edition of Zwingle's works published by Schulthess, in Zürich, (edited by Schulthess & Schuler, 1823-1842,) can now be had for seven thalers.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading journals of Theology and Sacred Literature, and of those which represent special ecclesiastical interests.

The *Journal of Sacred Literature* (October) contains the following articles:—I. A new explanation of the Taxing in Luke II, 1-5: II. The Jesuits: III. The Sabbath day: IV. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament: V. Wicliffe's Bible: VI. The septenary arrangement of Scripture: VII. The Rephaim, and their connexion with Egyptian history: VIII. Modern Judaism: IX. Scripture Parallelisms: X. Queried texts: XI. On the Evangelization of India: XII. Correspondence.

The *British Quarterly Review*, November:—I. Prussia and Austria, Monarchy v. Nationality: II. Willmott's Pleasures of Literature: III. Julius Müller—the Doctrine of Sin: IV. Early English Houses and Households: V. The Duke of Argyll on the Twofold Protest: VI. History by Modern Frenchmen: VII. Bushnell's Discourses: VIII. Geological Observations—Survey of Britain: IX. Martineau on Apostolic Christianity: X. England and Italy: XI. Popery—its Nature and Development: XII. Louis Kossuth and Lord Palmerston.

The *Christian Remembrancer*, (London,) October, contains the following articles:—I. Roman Law: II. Quakerism: III. Fari-

ni's Roman State: IV. The Sacramental System: V. The Synod of Exeter: VI. Notices.

The *North British Review*, November, contains:—I. The Peace Congress: II. Principles of Taxation: III. The Fine Arts in Edinburgh: IV. The Old Testament—Newman and Greg: V. Burns and his School: VI. John Owen: VII. Comparative Philology—Humboldt: VIII. The Frontier Wars of India: IX. Translations from the Classics—Æschylus: X. The Christian Struggle in Germany.

The contents of the *Theologische Studien u. Kritiken* for October, 1851, are as follows:—I. Observations on the Different Conceptions of Religion, with special reference to psychological questions, by Dr. Lechler, of Winnenden: II. Lucian and Christianity—a contribution to the Church History of the second century, by Rev. A. Planck, of Heidenheim: III. Additional observations on the authorship of the phrase *In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in utrisque caritas*, by Dr. F. Lücke: IV. Review of Hahn's *Geschichte der Ketzerei im Mittelalter*: V. Review of Hübsch's *Architektur und ihr Verhältniss zur heutigen Malerei und Sculptur*: VI. Kling on the *Evangelische Kirchenordnung* for Westphalia and the Rhine province.

The *Prospective Review* (November) contains the following articles:—I. Recent Translations of Classical Poets: II. Polemical Fiction: III. The American Fugitive Slave Act: IV. The Harmony of the Intuitive and Logical Elements in the ultimate grounds of Religious Belief.

Theological Critic, (edited by T. K. Arnold,) September:—I. Scipio de Ricci: II. The Ecclesiastical and Religious Condition of Geneva: III. The Beast from the Sea: IV. De Ecclesiasticæ Britonum Scotorumque Historiæ fontibus disseruit Carolus Gulielmus Schöll: V. Galatians iii, 4-6: VI. On the Authority of Plato and Aristotle in the Middle Ages: VII. Hebrew Metrolgy: VIII. John vi, 51, 58, 59, "Things New and Old."

Eclectic Review, September:—I. Prof. Maurice's Works: II. Companions of my Solitude: III. Shepherd's History of the Church of Rome: IV. Mrs. Browning's Casa Guidi Windows: V. Atkinson & Martineau on Man's Nature: VI. Scott's Lelio; a Vision of Reality: VII. The Spanish Protestants: VIII. Waring's Recollections of the Bard of Glamorgan: IX. Local Self-

government and Centralization. *October:*

—I. Lamartine's Restoration of Monarchy in France: II. The Creed of Christendom: III. Mayhew's Revelations of London: IV. Sherman's Memoirs of William Allen: V. Recent Poetry: VI. Neapolitan Atrocities —Mr. Gladstone's Letters: VII. Episcopal Revenues. *November:* —I. British Anti-State Church Association: II. Arab Travels in Central Africa: III. Porter's Textual Criticism: IV. The Ballad Poetry of Scotland: V. Adventures of a Gold Seeker: VI. South African Missions—Freeman and Dr. Gray: VII. Religious Scandal—Story of My Life: VIII. Religious Aspects of the Exhibition. *December:* —I. New Reformation in Ireland—The Rival Successions: II. Colonel Dixon's Sketches of Mairwara: III. Warburton's Memoirs of Horace Walpole: IV. Halley's Congregational Lectures—Sacramental Theories: V. Carlyle's Life of Sterling: VI. The Flax Movement: VII. Marriage with the Sister of a Deceased Wife: VIII. Kossuth and the Hungarian Revolution.

Among the works in theology and kindred topics recently announced on the continent are:

Die Lehre der ältesten Kirche vom Opfer im Leben und Cultus der Christen, von J. W. F. Höfling. Erlangen, 1851. 236 pp. Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, von Dr. S. C. Schirlitz. Giessen, 1851.

Golgatha. Seine Kirchen und Klöster. Nach Quellen und Anschau von Dr. Titus Tobler, prakt. Arzte in Horn am Bodensee. Mit Ansichten u. Plänen (auch inschriftl. Beilag.) St. Gallen u. Bern, 1851. 534 pp. 8vo.

Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der modernen speculativen Theologie in ihren Principien beleuchtet, von C. A. Thilo. Leipzig, 1851.

Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche, in dem Zusammenhang der Geistesgaben und des Geisteslebens des alten Christenthums. Eine exegetisch-historische Untersuchung, von Ad. Hilgenfeld, Dr. phil., Lic. Theol., ord. Mitgl. d. hist.-theol. Gesellsch. zu Leipzig. Leipzig, 1850. 152 pp. 8vo.

Predigten über die neuesten Zeitbewegungen, von Dr. A. Tholuck. 3. Heft: 10 kirchliche Zeitpredigten. Halle, 1851. 142 pp. 8vo.

Abhandlung über die Cosmogonie der heidnischen Völker vor der Zeit Jesu und der Apostel. Von Adolf Wutke, Privatdoc. d. Philos. an d. Univ. Breslau. Haag, 1850. 130 pp. 8vo.

Essai sur l'esprit et l'influence de la réformation de Luther, par Charles de Villers. Cinquième édit., augmentée du précis historique de la vie de Martin Luther par Melancthon: revue et publiée avec une préface et des notes par A. Maeder. Paris, 1851. 346 pp. 12mo.

Corpus Apologetarum christianorum saeculi secundi. Edidit J. C. T. Otto. Vol. VI. Tatianus Assyrius. Jenae, 1851. pp. XL u. 192. 8vo.

Beiträge zu den theologischen Wissenschaften in Verbindung mit der theolog. Gesellschaft herausgeg. von Ed. Reuss und Dr. Ed. Cunitz. 2 Bdchen. Jena, 1851. 231 pp. 8vo.

La Bible. Traduction nouvelle, avec l'hébreu en regard, accompagné des points-voyelles et des accents toniques, avec des notes philologiques, géographiques et littéraires, et des variants de la version des septante et du texte samaritain. Par S. Cahen. Tom. XV. Les Hagiographes. Tom. III. (Jyob) Job. Accompagné d'une esquisse sur la philosophie du poème de Job, par Js. Cahen. Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Bibliotheca judaica. Bibliographisches Handbuch der gesamten jüdischen Literatur mit Einschluss der Schriften über Juden u. Judenthum und einer Geschichte der jüdischen Bibliographie. Nach alphabet. Ordnung der Verfasser, bearb. von Dr. Jul. Fürst. 2. Thl. I.—M. Leipzig, 1851. 409 pp. 8vo.

Among the works in Theology and kindred subjects recently announced in Great Britain are the following:—

Thoughts on the Land of the Morning; a Record of Two Visits to Palestine. By H. B. Whittaker Churton, M.A., crown 8vo.:

—Lectures for the Use of Sick Persons, by the Rev. H. B. Bacon, fcp. 8vo.—The Church of England and the Church of Rome; a Charge delivered to the Clergy of Chichester, by the Ven. James Garbett, M.A., Archdeacon of Chichester, 8vo.—Sermons: Preached for the most part in a Village Church in the Diocese of Durham, by the Rev. John Edmunds, M.A., fcp. 8vo.: —A First Series of Practical Sermons, by the Rev. Frederic Jackson, fcp. 8vo.: —Sermons, by the Rev. Stuart Adolphus Pears, B.D., one of the Assistant Masters of Harrow School, 12mo. —Hippolytus and his Age; or, Doctrine and Practice of the Church of Rome under Commodus and Alexander Severus. With an Appendix, containing J. Bernaysii Bonensis Epistola Critica ad Bunsenium, by C. C. J. Bunsen,

D.C.L., 2 vols. post 8vo. :—The Popes: an Historical Summary, from Livius to Pius IX., by G. A. F. Wilks, M.D., 8vo. :—A History of Erastianism, by Archdeacon Wilberforce, post 8vo. :—An Inquiry into the Theology of the Anglican Reformers: with Extracts from their Writings on the Apostolical Succession, Baptism, the Holy Eucharist, Predestination, Faith, and Works. With a concluding Dissertation on their value and authority in illustrating the teaching of the Church of England, by a Priest of the Diocese of Exeter, 1 vol. post 8vo. :—Foreshadows; or, Lectures on our Lord's Miracles and Parables as Earnests of the Age to come, by Dr. Cummings, 2 vols. :—The Apocalypse Unveiled: an Analysis, a Harmony, a Brief Exposition, and a Practical Improvement of the Visions contained in the Book of the Revelation, by the Rev. Jas. Young, Vol. I., fcp. 8vo. :—The Nestorians and their Rituals, with the Narrative of a Mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842-1844, and of a late visit to those Countries in 1850; also, Researches into the Present Condition of the Syrian Jacobites, Papal Syrians, and Chaldeans, and an Inquiry into the Religious Tenets of the Yezedees, by the Rev. George Percy Badger, (Subscription price £2 :)—A New Commentary on the Apocalypse, by the Rev. Isaac Williams, B.D., in Eight Vols.; in small 8vo. :—Letters to a Seceder from the Church of England to the Communion of Rome, by W. E. Sendamore, M.A., in post 8vo. :—A Harmony of the Apocalypse; in a Revised Translation, from the best MSS., by Christopher Wordsworth, D.D., Canon of Westminster :—Protestantism and Popery contrasted by the acknowledged and authentic Teaching of each Religion, edited by the Rev. John Edmund Cox, M.A., F.S.A., of All Souls' College, Oxford; 2 vols. 8vo. :—The Church of Christ, in its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry: with an especial reference to the Controversy on the Subject between Romanists and Protestants, by Edward Arthur Litton, M.A., late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, 8vo. :—A Practical Exposition of St. Paul's Epistles to the

Thessalonians, to Timothy, Titus, Philémon, and the Hebrews, in the Form of Lectures, intended to assist the Practice of Domestic Instruction and Devotion, by John Bird, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, in 8vo. :—Footsteps of our Lord and His Apostles: a Succession of Visits to the Sites and Scenes of New-Testament Narrative, by W. H. Bartlett, Author of "Walks about Jerusalem;"—The Wycliffe Versions—The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, in the earliest English Versions made from the Latin Vulgate, by John Wycliffe and his Followers; edited by the Rev. Josiah Forshall, F.R.S., late Fellow of Exeter College, and Sir Frederic Madden, K.H., F.R.S., Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, 4 vols. 4to. :—On the Unity and Order of the Epistles of St. Paul to the Churches, by the Rev. Alfred T. Paget, M.A., of Shrewsbury School, 8vo. :—Toleratio Intolerabilis; or, the free development of the Romish System proved, by copious reference to its Canon Law, Councils, &c., to be inconsistent with the Safety and Welfare of the State, by the Rev. Henry T. J. Bagge, B.A. :—Philip Doddridge: His Life and Labours; a Centenary Memorial, by John Stoughton, fcp. 8vo. :—First Lines of Christian Theology, in the Form of a Syllabus, prepared for the use of the Students in Homerton College, by the late Rev. J. Pye Smith, D.D., edited by Rev. W. Farrer, LL.B., Secretary and Librarian of New College, London :—The Inquisition Revealed, in its Cruelties and History; with Memoirs of its Victims in France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, England, India, and other Countries, by Rev. T. Timpson. Dedicated to Cardinal Wiseman, 12mo. :—Sketch of the Religious History of the Slavonic Nations; being a Second Edition of his Lectures on this Subject, revised and enlarged, by Count Valerian Krassinski :—Democratic Ecclesiasticism; an Inquiry into the Principles of Church Government, advocated in "A Manual of Congregational Principles, by G. Payne, LL.D.," and in a Treatise on "Congregational Independence, by R. Wardlaw, D.D." By G. Turner.

AMERICAN.

PROPOSALS have been issued for the publication in Philadelphia of a new quarterly journal, to be called the "Presbyterian Quarterly Review," and to be "second to no Review in Europe or America." The names of the editors (Rev. Messrs. Wallace,

Barnes, Brainard, Parker, and Gilbert) are a sufficient guarantee that the work will be undertaken with ability and spirit.

WE understand that Dr. GEORGE PECK has in preparation a volume of "Lectures on *Young Men on the Formation of a Manly*

Character," which will be issued early in the spring. We can promise our readers, beforehand, a work at once resting upon a basis of sound religion and philosophy, and carefully working out the one main thought of "the formation of a manly character."

MOSHEIM's "*Commentarii de rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum Magnum*," is now to be put before the public in an English dress. Vidal's translation of Vol. I has been revised and rearranged, and Vol. II has been translated by the venerable Dr. James Murdock, and published by Mr. Sherman Converse, in two elegant 8vo. volumes, under the title of "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity during the first three hundred and twenty-five years from the Christian Era."

It will gratify our readers, and the religious world generally, to know that the Messrs. Harpers of this city have in press the writings of the late Dr. Olin. They will be comprised in four volumes, uniform in size with his *Travels in Europe*. The first volume will contain Sermons and Sketches of Sermons from his MSS., which have never yet appeared in print. The second volume will be made up of Addresses on various occasions, and miscellaneous articles from his powerful pen. His admirable Lectures to the Students of the University on the Theory and Practice of Scholastic Life, with his Baccalaurean Discourses, will make a third volume; and the fourth will comprise an extended and graphic account of Greece and Constantinople. The volumes may be expected early in the ensuing spring. They pass through the press under the supervision of Dr. Floy.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading American Theological Journals:—

Christian Examiner, (Boston,) November:—I. Elias Hicks and the Hicksite Quakers: II. The German in America: III. Institution for Idiots in Berlin: IV. Stuart's Commentary on Daniel: V. Parkman's Conspiracy of Pontiac: VI. Animal Magnetism: VII. The Poet Rückert.

Mercersburg Review, November:—I. Early Christianity: II. Trapper's Life: III. Reverence and Religion: IV. Significance of the Christian Name: V. Christian Prayer.

New-Englander, (New-Haven,) November:—I. Physical Science and the Useful Arts in their relation to Christian Civilization: II. Dr. Isaac Barrow: III. Lord's Epoch of Creation: IV. Puritan Element

of the American Character: V. Campbell's Age of Gospel Light: VI. Stephen's Farmers' Guide: VII. Wilson's Church Identified: VIII. Memoirs of Wordsworth.

Biblical Repertory, (Princeton,) October:—I. Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland: II. McCosh on the Method of Divine Government: III. Philosophy of Philo: IV. Relation of the Old to the New Dispensation: V. Schaff's Church History: VI. History of the Vaudois Church: VII. Review of Prof. Parke's last notice of the Repertory: VIII. Short notices of recent works, and Literary Intelligence.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) October:—I. Life of Zuingli: II. Proofs of the Existence of God: III. Harrison's English Language: IV. Government and Popular Education: V. Latin Lexicography: VI. Nature and Kind of the Sounds of Speech: VII. Import of "They pierced my hands and feet," *Psa.* xxii, 17: VIII. Neander as a Church Historian: IX. Recent Works on Asia Minor.

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia, S. C.,) October:—I. Validity of Popish Baptism: II. Chivalry and Civilization: III. Life of Thomas Paine: IV. Moral, Social, and Professional Duties of Attornies and Solicitors: V. Scripturalism and Rationalism: VI. Harmony of Revelation with Natural Science, with special reference to Geology. (Second article.)

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburg, Pa.,) October:—I. Memoir of H. H. Muhlenburg, D. D.: II. Lutheran Doctrine of the Lord's Supper: III. History of the Jews: IV. The Protestant Principle: V. Bibliography: VI. Hymns from the German.

Brownson's Quarterly, (Boston,) October:—I. Newman on the True Basis of Theology: II. St. Bonnet on Social Restoration: III. The Hungarian Nation: IV. The Edinburgh Review on Ultramontane Doubts.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) October:—I. Jubilee Year, or God in History: II. Canadian Clergy Reserves: III. Sermons for Servants: IV. Obedience to Law and Private Judgment: V. Divine Rule of the Church's Legislation: VI. Jephthah's Vow: VII. Wilberforce's Theory and Pantheism.

Christian Review, (New-York,) October:—I. Grote's Greece: II. Dr. Woods on Infant Baptism: III. Beneficence the Noblest Aim: IV. Objections to this Life as the

only period of Probation, considered: V. Annexation of Louisiana: VI. Ultimate Supremacy of the Kingdom of Redemption: VII. Temporal Power of the Popes.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) October:—I. Brown on Christ's Second Coming: II. Designation of the Figures in Isaiah xiv, xv, xvi, xvii: III. Foreign Missions and Millenarianism: IV. The Holy Ghost the Author of the only Advancement of Mankind: V. Todd on the

Prophecies: VI. Ferguson's Eastern Architecture.

Southern Methodist Quarterly, October:—I. Footprints of the Creator: II. Relation of Infidelity to Civil Government: III. Analysis and Review of the first eight chapters of Romans: IV. Poems by Matilda: V. Chalmers and Sydney Smith on Methodism: VI. The Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN had, during the summer semester of 1851, 1329 students, of whom there were studying Theology 184, Law 558, Medicine 232, Philosophy and Philology 354. The Theological Faculty contains 5 Professors *ordinarii*, 5 *extraordinarii*, and 4 *privat-docenten*. The Philosophical Faculty numbers 80 Professors *ordinarii*, 27 *extraordinarii*, and 32 *privat-docenten*. The UNIVERSITY OF BONN numbered for the same half year, 1000 students, of whom 196 belonged to the Catholic Theological department and 77 to the Protestant. The Juristical department numbered 374, the Medical 125, and the Philosophical 228. At ERLANGEN there are 401 students, 170 in Theology, 150 in Law, 53 in Medicine, and 22 in Philosophy and Philology. At FREIBURG there were 355, of whom 169 studied Theology, 65 Law, 73 Medicine, and 48 Philosophy and Philology. At GIESSEN there were 409 students, of whom 70 studied Theology. At HEIDELBERG there were 603 students, of whom 47 were Theological. The University of JENA numbered 621 students, of whom 85 were Theological. At LEIPSIG there were 846, of whom 168 were Theological students; at TÜBINGEN 768, of whom 299 studied Theology.

JELF's Greek Grammar has passed to a second edition, 2 vols. 8vo, which is said to be corrected and enlarged.

A copious review of all recent works of value in Latin Grammar is given by WEISSENBOEN in the *neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* for July and August, 1851.

THE *Introductory Lectures* delivered by the Professors at the opening of the New College, (Congregational,) St. John's Wood,

are announced as in press. The subjects of the lectures are as follows, viz.:—I. The Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures. By Rev. John Harris, D.D., Principal, and Professor of Systematic and Pastoral Theology: II. Earliest Form of Christianity. By Rev. J. H. Godwin, Professor of New-Testament Exegesis, and Mental and Moral Philosophy: III. The Study of the Natural-History Sciences. By Edwin Lankester, Esq., M.D., F. R. S., Professor of the Natural-History Sciences: IV. The Study of Mathematics. By Rev. P. Smith, B. A., Professor of Pure and Mixed Mathematics: V. Old-Testament Exegesis. By Rev. Maurice Nenner, Professor of Hebrew and the Oriental Languages, and of Old-Testament Exegesis: VI. The History of Classical Learning. By William Smith, Esq., L. L. D., Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages, and Literature.

THE October number of Jahn's *Jahrbücher* commences a valuable survey of all the works on Roman antiquities that have appeared since 1840. The first article reviews Ruperti, Zeiss, Becker, Götting, Walter, Burchardi, Rückert, Schuch, and others.

WE continue our summaries of the contents of the principal foreign Journals.

London Quarterly, October:—I. Widow-Burning: II. Life and Works of Bishop Ken: III. Puritanism in the Highlands—the Men: IV. Correspondence between Mirabeau and the Count de la Marck: V. Wilkin's Edition of Sir Thomas Browne: VI. The Lexington Papers: VII. Lyell on Life and its Successive Developments: VIII. Papal Pretensions: IX. Revolutionary Literature.

Irish Quarterly Review, September:—I. Moir's (Delta) Poets of the Past Half Cen-

tury: II. Shiel: III. Historic Literature of Ireland: IV. Mr. Montague Dempsey's Experiences of the Landed Interest: V. Government Patronage at Home and Abroad.

Westminster Review, October:—I. West-
ern Africa: II. The Marlboroughs and
Reign of Queen Anne: III. Reason and
Faith: IV. Newman's Political Economy:
V. Gregory of Nazianzum: VI. Decisive
Battles: VII. Process of Pleading: VIII.
Life and Immortality: IX. Foreign Litera-
ture.

Edinburgh Review, October:—I. Compar-
ative Philology: II. Dennistoun's Dukes of
Urbino: III. Sources of Expression in
Architecture: IV. Juvenile Delinquency:
V. Mirabeau's Correspondence: VI. Meta-
morphoses of Apuleius: VII. Neapolitan
Justice: VIII. The Anglo-Catholic Theory:
IX. Official Catalogue of the Great Exhi-
bition.

AMONG the books in Classical and Gene-
ral Literature, recently announced on the
continent of Europe are the following:—

Allgemeine Geschichte der Literatur von
den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart.
Ein Handbuch für alle Gebildeten. Von
Dr. Joh. Scherr. 1. Hälfte. Stuttgart, 1851.
359 pp. Large 8vo.

Chateaubriand, sa vie et ses écrits, avec
lettres inédites à l'auteur, par F. Z. Col-
lombet. Lyon et Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Die Weltalter. Von Dr. K. Ch. Planck,
Privatdocent. 2. Theil: Das Reich des
Idealismus oder zur Philosophie der Ge-
schichte. Tübingen, 1851. 309 pp. 8vo.

Histoire des peuples anciens et de leurs
cultes, ou le monde primitif, historique et
monumental, ou l'archéologie primitive,
par M. l'abbé Desroches. Caen, 1851. 4to.

Statistique des peuples de l'antiquité.
Les Egyptiens, les Hébreux, les Grecs, les
Romains et les Gaulois. Economie sociale,
civile et domestique de ces peuples; terri-
toire, population, origine, races, castes et
classes; agriculture, industrie, commerce,
richesse publique; forces militaires. Par
Alex. Moreau de Jonnes, membre de l'In-
stitute. 2 vols. Paris, 1851. 8vo.

Arica. Script Paul Boetticher, phil. Dr.
Hala, 1851. 115 pp. 8vo.

Lehrbuch der höheren Mathematik, ent-
haltend die Differential- und Integral-
Rechnung, Variations-Rechnung und ana-

lytische Geometrie. Nebst vielen Beispie-
len. Von Dr. T. Franke, Prof. zu Han-
nover. Hannover, 1851. 759 pp. 8vo.

Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques;
par une Société de professeurs et de savants.
Tom. V. (Persée—Quantité.) Paris, 1851.
Large 8vo.

M. Cousin et ses doctrines, par M. Roux-
Lavergne. Bruxell., 1851. 112 pp. 8vo.

Christian Metaphysics; or, Plato, Male-
branche, and Gioberté; the old and new
Ontologists compared with the Modern
Schools of Psychology. By the Rev. Ch.
Bohn Smyth. Lond., 1851. 266 pp. 8vo.

Lehrbuch der Psychologie. Von Dr. G.
Schilling, Prof. zu Giessen. Leipzig, 1851.
214 pp. 8vo.

AMONG the works in Classical and Gene-
ral Literature recently announced in Great
Britain are the following:—

HISTORY of the Roman State, from
1815-50, by Luigi Carlo Farini, translated
by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P.,
2 vols. 8vo.:—The Germania of Tacitus, with
Ethnological Dissertations and Notes, by Dr.
R. G. Latham, Author of the "English Lan-
guage," &c., demy 8vo.:—A Handbook of the
English Language, by Dr. R. G. Latham, late
Professor of the English Language and Lite-
rature in University College, London, 1 vol.
12mo.:—Lectures on the History of France,
delivered in the University of Cambridge,
by the Right Hon. James Stephen, K. C. B.,
LL. D., Professor of Modern History in the
University of Cambridge:—Outlines of
Universal History, from the Creation of the
World to the Present Time, translated from
the German of Dr. George Weber, by
Dr. M. Behr, Professor of German Lite-
rature, Winchester College:—Memoirs of
Marquis of Rockingham and his Con-
temporaries, from Original Letters and
Documents now first published, by the
Right Hon. the Earl of Albemarle, 2 vols.
8vo.:—Travels in the East in 1850-51, in-
cluding a Visit to Nineveh, by Lieut. the
Hon. Frederick Walpole, author of "Four
Years in the Pacific," 2 vols. 8vo.:—Recol-
lections of Manila and the Philippines, in
1848, 1849, and 1850, by Robert M'Kicking,
post 8vo.:—History of Greece, from its
Conquest by the Crusaders to its Conquest
by the Turks, and of the Empire of Trebi-
zond, 1204-1461, by George Finlay, Esq.:—
Travels in European Turkey in 1850,
through Bosnia, Servia, Bulgaria, Macedo-

nia, Roumelia, Albania, and Epirus, with a Visit to Greece and the Ionian Islands, and a Homeward Tour through Hungary and the Slavonian Provinces of Austria on the Lower Danube, by E. Spencer, Esq., 2 vols. 8vo. :—The History of the War in Afghanistan, by John William Kaye, written from the Unpublished Letters and Journals of the Most Distinguished Military and Political Officers employed in Afghanistan throughout the momentous years of British Connection with that country, 2 vols. 8vo. :—Journal of a Visit to Thessaly, Albania, and Mount Athos, by the Rev. George F. Bowen, Rector of the Greek University in Corfu, in one volume :—A New Volume of Essays, by the Rev. S. R. Maitland, D.D., F.R.S. :—A New Edition of Porson's Euripides, edited by Professor Scholefield, 8vo. :—A Tour in South Africa, with Notices of Natal, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ceylon, Egypt, and Palestine, by Rev. J. J. Freeman, Home Secretary of the London Missionary Society :—The Ansayrii, or Assassins, with Travels in the Further East, including a Visit to Nineveh, by Lieutenant the Hon. Fred. Walpole, R. N., 3 vols. 8vo., with Illustrations :—Travels from the Rocky Mountains to California, by the Hon. Henry Coke, post 8vo. :—The Life and Times of Dante, by Count Cesare Balbo, edited, with an Introduction and notes, by Mrs. Bunbury, 2 vols. post 8vo. :—Sir W. Hamilton's Critical Discussions from the Edinburgh Review, corrected and enlarged, 8vo. :—History of the English Railway, its Social Relations and Revelations, by John Francis, 2 vols. 8vo. :—History of Greek Classical Literature, with an Introduction on the Language, Biographical Notices, an Account of the Periods in which each principal Author lived and wrote, so far as Literature was affected by such History, and observations on the Works themselves, by R. W. Browne, Professor of Classics at King's College, London, 2 vols. 8vo. :—Spain as it is, by G. A. Hoskins, Esq., Author of "Travels in Ethiopia," "A Visit to the Great Oasis," &c., 2 vols., with Illustrations :—Outlines of the History of the English Language, with illustrative specimens, for the use of colleges and schools, by George L. Craik, Professor of History and of English Literature in Queen's Col-

lege, Belfast, 1 vol. fep. :—The History of England under the Houses of York and Lancaster, with an Introductory Sketch of the Early Reformation, 8vo. :—Fresh Discoveries at Nineveh, and Researches at Babylon, being the Results of the Second Expedition to Assyria, also a journey to the Khabor, the Desert, Lake Van, Ancient Armenia, Kurdistan, and the borders of the Euphrates, by Austen Henry Layard, D.C.L., with wood cuts, 2 vols. 8vo. :—Illustrations of the Sculptures, Vases, and Bronzes recently discovered at Nineveh, principally Bas-reliefs of the Wars and Exploits of Sennacherib from his Palace at Kouyunjik, from drawings made on the spot, by Austen Henry Layard, D.C.L., folio, uniform with "Layard's Monuments of Nineveh." :—Some Account of the Danes and Northmen in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by J. J. A. Worsaae, of Copenhagen, For. F.S.A., London, wood-cuts, 8vo. :—Memoirs of the late Emperor of China, and the Court of Pekin, by the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff :—Suwarow and his last Campaign, by Major Macready :—Pictures of Life in Mexico, 2 vols., by R. H. Mason, Esq. :—China during the War and Since the Peace, by Sir J. F. Davis, Bart., late Minister Plenipotentiary in China, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Hong Kong, 2 vols. :—History of Ancient Pottery : Egyptian, Asiatic, Greek, Roman, Etruscan, and Celtic. By Samuel Birch, F.S.A., assistant keeper of the antiquities in the British Museum. With illustrations. 8vo. :—Women of Christianity, Exemplary for Piety and Charity, by Miss Julia Kavanagh, with Portraits :—Memoirs of Horace Walpole and his Contemporaries, including numerous Original Letters from Strawberry Hill, edited by Eliot Warburton, Esq., 2 vols. 8vo. :—Lectures on the History of France, delivered before the University of Cambridge, by the Right Hon. Sir James Stephen, K.C.B., 2 vols. 8vo. :—The Book of Almanacs, with Index, by which the Almanacs belonging to any year preceding A. D. 2000 can be found, with Means of Finding New and Full Moons from B. C. 2000 to A. D. 2000, by Augustus de Morgan, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London, demy 8vo. oblong, price 5s. cloth.

THE METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1852.

ART. I.—FAITH AND SCIENCE—COMTE'S POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

[SECOND PAPER.]

Cours de Philosophie Positive. Par M. Auguste Comte, Ancien Elève de l'Ecole Polytechnique ; Répétiteur d'Analyse Transcendentale, et de Mécanique Rationnelle à la dite Ecole. Paris : Bachelier. 1830-1842. 6 tomes, 8vo.

THE fallacy involved in M. Comte's distribution of states and periods consists, in great measure, in mistaking a predominant characteristic for a specific difference, and hence in supposing them to be reciprocally exclusive of each other. It would, indeed, be doing injustice to M. Comte, which we are very far from having any disposition to do, to conceal his recognition of the actual co-existence of all, which is prominently and continually brought forward in the whole course of his elaborate work. But this admission recognises them merely in their antagonism, which is supposed to lead to an ultimate exclusion, and therefore we are perfectly correct in saying that, on his theory, they are logically exclusive of each other. It may seem strange that a doctrine, leading to such a result, should have been deliberately embraced by one who regards the theological habit of mind as spontaneous,* whence it should have been acknowledged as indestructible also; and who professes to have systematized and proclaimed the historical method, which ought to recognise as also indestructible, though not as incapable of restriction, all tendencies which have been characteristically manifested at any period of the progress of humanity. But it is not with these things, but with the consequences to which they lead, that we are principally concerned at present.

* "Le développement spontané des conceptions théologiques." Philos. Posit., leçon i, tome i, p. 9.

If these intellectual conditions are severally exclusive of each other, then the attainment of the Positive habit of mind must be a negation and complete overthrow of the Theological and Metaphysical; or, in plain language, such as M. Comte delights to use, Science is entirely incompatible with Religion and Metaphysics,* and the acceptance of the Positive Philosophy is the rejection of both. As we have shown briefly that this supposed exclusion is fallacious, we might here arrest our argument, for the presumption is at least in favour of the possible co-existence of Science, Metaphysics, and Religion, and we might wait till M. Comte had altered or modified his premises, and replaced the defective threads of his Logic. But as he unequivocally cashiers Logic altogether, we will proceed with our refutation by showing that not merely are his premises false, but his conclusions and their consequences erroneous. We do not mean to say that they are inconsistent with such incorrect premises, for the logical concatenation of the Positive Philosophy is almost without flaw, and constitutes one of its most admirable characteristics; but they are at variance with the truth.

We will again wave the discussion of M. Comte's irreligion, remarking only that there is a gross inconsistency in this abnegation of the validity of a belief which is attested as one of the fundamental facts of human nature by the whole course of that history on which his whole philosophy is erected, and which is confirmed by the universal experience and observation on which he relies as the instruments by which science is established. Nay more: so absolutely impossible is it to escape from the recognition and influence of this necessary belief, that even M. Comte himself, undoubting and total as is his infidelity in respect to all revealed or accredited religion, concludes his long labours by appending to them as a corollary a proposition for the institution of a new creed and a new worship, of which the divinity shall be an idealized humanity.†

We are in no danger of being supposed to argue from a prejudiced point of view—at any rate the argument will not be suspected of springing from a foregone conclusion—when we discuss M. Comte's rejection of Metaphysics; and on this subject, therefore, we shall venture to dwell at greater length, inasmuch as its repudiation arises from the same principles which have led to the abnegation of religion, and involves fallacies strikingly analogous to those which are connected with the rejection of Theology.

* "La théologie et la physique sont si profondément incompatibles." *Philos. Pos.*, leçon i, tome i, p. 13; leçon lvii, tome vi, pp. 551, 552; leçon lviii, p. 714; et passim.

† *République Occidentale, Conclusion Générale*, pp. 315-393.

If these intellectual conditions are necessarily exclusive of each other, then the attainment of the Positive faith of mind must be a rejection and complete overthrow of the Theological and Metaphysical; and in plain language, such as M. Comte declares to be, Science is entirely incompatible with Religion and Metaphysics; and the acceptance of the Positive Philosophy is the rejection of both. As we have shown already that this supposed exclusion is fallacious, we might here arrest our argument for the proposition is at least in favour of the possible co-existence of Science, Metaphysics, and Religion; and we might wait till M. Comte had shown or qualified his premises and replaced the defective elements of his Logic. But as an unapologetically certain logician, whether we will proceed with our refutation by showing that not merely are his premises false, but his conclusions and their consequent avowments. We do not mean to say that they are inconsistent with each other's premises, for the logical construction of the Positive Philosophy is shown without fail, and constitutes one of its most admirable characteristics; but they are at variance with the facts.

We will again leave the discussion of M. Comte's Intelligence resting on the fact that there is a great inconsistency in this application of the validity of a logic which is attacked as one of the fundamental facts of human nature by the whole course of that history on which his whole philosophy is based, and which is confirmed by the universal experience and observation on which he relies as the foundation by which science is established. Nay more: so absolutely impossible is it to escape from the recognition and influence of this necessary belief that even M. Comte himself, regarding and told as is his inability to respect to all revealed or accepted religion, considers his logic infirm by appealing to them as a necessary proposition for the institution of a new creed and a new religion of which the divinity shall be an idealized humanity.

We are in no danger of being supposed to argue from a particular point of view—at any rate the argument will not be regarded as springing from a personal conclusion—when we discuss M. Comte's rejection of Metaphysics; and on this subject, therefore, we shall venture to dwell at greater length, inasmuch as its rejection is not from the same principle which have led to the rejection of religion, and rather follows strikingly analogous to those which are connected with the rejection of Theology.

* "In Philosophy is physics and a philosophical investigation." *Philos. Soc. Trans.* 1841, p. 171, from Vol. 1, pp. 161, 162; from Vol. 2, p. 171.

It is generally conceived that Logic and Metaphysics are two distinct branches of moral science: but this position is not now, and never has been of universal acceptance; for sometimes Metaphysics has been regarded as a part of Logic, and more frequently Logic has been treated as a mere application of Metaphysics. The Scotch school has included all the Logic which it recognises in their narrow Psychology, while the Scholastics and many others, ourselves among the number, are disposed to comprehend within the range of Logic whatever can be distinctly known of Metaphysics. It does not fall within our province at this time to discuss which of these opinions is correct,—whether they constitute one or two sciences. M. Comte rejects both, and while we concede the propriety of this double rejection as a single and immediate consequence of that distribution of the states of mind which we have just animadverted on, we will consider the propriety of the abrogation of each, separately and distinctly.

It might still be a question whether the one or the other should have the precedence in this discussion; and a very important question it would be, if we intended to make the validity of either dependent upon the other. But, inasmuch as Metaphysics in its loose acceptation contemplates a larger scope than is ordinarily comprehended by Logic; and inasmuch as M. Comte's rejection of Metaphysics is absolute, while with regard to Logic he rather proposes to discard the term than the reality, and to substitute another Organon for the Aristotelian Logic, we shall first consider his grounds for the denial of Metaphysics and their validity, and then prosecute a similar inquiry in regard to his dethronement of Logic.

We have seen that the rejection of Metaphysics follows immediately from the principles of the Positive Philosophy as expounded by M. Comte; but he further objects to its claims to be regarded as a branch of knowledge, that it is a resuscitation of a defunct theology, that it is purely critical, meaning thereby that it only criticises other systems and is only adapted to a crisis or transition-stage of intellectual progress, that it has proved wholly unfruitful for two thousand years, that it can boast of no real discoveries, that its whole substance is a patch-work of imperfectly comprehended metaphors mistaken for reasoning, and that, when it attempts to place itself on the same platform with the other modern sciences, by supposing a distinction between internal and external observation, and thereon constructing a psychology, it makes only a futile effort.* In connexion with the last objection, he asks with more acuteness than ingenuity, How can any observation take place, when the organ ob-

served and the organ observing are identical? But, however conclusive such an inquiry might be if addressed by or to a philosopher who rigidly adhered to the old Aristotelian maxim, "*vere scire est per causas scire*,"* it comes with a bad grace from one whose fundamental maxim is that the "*quid*," the fact or phenomenon, can alone be known,† and that the "*quomodo*," or manner—the how—lies absolutely beyond human cognition. Nor is the question of any weight with those who admit this maxim in metaphysics as in other science, and attempt to give to its shadowy doctrines, as much as possible, a scientific or *positive* form. In our day few metaphysicians pretend to trace causation—"scire per causas:" the impossibility of such knowledge has been recognised in great measure, not in consequence of its promulgation by the Positive Philosophy, but in consequence of the difficulties which were shown to attend it by the metaphysicians Hume and Brown. We have not inserted in these objections M. Comte's opposition to metaphysics in consequence of its supposition of entities, in part because we have shown this to be characteristic merely of one form of ontology, not of all, and in part because it is connected with the religious part of the inquiry, since M. Comte regards God as only a metaphysical entity.

Let us now examine briefly and separately M. Comte's objections. They present a strong array of charges, we will not affect to disguise it, and they contain much truth in them, but they have been alleged by other philosophers, themselves metaphysicians, not as destructive of this branch of knowledge, or conclusive against its existence, but as evidence of the inherent difficulty of the subject, and of the necessity for cautious and careful reconstruction.

We pass over once more the theological objection, and address ourselves to the charge of Metaphysics being purely critical. If we regard this accusation as meaning that it merely criticises other philosophies, it might have been suggested by a loose apprehension of the significance of Kant's great work; but, in all probability, it is original with M. Comte, as a transition-state of intellect can have no independent philosophy of its own,—the very idea of an intellectual crisis or transition supposing a merely provisional body of doctrine to bridge over the chasm which separates one original or normal (we cannot avoid using the expression) system from the other. If we consider the accusation as implying that Meta-

* πάντες γὰρ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν αἰτιῶν φασὶν εἶναι γινώσκειν. Alex. Aphrod. Schol. Aristot., p. 525.

† ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ δεῖν καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνεται ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τὸ διότι. Aristot. Eth. Nicom., lib. i, c. ii, p. 1095, b. 6.; sed contra Metaph. lib. i, c. 1, p. 981, a. 29. It is still more applicable to the πῶς.

physical science is characteristic of a crisis, we may ask in what respects it is so. It cannot be in all respects, for it has existed in all ages since the march of intellect commenced. It was born and very acutely developed under the Polytheism of Greece, which M. Comte considers only one or two removes from Fetishism; it was found in company with the mythology of the Hindoos; it grew up with the extension and development of Christianity. But if it thus accompanied all forms of Theology but the first, it has existed concurrently with the earlier stages of the Positive Philosophy, and may continue to co-exist with its further progress; and M. Comte himself regards as one of the originators of that Philosophy, which he supposes to be final and exclusive, that very Descartes,* who is universally revered as the father of modern Metaphysics. The truth is that a metaphysical doctrine is not necessarily transitional, except inasmuch as all change is a transition; but a transitional state is necessarily metaphysical. The difference may be in appearance only verbal, but it is nevertheless one of vast importance. During a period of transition, Metaphysics encroaches upon the domain of both Theology and Science, and retains its command of them till the one has been established and the other reconstructed. It extends its sway at such a time beyond its legitimate kingdom; but it possesses a lawful sovereignty within which it is afterwards restricted. Its usurpations alone are peculiarly connected with a transitional state; its peculiar and just reign is eternal. We think that the vagueness of M. Comte's conception of Metaphysics, and his application of the epithet, Metaphysical, to a crisis in intellectual development, have sprung very much from his recognition of the predominance in our day of both the Metaphysical and the critical spirit, and a hasty induction therefrom. Now we acknowledge most freely that this is an age of criticism,—it has long been asserted by metaphysicians;† we admit that it is also an age of transition; and we have already confessed that an era of transition is necessarily metaphysical, (the reasons for which opinion we may hereafter have an opportunity of alleging;) but we cannot assent to the position that Metaphysics belongs only to a crisis, and is nothing but a criticism. How far it is essentially critical; why it is so far critical; and what is its independent or positive value, we shall endeavour to explain after replying to M. Comte's other objections.

M. Comte further charges upon Metaphysics its utter barrenness for two thousand years, and its inability to point to any real dis-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp. 455, 695, 756, 886.

† "Notre siècle est le siècle de la critique: tout doit y être soumis." Kant. Crit. de la Raison Pure, vol. i, p. 7, note, trad. Tissot; and Logique, § iv, p. 42.

coveries. This count in the indictment is rendered still more grave by its being, in some measure, supported by the high authority of Kant.* We will examine its validity as an objection, supposing it to be true; and then estimate its truth.

The period of infertility assigned by M. Comte makes us conjecture that he regards it as extending from the times of Aristotle to our own. This seems to admit that it had been fruitful previous to that time; and, if so, then, although it may have early attained its highest possible development, and may have been thenceforward stagnant, yet it must have been a valid branch of knowledge before, and at the time of its maturity, and must have possessed some value. Whatever value it then had, it must still possess, except so far as the same purposes are better subserved by some other philosophy, unless its whole scope is embraced in other science, which will not be pretended. Certainly, if M. Comte recognises its value or utility at any time, which he does distinctly on numerous occasions, its incapability of further advancement does not destroy that validity or authorize him to deny it at a future time. We may venture to say that Arithmetic is a constituted science, *tota, teres, et rotunda*, admitting no further development worthy of consideration, and already in great measure supplanted by Algebra. Yet no one, not even M. Comte himself, will presume to deny either the existence or the value of such a branch of knowledge as Arithmetic. We may also allege that Moral Philosophy has certainly made even fewer notable advances, as a purely human science, than Metaphysics since the Ethics of Aristotle and the Offices of Cicero; yet M. Comte professes his belief in the validity and existence of such a philosophy, though he would alter and amend it, and re-organize it on a new basis. Metaphysics may, in like manner, require a new basis, and may have been so long barren for want of it; but we have assuredly no right to conclude from its long failure to advance that it may not resume its progress at some future time. The science of Astronomy was almost retrograde for fourteen hundred years from Ptolemy to Copernicus, and did not in consequence prove ultimately to be either futile or barren.† Consequently, even if Metaphysics be all that it is represented to be in this unfavourable picture, its stagnant condition would not furnish in the slightest respect a reason for its entire negation.

But, notwithstanding the allegations of M. Comte, and their partial confirmation by Kant, we deny that Metaphysics has been stagnant.

* Crit. de la Raison Pure, préface de la seconde édition, vol. i, p. 331.

† By some such reasoning Kant appears to have satisfied himself with regard to the doubt which he had suggested. Crit. de la Raison Pure, vol. i, p. 332.

The facts of which it takes cognizance are almost entirely facts of internal consciousness. These are its data, and they have always been equally possessed by all ages and classes of men. No mechanic arts, no curious instruments are requisite for their apprehension; they cannot be multiplied by the advancement of science, nor enlarged by any process of invention. All that can be done is to observe them more clearly, to harmonize and explain them more accurately and consistently, and to detect their mutual relations and dependence more precisely. The subject-matter, then, of Metaphysics, once determined with any degree of completeness, remains thenceforward incapable of any considerable expansion, except when the science transcends its domain. Hence, as the territory of the science does not enlarge it appears to be stagnant—nay, as it usurps ground in its earlier stages which does not rightfully belong to it, and which it must ultimately surrender, it may appear to recede. But production may be increased by cultivation as well as by an extension of the area—the power and the action may equally exist when concentrated, as when they were diffused. And such, we think, has been the case. But, again, a new source of delusion is opened. The fruitfulness of Metaphysics consists in the clearer determination of common notions and first principles; and the moment this greater perspicuity is attained, the man of science and the politician, the philosopher and the crowd, all avail themselves of the conquest; it is received and absorbed by the general intellect of the current and succeeding ages, and all forget the instrument by which it has been achieved, and deny the claims of the benefactress to their gratitude. Yet it might be easy to show that every intellectual reformation had been heralded, facilitated, or effected by a preceding improvement in the very Metaphysics which is so despitely entreated. If even, then, it could not now point to any real discoveries which would be generally credited to it, nevertheless it might have rendered most essential aid to the progress of society and of science, by dispelling those delusions which impeded their growth, and rendered it impossible. It might have ministered, as undoubtedly it has, to the advancement of both, by rendering all our notions more clear, distinct, and precise than they had previously been, or would otherwise have been; and surely this service would have been of no slight magnitude. Thus the absence of real discoveries, if such were the fact, would not be an argument against either the utility or the validity of metaphysical speculation.

But we are disposed, also, to deny its asserted failure to produce real discoveries. It proceeds through a succession of analogous changes, which are renewed again and again with each completion

of the circle; and hence its history, to the eyes of the prejudiced or the uninitiated, appears to be merely a silly recurrence of identically the same doctrines. But it is not so: the progress, as the fertility of Metaphysics, consists in the more clear apprehension and explanation of the same subjects—in the gradually expanding comprehension of each recurring system—and, however close may be the analogy between the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle, of Hegel and Plato, of Schelling and the Neo-Platonists, of Comte and Hippo, none will allege that the modern systems are not in advance of the ancient, because the points of view respectively may be identically the same. This progress implies discoveries; perhaps not such as M. Comte contemplates: but what does he mean by real discoveries? It has not invented a new motive power, nor analyzed soils, nor discovered another planet; but such discoveries belong not to its sphere. But it has discovered the conceptions, and invented and defined their appropriate terms, by which our science, our philosophy, and all our higher speculations are carried on. If we were required to specify an instance of real discovery, we would say, it has proved that inability to comprehend causation which is the corner-stone of the vast edifice which M. Comte has erected. He did not deduce this doctrine from his own premises or for himself; he did not receive it from Bacon or any of the earlier lights of the Positive school; but he borrowed it from Hume. Can he say that this is not a real discovery? If he does, then he denies absolutely the sole foundation on which his whole colossal scheme is reared.

It is but too true that metaphysical speculation has been frequently little more than a patch-work of half-comprehended metaphors, which have been employed with fluctuating significations. But this objection does not affect its substance; it only touches its vesture. It were to be desired that a defect so grievous should be remedied, and it may be remedied to a very great extent. The nature of the human mind, and the manner in which its knowledge is acquired, necessitate the employment of direct metaphors, borrowed from the sensible world, in Metaphysics, more than in any other department of human study. We cannot reason about things ideal with ideal symbols: when we speak of these abstruse subjects, we are obliged to apply to their discussion the terms of the common vocabulary with which all are familiar. But the metaphors which we employ gradually become fixed and definite, and lose their metaphorical character, in the same manner that most of the words of our ordinary language have been formed by the conversion of metaphorical into direct expressions. Much care may, indeed, be needed to prevent the illusions which spring from their origin; still more to avoid the

illusions which arise from their vagueness and corruption in vulgar use. The charge is a valid censure on those metaphysicians who employ metaphors loosely, and do not adhere to any strict well-defined signification; but it cannot be conceived to constitute a valid objection against the whole existing body of metaphysical doctrine—still less against the possibility or value of any such doctrine.

But the unkindest cut of all is to complain of the effort which Metaphysics has made to become positive—according to M. Comte, the only mode in which science passes from an imperfect into a comparatively perfect state. We do not ourselves believe in the possibility or expediency of Metaphysics assuming a strict scientific form, but we think that it partially admits of a positive complexion; and that the more it can clothe itself with this type, the better, provided it does not exclude or fail to recognise the existence of what is incapable of this conversion. We think, too, that the manner in which the Scotch school has sought to attain a positive character has been lamentably indiscreet, and has, in some measure, conceded the argument to M. Comte; but what shall we say of his own proposal to construct a Psychology on the positive basis, after rejecting Metaphysics altogether, and cavilling at its attempt to assume a positive form at all?

Having answered these objections, let us be indulged in a few brief remarks on the validity, the use, and the importance of Metaphysics. After what we said in our previous essay, we shall not be suspected of a disposition to exaggerate these. Metaphysics must be valid, because it is spontaneous, inevitable, indestructible, and subserves purposes not otherwise to be effected. At the very foundation of all reasoning, and especially of all science, lie primitive and abstract ideas, such as matter, substance, being, property, cause, effect, change, nature, time, space, relation, number, quantity, quality, accident, &c., which must be defined and explained—or it must be shown how far they are explicable, and how far inexplicable—before science is possible. If these explanations be seriously incorrect, science will ultimately suffer its share of the penalty; and before the science can be reformed, the Metaphysics must be amended. The Metaphysical speculations of Leibnitz, dependent upon those of Descartes and Spinoza, led to the theory of the *vis viva*, which long troubled Mechanics, and has not yet received its final solution. Even Mathematics is nothing more than the development of special metaphysical ideas by a congenial metaphysical process; and the present confusion and prospective barrenness (we retort upon M. Comte with his own word with peculiar pleasure) must seek its remedy

from a renewed and more accurate analysis of the Metaphysical principles on which the higher parts of the Calculus rest. All our reasoning and science depend upon first principles, which lie within the domain of Metaphysics. We may except to the name, and propose another, but still there is the domain, whether it belongs to an acknowledged lord and master, or not: we may hew it in pieces and apportion the fragments among the various sciences, but the mutilated members can be gathered up, and they will grow together like the limbs of the rejuvenated *Æson* when removed from the caldron. The partition, as the change of name, is a kind of jugglery which can deceive no one but those who are too weak to avoid deception, or determined to be deceived. If there must be then a body of knowledge concerned with first principles, to explain the very foundations of science and all other reasoning, we cannot refuse to acknowledge the validity, the utility, and the importance of Metaphysics.

But to remove misapprehension, and prevent the confusion which may so naturally flow from the tenor of M. Comte's remarks—three parts true, and one part false as they are,—we promised also to show why Metaphysical speculation was critical, and how far it was so. Its critical character proceeds, in great measure, from the nature of the subject-matter, as we have already mentioned. As its data are immutable and incapable of multiplication, all that can be done in the development of metaphysical doctrine is to examine them: and as they form the latent premises of all knowledge, we cannot hope in our examination to advance a single step beyond them, or to discover facts or laws of greater generality than those which meet us at the outset. Hence progress in this kind of speculation must consist in the criticism of those facts, and of the previous explications which have been given to them; for they are not tangible, they scarcely admit of intentional modification or experiment, and their different aspects consist almost entirely of the different interpretations which have been put upon them. But it is only with respect to such first principles that Metaphysics is essentially critical; its further deductions are spontaneous and original, although it may be necessary, in confirmation of their validity, to show how they explain or refute other conflicting theories which profess to be founded upon the same facts.

Again: Metaphysics is characteristic of a crisis, because, during a transition from one intellectual system to another, before the goal towards which the movement tends has been discovered, the only hope of advancement must be sought in the analysis of existing or anterior systems, in order to detect the germs of truth which com-

municated to them their past vitality, and the sources of error which have resulted in their present state of paralysis. In a season of doubt and difficulty we are irresistibly thrown back upon a renewed examination of the first principles of our knowledge; and this, as has already been said, is the peculiar province of Metaphysics. That, at such a time, it claims more than its due share of human thought and regard may be very true. It follows from the tendency of the human mind to render every principle which it adopts, and every theory which it receives, sovereign and exclusive. But this tendency is just as strongly manifested in M. Comte's Positive Philosophy, and the present claim of Science to universal empire, as in Metaphysics, and is further illustrated by the past or present conflicts of all the various branches of human knowledge. If Hegel and Schelling in our own day assign to Metaphysics an all-embracing empire, a like claim has been advanced in favour of Mathematics by M. Hoëné Wronski, and in favour of science by M. Comte, and less systematically by the great mass of men of science. In reply to M. Comte's objections, let it be stated that the period of the greatest influence and activity of Metaphysics is not at any central epoch between two systems, as he seems to suppose, but just on the eve of a new advancement of *positive* discovery, and is so because its conquests are essential to the further progress of Science. Assuredly recent years, which have witnessed such a brilliant career of science, have been more illustrated by the prominence of metaphysical speculation than the centuries which preceded them. Hence, though Metaphysical science appertains to a crisis or period of transition, so far as we have admitted, and for the reasons which we have assigned, it does not exclude, though it does and it ought to colour, the coincident evolution of both theology and science, for even under the alleged domination of the Metaphysical spirit, and despite its attempts to secure a usurped jurisdiction, science has so rapidly advanced as in these latter days to press claims still more exclusive than those of Metaphysics have ever been.

We have thus endeavoured to exhibit both the truth and error of M. Comte's views in regard to Metaphysics: it is not the first time that Metaphysics has been rejected, nor is it the first time that the futility of such rejection has been shown. About three centuries ago, Marius Nizolius, of Brescia, in like manner affirmed Metaphysics to be partly false, and partly superfluous and unnecessary, and was answered long afterwards by Leibnitz.*

* "Metaphysicam partim falsam, partim supervacaneam, et non necessariam esse, affirmamus." Mar. Nizol. De ver. princip. philosophandi, lib. iii, cap. iv, p. 217, ap. Leibnitii opera. Ed. Dutens, tom. i, ps. i, p. 72. Vide etiam pp. 60, 61.

But, like his predecessor, Nizolius,* M. Comte entertains hardly any greater consideration for Logic than for Metaphysics. He does not, indeed, deny the existence of logical processes and logical procedure, and he speaks continually of logical laws, and boasts of the logical consistency of his work,† but he conceives that the principles of Logic cannot be manifested otherwise than in a concrete state, and can be exhibited only in connexion with the reasoning of the separate sciences. He considers that Logic as a science is denied in the negation of Metaphysics; and that Logic as an art of reasoning, and a doctrine to be separately taught, is eminently futile and ridiculous. He contemplates, however, the possibility at some future time of constructing a Positive Logic, or, in other words, a Logic of Inductive Philosophy, but thinks that the time for such systematization has not yet arrived; and we are strongly inclined to agree with him in this opinion, notwithstanding the profound and elaborate attempt of Mr. Mill. But he conceives that, even if such a body of Logical rules and principles could be constructed, it would be of very little avail, and entirely useless except in its combination with specific scientific inquiries.‡

On this criticism we have several observations to make.

M. Comte, of course, does not pretend to deny that correct reasoning differs from incorrect; he is, therefore, obliged to recognise the existence of Logic in its loose sense of accurate argumentation. He further admits that there are principles and that there must be rules, by which such accuracy is to be determined, but he deems any attempt as yet to discover them from the analysis of scientific procedure, premature. From this source, however, he thinks that the only valid or Positive Logic can be derived. No one has done more than M. Comte towards the enlargement of the field of Logic; no one has with equal skill and judgment analyzed the organization of the sciences, and indicated more clearly the nature and the manner of their conclusions. We willingly accept from him his important discoveries in this respect, and cordially welcome them as valuable accessions to the domain of Logic. Indeed, we regard his inductive philosophy, as systematized by Mr. Mill, to be the only considerable

* "Nunc ad Nizolii errores redeundum est, ex quibus, post Aristotelem interpretibus confusum, palmarius est, omnimoda illa Dialecticæ et Metaphysicæ abolitio, quam tamen et Nominales, iisdem principiis nixi, retinuerint. Et vero quis neget, esse quædam præcepta tum artis cogitandi seu scientiæ de mente, tum pietatis naturalis, seu scientiæ de summa rerum," &c. Leibnitz, *Præf. ad Mar. Nizol.*, § xxix, *Opera* tom. iv, ps. i, p. 60.

† "Toujours guidés par les principes logiques posés au tome quatrième," &c. *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, leçon lvii, tome vi, p. 491.

‡ *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, leçon i, tome i, pp. 38-40; leçon lviii, pp. 761-763.

enlargement of Logic, which has been effected since the writings of Aristotle. But we cannot pay the price which he asks for this augmentation; we cannot consent to regard it as subversive or exclusive of what we may call, for want of a better term, syllogistic Logic. Without this, indeed, the new addition would have been impossible as it would be valueless. Every branch of knowledge, when finally organized as a science, is so constituted by the process of deduction, and this M. Comte recognises. The facts are discovered and stripped of their deceptive appearance by observation and experiment; the general laws which regulate or co-ordinate those facts are gathered by induction; but the development of those laws into a science, their employment for the discovery or explanation of new facts, are the work of deductive or syllogistic reasoning, tested of course in each case by observation and experiment. We may go one step further and say, that induction itself presupposes deduction and employs the syllogism.* M. Comte perceives and acknowledges the necessary assumption of the proposition, that the operation of the laws of nature is general, in all inductive reasoning. This is the latent but indispensable major premiss in every inductive enthymeme. But here Comte would object, that, though this be true, yet we reason without having learned Logic, and adopt this premiss, as we pursue accurate reasoning, without reference to any technical rules of the syllogism. These objections are the old ones, which have been so often refuted before that we will not answer them again. They proceed upon the common delusion that Logic is the art of thinking and one mode of reasoning. It is not one mode, but the only possible mode of reasoning, notwithstanding Dugald Stewart asserts that "there are various modes of reasoning to which the syllogistic theory does not apply!"† It is not the art of thinking, but the art of avoiding and detecting incorrect reasoning, and recognising the correspondence of argument with the formal conditions of accurate demonstration. It is solely concerned with the form of the argument, not with its substance or subject matter. It does not pretend to furnish a man with the facts about which he reasons, but it guards him against fallacious deductions from those facts. M. Comte's objections to Logic are founded, like those of Dugald Stewart and its other antagonists, upon an entire misconception of the nature and functions of Logic. A due respect to

* We are aware that this is directly in contravention of the thesis of Mr. Mill, which has been so highly commended, (*Logic*, book ii, chap. iii,) which is notwithstanding invalid and illogical.

† *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, pt. ii, c. iv, p. 112; vide p. 111, and pt. ii, chap. iii, sect. i.

this science might have saved him from that confusion of its equivocal meanings, and that utter ignorance of its true scope and character, which have led him to reject it. It is strange, indeed, that so much should have been written in disparagement of Logic, and yet not one of the distinguished authors who have impugned it has had the least acquaintance with its true objects and nature. From John Locke to Augustus Comte not one of its adversaries has clearly understood what the Logic was which they condemned. As the science which explains the natural laws and procedure of the human mind in reasoning, it is essentially indestructible; as the art which applies to daily use the rules gathered from those laws, it is of the highest importance, although it does not teach us to reason, nor apprise us of the conclusions of science, but acts within a much more limited range. We ourselves care little for the censure of those meagre systems of Logic which have long been regarded as constituting the science; but when an attack is made upon the validity of deductive Logic, in general terms, we must express our positive dissent.

This tendency to reject Logic has sprung from the negligent study of Bacon, and a misapprehension of the tenor and design of his remarks. He objected to the *a priori* construction of science by deduction from assumed premises, and indicated the necessity of collecting these premises by induction from observation and experiment. But he clearly, distinctly, and continually avowed the value and importance of deductive Logic, in its proper sphere, and in the development of the various branches of Ethical science.* The blunder of denying the value of Logic, and of supposing that Bacon denied it, must be charged exclusively upon the ignorance of his followers of the precepts given by their master. When Logic boasts of such advocates as Aristotle, Bacon, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, and Mill—the chiefs of the most various philosophies—it may smile at the opposition of Dugald Stewart and the Scotch school, and may disregard the rebellion of M. Comte. Its validity and its use have been proclaimed by the greatest minds of all ages, and the strong eulogies of the Scholastics have been paralleled by the more sedate praise of Bacon;† the vivid mind of Leibnitz insisted strenuously

* De Augm. Sci., lib. ii, vol. viii, p. 83; lib. v, c. i, p. 256; c. ii, p. 262. Fab. Cup., vol. xi, p. 99. Adv. Learning, vol. i, p. 193.

† There has been so much misapprehension of Bacon's views of Logic that we take the liberty of quoting one passage:—"Pars ista Humanæ Philosophiæ, quæ ad Logicam spectat, ingeniorum plurimorum gustui ac palato minus grata est; et nihil aliud videtur quam spinosæ subtilitatis laqueus ac tendicula. ° ° At istud lumen siccum plurimorum mollia et madida ingenia offendit et torret.

upon its indispensable necessity;* and the critical depth of Kant is enraptured with "the certainty, the beauty, and even the utility of Logic."† If all positive knowledge is scientific, it is attained by reasoning; if attained by reasoning, its accuracy or inaccuracy must be determined by Logic, which only professes to determine the formal conditions of correct or fallacious argument. Had M. Comte not rejected Logical science he would have avoided the fundamental error of his philosophy of assuming a part for the whole, and of concluding that what might be true of a part was also true of the whole. He might have gone further, and, as he has traced the anarchy and revolutionary character of our times to its intellectual aberrations, he might have traced back these aberrations to the illogical character (which he recognises) and the disregard of Logic, which have prevailed for the last three centuries. So far as his objections to Logic are just, they are inapplicable to either the art or the science properly understood: so far as they are applicable, they are unreasonable.

Having thus taken notice of those important branches of human knowledge which M. Comte rejects, we are prepared to enter into the further consideration of the Positive Method, as illustrated by that Hierarchy of the Sciences, constructed or to be constructed, which he recognises. But we deem it proper to stop here for one moment to state the reasons which have induced us to dwell so long upon inquiries that may seem almost excluded by the nature of M. Comte's system, and may consequently appear to be merely preliminary to its discussion. In reality, however, these are the most important points presented in the discussion of the Positive Philosophy. The key-note to any system of philosophy must be sought in its fundamental principles and method: the criticism of these is the most satisfactory, as well as the briefest criticism of the whole; for the entire edifice is determined as soon as the data and method are established. But in the philosophy of M. Comte the exclusion of Theology and Metaphysics is one of the fundamental axioms, because it is rather assumed as a basis for Positivism than legitimately

Ceterum unamquamque rem propria si placet dignitate metiri, Rationales Scientiæ reliquarum omnino claves sunt. Atque quemadmodum manus instrumentum instrumentorum, anima forma formarum, ita et illæ artes artium ponendæ sunt." De Augm. Sci., lib. v, c. i, vol. viii, pp. 255, 256. By Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, and Abelard Logic was called "*Disciplina disciplinarum*," "*dux universæ scientiæ*," "*sola dicendi scientia*;" and of it they said, "*hæc docet docere, hæc docet discere*," and "*scit scire sola*."

° De Conform. Fid. cum Rat., §§ 62, 65; Opera, pp. 102, 105, §§ 27-31; tome i, pp. 84-87. Leibnitz Œuvres, ed. Jacques, vol. ii, pp. 93, 96, 76-77.

† Kant Logique, trad. Tissot, pp. v, vi.

deduced from it; and this exclusion decides, in great measure, the character of the method. It is this, which we regard as the vital error of the whole creed, and consequently on this point the validity or the invalidity of the scheme mainly turns. We have recognised and are willing to repeat our conviction of the justice and solidity of the Positive system as strictly applied and confined to science; but we maintain also the absolute necessity of recognising a knowledge which lies beyond the circle of scientific systems, of retaining those very branches of learning which M. Comte rejects, and we deem this to be as much required by the interests of science as by the claims of a correct and all-embracing philosophy. There is a peculiar difficulty in refuting a long and elaborate work, whose details are for the most part as correct as they are profound, and spring legitimately from a philosophy in which truth and error are closely intermingled, with a very decided predominance of the former. It is easy enough to reply to positions and systems entirely erroneous; but when more than half is true, it is an arduous task to detect those fallacies from which the dangerous tendencies flow, without denying that which is just and solid. We have attempted to do this, rendering free credit and assent to what is valid in M. Comte's system, and at the same time refusing and refuting his errors, and tracing their origin and dependence. Their source we have detected in his illogical divisions and illogical exclusions, and as this part of our labours is virtually a refutation of the fundamental sophistry involved in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, we have been obliged to dwell upon these topics at greater length than a superficial observer might have deemed either requisite or appropriate. This apparent delay, however, enables us to achieve the remainder of our task within comparatively brief limits, though we shall be detained somewhat by a discussion of M. Comte's estimate of Mathematical Science, in consequence of its connexion with the Logic and Metaphysics which he has rejected.

As the simplest or least complex facts are those which are first observed and explained; so in the development of the Positive Method and its application to the classification of the sciences, these must succeed each other in proportion to the increasing complexity of their subject-matter. As each science requires for its full comprehension the aid of all the previous sciences, that which involves the simplest ideas and stands at the commencement of the scale, must constitute the proper introduction to all the others. Such is the position of Mathematics, and such is one of its functions. We might except to these principles, inasmuch as the sciences react upon each other and mutually require the aid of all the others; but

as this scheme of classification is the most clear and comprehensive that we have seen or can conceive, and probably as perfect as the nature of the case will permit, we receive it without question, and concede to M. Comte the praise of having solved a difficulty which Bacon could not master, and which D'Alembert could not diminish.*

The progress of the sciences, as history attests and as their present condition confirms, has been in the main, perhaps not entirely, in accordance with the principles just laid down, and therefore in proportion to their simplicity. Hence Mathematics "constitutes the first and the most perfect of all the fundamental sciences."† In regard to its exquisite perfection there can be no doubt, though we may find it necessary to examine into its extent and its explanation; but it can only be regarded as the first and fundamental science, by cashiering Metaphysics altogether, denying the possibility of any metaphysical doctrine, and striking it completely out of the field of view. This, as we have already stated, M. Comte does: he says that beyond Mathematics we cannot go without falling into the dream-land of Metaphysics.‡ This is, indeed, the only step beyond; but, as we have also said before, his reluctance to take this step—his arbitrary and arrogant negation of any such conceivable science—his effort to establish all human knowledge on a new basis, and to reform all modes of science, without recourse to metaphysical inquiry—constitute the really weak and defective side of his system, neutralize much that is good in it, and render it essentially imperfect, and insufficient for the ultimate purposes designed. It was intended to render this scheme of philosophy the spear of Ithuriel to test the validity of all knowledge, but the head of the spear, with all its magic virtue, is wanting, and the pointless shaft will not be found to be the wand of the true enchanter. All science must rest ultimately on the data and conclusions of the philosophy of the human mind: without these the support for the superstructure is wanting; and it is this basis—the *πῶς οὐδὲν* of all human knowledge—which Comte has deliberately refused to employ.

It is singular enough that this sneer at Metaphysics, which contaminates his whole reasoning, should be presented in connexion with Mathematics, and alleged as a reason for regarding the latter science as primary and fundamental. But Mathematics is purely a concrete form of Metaphysics—being eminently metaphysical in

* Dug. Stewart's *Diss. on the Progress of Metaphys. and Phil.* Supplement to *Encyclop. Britan.*, vol. i.

† *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, leçon iii, tome i, p. 145.

‡ "On ne saurait tenter d'aller plus loin sans tomber inévitablement dans les rêveries métaphysiques." *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, leçon iii, tome i, p. 145.

its conceptions, its materials, and its development. The *substratum*, which Comte deems it impossible to discover, is the connexion of the laws and processes of human reasoning with the materials to which it is applied. Take away the *subjecta materia*, quantity and relation, and the residuum will be the abstract laws and processes of the human mind, exhibited as applicable to all reasoning, and which, as abstractions, we may regard as existent even when not operative, i. e. Metaphysics. The substance of Mathematics is composed of two metaphysical conceptions; its axioms are purely and strictly metaphysical propositions; and its procedure is merely the deduction by Logic from these axioms and from the definition of those conceptions of the truths involved in them.

The fact, which would otherwise be inexplicable, that the great Mathematicians have also been the great Metaphysicians of their respective ages, might have led M. Comte to suspect some intimate connexion between the two departments of knowledge, if he had not been blinded by his prejudices.*

But Metaphysics being absolutely rejected, and Logic unceremoniously shoved aside, some primordial science must be introduced in their place to constitute the canon and the touch-stone of reasoning. This, under the new *régime*, is to be one of the functions of Mathematics. The rigorous logical universality of mathematical science† is announced to us as a new revelation to console us for the extinction of the old: we are assured that there is no question whatever which may not be conceived as ultimately reducible to a question of numbers,‡ and consequently brought within the range of mathematical solution. But is this possible in the case of social phenomena,—History, Law, Morals, Political Economy, &c.,—to say nothing of the rejected claims of Metaphysics and Religion? There is a large verge in these for the application of mathematical procedure, as the brilliant researches of M. Quetelet have proved; but these sciences cannot be entirely absorbed by Statistics. M. Comte has himself mentioned Pathology as an exception to his maxim. Certainly, in the present state of that science, Mathematics is not applicable to it, though we may readily conceive it to be so improved as to permit a partial employment of mathematical processes. But, in the other sciences which we have mentioned, the diversity and the varying intensity of the operative influences, the constant flux of modifications which they are ever undergoing, must at all

* Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes, Galileo, Barrow, Newton, Leibnitz, and we might add Kant.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, p. 162.

‡ Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, pp. 148, 149. Cf. p. 162.

times continue to withdraw them from the range of an exclusive mathematical treatment.* Hence the complaints of writers on the sociological sciences against the introduction of such modes of reasoning or illustration. It will not suffice to say that Mathematics is applicable, but the phenomena are too complex to admit of mathematical treatment. From whatever cause the impossibility to apply it to such questions may arise, that impossibility is proof of inapplicability. M. Comte admits† that the difficulty of its application to any but the most simple phenomena is insurmountable; and this, though not actually inconsistent with his previous assertion of its logical universality, is repugnant to it. If it may be conceived applicable in theory, but is found inapplicable in practice, this discrepancy might be reconciled upon a metaphysical basis; but after the abnegation of all Metaphysics, it would be an inadmissible explanation, and M. Comte can seek no aid from that source.

We were surprised to find that Sir David Brewster had fallen into the same delusion: "No sound knowledge," says he, "can exist, but that which rests immediately on facts, or is deduced from them by mathematical reasoning."‡ Sir David believes in Christianity and Metaphysics—in the former at least,—and we have a shorter reply for him. If this position be true, where is the evidence of inspiration or revelation, and whence the truth of religion? Yet he afterwards most justly reprehends the atheism of Comte. Is the being of God to be proved or confirmed by a simple algebraic equation? or the truth of Christianity by a differential formula?

Our animadversion upon the exclusive and unlimited claims of mathematical procedure by no means prevents our appreciation of the value of the science as a means of intellectual discipline and an efficient instrument in all scientific researches. We cordially assent to the eulogies bestowed upon it by M. Comte, bating their exclusiveness; and while we make this exception, we would remind him that almost every one of his Lectures is filled with reclamations against the tyranny and unrestrained ascendancy of the mathematical spirit, whence, according to him, has proceeded that specialization of modern scientific inquiry, of which he constantly complains,§ and that prolongation of intellectual anarchy, which he

* *τὴν δ' ἀκριβοσλογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτῆτεον.* Aristot. Metaph. A. minus, c. iii, p. 995, b. 14. Aristotle had discernment enough to perceive that even mathematical accuracy could not be expected in all reasoning, much less mathematical procedure.

† Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 151.

‡ Review of Comte's Cours de Phil. Pos., vols. i, ii. Edinburgh Review, July, 1838, No. cxxxvi, art. i, p. 1.

§ Tome vi, pp. 67, 125, 289, 290, 302, 310, 312, 328, 339, 345, 452, 456, 457, 813.

is desirous of bringing to an end. In fact, we agree cordially and fully throughout with M. Comte's positions, except so far as they are warped from the truth by the excessive latitude and exclusive character of his principles; and slight as the amount of error may appear, in comparison with the whole body of the Positive doctrine, every fallacy and every pernicious tendency, with the exception of a few fantastic extravagances, may be legitimately traced to these fundamental defects.

But M. Comte is neither the first, nor the only philosopher, who has assigned to Mathematics its pre-eminent importance as a discipline for the mind, and who has required it as propædæutic to other scientific studies. Every one is familiar with the celebrated prohibition of Plato, but is not equally familiar with the ground on which it was placed by him. He regarded Mathematics not as a part of philosophy, but as introductory or progymnastic to it;* and the Peripatetics assigned to it a function closely analogous to that which is attributed to it by M. Comte.† The weight of Lord Bacon's opinion, as also of John Locke's, is thrown in the same direction; and in very recent times a learned, but most eccentric writer, who aims at the same practical ends as Comte, but whose philosophy starts from the opposite pole, and contemplates not the extinguishment, but the resuscitation of Christianity, asserts the same dogma,‡ though he too protests against the present ascendancy of Mathematicians.§

In conceding the claims of Mathematics in this respect, we might possibly be supposed to concede more than could be justly or safely granted. It may be well, then, to inquire, Whence does its peculiar efficacy spring, or, which is nearly the same question, What is the cause of its scientific and logical perfection. This problem has in all ages afforded so large a scope for misapprehension and crude

* φασιν ὅτι τὸ μαθηματικὸν οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δοξάζει· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ μαθηματικὸν οὐ δοξάζει μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἀλλὰ προ-
γυμνασμά τι, ὥσπερ ἡ γραμματικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ· ὅθεν καὶ τῷ Ἀκροατηρίῳ ἐπ-
έγραψεν “ἀγεωμέτρητος οὐδεὶς εἰσίτω.” David, Schol. Aristot., p. 12, b. 8; vide Comte i, p. 112.

† τὸ μαθηματικὸν μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ φυσιολογικοῦ καὶ θεολογικοῦ, ὡς καὶ τῶν δύο μετέχον· καὶ γὰρ ἐνυλὸν ἐστὶν ὁμοίως τῷ φυσιολογικῷ, καὶ ἄνυλον ὁμοίως τῷ θεολογικῷ. David, Schol. Aristot., p. 15, b. 3, v. 24. This is Comte's distinction between pure or abstract and concrete or mixed mathematics. Leçon iii, tome i, pp. 138, 139.

‡ Hoëné Wronski, *Messianisme*, tome ii, p. 600. We might have added Roger Bacon to the above list. “Et harum scientiarum (the four great sciences) porta et clavis est mathematica.” *Opus Majus*, ps. iv, c. i, p. 43, editio Veneta. But it is easy to multiply such authorities.

§ Hoëné Wronski, *Messianisme*, tome i, p. 18.

reasoning; it has been so miserably misconceived by idealists of every shade and school, from Plato to Dugald Stewart, that the present discussion may have other advantages than those which spring from the reduction of M. Comte's views within correct limits.

The doctrine, that mathematical truth or reasoning indicates the existence of absolute, eternal, infinite, and immutable truth, was familiar to Plato and his followers, as is proved by the examination to which it is subjected in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, and in the commentaries of his scholiasts. It was revived by Descartes and Spinoza, received by Leibnitz, reasserted by Kant in the least logical part of his great work, adopted by Whewell without being comprehended, clamoured over by the whole Scotch school, and it again reappears in Victor Cousin and Morell. Yet even Aristotle and the Peripatetics perceived that Geometry and the other branches of Mathematics were founded upon observation.* The argument of Morell is mere "*crambe repetita*;" but as a repetition in a concise form of the old staple argument, we may use it as the target for our batteries. "Take for instance," says he, "any axiomatic truth of pure mathematics. It is not through mere sensation that you have arrived at it; neither is it an arbitrary relation of your own production; nor is it conceived of in pursuance of any resolution of your own will. Try as you may, and you cannot alter the conceptions of pure reason even to an infinitesimal degree," &c. Whence he concludes that mathematical truth is transcendental and ideal.† All this is true except the inference deduced from it. There is no necessary or logical relation between the premises and the conclusion. The premises are true, because in subjects not immersed in matter, but confined entirely to the region of the intellect or pure reason, the assumptions being taken and developed according to the fundamental and immodifiable laws and processes of the human mind, the mind would have to go out of itself, and contradict its own nature, to arrive at the possibility of considering conclusions in such subjects otherwise than as they appear. In like manner, and for the same cause, such facts or truths present themselves without difference or variation, because they lie beyond the circle of passion and imagination, and result only from those general laws which are the common and necessary conditions of all intellectual action. Hence an ample explanation of mathematical truth may be afforded without any appeal to an invisible and imaginary universe; and consequently if there be such other explication of the facts, the logic of

* Aristot. *Metaph.* x, ii, p. 1060, b. 13; xii, iii, pp. 1077, 1078; xiii, ii, p. 1090, a. 13; iii, p. 1090, b. 7; and Alexander *Aphrodisiensis*, *Schol. Aristot.* p. 524.

† *Crit. Hist. Phil.*, xix. Century, pp. 54, 55.

Morell's reasoning is invalidated, and the premises are insufficient to sustain the conclusion. Morell perceived that the reasoning of Descartes on this subject was in a circle,*—how could he then fail to perceive the fallacy of his own?

Into the error of the Idealists M. Comte was of course secure against falling. He very properly traces the strict logical accuracy of mathematical reasoning to the fact that Mathematics is only the explanation of the relations of mutual dependence existing between all parts of the abstractions which constitute its subject.† This, however, is only a secondary proposition, consequent upon the more general truth which forms the basis of mathematical science, to wit, that it takes cognizance only of abstractions, which are purely creations of the intellect,‡ stimulated indeed by observation, but independent any further of external matter, and therefore not liable to be disturbed or infected by the qualifying circumstances, and changing modifications, and complex aspects of everything external. These abstractions, once conceived and assumed, are developed in accordance with the pure and undiluted processes of the mind, and therefore the science which is founded upon them, consists merely of the explanation of the new relations discovered or occasioned by the intellectual modifications under which they are conceived to exist. Hence Comte's explanation is not the primary, but the derivative cause of the stringent universality and absolute perfection of mathematical truth. It fails from being in defect, as the theory of the Idealists failed from being in excess.

The rejection of Metaphysics is the stumbling-block in M. Comte's way, which prevents him from arriving, like Aristotle, at a complete solution of the question. It has also led him into an inconsistency; for, notwithstanding this rejection, he does finally rest the perfection of mathematical science upon what can hardly be regarded in any other light than as a metaphysical ground. He says that its perfection is occasioned by the extreme simplicity of the ideas which it contemplates.§ Aristotle says the same thing, but with a spirit of so much larger comprehension as to change the character of the doctrine.|| He recognises and acknowledges the dependence of Mathematics on Metaphysics.¶ We would ask M. Comte what is

* Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., pp. 119, 120.

† Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 130.

‡ This Aristotle clearly perceives. He says that mathematical reasoning is ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. Metaph. iii, ii, p. 1005.

§ Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 148.

|| Aristot. Metaph. x, iii, p. 1061, a. 28—b. 8; vi, x, p. 1036, a. 9.

¶ ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς χρήται τοῖς κοινοῖς ἰδέαις, καὶ τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς εἰς θεωρεῖται τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας. Metaph. x, iv, p. 1061, b. 17.

the nature of those simple ideas with which Mathematics is concerned? and what is the cause of their simplicity? It is that those ideas are purely metaphysical, and are therefore exempt from the fallacies and limitations which would be necessarily attendant upon any discussion beyond the magic circle of purely metaphysical speculation. The ideas contemplated by Mathematics are purely metaphysical as being intellectual abstractions; and the simplicity of the science is due to the strict retention of all its processes within the narrow and definite limits of logical intellection—which is metaphysical also. We are constantly informed by Aristotle and his commentators that the subject of Metaphysics is, τὸ ὅν ἢ ὅτι, and with this the definitions assigned by all great metaphysicians accord.* If this definition is intelligible, is it not obvious that the province of Mathematics, in its higher and more abstract character, falls within its domain? if it is otherwise unintelligible, does not the nature of Mathematics light us to its significance?

Again, M. Comte rightly distinguishes between applied Mathematics (Mathématique concrète) and pure Mathematics (Mathématique abstraite,) characterizing the former as “experimental, physical, phenomenal,” the latter as purely logical or *rationnel*.† Abstract or pure Mathematics are, as we have said, only the development of abstractions and assumptions which the mind has defined for itself. From whatever source these abstractions be taken, whether we regard them as the spontaneous products of innate intellectual tendencies, or conceive them to be generalizations and segregations from observed facts, after they are once received as data, no further subject-matter is introduced either by observation without, or genesis within; but we unroll the implicit and latent relations, which are involved in those data, and prosecute the development under the sole guidance of the reasoning tendencies of the human mind, or, in other words, in strict obedience to those vital laws of reason, which are inseparably connected with the thinking faculty of man. Hence, abstract mathematics is entirely the creature of reason, and therefore strictly logical; but the necessity of a constant reference to external facts, whether in the way of observation or experiment, infects applied mathematics with the deficiency incident to every part of knowledge derived *ab extra*, and thus renders it phenomenal, and of course experimental and physical.

From this discussion of the nature and validity of mathematical reasoning we may readily deduce the causes of its efficacy as an

* “Metaphysica agit tum de ente, tum de entis affectibus.” Leibnitz, *De Arte Combinat. Procm. Op. tom. ii, p. 344.*

† *Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, pp. 138, 139.*

intellectual discipline and propædæutic, and also of its almost universal applicability.

Abstract Mathematics, it follows from what we have just said, is only concrete logic—it is the strictest logical procedure united and applied to the simplest and most congenial subject-matter. As concrete knowledge always presents fewer difficulties than abstract; as the practice of accurate and logical reasoning must be more efficient in inducing a like habit than any theory or art of its procedure can be, Mathematics, which is the strictest, as well as the simplest form of concrete logic, must be eminently adapted to become a wholesome discipline of the reasoning faculties. It is, however, merely the drill of the soldier, not the science of the general. It generates a spontaneous accuracy in ordinary practice, but it throws no light on the validity of its own procedure, nor does it render that most essential service of pure logic—a canon for the detection of error and the exhibition of its causes. But from this explanation we can also perceive how the prevailing devotion to mathematical studies during the three centuries which have witnessed the disregard and decline of Logic has been efficacious in postponing even to our own day the fatal consequences which must flow from inattention to the principles on which all reasoning must rest, and the limitations within which alone it can be valid.

The hydra-headed error, with which we have been contending, springs up again when we proceed to consider the reasons assigned by M. Comte for the singular efficacy of Mathematics as an instrument in its application to other sciences. This he justly refers to the generality, the simplicity, and the purely abstract character of the conceptions with which it is concerned.* But there is a step beyond, which he was prevented from taking by the fast-anchored error from which his whole system takes its departure. Having commenced with the denial of all Metaphysical science, actual or conceivable, and having assumed as the scope of his labours the substitution of a scheme, which might dispense with and render nugatory all metaphysical inquiry, he was estopped from taking the necessary step in advance, as it would infallibly have led him within the confines of metaphysical speculation.

We are barred by no such self-imposed limitation, and take this step in confidence. Mathematical reasoning is the logic of definite or definable relations. Its forms are generalized and simple abstractions: as such, they are applicable to any subject where such relations can be detected; and, being applicable in all such cases, they convey their significance without any recognised subject-

* Cours de Phil. Pos., leçon iii, tome i, p. 146.

matter other than those relations, and are true, independent of the specialities to which in practice they may be applied. This explains the extent of the range, and the general applicability of mathematical procedure.

So far, the errors of M. Comte have been found all connected, and springing as ramifications from one central error—the supposition that all knowledge might be embraced within the circle of scientific reasoning. From this fallacy have sprung his rejection of Theology, Logic, and Metaphysics, his distribution of the periods of human history, and the progress of human intellect into three stages, his substitution of Mathematics for the sciences which have been condemned. Having refuted his delusions in this respect we have criticised, so far as they require criticism, nearly the whole peculiarities of the Positive Philosophy. Its separate applications would, indeed, well reward our attention had we time for their consideration, but they may be judged by the principles we have established in connexion with the special criticism derived from each separate science. It is only necessary for the completion of our view of the Positive Method to mention the principle of classification employed in the arrangement and distribution of the successive branches of science, and then we may pass on to a consideration of the tendencies of the Positive Philosophy and the dangers to be apprehended from it, with a brief statement of which we shall conclude our long essay, leaving for a future notice of the *République Occidentale* the consideration of M. Comte's development of his principles and conclusions into a scheme of social regeneration and social philosophy.

As Mathematics constitutes the primary and fundamental science in the Positive System, in consequence of the peculiar simplicity of the ideas which it contemplates, so the general principle which regulates the relations and successions of the other sciences is, that those which are the most abstract, or whose speculations are conversant with the most simple and homogeneous subjects, are first in rank, in order of development, in perfection, and furnish the bases for the more complex sciences. A similar view of classification seems to have been involved in the reasons assigned by the ancients for the precedence which they gave to Arithmetic and Music over Geometry and Astronomy.* The same principle is also employed to determine the subdivisions of the sciences, which are further distinguished into their statical and dynamical branches.† There can be no doubt that this principle of system-

* David, *Prolegg. Phil. Schol. Aristot.*, p. 15, b. 34. Cf. p. 16, a. 38. *Asclep. Schol. ad Metaph.*, p. 606, a.

† *Cours de Phil. Pos.*, leçon i, tome i, p. 33.

atization is more philosophic than any that preceded it, and infinitely preferable to all others in the results to which it conduces. M. Comte's criticisms on former modes of classification are both just and acute, and it is not the least tribute which has been paid to his philosophic ingenuity that the elaborate but too cumbrous and artificial scheme of Ampère is virtually built upon his, and involves most of what is distinctive in it. Of course, even in this part of his labours, the exclusion of Theology and Metaphysics invalidates the plan; but it rather renders the scheme incomplete, than affects the value of his arrangement so far as it goes. He does, indeed, erroneously deny any distinction between Moral and Physical Science,*—a distinction which is perhaps exaggerated in the classification of Ampère,—but this was a necessary consequence of the false and contracted basis on which the whole edifice was reared. It is, however, easily corrected. But we must also remark that while it is perfectly true that the more complex sciences require and presuppose the assistance of the more simple sciences, these themselves for their improvement need the aid of the more composite and difficult. The reaction is not equal to the action, but its influence is very decided, and all parts of knowledge are mutually dependent on each other,—

alterius sic

Poscit opem res, et conjurat amice.

M. Comte recognises this interdependence, but the tendency of his system is to impede the recognition of its importance. One signal consequence of his system, which he does not fail to reiterate, is that all the sciences hang together, and explain each other:—that the attempt to treat them as entirely separate and distinct is to destroy their value and to insure their ruin, and not theirs only, but the infection of the whole tone and temper of human intellect. It is to this effort, whether consciously or unconsciously made, that he refers that excessive specialization of modern thought, which is so intimately connected with the anarchy of the age. The detection of this error is a service which is entitled to the most cordial appreciation.

The application of the principles which we have mentioned and discussed, results in the development in regular order, of the several sciences which have been created by human genius and industry. These are arranged in a tabular form and in their genetic order in a scale of classification prefixed to the first volume of the work. First appears Mathematics, with its subdivisions, the Calculus, (including Arithmetic with the various forms of the Integral and Dif-

ferential Calculus,) Geometry, and pure Mechanics. Next comes Astronomy, divided into Astronomical Geometry and Astronomical Mechanics. Then follows Physics, which treats of Barology, Thermology, Acoustics, Optics, and Electrolgy. From these we proceed to Chemistry, Organic and Inorganic, and thus complete the circle of the sciences of inanimate matter. The next stage introduces us to the complex phenomena of the world of life, and here the deficiencies of M. Comte's fundamental principles begin to reveal themselves in fatal fallacies. The first science of organized bodies is Biology, or the theory of animation, a branch of knowledge whose outlines are as yet sketched only with a wavering and uncertain hand, although the sagacity and ingenuity of M. Comte are strikingly exhibited in the general tenor of his remarks. To this head he refers Anatomy, the Physiology of vegetation, animation, the intellect and the passions, and under it admits Phrenology into the circle of the Positive Sciences. Having thus completed the theory of human and animal nature, which he assimilates too closely to each other, he passes on to a science partly reconstructed, but in great measure created by himself, Sociology or Social Physics, and thus adds the crowning stone to his simple, systematic, and comprehensive plan. Parts of this last department of study had been previously elaborated, but either under too isolated a form, or on too arbitrary a basis, but M. Comte proposes to develop them in their mutual connexion and harmonious interdependence. Thus he objects to a separate science of Political Economy, on grounds which are not altogether valid, although they have been too little regarded by the followers of Adam Smith and Ricardo, and which, after having been ably examined by Mr. Mill, in his system of Logic, have been utterly disregarded by him in his treatise on Political Economy. We cannot dwell upon this portion of the Course of Positive Philosophy, because it does not legitimately fall within the restricted scope of this essay, but, admirable as is the whole work, no portions of it, in our estimation, exhibit so much depth, comprehension, originality, and acumen as the fourth and sixth volumes in which the application of the historical method to the philosophy of society is developed, and the outlines and conditions of the new science of Sociology are laid down.

Thus by a regular and strictly logical progression M. Comte leads us through the whole circle of *Positive* science, constructed or conceivable; and, throughout, his whole system is the consistent evolution of certain principles which he lays down at the outset. Stage above stage, in orderly sequence, the elaborate structure rises, proceeding from the more simple to the more complex in accordance with the necessary conditions of knowledge, until its ever-widening

horizon circumscribes the whole sphere of intellectual pursuits which can fall within the apprehension of the Positive philosopher. Some branches of knowledge are, indeed, excluded from this vast temple of human learning, in consequence of an error involved in the fundamental position of his philosophy, which infects, more or less, its whole development; but overlooking this error and its consequences, no more complete or perfect exposition of the genius, the functions, the successions, the defects, or the excellences of the various sciences can be imagined. The mighty edifice, and the fatal fallacy which is embodied in its construction, remind us, indeed, of the endeavour at Babel to raise by human effort a ladder to the skies; and of the legend of Greek mythology which tells how the giants of the elder world attempted to scale the heavens by piling Pelion upon Ossa, and Ossa upon Olympus, in the vain hope of hurling the gods from their thrones. The history of that futile enterprise is written,—

Affectasse ferunt regnum cœleste Gigantas,
 Altaque congestos struxisse ad sidera montes.
 Tum pater omnipotens misso perfregit Olympus
 Fulmine, et excussit subjecto Pelion Ossæ.

A like fate attends M. Comte's labours, so far as their ultimate aim is concerned; but the mountains which he has reared will remain, a perpetual memorial of his greatness, and will attest, notwithstanding his failure to achieve the object contemplated, that his work was the work of the Prince of the Titans.

Our long exposition of the character and defects of the Positive Method will enable us to exhibit briefly the character and efficiency of the Positive Philosophy. It will be readily perceived that it is a system of extreme sensationalism, or, more correctly, it proceeds beyond sensationalism in the same direction, by absolutely refusing to entertain any opinion, or tolerate any theory in explanation of the origin or validity of human knowledge. It recognises all the great properties of the human mind, except its religious and metaphysical appetencies, and receives all the primary conclusions of the intellect and perceptions of the senses, purely as phenomena, without taking any cognizance of the existence of either substance or cause behind the phenomena. As a partial explanation of human knowledge, as a theory of its systematized or scientific branches, we admit the value and absolute truth of this interpretation—but merely in connexion with an extra-scientific recognition of the unscientific sphere of human knowledge and belief. It ought to be, therefore, eminently efficacious within its own peculiar sphere in producing larger, wider, and healthier views of science, though we much fear its value even in this respect is seriously impaired by the prejudices

which it will excite, and the fallacious exclusiveness of view which it will occasion, by its rejection of all religious belief and doctrine. In fact, science can no more dispense with the recognition, open and avowed, of an unquestioning faith, than the human race can afford to discard Christianity. Science, to achieve its noblest triumphs, to render its most eminent services to humanity, must be irradiated with that celestial light, "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." "*Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei*," "the heavens declare the glory of God," and all science is but the dim and imperfect revelation of the goodness, the majesty, the power, and the wisdom of Jehovah. It is almost valueless except so far as it ministers to the greater happiness, morality, and permanent comfort of man and of society. Can these things be secured without religion? The unbecoming flippancy of the speech of M. Comte, that the heavens declare only the glory of Newton and Laplace, is strangely ill-turned, at a period when all the discoveries in Science and Philology tend to confirm the narratives of Scripture and the precepts of revelation. There is a maxim immortalized in our own English poetry which may be suitably commended to M. Comte, as the only rebuke of which a declaration, so unworthy of his lofty genius, is entitled to,—

An undevout astronomer is mad.

It belongs to the consideration of M. Comte's scheme for the renovation of society, as expounded in his latest work, to examine the special aptitude of the Positive Philosophy for this purpose. We can only say here, that the total negation of all religion allows no hope of its having any such efficacy, and is by no means in consonance with his acute discovery of the causes of present anarchy and present social evils in the unregulated license of the passions, and the decay of the noblest affections—confidence, justice, charity, mutual regard, and sympathetic faith.

The Positive Philosophy is then entirely invalid as a reformation of the intellect of the world, for it excludes the idea of such reformation in those very points in which it is most imperatively required. It is valid merely in reference to strict science, and for its full validity even in this respect it requires the cordial recognition and the lively appreciation at all times of nearly everything which M. Comte excludes. If received by itself as the gospel of a new era, it perpetuates and increases the very evils which it would redress or avert; for it petrifies science into the mere instrument of human passions instead of rendering it the obedient instrument for the better fulfilment of the duties and destinies of man. Notwithstanding all M. Comte's efforts to awaken a healthier state of feeling, to correct

the greed and egotism of the day, to refine, elevate, and develop the affections, it must paralyze these more and more, for the moral nature of man is not to be found, disciplined, chastened, or ennobled by scientific precepts, or by intellectual deductions. M. Comte recognises the fatal ascendancy which is conceded to intellect in the nineteenth century; he strives manfully to hurl the usurper from the throne; but it must retain the sovereignty of human life and conduct, as long as the intellect is the sole alembic for testing the validity of the rules of human action. From the full comprehension of all science, of all philosophy, of all life, flows necessarily and irresistibly as the tides of the ocean, the conclusion that beyond human speculation, beyond human interpretation, beyond the domain of human reason, lies the absolute, authoritative guide of human thought and conduct, in the will of God, revealed in his Scriptures, or as certainly revealed in those indestructible instincts which are interwoven with the very being of man. We do not object to M. Comte's philosophy because it excludes religion; but we object to it because it fails to attain its own ends, because it vainly attempts to accomplish those things which religion does and alone can accomplish, because it does itself reveal the absolute necessity of religion for the attainment of its own ends, and hence proves its exclusion of religion to be a fatal defect.

We do not think that any of the professed followers of M. Comte can admire his genius and learning, the ponderous strength of his intellectual powers, their graceful and easy play, his fearlessness, sincerity, and simplicity more highly than we do, nor appreciate more cordially, nor accept more gratefully his philosophy so far as it is correct and applicable; but the maintenance to the end of that logical consistency, with which his scheme is concatenated, must have shown him the defect in his fundamental position and led to its correction, if his ultra St. Simonism had not rendered the denial of God and the negation of religion immutable assumptions. Yet, this is the blunder which has deprived M. Comte of the highest crown of intellectual greatness. We admit him to be second only to Bacon and Aristotle among the mighty intellects of all time: had he as rigidly incorporated religious faith into his system, as he has strictly excluded it; had he shown its indissoluble connexion and perfect harmony with all knowledge, scientific or other, instead of endeavouring to show, which he has not succeeded in doing, its absolute antagonism to science, we should then have hailed in him one greater than Bacon, for he would have infallibly furnished the solution required for the intellectual and social difficulties of the times.

Comte's Positive Philosophy is the last word of modern infidelity—its highest, most complete, and philosophic expression; it is the most undiluted development of the material, money-seeking, selfish and self-sufficient tendencies of the late centuries. A disposition to reject all restraint, to acknowledge no authority but individual passion or interest, to recognise the *summum bonum* in individual gratifications, to bow to no sovereign but human reason, and to adore human intellect with a base and beggarly worship, as corrupting as it is blind, has become the main characteristic of this nineteenth century, and has matured in anarchy, revolution, and social distress, its fatal fruits.* These tendencies have at length crystallized themselves into a brilliant system in the Positive Philosophy; but its brilliancy is death—it is the annihilating stroke of the lightning which gleams before our eyes, and dazzles us with its fatal beauty. Let us hope that the last revelation of the philosophy of this world may be a sign of the coming advent of a better, as the plagues of Egypt heralded the exodus of the Israelites.

ART. II.—ROGER WILLIAMS.

1. *Memoir of Roger Williams, the Founder of the State of Rhode Island.* By JAMES D. KNOWLES, Professor of Pastoral Duties in the Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Lincoln, Edmonds & Co.
2. *Life of Roger Williams.* By WILLIAM GAMMELL. Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown.

MR. KNOWLES has done the cause of morals and religion valuable service in rescuing from oblivion many important facts, throwing light upon the true character of Roger Williams. Several attempts had been previously made to accomplish this work, but they had all failed. Dr. Belknap designed to give the life of Roger Williams a place in his American Biography, and he sought earnestly for materials, but with indifferent success. It was announced, a few years since, that Southey intended to write the life of Roger Williams; the design was pro-

* The aims and tendencies of the civilization of the age have been so admirably expressed in a few brief formulæ by Hoëné Wronski, (*Messianisme*, tome i, pp. 47-49,) that we would have willingly inserted them here, had not our remarks run to such a length that we have been obliged to omit many topics of more importance. One expression has so pointed an application to the Positive Philosophy, as to indicate that the statement was intended as a criticism upon it, and it may certainly be regarded in that light, as a most forcible and just exposition of the fatal creed which must spring from the adoption of the Positivism of M. Comte.

bably relinquished for the same reason. At Southey's suggestion the Rev. Mr. Greenwood, of Boston, collected many valuable materials, but he, too, for personal reasons, abandoned the undertaking. The task of our author was a most difficult one. After receiving all the materials previously collected by Mr. Greenwood, he says, "In my further search for information, I soon discovered, that many persons, well acquainted with our early history, knew very little of Roger Williams. In the books I found almost every important fact concerning him stated differently. I was obliged to gather hints from disconnected documents, and to reconcile contradictory assertions;—my labour often resembled the miner, who sifts large masses of sand, to obtain a few particles of gold." But, difficult as was the task, he has performed it well.

Mr. Gammell's life of Roger Williams presents a truthful and striking portrait of the justly styled "apostle of religious liberty." He relies principally on the facts furnished by Mr. Knowles, and has used them with great skill and advantage. His work is unquestionably one of the most interesting biographies to be found in "Sparks's Library," of which it forms the fourth volume.

In attempting a brief sketch of the life, character, and career of the founder of Rhode Island, we shall make free use of the volumes before us.

But little is known respecting the early life of Roger Williams. From the best information received, it is supposed that he was born in Wales, in 1599. He possessed the Welsh temperament—excitable and ardent feelings, generosity, courage, and firmness. It is supposed that he was a distant relative of Oliver Cromwell—perhaps second cousin. Mr. Williams does not claim in his writings such relationship with the Protector, though he often speaks of being intimate with him. They seemed to have been kindred spirits, whose hearts beat in unison on those great principles which they labored so ardently to promote. Roger speaks of a "close conference with Oliver," on the subject of Popery, which, it is said, they both abhorred and feared. How much they may have assisted each other by their frequent and "close" conferences in the great work to which they seemed to have been providentially called, will not be known before the great day of final accounts.

He became a Christian in early life, though the exact time of his experiencing regenerating grace is unknown. Near the close of life, he observes,—“From my childhood, now above threescore years, the Father of lights and mercies touched my soul with a love to himself, to his only-begotten, the true Lord Jesus, and to his Holy Scriptures.” “The religious character, whose germs were thus early

planted, grew and ripened with his years, amidst the retirement of his secluded studies, and bore fruits in a life of piety and virtue, which won for him the respect and confidence of those with whom he was associated."

As is the case with most great and good men, the stability of his Christian character and his usefulness were laid in his early piety. He was eminently spiritually-minded, and this characteristic he retained to the close of life. Few men have ever lived who possessed through a long life a Christian character so pure and blameless.

That Mr. Williams was liberally educated has generally been admitted, but *where*, has, until recently, been a matter of doubt. It has been generally supposed that he was educated at the University of Oxford, under the patronage of Sir Edward Coke, whose interest in him was first excited by an incident as follows:—

"Sir Edward observed him, one day, during public worship, taking notes of the discourse. His curiosity was excited, and he requested the boy to show him his notes. He was so favourably impressed by the evidences of talent which these exhibited, that he requested the parents of young Williams to intrust their son to his care."

From an interesting correspondence between Mr. Williams and Lady Sadler, a daughter of Sir Edward Coke, which was obtained by Mr. Bancroft when in England, and is now in the possession of the "Rhode Island Historical Society," we learn that he was educated as above supposed, which certainly reflects great honour on his generous patron. He drank deeply at the fountains of learning, as his writings abundantly testify. Says Mr. Gammell, "His mind was enriched and expanded with the best learning of the age; and it is probable, that his preparation for the sacred profession, to which he was looking forward, was, for the time, unusually thorough and complete." He was thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and the Dutch, and it is said while teaching John Milton the Dutch, Milton taught him several other languages besides the above. He subsequently obtained a knowledge of the Indian languages of New-England, and wrote a "Key" to those languages—an interesting and valuable work.

He studied law under the direction of Sir Edward Coke,—his patron would naturally wish to train his pupil to his own useful and honourable profession,—and the knowledge he thus obtained of jurisprudence had evidently much to do in qualifying him for the duties of a legislator. He soon, however, turned his attention to the study of theology,—a study more congenial with his taste,—and became eminent as a theologian. "He was admitted to orders in the Established Church, though it is not known by what bishop, or in what year, he

was ordained. It is also said that he was appointed to the charge of a parish, while in England, but of this no mention whatever is made in his writings which now exist." His preaching attracted considerable attention, and he was respected and beloved as a devoted minister of Jesus Christ.

Roger Williams embraced the cause of the Puritans. It was an important period in English history. The great principles of the Reformation, first preached in England by Wiclif, now began to develop themselves in the institutions both of the Church and State. They were violently opposed by the power of the hierarchy, but hailed with rejoicing by those who had long felt the oppressive yoke, and desired freedom of conscience. The mighty struggle, which had commenced with the Reformation, between the corrupt forms of religion and the principles of civil and religious liberty, was now revived with great zeal. Elizabeth, who was supposed to be friendly to the Protestants, possessed the despotic temper of her father. She was in love with the showy rites of Popery. She actually hated the Non-conformists more than the Papists, and issued her mandate that the former should submit to the ceremonies of the Established Church.

"Severe laws were passed by an obsequious Parliament, and enforced, with ready zeal, by servile bishops. Every minister who refused to conform to all the prescribed ceremonies was liable to be deprived of his office; and a large number of the ablest ministers in the nation were thus expelled and silenced. In order to enforce the laws with the utmost rigor, a new tribunal was erected, called the 'Court of High Commission,' consisting of commissioners, appointed by the queen. This Court was invested with power to arrest ministers in any part of the kingdom, to deprive them of their livings, and to fine or imprison them at the pleasure of the Court. Instead of producing witnesses in open court to prove the charges, they assumed a power of administering an oath *ex officio*, whereby the prisoner was obliged to answer all questions the Court should put to him, though highly prejudicial to his own defence. If he refused to swear, he was imprisoned for contempt; and if he took the oath, he was convicted upon his own confession. By this Protestant Inquisition, and by other means, one fourth of the preachers in England are said to have been under suspension. Numerous parishes were destitute of preachers, and so many were filled by illiterate and profligate men, that not one benefited clergyman in six was capable of composing a sermon. Thus were learned and pious ministers oppressed, merely for their conscientious scruples about a few ceremonies, their families were ruined, the people were deprived of faithful teachers, the progress of truth hindered, the prelatists were gratified, and a state of irritation was produced in the public mind, which led, in a succeeding reign, to the disastrous issue of a bloody civil war."

Roger Williams, whose political principles were very liberal, and who held in abhorrence the doctrines upheld by the court, could not but espouse the cause of the Non-conformists, or Puritans. James, whose accession to the throne greatly excited the hopes of the Puritans, proved to be

"An obstinate and arbitrary monarch, who inflexibly maintained in theory, and often in practice, those despotic principles which led his son to the scaffold, and expelled James II. from the throne. A mind like that of Williams, strong, searching, and fearless, would naturally be opposed to the pretensions of the king. His patron, Sir Edward Coke, incurred the resentment of James, for his free principles, and his bold vindication of the rights of the people."

Cotton, Hooker, and many other distinguished ministers were silenced, and Williams, who had become their associate and friend, could not expect to escape. With many others, he wisely concluded to seek an asylum on the shores of New-England. Consequently, on the 1st of Dec., 1630, in the ship *Lyon*, Capt. Peirce, master, (the same ship which bore so many of the pilgrims to America,) he embarked at Bristol, and, after a tempestuous voyage of sixty-six days, arrived at Boston, Feb. 5th, 1631. Mr. Gammell says:—

"He was now in the thirty-second year of his age, and in the full maturity of all his powers, having already acquired a reputation for eloquence and piety, which had spread widely in England, and had preceded him to America. His arrival at Boston is mentioned by Gov. Winthrop, as of 'a godly minister,' and was doubtless hailed, by the Churches of the infant settlements of Massachusetts Bay, as an accession to their strength of the precious gifts of piety and learning. They little anticipated the startling doctrines he would put forth; and he had no intimation of the singular destiny that was preparing for him amid the unknown wilderness to which he had come. When he embarked at Bristol, he had been recently married, and was accompanied by his wife, Mrs. Mary Williams, a lady who lived to share his changeful fortunes among the checkered scenes through which he subsequently passed, but of whose early history even less is known than that of her husband."

On his arrival in Boston, he was sadly disappointed. He had come, as he supposed, to the asylum of the exiled Puritans, where he would be received with open arms by his former associates and friends, and where he could enjoy those civil and religious privileges of which he had been deprived in his native land. But he had scarcely entered the colony before he found that the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were arrayed against him. He had fled from persecution, and now, to his surprise, he found that the same intolerant spirit which had caused so many martyrs to bleed on British soil, and had made his stay in England intolerable, was actually governing the Massachusetts pilgrims. He supposed that they had formed a colony and established a Church in which civil and religious freedom might be enjoyed, but he now found his mistake. Understanding the principles by which they were governed, he refused to unite with the Church in Boston. Soon after his arrival, Mr. Williams was invited by the Church in Salem to become assistant to their pastor, the Rev. Mr. Skelton; but the magistrates of the colony remonstrated against his being thus settled. They addressed a letter to the Church, in which they stated the reasons for their remonstrance. First, Mr. Williams

had refused to join the Church in Boston, "because they would not declare their repentance for having had communion with the Churches of England while they lived there. Secondly, that he had declared his opinion, that the magistrate might not punish a breach of the Sabbath, nor any other offence that was a breach of the first table." As to the first reason assigned, Mr. Williams was not alone in believing that the pilgrims had been in fault in holding communion with those who were the greatest enemies to experimental religion in England. He looked upon such communion as a compromise with iniquity.

"Mr. Williams, however, had already removed to Salem, where, on the 12th of April, 1631, he was settled as a minister of the Church, notwithstanding the opposition of the magistrates, who at that time were assembled at Boston. On the 18th of the following May, after having been duly propounded, he was admitted a freeman of the colony, and took the usual oath of allegiance prescribed in such cases. He was now, in the fullest sense of the word, a citizen of the colony, and one of the ministers of its oldest Church. He had thus identified himself with its interests by the most significant acts which he could perform, and was doubtless as ready to labour in its service, and to share its burdens, as any of those who had been appointed to preside over its affairs. The people of Salem had extended to him their confidence, and his life and ministry there had confirmed their respect and attachment, and were giving promise of a long career, as their guide, and teacher, and friend."

But Mr. Williams was not permitted to remain here in peace. He and his Church were constantly harassed and disturbed by the civil authorities, who claimed a guardianship over the popular faith. Their advice in the settlement of Mr. Williams had not been followed, and this had awakened their stern displeasure. For the sake of peace and quiet, after the lapse of a few months, in August, 1631, he left a kind and affectionate people, to whom his labours had been made a great blessing, and sought a residence beyond the persecuting jurisdiction of Massachusetts Bay, in the colony of Plymouth. Here he was received with great attention and respect. His eminent talents as a Christian minister, and his deep personal piety were properly appreciated. He was soon admitted to the Church, and settled as assistant to the Rev. Ralph Smith. But although he found in the Puritans that came over in the Mayflower a far more liberal spirit than that which governed their neighbours in Massachusetts Bay, he did not feel perfectly at home. His feelings were strongly enlisted for the people in Salem, and he longed for the privilege of again ministering to them the word of life. They earnestly desired his return among them, and strongly invited him back. After an absence of two years, during which time he had formed strong attachments in Plymouth, though the preaching of his liberal sentiments had awakened the suspicions of some of the principal

men of the colony, he returned to Salem, and again entered upon the duties of his ministry among a people that he honoured and loved. The Church in Plymouth were unwilling to lose the services of so valuable a pastor, and remonstrated with him against his departure; but believing it to be his duty, he at once sought and obtained a dismission.

Mr. Williams's second residence in Salem forms an important period of the history of this distinguished man. He resided there a year without being settled as a pastor; but at the death of Mr. Skelton, in 1634, he entered upon the duties of a regularly settled minister. A war now commenced, fierce and terrible. The General Court of Massachusetts must bring Roger Williams to terms! But in case of his refusal to submit to their unrighteous demands, he must be banished from the colony. Such were the conduct and sentiments of those who had fled from England to America to enjoy the rights of conscience! During the first year of Mr. Williams's residence in Salem, even while he ministered "by way of prophecy," he was constantly harassed by magistrates, and was several times summoned before the Court to answer for his sentiments. As the Church in Salem had invited Mr. Williams to become their minister, they wished to ordain him; but against this the Court sent in a decided remonstrance. "The Church, however, with a becoming independence, disregarded the remonstrance, and Mr. Williams was regularly instituted in the pastoral office, in August, 1634. This act was regarded by the Court as a highhanded contempt of their authority, which was not soon forgiven, and was at length punished in a most remarkable and characteristic manner." At nearly every session of the Court Mr. Williams was summoned before it, and his sentiments were complained of, or condemned. "A few months after his settlement as pastor of the Church," we find him again obnoxious to the Court, for having publicly called in question the king's patent, and also "for usually terming the Churches of New-England antichristian." Again, in the following April, 1635, the governor and assistants summoned him to appear at Boston. "The occasion was, that he had taught publicly that a magistrate ought not to tender an oath to an unregenerate man, for that we thereby have communion with a wicked man in the worship of God, and cause him to take the name of God in vain. He was heard before all the ministers, and very clearly confuted." So says Gov. Winthrop. Had Mr. Williams given a version of the argument, the result might have been differently stated.

The controversy in which Mr. Williams was engaged continued with increasing violence. Mr. Gammell observes:—

"The controversy with the authorities of Massachusetts, in which the principles of Williams had impelled him to engage, was now becoming every day more violent, and running into almost every act of the Court, and every relation of social life. They still maintained a connexion with the Church of England, and manifested a respect for its institutions. Williams retained a vivid recollection of its intolerant acts, and boldly declared its 'bloody tenet of persecution,' as he termed it, to be 'most lamentably contrary to the doctrine of Jesus Christ.' The magistrates enacted a law, requiring every man to attend public worship, and to contribute to its support. This he denounced as an open violation of natural rights, and the prolific source of every form of persecution. 'No one,' said he, 'should be bound to maintain a worship against his own consent.' The ablest divines were appointed to reason with him, and to refute the heresies that seemed wrought into his very being. But it was all in vain. His opinions were misrepresented, and carried out to absurd and unauthorized conclusions, and these were charged upon him as essential parts of his doctrine; but he contented himself simply with denying what he did not believe, and reiterating, with irrepressible boldness, the faith which he held. This faith set a clear and well-defined limit to the exercise of the civil power. 'It extends,' said he, with singular accuracy and clearness of perception, 'only to the bodies, and goods, and outward estates of men;' with conscience and with religious opinions, 'the civil magistrate may not intermeddle, even to stop a Church from apostasy and heresy.' These were the opinions that inflamed the whole body of the divines, and called down upon his head the sternest censures from both the civil and ecclesiastical heads of the colony."

Matters had now reached a point when something more effective on the part of the magistrates of Massachusetts must be done. They had denied the right of the Church in Salem to a tract of land in Marblehead, and in other respects had treated them with great injustice. In July, Mr. Williams was again summoned before the General Court in Boston, to answer certain charges brought against him, the substance of which has already been stated. At this Court no witnesses were examined, or counsel heard. They heard his sentiments, and, of course, condemned them. In October, 1635, the next General Court was held, before which he was again summoned. He now came for the last time, but he came with his principles. Under the advice of the ministers of the colony, the Court decided that he should depart out of their jurisdiction within six weeks. The following is the act of banishment:—

"Whereas, Mr. Roger Williams, one of the elders of the Church of Salem, hath broached and divulged divers new and dangerous opinions against the authority of magistrates; and also writ letters of defamation, both of the magistrates and Churches here, and that before any conviction, and yet maintained the same without any retraction; it is therefore ordered, that the said Mr. Williams shall depart out of this jurisdiction within six weeks now next ensuing, which if he neglect to perform, it shall be lawful for the governor and two of the magistrates to send him to some place out of this jurisdiction, not to return any more without license of the Court."

The sentence of banishment produced great excitement among the people of Salem, and was regarded as an act of persecution by the more soberminded citizens of the colony. The Court afterwards

gave him permission to remain till spring; but learning that he persisted in uttering and maintaining his sentiments, and fearing the influence of his teachings, they determined to send him to England, by a ship then about ready to sail. For this purpose he was summoned to attend the Court in Boston. He refused to obey the summons, on the ground of ill health. The magistrates, not to be defeated, issued a warrant for him to be apprehended and taken on board the ship, which was ready to sail for England. The officers on going to his house, found his wife and children, but he had been gone several days. Speaking of the banishment of Mr. Williams, Mr. Gammell justly remarks:—

“It is plain that the head and front of his offending consisted in his maintaining, that the civil magistrate has no right to interfere with religious opinions. Of the truth of this principle, and of its paramount importance to the well-being of society, there is no longer any room for question. It is now the cherished sentiment of the people of this country, and is rapidly extending its sway throughout the Protestant world. In the mind of Roger Williams, even at an early period of life, it was clearly conceived, and earnestly pressed to its legitimate results; though it was there mingled with other opinions, with which it had no natural connexion. It may also be admitted, that, while in Massachusetts, he advocated his principle with too urgent a zeal, and with too little regard for the prevailing opinions of the age; but, after making every allowance that either justice or charity can claim, his banishment must be regarded as an arbitrary proceeding, utterly without foundation either in justice or in state necessity. It was the offspring of a principle that would justify every species of tyranny, and it will forever remain among the few spots that tarnish the escutcheon of Massachusetts, otherwise radiant with unnumbered virtues.”

It was winter when Mr. Williams was driven from his home in Salem. Referring to this remarkable period of his history several years afterwards, he says, “I was sorely tossed for fourteen weeks, in a bitter winter season, not knowing what bread or bed did mean.” During his residence at Plymouth, he had become acquainted with several Indian chiefs, called sachems, and among them was Massassoit, the father of King Philip, who governed the Wampanoags, a tribe of the Pokanokets. This Indian chief welcomed Mr. Williams to his cabin, at Warren, or where this beautiful town now stands, and received him with true hospitality. “He granted him a tract of land on the Seekonk river, to which, at the opening of spring, he repaired, and where “he pitched and began to build and plant.” But here he was not permitted to remain. It seems he had not gone quite far enough into the wilderness. “I received a letter,” says he, “from my ancient friend, Mr. Winslow, then Governor of Plymouth, professing his own and others’ love and respect for me, yet lovingly advising me, since I was fallen into the edge of their bounds, and they were loath to displease the Bay, to remove but to the other side of the

water; and then, he said, I had the country before me, and might be as free as themselves, and we should be loving neighbors together." Wishing to be entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts or Plymouth colonies, he again took up the line of march, and landed near the mouth of the Mooshauc river, where he commenced the first "plantations of Providence." Here he found a home, and was enabled to lay the foundations of a great and growing city, the name of which was to stand as a perpetual memorial of that superintending Providence, which, he believed, had directed him to this spot.

His colony was founded on the principles which he had long advocated, and for which he had been exiled. He purchased his lands of the Indians, (those which were not given to him,) whom he acknowledged as the rightful owners of the soil. The deeds were generally given in his own name, and he might have retained all his lands as his own property; but this he was unwilling to do, as he desired that the new settlement might be "for a shelter for persons distressed for conscience." Though he had disposed of all he possessed to purchase these lands, yet he gave them as a free gift to those who had united with him in forming the colony. Before he could obtain a charter, the government must be voluntary, but all belonging to it agreed that "no man should be molested for his conscience." Though great liberty of conscience was admitted, great peace and harmony were generally preserved in the settlement. In this respect, its inhabitants were not a whit behind their Massachusetts neighbours. Disturbances, it is true, often afflicted the colony, but these were not the result of the liberal principles introduced into it by its founder, but sprang from causes which always exist in new settlements.

In the summer of 1643, he set sail from New-York for England, to obtain a charter for the infant colony. This he secured through the influence of Sir Henry Vane and other friends of religious freedom, and re-embarked for America, in the summer of 1644. He landed in Boston, September 17, and was permitted to pass through the forbidden territory, by virtue of a letter which he presented from several members of both houses of Parliament, and addressed "to the Governor and Assistants of Massachusetts Bay." He was received by his friends in Providence amid great rejoicings. Several towns of the "Providence Plantations" formed themselves into a government under the charter, May, 1647. Disturbances had sprung up in the colony, owing to misunderstandings and claims that were made to a part of the territory, supposed to belong to the colony. Mr. Williams was again urged to visit England, for the purpose of obtaining the interposition of the Council in adjusting those difficulties. At length, he consented to go; and though he found it difficult to reach Boston,

in consequence of the opposition of the authorities and people of Massachusetts to his passing through their territory, yet he sailed from that port for England, November, 1651. During this visit to England he was thrown into the society of some of its most distinguished men. He held frequent intercourse with Sir Henry Vane, Oliver Cromwell, Harrison, the major-general of the army, Lawrence, the lord president of the council of state, and many other distinguished men then governing public affairs. Having accomplished the object of his mission, as far as possible, he returned to Providence, where he found a great work to be done, in removing the jealousies and feuds, which had become inveterate, and which had separated and distracted the citizens of the colony. Through his influence, and a letter addressed to the colony by Sir Henry Vane, the disputes among the citizens were settled, the government re-organized, and Mr. Williams was chosen president of the colony. Peace was now restored throughout the settlement.

On the restoration of Charles the Second to the throne of England, another effort was made to obtain a new charter for the colony, which Mr. Williams had failed to obtain on his second visit to England, on account of the unsettled state of affairs in that country. The effort was successful. The charter was received from the king, July 8th, 1663, and was presented to the General Court of Commissioners at Newport, Nov. 24, of the same year. It instituted a "government clothed with more perfect authority, and better suited to the condition of the people," and still recognising in full the same principle of unlimited freedom 'in matters of religious concerns,' on which the colony had been originally founded." Under this charter, "Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" continued to act and prosper until the famous "war" in this State a few years since, when a Constitution was adopted, though in most respects, not differing materially from the old charter. The charter, in 1843, when it was supplanted by the present constitution of the State, is supposed to have been the oldest charter of any civil government in the world.

Roger Williams is claimed to have been the first who advocated the rights of conscience. Says Mr. Bancroft, "Williams was the first person to assert in its *plenitude* the doctrine of the liberty of conscience, the equality of opinions before the law, and in its defence he was the harbinger of Milton, and the precursor and superior of Jeremy Taylor." Says Judge Story, "In the Rhode Island code of laws we read, *for the first time* since Christianity ascended the throne of the Cæsars, that conscience should be free, and men should not be punished for worshipping God as they were persuaded he required." Says another late writer, "The Bloody Tenet was

proclaimed by him in England and America in 1644, and contained the substance of the great argument for humanity. Bishop Heber seems not to have read the book, for he says, 'The Liberty of Prophesying, by Jeremy Taylor, is the first attempt to put the perilous and portentous novelty on record;' a book not published till 1647, of which Williams says in *The Bloody Tenet yet more Bloody*, that it is 'a monumental, everlasting testimony to the truth.' The great treatise of John Milton, *On the Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Matters*, was not published till 1659; but it is to be remembered that Williams was an assistant to Milton, who was secretary of state in 1653-1654, and aided him in the Dutch correspondence; so that it is very probable Milton had already adopted the views of Williams on this great subject. The great Locke did not publish his *Letters* on this subject till 1690, just before the 'act of toleration' was passed in the British parliament." Some have asserted that religious liberty was enjoyed in Holland long before Williams was born. The assertion is true only to a limited extent. The greatest religious liberty of Holland excluded Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, and others from civil places, while Turks, Jews, and Pagans were in a far worse condition. This was not the religious liberty for which Williams was banished from the colony of Massachusetts, and to advocate which he spent his life.

As a legislator, counsellor, and governor, Roger Williams has had but few equals. Of the truth of this remark, the history of the colony that he planted furnishes abundant proof. The various Indian tribes of New-England were, to a great extent, under his control. He had studied their languages and disposition, and had secured their confidence. Whenever difficulties existed between them and the English, he was ready to do all in his power to effect a settlement. Through his interposition, the Massachusetts colony were saved from a long and bloody war with the Indians. What an instance of Christian magnanimity we have here! Roger Williams had been banished by this colony for maintaining the rights of conscience; but we now see him perilling his own life to save the colony from the horrors of conflagration and massacre.

As a writer, he is known by several valuable works; most of which are now out of print. His *first* book bears the following title: "A Key into the Language of America, or an help to the Language of the Natives in that part of America called New-England; together with brief Observations of the Customs, Manners, and Worships, &c., of the aforesaid Natives, in Peace and War, in Life and Death. On all which are added Spiritual Observations, general and particular, by the Author, of chief and special use (upon

all occasions) to all the English inhabiting those Parts; yet pleasant and profitable to the View of all Men. By Roger Williams, of Providence, in New-England. London: printed by Gregory Dexter, 1643." This work was written at sea, during his first voyage to England, and is exceedingly valuable for the information it contains of the languages of which it treats. The greater part of the work has been republished by the Massachusetts and Rhode Island Historical Societies. His *second* work is entitled, "Mr. Cotton's Letter, lately printed, Examined and Answered. By Roger Williams, of Providence, in New-England. London: imprinted in the year 1644." Mr. Cotton in his Letter vindicates the conduct of the magistrates in sending him from the colony. Mr. Williams replies in this work in a most able manner. A copy of the work may be found in the library of Yale College. His *third* work is called "The Bloody Tenet of Persecution, for cause of Conscience, discussed, in a Conference between Truth and Peace, who, in all tender Affection, present to the High Court of Parliament (as the Result of their Discourse) these (amongst other Passages) of highest consideration." Printed in London, 1644, and consisting of two hundred and forty-seven pages, small quarto. This work may be found in the library of Brown University. Mr. Cotton wrote a reply to the work in 1647, entitled, "The Bloody Tenet Washed and made White in the Blood of the Lamb, being discussed and discharged of Blood-guiltiness, by Just Defence." Mr. Williams's *fourth* work was a rejoinder to this work of Mr. Cotton's, with the following title: "The Bloody Tenet yet more Bloody, by Mr. Cotton's Endeavour to Wash it White in the Blood of the Lamb," &c.: printed in London, 1652, and comprising three hundred and twenty pages. The library of Harvard College contains a copy of this work. His next work is entitled, "The Hireling Ministry None of Christ's," &c.: printed in London, 1652. The doctrine of religious liberty is the subject of the work, a copy of which may be found in the library of the American Antiquarian Society at Worcester. He also published a work, called, "Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health, and their Preservatives. London, 1652." His last work was printed in Boston, and has the following title: "George Fox digged out of his Burrowes, or an Offer of Disputation, on fourteen proposals made last summer, 1672, unto G. Fox, then present on Rhode Island, by R. W." This book comprises three hundred and twenty pages, and "derives its quaint title from the accidental combination of the names of Fox and Burrowes in the work, which had been written in defence of the Quakers." It gives a full account of his controversy with the Quakers, and is said to be the most violent and denunciatory of all his writings. Even some

of his greatest opposers commended him for his opposition to the Quakers. "Mather, in his *Magnalia*, makes a tirade against Williams, and compares him to 'a windmill, that, by its rapid motion, was like to set the whole country on fire,' yet commends him for his opposition and firm ground against the Quakers."

The republication of the works of Roger Williams is now called for, and we hope they will soon be given to the public. They would throw much light on the age in which he lived—an age which Dr. Chalmers called the "Augustan age of Christianity." He lived "through all the days of Goodwin, Owen, and Bunyan; in the times of Robinson, Baxter, Hooker, Cotton, and multitudes of others, men of eminence; who, together with John Milton and Oliver Cromwell, effected a second reformation in the Christian Church. The lives and writings of these men have been published; and such is the call for them, that new editions are even now issuing from the press." "Those who admire Milton, cannot fail to admire Williams; admire him, not because they approve of *all* his views, but because, even when they differ from him, they will perceive that he is conscientious, and that his arguments deserve attention and consideration."

Roger Williams lived to see the colony that he planted established on a firm basis, and in a state of prosperity. He died in Providence, R. I., 1683, in the eighty-fourth year of his age. His memory will be fondly cherished while the rights of conscience are respected; and posterity will yet do justice to the character, and honour to the name, of the founder of Rhode Island.

ART. III.—RECENT EDITIONS OF THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOKLES.

[SECOND PAPER.]

225. πολλὰς γὰρ — ἐπιστάσεις. Mr. Donaldson renders very inelegantly: *Troth, I have had many half-way houses of cogitation*; as if the allusion were to some such places as English "Tom and Jerry" houses. The literal translation is *many haltings of thought*, i. e. deliberation often held me back. In addition to the passages cited by the editors in support of the interpretation of the scholiast, cf. Plut. *Mor.*, p. 48, B, ἐπιστάσεις καὶ διατριβὰς λαμβάνειν, Aristot. *An. I.* 3, where the word ἐπίστασις is used as an antithesis to ἡ κίνησις.

234. Mr. Wunder pronounces the common reading corrupt on

account of the collocation of the pronoun, and the previous employment of *δεῦρο*, which, without *σοι*, expresses all that is necessary. Emper, also, regards *σοι* as the addition of an interpreter, and conjectures that Sophokles wrote, *ὥς, κεί τὸ μῆδεν ἐξεῖρῶ, φράσων ὁμῶς*. Such a mode of expression would, undoubtedly, have been used by an educated speaker. Here, however, the terror and unpolished character of the sentinel justify the emphatic position of the pronoun, and its verbose repetition after *δεῦρο μολεῖν*. Erfurdt properly compares *Æd. Tyr.* 545, 6.

241. Mr. Donaldson has adopted Emper's suggestion *στεγάζει* in place of the vulgate *στοχάζει*, observing that the latter verb "has no signification which suits the context: *στεγάζει*, which means *you roof yourself in or cover yourself over head*, is the proper correlative to *ἀποφάργινυσαι κύκλῳ*, *you surround yourself with a hedge*." Prof. Woolsey rightly retains the common reading, and remarks excellently that Kreon adapts his language to the soldier, and uses figures drawn from military matters. Compare *Plat. Legg.* p. 705, E, *ὃς ἂν δίκην τοξότου ἐκάστοτε στοχάζηται τούτου*, and many passages in Polybius. Render: *you take good aim, you aim excellently well at your mark and hedge the matter all around*. The addition of *γε* serves to heighten the ironical force of *εὔ*.

284. Emper has observed that Mr. Wunder's remarks upon the use of *πότερον* in a simple interrogation are uncalled for, so far as the present passage is concerned. The alternative inquiry follows at v. 288, where Brunck and Erfurdt edit incorrectly *ἦ*.

291. The commentators generally translate *δικαίως*, *ut decet*. Mr. Donaldson renders with a truer perception of the meaning of the passage: *and they kept not their necks in equal poise beneath the yoke*. The adjective *δίκαιος* has a similar signification in *Xen. Mem.* 4, 4, 5, *φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι*, where *δικαίους* is used with singular appropriateness, because the subject of discourse is *δικαιοσύνη*, and a play upon the double meaning of the adjective, *justus* and *idoneus*, is intended. Ruhnken observes that *δίκαιος* is applied to a person or thing, in which *nec abundat aliquid nec deficit, quæ muneri suo par est, numeris suis absoluta*. So also Krüger remarks that the Latin *justus* is frequently said of a thing *quod est tale, ut recte munere suo fungatur, vices suas expleat*. Compare *Xen. Kyr.* 2, 2, 26: *οὔτε γὰρ ἄρμα δῆπον ταχὺ γένοιτ' ἂν, βραδέων ἵππων ἐνόντων, οὔτε δίκαιον, ἀδίκων ξυνεξυγμένων*. Pollux 1, 186: *ἵππος δίκαιος τὴν γνάθον*, i. e. with a mouth properly trained. *Xen. de Ven.* 3, 5: *ἦ ἀδικος γνάθος, maxilla improba*, i. e. so hard-mouthed as not to feel the bit. *Id. Kyr.* 8, 3, 38: *γῆδιον δικαιοτάτον πάντων*. *Virg.*

Georg. 2, 147: *justissima tellus*. The expression *δίκαιον σῶμα* in Hippokrates is defined by Galen: ἀκριβῶς ἴσον ἐκατέρωθεν.

302, 303. Mr. Wunder's translation of these verses, *qui vero mercede accepta scelus commiserunt tandem aliquando ut pœnas perfecerunt*, is unsatisfactory, since it leaves us in uncertainty, as Emper remarks, whether we are to refer χρόνῳ ποτε to ἐξέπραξαν, or to δοῦναι δίκην. We think that they must be joined with the former (with a reference to πάλαι in v. 289.) That the aorist is elsewhere used of an action which is future but must certainly happen, (Plat. Civ. p. 406, D; Eur. Med. 78,) is undoubtedly true, but inapplicable to our own passage, of which the general sense is as follows: *long since I knew that a party opposed to my authority existed in the State: — at length by an overt act they have given me the opportunity of inflicting punishment.*

323. Mr. Donaldson renders: 'T is sad, when one thinks good, to think a lie. To this version the objection urged by Emper against those of Brunck and Boeckh that they ignore the existence of καί, is of equal force.

332. Mr. Wunder writes with Neue πολλά τε δεινά, an alteration which makes πολλά the subject, and δεινά the predicate: *there are many things which are cunning, and man is the most cunning.* The common reading, by inverting the propositions, is far more emphatic.

353. The vulgate is manifestly corrupt. The metre is defective, and the future tense inapplicable to one of a series of events represented by the poet as of habitual occurrence. Of the various attempts which have been made to restore the passage, Emper and Donaldson concur in pronouncing Schöne's suggestion, ἵππον ὀχμαῖζεται ἀμφιλόφον ζυγῶν, by far the most probable. Döderlein's conjecture, ἵππον ἀέξεται ἀμφιλόφον ζυγῶν, opibus augetur or proficit eo quod jugum ἀμφιλόφον imponit equo, is a closer approximation to the reading of the books, but would be hardly intelligible, without the author's translation. Although, on account of their wide divergence from the writing of the MSS., we have not yet found any emendation which seems pre-eminently plausible, we are disposed to believe that the exigencies of the sense have been best consulted by C. F. G. Arndt (*Quæst. Crit.* p. 8): —

ἵππον ἕρξ' ὑπαὶ ἀμφιλόφον ζυγόν.

Comp. Virg. *Æn.* 7, 639: *ad juga cogit equos*. Stat. *Theb.* 7, 136: *alienaque cogunt ad juga cornipedes*.

368. Mr. Wunder, without giving us a reason, tells us that παρείρων is corrupt. Mr. Dindorf edits παραιρών, whilst Emper and

Donaldson adopt Musgrave's emendation *γεραίρων*. Prof. Woolsey very rightly retains the manuscript reading unaltered, and remarks: "This rare word seems to mean *inserting* or *weaving in by the side of* and thus *joining to*." That this interpretation is correct is placed beyond all doubt by a comparison of the following passages: *Æsch. fragm.* 267; *Archil.* 81; *Xen. Conv.* 6, 2; *Longin.* *περὶ ὑψους* 3, 1; *Polyb.* 18, 1, 13. The Latin *asserere* is similarly used in the sense of *vindicare, defendere, conservare*. The meaning of our passage is therefore: *adding observance of his country's law and the oath-bound right of the gods, high is he in the State*. Comp. the observation of the scholiast: ὁ πληρῶν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὑψίπολις γίγνεται, ὃ ἔστιν, ἐν τῇ πόλει ὑψηλός.

404. Prof. Woolsey calls attention to the illustration which this passage presents of the post-position of the antecedent notion, and its introduction into the relative clause as an apposition to the relative pronoun. This usage is so frequent, both in Greek and Latin writers, as to need little explanation. The grammatical point requiring special notice in our own verse is the insertion of the article (*δεικτικῶς*), which, in this transposition, is exceedingly rare. A few examples of its employment are met with in Plato. *Theat.* p. 167, B: ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν. *Civ.* p. 477, C: εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος. Cf. *Krüger Griech. Sprachl.* 51, 12, *Anm.*

412. Dindorf and Donaldson follow the Triklinian editions in writing *βάλαι*. The common reading is very properly retained by Prof. Woolsey, and is, in our opinion, greatly preferable. For if *καθήμεθα* is to be regarded as in form a historic tense, it has at least a present signification; and the use of the conjunctive in the dependent clause imparts singular animation and energy to the language of the sentinel.

452. Mr. Wunder, with the approbation of Emper, has enclosed this verse in brackets, "*ex optima G. Dindorfii conjectura, quam nuperrime mecum communicavit*." It is matter for regret that the communications of Mr. Dindorf should in so many instances besides the present have led Mr. Wunder to lay aside the praiseworthy circumspection which, when left to his own judgment, he invariably displays. Prof. Felton regards the relative pronoun as referred to τῶν κάτω θεῶν in the preceding verse, and τοῦςδε νόμους as denoting *has leges, quas in mente habeo*, *περὶ τοῦ θάπτειν τοὺς τεθνηκότας*,—an explanation which removes all difficulty and yields a sentiment that agrees admirably with the evident intention of the poet. Kreon asks Antigone if she understood his proclamation (τὰ κηρυχθέντα), and subsequently expresses surprise, that she should

venture to transgress *these laws* (τούςδε νόμους,) meaning, of course, his own edict. She replies, that she did not consider his proclamation as emanating from Zeus or from Dike, *the co-assessor of the gods who have regulated the rights of the dead*.

505. Mr. Donaldson follows Dindorf in writing ἐγκλήτοι in place of ἐγκλείσοι, which, in addition to the unanimous support of the MSS., is defended by Eustathius, and, in no less degree, by the sense of the passage. For Antigone alludes to a future time in which the chorus will, spontaneously or upon further provocation, express its opinion.

519. The evident favour with which Prof. Woolsey regarded in his second edition the emendation of Brunck, has led him to abandon the common reading τούς νόμους τούτους. We think, however, that some further reason was necessary for the change than the supposition that ἴσους is alluded to and played upon in Kreon's reply. The vulgate as explained by the scholiast yields a highly appropriate sense, and the language of Antigone, in v. 517, seems to warrant the inference that she did not believe in that ἰσοτιμία ἐν Ἀιδον, which is spoken of by Lucian.

551. Emper and Wunder have admitted Dindorf's conjecture, ἀλγοῦσα μὲν ὃν, καὶ γέλωτ' ἐν σοὶ γελῶ. But apart from the circumstance that this alteration is wholly destitute of authority, the common reading yields a preferable sense: *If I do laugh at you, it is with grief, indeed, to myself*. Antigone says that she grieves for Ismene, although she ridicules her as she had done in v. 549.

578. Mr. Dindorf, who is followed by Wunder, pronounces the common reading to be "intolerable," and emends εὐ δὲ τάςδε χρεὶ γυναικας εἶλαι μηδ' ἀνειμένας ἑᾶν. We believe that a more unhappy conjecture was never given to the world. The construction is obvious. Γυναικας is the predicate of τάςδε and the antithesis of ἀνειμένας. We regard it, therefore, as unnecessary to institute any examination into the arguments by which Mr. Dindorf seeks to establish the authenticity of the very doubtful word he substitutes for εἶναι.

600. The MSS. exhibit ῥίζας τέτατο. Hermann first inserted ὁ before τέτατο, which restores the metre, and is regarded by all subsequent editors as necessary to the sense. We prefer the *lenior emendatio*, suggested by Prof. Klotz. This alteration (ἐτέτατο) is recommended by the additional emphasis it imparts to the language, and by removing the objection that the verb ἀμῶ is referred grammatically to φάος, but logically to ῥίζα.—We disapprove Mr. Wunder's adoption of κόπις (the emendation of Jortin) in place of κόνις, and are glad

to observe that Prof. Woolsey has followed a more excellent way in adhering to the writing of the books. The ποιητικὴ ἀδεία, although covering a multitude of sins, will hardly justify our assigning a sword to the *Di Inferi* on the authority of such passages as *Æsch. Agam.* 538, fitly chosen by Aristophanes (*Avv.* 1240) as a mark for his satire; whilst the whole context and the words immediately following show that the reference is strictly limited to Antigone, and that κόνης is employed in direct allusion to the fatal dust which she had strewn over the corpse of Polyneikes.

605. Prof. Woolsey now follows Hermann in writing ὑπερβασία, without assigning the reasons which have led him to reject the common reading. The correction is recommended by its better adaptation to the connexion of ideas, by ὑπερφόρνησις the explanation of the scholiast, and by the authority of the two best codices. — In the following verse Dindorf accepts the conjecture of Brunck, (supported by one MS. of inferior reputation,) and edits κατὰσχη from the mistaken conviction that the optative cannot stand in a construction like the present without the particle ἄν. As our passage, however, is one in which the objective certainty of the proposition implied in the question is not doubted in the slightest degree, the employment of the optative without ἄν is in complete accordance with Attic usage. Compare *Æsch. Choëph.* 392: ἀλλ' ὑπέρολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι; So here τίς ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι; *what mortal sin can restrain thy power?* no one. The insertion of ἄν would imply that the proposition may be realized, if a certain contingency happens, or if the implied condition were granted. Its suppression, on the other hand, gives a stronger negation to the optative, rendering the denial of a contrary supposition absolute and independent of every condition or circumstance which *might* render it less likely to hold good. Excellently, therefore, does Hermann remark: "*additum ἄν mutat sententiam magisque incertam reddit, et fere posse quid fieri significat.*"

606. If παντογῆρος is retained, it must, without doubt, be taken in an active sense—*qui ad senium ducit omnia, qui omnia senio afficit*; but we incline to Emper's opinion that it is not a genuine Sophoklean epithet. It seems wholly inapplicable to the balmy and invigorating influences of "tired nature's sweet restorer;" and there is much force in the observation of the critic just named that "as the gods are represented to be liable to sleep, they must be considered as obnoxious to grow old, if that is a property of sleep." He suggests that the blunder originated in the transcriber's eye having wandered to ἀγῆρος, written as a various reading by the side of ἀγῆρω; and that Sophokles probably wrote παντοδμάτωρ after

πανδαμάτωρ, which is an Homeric epithet of Hypnos. Bamberger proposes παντοθῆρως or παντόθηρος, whilst Donaldson, comparing *Ai.* 660, believes the true reading to be παγκρατής. We prefer the conjecture of Riemer πανταγῆρως, *never growing old*, as a closer approximation to the reading of the books. — In the next verse, where the vulgate οὐτ' ἀκάματοι θεῶν offends the metre, Mr. Dindorf writes οὐτ' ἀκοποι θεῶν νιν μῆνες on his own authority, whilst Mr. Wunder follows Hermann in editing ἀκμητοί, and Brunck in transposing the order of the words. With these alterations, the line is read as follows in *his* text: οὐτε θεῶν ἀκμητοί μῆνες. Mr. Donaldson is still bolder; but his alterations will meet few admirers. We think Seidler's correction, οὐτ' ἀκάμαντοι, confirmed as it is by the MS. Par. 2886, the most probable emendation which has yet been proposed. Prof. Woolsey is silent.

611–614. We cannot coincide with the opinion of Mr. Wunder, that in this difficult passage the words οὐδὲν ἔρπει have been erroneously introduced from v. 618; and still less with the very positive assertion of other commentators, that they could not have proceeded from the pen of Sophokles. Mr. Wunder states that ἐπαρκέσει, if all other difficulties were passed over, cannot possibly signify *valebit*. As Emper has observed, its strict meaning is undoubtedly *sufficiet*, and “a more accurate translation would certainly be, *satis valebit*.” The translation of the whole passage given by Prof. Woolsey, who reads ἔρπων with a scholiast, has apparently failed to satisfy himself, and does not, in our judgment, convey a very striking or appropriate sense. We think that the difficulty will be removed by adopting Emper's punctuation and arrangement:—

..... ἐπαρκέσει
νόμος ὅδ', ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΡΠΕΙ,
θνατῶν βιότη πάμπολις, ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ.

This arrangement upholds the writing of the books, yields a satisfactory sentiment, and emphatically “sets forth the purport of the law.” The perplexity and mistake of the commentators originated in their considering the law to have been ΘΝΑΤΩΝ ΒΙΟΤΩΙ ΠΑΜΠΟΛΙΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ; whereas the words θνατῶν βιότη πάμπολις are to be joined with νόμος ὅδε, and form no part, but simply express the wide extension of the law ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΡΠΕΙ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΤΑΣ. A very similar passage is found in Eur. *Iph. A.* 1062, quoted by Emper. The word πάμπολις is explained by παγκόσμιος in the note of the scholiast.

635. The “ambiguity of meaning,” involved in the participle ἔχων, has been long ago pointed out by the critics, and in no degree ex-

tends to ἀπορροῖς. None but a schoolboy who has just mastered his forms, would doubt whether this is the indicative or the optative. This will be apparent if the participle is resolved into a conditional clause with the hypothetical particle εἰ. See Krüger *Griech. Sprachl.* 65, 5, *Ann.* 2. Hermann rightly explains the construction, σὺ μοι τὰς γνώμας ἀπορροῖς, ὥστε χρηστὰς εἶναι, ἔχων χρηστὰς γνώμας. The marked approbation with which Kreon receives the assurances of his son indicates that he mistook his language for a profession of unlimited and unqualified obedience.

664. Wunder and Donaldson have admitted Mr. Dindorf's conjecture τοῖς κρατύνουσιν νοεῖ in lieu of the vulgate τοῖς κρατοῦσιν ἐννοεῖ. "Mr. Dindorf was led to form his conjecture from the writing of the Cod. Laur. a.: κρατ—οὔσιν νοεῖ. Both readings are doubtless admissible, but we prefer ἐννοεῖ as a word of wider import. Νοεῖν signifies *to think about, plan or be anxious about* a thing; ἐννοεῖν, *to have in one's mind, to fancy or dream of* a thing. The latter verb, therefore, imparts a fuller significance to the language of the king, and is better adapted to the remainder of the sentence." Such are the words of Emper. We believe that it would puzzle Mr. Dindorf himself to explain why in this instance he should have chosen to follow the manuscript above mentioned, and at vv. 505, 575 should have rejected its authority.

674. Emper suspects the accuracy of the common reading, and thinks σὺν μάχῃ δορός a very old alteration by some metrician for σὺν δορὶ μάχης, i. e. σὺν δόρει μάχης, the sense of the whole passage being: *Insubordination breaks down the ranks and causes flight in concert with the foeman's spear*, i. e. anarchy contributes as much to confusion and overthrow as the lances of the enemy. If any change is required, we should prefer συμμάχον δορός; but the vulgate is defended by Eur. *Erechth. fragm.* 17, 24, ed. Dind.: οὐκ ἂν νῦν ἐξέπεμπον εἰς μάχην δορός. — In the following verse ὀρθοῦμενοι does not mean, as Mr. Wunder translates, *qui erecti stant*, nor, as Emper supposes, *qui se regi patiuntur*, but *qui rectam aciem servant*. For Mr. Donaldson observes accurately that although ὀρθός strictly signifies *vertical*, and εὐθεὺς *horizontal*, they are both employed to denote a straight, unbroken line, whether horizontal or vertical.

677. The scholiast explains τοῖς κοσμουμένοις by τοῖς ἀρχουσιν, with the approbation of Hermann. Prof. Woolsey more accurately receives the participle as neuter: *iis quæ constitui*.

687. Mr. Wunder on his own authority edits λέγοιτο. But since καλῶς ἔχον is shown by the whole connexion to denote καλῶς εἰρημένον τι, the necessity for the alteration is not very apparent. "The

sense has been made clear," says Mr. Donaldson, "by the particles which the poet has employed: although I could not and do not wish to arraign the justice of your sentiments, nevertheless (μέντοι) it might come to pass that this censure would proceed with propriety from another (i. e. γένοιτο καλῶς — ἔχον καὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ὅπως σὺ κ. τ. λ., where καὶ performs that office of emphasis which is best expressed in English by a stress on the auxiliary). At all events (οὖν), whether such censure were right or wrong, it is my natural office as your son (πέφυκα) to keep an eye on your behalf (προσκοπεῖν, cf. 732: σοῦ γὰρ οὖν προ-κήδομαι) to all thoughts, words, and censures which have reference to your conduct."

696. Mr. Wunder remarks that οὔτε ought, in strictness, to have filled the place of μήτε. He connects the negative particle with the infinitives, and proceeds: "*Ejus rei causam facile apparet hanc fuisse, quod id inprimis animadverti voluit, impedimento fuisse Antigonam, ne insepultus jaceret Polynices, quum sepultura honorem ornaret.*" Emper explains more correctly that while the language of Sophokles may be viewed as a blending of two constructions (οὐκ εἶασε δλέσθαι and ἐποίησε μὴ δλέσθαι) the use of the negation μή is justified by the transition from a particular to a general reference. "Ἦτις relates, it is true, to Antigone, but, by means of the second apodosis, (for the poet here employs the *protasis inter duplicem apodosin*,) the thought receives a general application: οὐχ ἦδε, &c.," the special allusion to Antigone terminating at φθίνει.

736. Mr. Dindorf edits *χρή με* on the authority of Dobree. Nothing, however, can be more unobjectionable than the employment of γε to emphasize the notion of *χρή* and to set forth prominently its opposition to reality.

740. In this instance we approve Mr. Dindorf's restitution of *συμμαχεῖ* as exhibited by the best MSS. The infinitive *συμμαχεῖν*, which may be explained upon the supposition of two constructions, (ἔοικε *συμμαχεῖν* and ὥς *ἔοικε, συμμαχεῖ*,) rests upon the authority of one manuscript of inferior reputation.

782. Most commentators understand by *κτῆματα*, *divites potentesque*, although confessing that the antithesis between "the wealthy and the powerful," and the "soft cheeks of the virgin in her youth" is scarcely Sophoklean. Reisig gives a better, probably the true interpretation: "*κτῆματα sunt illi qui amore capti sunt.*" The expression *ἔρωσ κέκτηται τινα* is fully as legitimate as *ἔρωσ ἔχει τινα*, Pind. *Isthm.* 7, 29; and since *κτῆματα* was notoriously used "*de iis personis, quæ bello captæ aut alio modo subactæ essent,*" the phrase *κτῆματα Ἔρωτος* was fairly applicable to those over whom Love exerts his irresistible might. In Plat. *Legg.* p. 906 A, men are called

κτῆματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων: comp. *Phædr.* p. 62, D, ἡμᾶς θεοῦ κτῆματα εἶναι. This view harmonizes also with the connexion of ideas in the passage before us. Eros is invoked as the invincible in battle; the metaphor being subsequently heightened by the additional notion that he makes his own possessions or enslaves those whom he attacks. Cf. *Plat. Pol.* ix, 3. The peculiar force of ἐμπίπτειν, a word borrowed from the language of the palaestra, where simply throwing an adversary was deemed an incomplete victory unless the victor threw himself upon his opponent, is well explained by Eustathius, p. 1301, 25, οἱ νικῶντες ἐμπίπτειν λέγονται, ἥγουν βιαίως ἐπικεῖσθαι. Hence ἐμπίπτειν τινί signifies, repente invadere aliquem ita, ut totum eum occupatum teneas, (cf. *Æsch. Agam.* 341; *Thukyd.* 6, 24,) and is very appropriately used in our passage to set forth the resistless mastery of Love. It will scarcely be necessary to add that κτῆμασι sustains the relation of a proleptic predicate to the action of the verb with which it is associated. See Krüger *Griech. Sprachl.* 57, 4 and *Anm.* 1. The objection of Emper that the explanation above given does not bring out the antithetical relation which the introductory sentences of this invocation bear to one another is, in our opinion, happily met by the observation of Prof. Woolsey that the opposition is "between the violence of Love in assaulting his victims and his mildness on a maiden's cheeks, between his restless roving over the sea and his retired rustic haunts, and between mortals and immortals over whom he exercises sway."

797. Mr. Dindorf expunges the words ἐν ἀρχαῖς and interpolates οὐχί between μεγάλων and παρέδρος. Such an alteration is very unhappy in point of taste, and does violence to the concinnity of the metaphorical language by the abrupt and grating transition it makes from affirmation to negation. The common reading is defended by *Eur. Med.* 843, τᾷ σοφίᾳ παρέδρους ἔρωτας, aptly quoted by Seidler. Ἐν ἀρχαῖς signifies, in imperando, in administrandis rebus.

836. Prof. Woolsey explains the sense: *It is a great thing for a mortal to share alike with demigods, like Niobe.* We think that τοῖς ἰσοθέοις can hardly be τοῖς ἡμιθεοῖς, even if considered masculine. Emper more accurately pronounces it neuter, "because Sophokles would hardly employ the lower synonym ἰσόθεος in reference to Niobe, whom he had just before called θεός and θεογεννής."

840. The emendation of Erfurdt ὀλλυμέναν, received by Dindorf and Wunder, seems, as the participle of present time, inferior to the quasi-adjectival οὐλομέναν, the correction of Boeckh, which is found in one manuscript, and is supported by *Eur. Iph. A.* 793; *Iph. T.* 1109.

846. Mr. Wunder corrects ἐπανδῶμαι, probably from the gloss

(ἐπιβοῶμαι) written upon the margin of the MS. La. The alteration is made unnecessary by supplying a concessive clause to ἐμπας: [even though I obtain nothing else] *you, at all events, I obtain.* Compare Hom. *Od.* 15, 214; 19, 302.

879. Wunder has written ἰρόν, and is followed by Dindorf and Donaldson. Why may not the first syllable of ἰερόν be lengthened by the arsis (as often in epic poetry), and the verse itself retained as a dactylic pentameter catalectic? — In v. 865, Mr. Donaldson inserts *ā* before ταλαίφρων, “on account of the Cretic rhythm.” Mr. Dindorf adopts a still more unjustifiable course in editing ἐρχομαι τὰν πνύαταν ὁδόν. If these changes are tolerated, we may well inquire where critical license is to have its termination.

884. Wunder, on Schaefer’s authority, renders *ei xpeîn, si utile esset, si prodesset.* We agree with Emper that since lamentation before death is made for the express purpose of retarding that event, and is so far really and not hypothetically advantageous, it would be better to render *si liceat.*

887. Prof. Woolsey very properly receives the reading of the MS. Vat. ἄφετε μόνην. It has not only better authority than ἄπιτε, but from the annotation of Triclinius, ἀφεῖτε χρὴ γράφειν, οὐκ ἄφετε, appears to have been the common reading in his day.

904. We think that all difficulties as to the explanation and construction of this verse are best met by the emendation of C. F. G. Arndt (*Quæst. Crit.*, pp. 9, 10):—

καί τοι σέ γ’ εὖ ἔτιμησα τοῖς φρονούσιν εὖ,

i. e. *quanquam te quidem recte honoravi iudicio eorum, qui recte sapiunt.* For the repetition of the modal adverb, cf. 1031: εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ λέγω. On the frequent interchange and confusion in ancient manuscripts between *ω* and the diphthong *eu*, see Schaefer’s note on Greg. Cor. p. 469.

940. The metre gives evidence of some slight corruption of the text. Mr. Dindorf throws out the last four words, (forming an entire verse,) without perceiving that their removal is fatal to the point of the whole passage. Emper and Donaldson think that *κοιρανίδα* could not have been used as an appellation of the chorus; and emend τὴν κοιρανιδῶν μούνην λοιπὴν, with the rejection of *βασιλίδα*, as a marginal gloss. Prof. Woolsey evinces a sounder judgment and higher regard for the authority of the manuscripts by adopting Seidler’s correction *βασιληίδα*, which, although an epic form, is found in dactylic verse at Eur. *Hippol.* 1281. The objection that *κοιρανίδα* cannot be applied to the chorus, is refuted by the scholiast and the practice of Sophokles. Cf. 970; *Æd. Kol.* 331; *Æd. Tyr.* 85, 882.

955. Prof. Woolsey, in common with most modern editors, has adopted Scaliger's emendation *ὀξύχολος*, "because the anger of Lykurgos is the leading thought in this and the following sentences." Such a construction, resolving the adjective into a secondary predicate, may be justified, according to Donaldson, by v. 135 and *Trach.* 936, where *πυρόφορος* and *δύστηνος* are, in his opinion, similarly used. We would not, for our own part, venture against the consent of the MSS. and the lemma of the scholiast to make any alteration, and are glad to find that this view agrees with the *latest* dictum of Hermann: "*recte positum adverbium, verbis ita junctis, ξεύχθη ὀξύχολως ἐκ Διονύσου, celeri Bacchi ira.*"

959. Mr. Wunder defends the common reading upon the assumption that the words *οὕτω* — *μένος* form no part of the history whose main features are here recited, but express a general reflection of the chorus. In this view Prof. Woolsey coincides, and adds that *ἀποστάζει* is intransitive. The objection to this explanation is, that the special epithets *δεινόν* and *ἀνθηρόν* can scarcely be thought to refer to anything else than the madness of Lykurgos. Emper erases the comma after *ἀποστάζει*, and places it after *κείνος*, the pronoun being placed last in the sentence for the sake of emphasis, and to mark the parallel between the case of the Thracian king and that of Antigone. "*She too had exhibited her madness in violent words,* v. 603, *λόγον τ' ἀνοία καὶ φρενῶν Ἑρινύς;* and when the parallel comes, the emphasis falls naturally on *κείνος*." We agree with this critic in considering *ἀποστάζει* transitive, as at *Æsch. Suppl.* 582, *Musæ.* 123, and in thinking the repetition of *μανίας* (v. 960) intolerable. As we have, therefore, no doubt that the penultima of *άνίας* is occasionally shortened in the Attic poets, (cf. Porson on *Eur. Phæn.* 1334,) we unhesitatingly accept his most elegant emendation: *ἐπέγνω δ' άνίας*.

982. Mr. Donaldson pronounces the word *άντασε* "inexplicable," and adopts Dindorf's correction *αὔδασε* in the following sense, which we need not tell our readers is *not* to be found in the Greek: *challenged her share in the old honours of the Erechtheidæ*. We could have wished that he had quoted some examples in illustration of this use of the active verb *αἰδῶω*. The passage from the *Philoktetes* (v. 240) is not at all in point.

1035. That *τῶν δ' ὕπαι γένους* cannot possibly stand for *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐγγενῶν*, has been shown by Wunder and Emper. The latter critic observes that "the laws of the language will justify no other interpretation than, *ab aliis vero, qui mei generis sunt*, the harshness of such a mode of expression being, however, intolerable." Mr. Donaldson's ingenious emendation *τῶν ὕπ', ἀργέρον* yields the ne-

cessary sense: *by whom, for silver, I have long been bought and sold.* "The resemblance between ΤΩΝΥΠΑΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ and ΤΩΝΥΠΑΙΤΥΡΟΥ led, doubtless, to the corruption which has hitherto remained in the text."

1068. We approve Emper's reading and punctuation,—

ἀνθ' ὧν ἔχεις μὲν, τῶν ἄνω βαλὼν κατῶ,
ψυχὴν ἀτίμως ἐν τάφῳ κατοικίσας,—

by which "ἔχεις is joined, very advantageously to the sense of the passage, with the participle κατοικίσας. When the finite verb κατέφικισας had once found its way into the text, the insertion of the copulative particle (τε) became an almost necessary consequence." We would add that κατοικίσας is supported by manuscript authority.

1080–1083. Wunder considers these verses a spurious interpolation, and Dindorf removes them from his text. Donaldson disagrees entirely with these editors, and remarks excellently that "their oracular obscurity is quite in keeping with the lines which precede." The inadmissibility of Boeckh's opinion that these lines contain a general sentiment, is forcibly shown in the remainder of his admirable note, to which with real pleasure we refer our readers.

1090. Wunder observes that the genitive τῶν φρενῶν depends upon τὸν νοῦν, and that no difficulty will be felt respecting such a collocation by those who remember the Homeric expressions νόος ἐν στήθεσσι, ἐν φρέσιν, and the like. The analogy is not, however, exact; for in the formulas alluded to, στήθεα, φρένες are used in a strict anatomical sense of parts of the human body in which the νόος was supposed to have its seat. Nevertheless we believe that his statement of the construction of the words τὸν νοῦν τῶν φρενῶν is perfectly correct. Cf. Eur. *fragm. ap. Lykurg.* 92: ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν.

1110. Wunder and Dindorf coincide with Hermann's surmise that some verses have perished after the words εἰς ἐπόψιον τόπον, and therefore indicate a lacuna by placing asterisks between this and the following verse. The lost verses contained, in their opinion, a more accurate description of the place in question and a more distinct reference to Antigone. We agree with Donaldson that such a supposition is unnecessary. The ἐπόψιος τόπος has been already described at v. 411: ἄκρων ἐκ πάγων, and "was probably depicted on the right-hand *periaktos*." The mere mention of the spot upon which the corpse of Polynceikes lay, and the direction to take hatchets in their hands for the purpose of cutting down timber for the funeral pile from the trees which stood there in considerable abundance, (v. 416: πᾶσαν αἰκίζων φόβην ὕλης πεδιάδος,)

would be all the description of the locality referred to, that Kreon in his haste and excitement would be likely to give to his attendants. "The antithesis in v. 1112 seems to point to an intentional brevity in describing his proposed liberation of Antigone." These remarks are principally drawn from the excellent note of Donaldson.

1156. From Wunder's explanation, οὐδεὶς γὰρ βίος ἐστίν, οὔτε σᾶς ὃν ἂν ἀνέσσαιμι, οὔτε πессών, ὃν ἂν μεμψαίμην ποτέ, it is evident that he understands σᾶντα of a *prosperous* state of life, and supplies to μεμψαίμην the participle πессόντα in the opposite signification. In this view the sense would be: *I ne'er would venture to praise the life of any man if prosperous, nor blame it if adverse.* Such an explanation is ingenious, but the harshness of the supposed ellipse renders it, in our judgment, inadmissible in the verses before us. Ὅποιον σᾶντα can only mean, *in qualemcumque statum devenerit*, as the scholiast, Hermann and Emper have already seen.

1209. Mr. Wunder observes: "*pro περιβαίνει aliud quid a poeta scriptum fuisse numeris docemur.*" We do not see the reason why. The "*aliud quid*" he conjectures to be περιπολεῖ. Hermann also thinks περιβαίνει "*insolentius dictum,*" and prefers περιπτενέι. Περιβαίνειν and ἀμφιβαίνειν are, however, employed of analogous phenomena, and Emper remarks that Homer has used περιήλυθεν of sound.

1233. Prof. Woolsey leaves the student in something like a dilemma as to the meaning to be given to κνώδοντας. For in the first part of his note we read, "Comp. Ajax 1025, where this word has the sense *blade or sword*;" but at its close, "Lobeck on Ajax loc. cit. renders this word in correspondence with its usage in Xenophon, the *hilt-pieces of the sword*, and with this Hermann and Boeckh agree." The words of Lobeck are simply these: "*Nomen κνώδων, a verbo κνώ propagatum, proprie non gladium, sed remoras venabulorum et gladiatorum denotat.*" The reviewer may direct attention to the note upon the verse referred to in the Harvard edition of the Aias, p. 280.

1278. Mr. Wunder, supplying κακά to the participles from v. 1280, adopts Boeckh's rendering: *as the true holder and possessor of misfortune.* Emper explains more correctly that the words ὥς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος do not belong, as their position would seem to intimate, to both members of the period, but are limited exclusively to the first. Hence he interprets: *whilst thou art bearing in thy hands one part of thy misfortunes, upon the supposition that (ὥς) thou hast and art fully in possession of (all the evils that have been allotted thee, — let that opinion be dismissed) for thou seemest to have come with a prospect of seeing speedily the other part.*

In this way the introduction of ὥς is satisfactorily explained, and the emphatic position of the words above quoted, is seen to be due to the antithesis between the participles of the present and the infinitive of the future.

1281. In Jelf's Greek Grammar, 780, *Obs.* 2, this verse is quoted as an illustration of the occasionally pleonastic employment in poetry of ἦ before the genitive. Boeckh more correctly explains: *quid autem est pejus aut adhuc malorum?* Mr. Dindorf writes τί δ' ἔστιν αὖ; and omits all that follows,—his favourite expedient for getting rid of a difficulty. We would call attention to the elegant conjecture of Emper:—

τί δ' ἔστιν; ἦ κάκιον αὖ κακῶν ἔτι;

1290. Hermann omits the words ὦ παῖ, and Wunder observes: "*verba quidem ὦ παῖ mihi quoque et metro et sententiæ adversari videntur.*" Mr. Donaldson asserts correctly that the allocution ὦ παῖ cannot possibly refer to the slave who is addressed here. Why Emper's emendation,

τί φῆς; ὦ παῖ, τίνα λέγει σοι νέον,

(σοι being joined with ἀμφικεῖσθαι and σφάγιον ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ regarded as a parenthetic clause,) should be pronounced "quite out of place," we know not. Surely nothing can be more natural, in such circumstances as those of Kreon, than an apostrophe to the deceased Hæmon.

1301, 1302. Most critics agree (see Arndt, *Quæst. Soph.* p. 11) that there is some corruption in these verses, and that they could not have proceeded in their present form from the pen of the poet. The objections to the vulgate are well stated by Emper: "Although it is just possible that ὀξύθηκτος might have been applied figuratively to a personal notion as an epithet of violent passion or emotion, we should find it hard to produce another example of the use of this compound adjective in such a meaning. Admitting it, however, the connexion of ideas in this passage is broken and perverse. The words previously uttered by the exangelos refer altogether to Eurydike; how can he then, Eurydike being still the subject, connect these words with the preceding by means of ἦ δέ? Moreover, the expression λῦει βλέφαρα κελαινά, if employed in the sense *kills herself*, is a very unusual substitution of the active for the middle voice. Lastly, βοῦία πέριξ, apart from the affected character of the phraseology, is very unsuitable to the sense. Why should the queen be represented, when meditating death, to have figured round the altar like a *danscuse*?

"Hence," he continues, "I feel satisfied that ὀξύθηκτος does not relate to the queen, but to a weapon exhibited or pointed out by the exangelos, with which Eurydike had committed the act of self-destruction. Now of this weapon (probably the sacrificial knife from the altar) λύει βλέφαρα could be said with entire propriety. The requisite sense is then obtained if, instead of πέριξ, we read πτέρυξ, a word which is very applicable to a two-edged sacrificial knife, and is indeed often used in this sense under precisely similar circumstances. Such an emendation supersedes the necessity of assuming a lacuna; for in accordance with a very refined idiom of the Greek language, the grammatical here gives place to the logical subject. Whilst, therefore, πτέρυξ is the formal subject-nominative to the words λύει βλέφαρα, the queen, who bears this weapon, still remains the strict natural subject, and the exangelos can accordingly proceed κοκύσσα, &c. As, however, his language is still in some degree obscure, the inquiry of Kreon:

ποῖω δὲ κάπελύσατ' ἐν φοναῖς τρόπῳ;

and the reply, describing in plain terms her suicide:

παίσας' ὑφ' ἥπαρ αὐτόχειρ αὐτήν κ. τ. λ.,

are added for the sake of additional explanation."

So far, then, for the consideration of individual verses of this play. Let it not, however, be supposed that our having refrained from remark upon numerous other passages, in which modern editors have forsaken the established readings, and interpolated, upon their own authority, or that of their predecessors, such emendations as best harmonized with their own notions of what Sophokles *ought* to have written, is any proof that we acquiesce in their corrections or the principle by which their temerity is sought to be defended.

The length to which our article has extended, will, we believe, be pardoned by those of our readers who love Sophokles, and are anxious for the diffusion of a thirst for classical learning among all classes of our countrymen. To the sneer of dry-eyed utilitarians, who "*centum Græcos curto centusse licentur*," and who, to borrow the words of the most eminent of living scholars, "*nil aliud optant quam panes et circenses, hoc est, pecuniæ cito conficiendæ et per delicias prodigendæ vias et rationes*," we profess our indifference.

We would, in conclusion, leave it with our more learned readers to determine, whether, in respect of the textual innovations and imperfect epexegesis, to which, as characteristic of the age, we have invited their attention, they have not seen ample reason, in this

review of the labours of some of the most renowned and erudite scholars of the day, to desire that the excellent rule, quoted by Prof. Blackie from Thomas à Kempis (or the writer who bears that name): "*Omnis scriptura sacra eo spiritu debet legi quo scripta est,*" as essential to the interpretation of the words of Holy Writ, should be as rigidly applied in the field of classical criticism? And we cannot abstain from congratulating Americans that the necessity of this principle to the correct explanation and treatment of the "*Antigone*" has been most distinctly seen and most faithfully followed by their distinguished countryman, the urbane and accomplished President of Yale. *O si sic omnes!*

ART. IV.—RECENT EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF PASCAL,

1. *Pensées, Fragments et Lettres de BLAISE PASCAL, publiés pour la première fois conformément aux manuscrits originaux en grande partie inédits.* Par M. PROSPER FAUGÈRE. 2 vols., 8vo. Paris. 1844.
2. *The Provincial Letters of BLAISE PASCAL: a new translation, with Historical Introduction and Notes.* By THOMAS M'CRUE, D. D. 12mo. Edinburgh.
3. *The Works of Pascal, newly translated and arranged by GEORGE PEARCE, Esq.* Vol. I, Provincial Letters: II, Miscellaneous Writings: III, Thoughts on Religion, &c. 3 vols. London. 1847-1850.

PASCAL has attracted almost as much attention of late years as at any former period. New editions of his works have appeared in almost every country, and almost every literary journal has undertaken, *de novo*, the task of examining and rejudging the strange phenomena of his life and genius. This revival of interest is due, doubtless, partly to the revival of Jesuitism; the very mention of the society recalls the name of its strongest assailant. But Pascal's polemical renown is, perhaps, the smallest part of his fame. As a prodigy of intellect, as a man far in advance of his times in profoundness of thought, as a model of taste and of style, and, at the same time, as a sad specimen of the weakness of that human nature whose grandeur and whose misery he has so graphically depicted, he will be, for every age, a problem and a study. The appearance of the works mentioned at the head of this article, with several others bearing upon the history and genius of Pascal, affords us a fitting opportunity for our attempt at a solution of the enigmas of his career. But a full investigation of the subject as well as of the books relating to it would require more space than we can allot to one article; and we shall, therefore, divide the task, devoting the present paper

to a brief survey of the new editions of Pascal's writings in France and of their translations in Great Britain.

The title, "Pascal's Thoughts," has long been a ruling one among booksellers' lists and library catalogues; but the work which passed under that name until 1844 was hardly deserving the name of an authentic book in any sense. Yet on the merits of that book, even such as it was, we should feel it impertinent, at this day, to speak, even in praise. The verdict of mankind has placed the private note-book of Pascal above the elaborate productions of most other men. The literary history of the work is very curious. After the publication of the "Provincial Letters" Pascal's mind was occupied, for the most part, up to the day of his death, with preparation for a "Defence of Christianity," on the largest scale of thought. The scope and method of the work formed the subject of frequent conversations in the learned circle of the Port Royal; and on one occasion, at least, he stated his plan, in tolerably full outline, to his friends. Soon after his suffering spirit was removed by death, his friends determined to arrange and publish his posthumous works, among which they found heads and fragments of arguments, sketches of chapters, stray thoughts and illustrations, evidently intended to form part of the great work on which his mind had been at work for years. He had formed the plan of a vast edifice, but alas! he had only been permitted to gather a few stones for the building. Numerous "thoughts" on other subjects, principally theological and ethical, were also found among his manuscripts. The manuscripts themselves were in a most chaotic state. It appears that whenever a thought occurred to Pascal, he jotted it down, not in a note-book, but on a loose piece of paper, often on the back of an old letter: and all that he did for the preservation of these "Sibylline leaves" was to arrange them in bundles or on files.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the "Thoughts," when published, should have been mere fragments; the greater wonder is, that they should have been preserved at all. But the worst part of the story remains to be told. Pascal's friends (of whom Arnauld, Nicole, and the Duke de Roannes were the chief) came to the wise conclusion that these remains, fragmentary as they were, were too valuable to be lost to the world. But the Jesuits, whom Pascal had immortalized by his ridicule, were then all-powerful at court; and it was a very delicate task to publish a theological work, just then, in Pascal's name. Before the work could appear, it had to undergo a substantial censorship by a committee of doctors of the Sorbonne, nine in number. *Each* of these made such corrections and suppressions as he thought necessary to make the work absolutely orthodox!

Moreover, Pascal's friends thought themselves at liberty to do *anything* they pleased with these remains, altering at pleasure both the substance and the *style*. "These fragments," says M. Faugère, indignantly, which sickness and death had left incomplete, suffered, without ceasing to be immortal, all the mutilations and alterations which an exaggerated prudence and a mistaken zeal could suggest; mutilations, caused by the same orthodox scruples which had actuated the censors; alterations, inspired by a desire to improve *and embellish the style of the author of the Provincials!*" Madame Perier, (Pascal's sister,) to her praise be it spoken, resisted all these alterations to the last, and demanded that "not a syllable should be changed;" but she stood alone, and was overruled by the literary clique, who—worthy men—stupidly dreamed of mending *Pascal's* style. In the preface to the first edition of the *Pensées*, (published in 1670,) M. Etienne Perier gives a very *naïve* statement of the method of procedure adopted by himself and his coadjutors in preparing the work for the press, from which it appears, that after rejecting the first plan that presented itself, viz., that of printing the MSS. just as they were, they actually, for a time, entertained the thought of filling up Pascal's outline, and "supplying, in some sort, the work he intended to write!" But "at last," says M. Perier, with inimitable simplicity, "we decided to reject this plan also, considering that it was almost impossible to enter completely into the thought and plan of an author—especially of one dead; and because the work produced would not have been M. Pascal's, but *one altogether different*." The plan finally adopted was, according to M. Perier, to select those passages which were most clear and complete, and print them "without alteration," and to suppress all that were too obscure or imperfect. How much they printed "without alteration," may be judged from the statement of M. Faugère, that "they modified the style in a thousand ways—sometimes breaking a thought into fragments, and scattering them in an arbitrary way; at other times joining together isolated and distinct passages; and finally substituting, in many places, their own common-place for the original expressions of Pascal. There are not, in the first or any of the subsequent editions, *twenty consecutive lines* free from alteration."*

* This is abundantly confirmed by M. Cousin, who speaks of "altérations de mots, altérations de tours, altérations de phrases, suppressions, substitutions, additions, compositions arbitraires et absurdes, tantôt d'un paragraphe, tantôt d'un chapitre entier, et, qui pis est, décompositions plus arbitraires encore et vraiment inconcevables de chapitres qui, dans le manuscrit de Pascal, se présentaient parfaitement liés dans toutes leurs parties et profondément travaillés."

—*Rapport à l'Académie*, ix.

Edition followed edition, with occasional additions, until, in 1776, Condorcet published his "*Eloge et Pensées de Pascal, nouvelle édition.*" A century—and such a century—had passed away; the encyclopædists now ruled instead of the Jesuits; and poor Pascal, who had formerly to be trimmed to suit the taste of orthodoxy, must now be re-edited in the infidel spirit. Assuredly, as Mr. Faugère remarks, a comparison of the *Pensées* of 1670 with the edition of 1776 would afford a curious illustration of the revolution which the French mind had undergone in that interval. Condorcet suppressed every sentiment of elevated piety and devotion as follies of superstition. In 1778 this edition was re-issued under the fit supervision of Voltaire, who added notes remarkable only for their railery and their injustice.

In 1779 the first attempt at a *complete* edition of Pascal's works was given to the world by Bossuet. The *Pensées* occupied the second volume of this edition. It is a curious fact, that when Bossuet sought for official permission to publish the work, M. Malesherbes, then keeper of the seals, advised him to issue it under a fictitious imprint, and so it appeared as published by Détune, libraire à la Haye, when, in fact, it was published by the bookseller Nyon at Paris. M. Bossuet endeavoured to make his edition as complete as possible, and obtained many new scraps from different sources. He did not attempt, however, a correction of the old errors, but, in fact, added many new ones of his own. Such as this edition was, however, it became the standard, and has been followed, more or less exactly, by all subsequent editors, and by all English translators, up to 1844.

The fact that the printed text of the *Pensées* was thus mutilated and imperfect had long been known, or at least suspected, by the literary world; but the full state of the case was not understood until 1843, when M. Cousin published his *Report* above cited. The original *autograph* MS. was fortunately preserved in the Royal Library, at Paris, and M. Cousin, comparing it with the current text, easily proved the necessity of a new revision of the "posthumous works of Pascal." The task was undertaken by M. Faugère, with a zeal and industry only rivalled by his tact and ability. The basis of his edition, of course, is the *autograph* MS., which he describes* as a large folio volume of 491 pages, containing the scraps to which Pascal had originally intrusted his meditations, carefully pasted on the page, or, when both sides of the paper were written on, inserted between the leaves. They were not arranged on any intelligible principle, or, indeed, on any principle whatever, but thrown together pell-mell—here a portion of a fragment, and there another, whole pages some-

* Introduction, p. xl.

times intervening between two parts of the same "thought." The handwriting was almost undecipherable except by an adept. M. Faugère also had recourse to all the *copies* of this MS. known to be extant, and also to all other papers of Pascal's, or of his friends, likely to be of use in his editorial labours. Through the course of these labours, (an accurate account of which is given in his Introduction,) we cannot follow him further than to say that he has given us *every word* of the MS., except some few which are absolutely illegible, allowing himself no liberty whatever of alteration and emendation. In the matter of *arrangement*, however, he was obviously entirely free; and his success in this regard has been admirable. The materials are divided into two parts: first, the fragments pertaining to the great work on "Christianity;" and secondly, all others—letters, observations, short treatises, &c. These last compose the first volume of his work: the "Thoughts on Religion" occupy the second. In the arrangement of this part M. Faugère availed himself of the recorded conversation before referred to, in which Pascal developed to his friends the general plan of his apology, dividing it into two parts—first, the Misery of Man without God; second, the Happiness of Man with God. Under these heads the fragments are arranged in as near an approach to logical order as possible; and in this part of the work M. Faugère was aided, in many cases, by hints and indications on Pascal's MS. scraps. The result is a work in which we may study not only Pascal's views of religion, but also Pascal himself.

Leaving now M. Faugère's work, which confines itself to the *Pensées*, let us pass to the recent translations, both of the *Provincials* and the *Thoughts*. It is a curious coincidence that the two translations of the *Provincials* named at the head of this article appeared almost simultaneously in London and Edinburgh. The *first* English translation was contemporary with the letters themselves, (1657,) a second appeared in 1744, and a third in 1816. Mr. Pearce and Dr. M'Crie appear to have each entered upon their work with the design of affording a "faithful" translation of this master-piece of style. Dr. M'Crie's is executed with tolerable accuracy, though not with elegance. It is a model, however, when compared with its London rival. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say of Mr. Pearce's book, once for all, that it is a travesty of the *Provincials*. There is not a page of its four hundred, in which something of Pascal's meaning, and all his grace and elegance, are not lost. The following passage from his preface will show with what admirable self-complacency, and at the same time with what humble stock of preparation, Mr. Pearce goes to work.

"In translating a composition that rises little above the ordinary level, fidelity to the author's meaning, and correctness of language, are sufficient. But, if the work be one of a high order of literary beauty—one, whose pages delight not less from intrinsic excellence, their power of reasoning and variety of illustration, than from felicities of diction and graces of style—in such a case, the effort to do justice to the great original should rise proportionably higher. The ear should be carefully relieved from the unpleasing effect of foreign idiom. Where the genius of the native tongue has sanctioned expressions, that, in a bolder vernacular, seem insipid, they should be raised: where, to a more sober taste, the language appears too exalted, it should be subdued. Especially should sympathy be shown by the translator with the higher excellences of the original composition. He should kindle with its ardour, and rise with its elevation. In those passages in which genius is wont to gather up her powers, and carry with resistless force the passions of the reader—and in such passages none abound more than Pascal—on such occasions, when the loftiest reach of thought pours its conceptions into a mould of classic beauty, he should then aim at something of a kindred vigour, and give his humbler aid to transfer with fidelity the features of his great model. His art is, after all, but an imitative one. The thought—the argument—the eloquence—the spirit and life, are all the author's. But yet, in the subordinate sphere he occupies, there is a measure of excellence to be aspired to; a merit analogous to that in the sister-arts, in which the painting or the statue will be so skilfully copied, that the practised eye of the connoisseur only can detect the imitation. The difference, however, here is, that if any measure of resemblance be achieved, *no deception*—as in the other cases—can be contemplated. The object in view is only to court respect and admiration for the master-mind that is attempted to be traced."

Was there ever candour so charming as this disclaimer of "*deception*," coming especially from one so evidently capable of *counterfeiting* Pascal as Mr. Pearce proves himself to be in this fair sample of his English writing? After this, an instance or two will be quite sufficient to illustrate his power of reproducing, in English, not the delicate refinements of the "*Provincials*" merely, but even their substantial sense. Let us select a simple, and yet celebrated passage as a test. In the fifth Letter, the garrulous Jesuit is made to recount a number of obscure casuists bearing the most gothically outlandish names of Germany and Spain,* until Pascal interrupts the catalogue with that *naïve* exclamation, strong in its force alike of irony and argument,—

"O mon père! lui dis-je, *tout effrayé*, tous ces gens-là étaient-ils chrétiens? *Comment*, Chrétiens, me répondit-il. Ne vous disais-je pas que ce sont les seuls par lesquels nous gouvernons aujourd'hui la chrétienté? Cela me fit pitié: mais je ne lui en témoignai rien, et lui demandai seulement si tous ces auteurs-là étaient jésuites. Non, me dit-il, mais il n'importe; ils n'ont pas laissé de dire de bonnes choses."

The reader will observe that in this passage there is not a particle of *idiom* to excuse a deviation from the text. And in proportion to the exquisite simplicity of the original, all departure from it in the version, however slight *grammatically*, must be, *æsthetically*, a distortion. Then hear Mr. Pearce:—

* E. g.: Achokier, Dealkozer, Dellacrux, Veracrux, Squilanti, Bizozeri, Villagut.

"O, my *good* father!" cried I, alarmed, "were all these people Christians?" "Christians!" said he, "did I not tell you they were the only *persons* by whom, in the present day, we regulate our system of Christianity?" I was concerned to hear him say this; but made no remark; and only asked him if they were all Jesuits? "No," he replied, "but that is of no importance; there are excellent things in them all."

The Italics in the French mark the *omissions* of the translator; those in the English, his *interpolations*, on both which, together with his *mistranslations*, we must be allowed a word or two. And first, the phrase, "my good father," is twice faulty: the pronoun should not be rendered at all; the word "good" is neither expressed nor implied in the French; and the two together import a self-possessed and semi-sneering familiarity, grossly out of keeping with the simple and sudden consternation of Pascal. Moreover, the nice touch given to this ironical "alarm" by the word "*tout*" is perversely omitted. The word "alarm" is itself wrong; the emotion intended is obviously *terror*, in a modified degree. The ambiguity of the rest of the sentence is perhaps chargeable to our idiom. The question asked is not, properly, whether "*all* these people" were Christians; this would imply that part of them had been already recognised as such, whereas no partitive reference is designed: "All," finely expressive of affright, refers only to the magnitude of the number, not to their collective "Christianity." And this is exactly expressed by the French construction of the phrase. But the Jesuit's reply is stripped of its most characteristic trait, the "*how*;" and he is, at the same time, made to utter "Christians" with an exclamation instead of an interrogation. Both betray a great misconception of the refined spirit of the dialogue. In the next sentence "*les seuls*" is barbarously rendered "the only persons"—this last word being foisted in by the translator as if on purpose to confound the sense by substituting a vaguely generic term for a particular species—the adjective *seuls* obviously applying to "Christians" merely. Nor is *aujourd'hui* properly rendered by the uncouth phrase "in the present day;" still less is *chrétienté* by "our system of Christianity," which is, in fact, nonsense. In the next phrase—*cela me fit pitié*—the sentiment expressed is *not* "concern," nor was it excited by "hearing" the Jesuit "say this;" nor is Pascal's forbearance to manifest it easily recognised in the trivial phrase, "I made no remark,"—a phrase absurd, too, when the question whether they were "all Jesuits," is uttered in the very same breath. In this question, besides, the word *auteurs-là* is left untranslated, although it gives explicitness to the sense, and serves, at the same time, (particularly by the *là*,) to insinuate the writer's tone of lurking raillery. We have now reached the last sentence of our extract—and even that is not unexception-

able: for "that is of no importance," is a splay-footed version of *n'importe*; and "*there are excellent things in them all*," does scarcely more justice to the vernacular than to the original.

The specimen we have given is a fair example of Mr. Pearce's handiwork in the "translation" of *Les Provinciales*. Let us now try Dr. McCrie by the same test passage.

"O my dear father," cried I, quite alarmed, "were all these people Christians?" "How, Christians," returned the *casuist*: "did I not tell you these are the only *writers* by whom we now govern Christendom?" Deeply affected as I was by this announcement, I concealed my emotion from the *monk*, and only asked him if all these authors were Jesuits? "No," said he; "but that is of little consequence; they have said a number of good things for all that."

That the North-Briton is (at least in our judgment) a far better translator of Pascal than his brother of the South, will be obvious enough to the reader who has followed the above comments with attention. There is, throughout, less omission and less mistranslation. Nevertheless, Dr. McCrie's *interpolations* show that he is only less inattentive than Mr. Pearce to the decorum of the dialogue. The epithet "dear" is improper enough to give the very shade of Pascal an æsthetical shudder; nowhere, in the whole book, we think, does he employ this form of address. It is more objectionable than even Mr. Pearce's "good," and imports rather the scorn of a Scotch Presbyterian towards the Jesuit, than the semi-reverential air and respectful address of the pious Port-Royalist and the polite Frenchman. Another instance may be found in the introduction of the word "*casuist*:" and still another and coarser in the term "*monk*." To appreciate the full grossness of these interpolations, let the reader of taste only turn them into the French, or try to imagine them on the lips of Pascal.

The lesser inaccuracies of both translations may be briefly seen from a comparison of them with the following literal rendering of the passage: "O father,"—I exclaimed, quite terrified,—"*all these strange people, were they Christians?*" "*How, Christians?*" replied he. "*Did I not tell you that they are the only Christians by whom we now-a-days govern Christendom?*" I was shocked at this, but I suppressed the emotion, and only asked him if all these authors of his were Jesuits? "*They are not,*" said he: "*but no matter; they have written, nevertheless, many excellent things.*"

To this example of ill-success in rendering the delicate vein of Pascal we might add others of a different quality, but our space will hardly allow us to do more than to cite the closing paragraph of the Twelfth Provincial—a passage justly celebrated as combining the vigour of Demosthenes with the sublimity of Bossuet—and to place

beside it the two English translations, permitting our readers to judge between them:—

“Vous croyez avoir la force et l'impunité, mais je crois avoir la vérité et l'innocence. C'est une étrange et longue guerre que celle où la violence essaie d'opprimer la vérité. Tous les efforts de la violence ne peuvent affaiblir la vérité, et ne servent qu'à la relever davantage. Toutes les lumières de la vérité ne peuvent rien pour arrêter la violence, et ne font que l'irriter encore plus. Quand la force combat la force, la plus puissante détruit la moindre: quand on oppose les discours aux discours, ceux qui sont véritables et convaincants confondent et dissipent ceux qui n'ont que la vanité et le mensonge: mais la violence et la vérité ne peuvent rien l'une sur l'autre. Qu'on ne prétende pas de la néanmoins que les choses soient égales, car il y a cette extrême différence: que la violence n'a qu'un cours borné par l'ordre de Dieu, qui en conduit les effets à la gloire de la vérité qu'elle attaque; au lieu que la vérité subsiste éternellement, et triomphe enfin de ses ennemis, parcequ'elle est éternelle et puissant comme Dieu même.”

We give first Mr. Pearce's attempt at a translation of this noble passage:—

“You think yourselves sheltered by the impunity of power; but I stand on the vantage-ground of innocence and truth! Long and persevering may be the assaults of violence against those sacred bulwarks. No efforts of rude power can overthrow truth; they serve only to enhance her lustre; while truth's most transcendent radiance avails not to arrest the course of violence, and serves but to irritate it the more. When force opposes force, the stronger overpowers the weak; when controversies are arrayed against each other, those founded on justice and reason may silence the clamours of vanity and falsehood; but violence and truth will ever wage against each other a fruitless and interminable warfare. Yea, let it not then be concluded that their forces are balanced, and their weapons tempered alike. There is between them this immeasurable difference, that violence traces a course limited and circumscribed by the resistless decree of God, which causes all its efforts to subserve the advancement of the sacred cause assailed. But truth shall remain ever unimpaired, and be victorious over all her enemies; for she is immortal and omnipotent, like the Eternal himself!”

Dr. M'Crie gives the passage as follows:—

“You think you have power and impunity on your side; and I think that I have truth and innocence on mine. It is a strange and tedious war, when violence attempts to vanquish truth. All the efforts of violence cannot weaken truth, and only serve to give it fresh vigour. All the lights of truth cannot arrest violence, and only serve to exasperate it. When force meets force, the weaker must succumb to the stronger; when argument is opposed to argument, the solid and the convincing triumph over the empty and the false; but violence and verity can make no impression on each other. Let none suppose, however, that the two are, then, equal to each other; for there is this vast difference between them, that violence has only a certain course to run, limited by the appointment of Heaven, which overrules its effects to the glory of the truth which it assails; whereas verity endures forever, and eventually triumphs over its enemies, being eternal and almighty as God himself.”

The Scotch version here maintains its general and easy superiority: indeed, it can only be found fault with in regard to the nicer shadings. But Mr. Pearce's version is a villanous caricature from the first to the last syllable. We deliberately affirm that there is not a sentence

—nay, hardly a word—which does not either belie the import or blur the expression of the original. Even the phrase on which the whole argument of the passage hinges is entirely disregarded in this mock-version. *C'est une étrange et longue guerre que celle où la violence essaie d'opprimer la vérité*, says Pascal; and from this text, and particularly from the word “strange,” (as Dr. M'Crie gives it, though it would, perhaps, be better “unnatural,”) is drawn out the silvery thread whereupon is strung the series of sublime reflections that follows; but it is all lost on Mr. Pearce and on those who are so unhappy as to read his translation for Pascal. To expose, in detail, the confusions he has wrought in the passage would occupy (and occupy usefully) one half the space of this article. His book, throughout, as we have said, is full of such. The very doctrine which the original work was written to vindicate he can neither distinguish nor designate in English—fluctuating, in his translation (!) of “*grace efficace*” between the words “effective,” “effectual,” and “efficient;” never once, we believe, even by accident, stumbling upon the only true and proper term, “efficacious.”

Are we not justified in stopping a moment to ask what *can* be the condition of British literature and criticism, when we see a profane parody like this upon the first of modern classics issue from the metropolitan press, not only unwhipped of criticism, but we believe commended by the press, and certainly patronized by the public, as may be concluded from the recent appearance of the two volumes which profess to give a translation of Faugère's edition of the *Pensées*?* Of these we have seen only the second volume, containing the “Thoughts on Religion,” and find it marked by the same want of discrimination that we have so signally noted in the translation of the “Provincials.” But we must have done with Mr. Pearce.

On perusing the immortal fragments of Pascal brought together by M. Faugère, one circumstance has struck us at almost every page—not so much the fact itself as that we have never seen it noted by English writers, or even by French. We allude to the *plagiarisms*

* Hear what the *British Quarterly* (!) says in praise of these and of Mr. Pearce: “It would have been difficult, we dare say, upon the whole, to have found a more graceful (*sic*) and successful (*sic*) translator of these volumes than Mr. Pearce, known by his previous version of the ‘Provincial Letters;’ though we yet feel bound to think that he allows himself frequently far too much license in rendering the exact statements of Pascal Withal, however, there are throughout his pages abundant traces of accurate scholarship, pure taste (*sic*), and, above all, of a hearty admiration, and sometimes fine discernment of the beauties of Pascal; and we are free, therefore, to commend his volumes as a skilful and attractive version of the ‘Thoughts.’”

made from these "Thoughts" by many of our English classics. Our space will only allow us to allude to a few examples.

Perhaps one of the tritest saws of our criticism, from Pope downwards, is the remark, that the best written books are those which everybody thinks he could produce himself; and it is a literal translation from the following phrase in Pascal's admirable *Art de Persuader*: "Les meilleurs livres sont ceux que ceux qui les lisent croient qu'ils auraient pu faire." * Dr. Johnson himself, with all his characteristically English arrogance towards the French language and literature, has, once at least, drawn from this common source. He apologizes to one of his blue-stocking correspondents for the length of his letter on the ground that he "had not time to make it shorter;" and this profound *mot* is credited to him, we believe, to this day. Pascal, however, apologized at the end of the sixteenth Provincial, for its length, in the following terms: *Je n'ai fait celle-ci plus longue que parceque je n'ai pas eu le loisir de la faire plus courte.* Burke, too, had read Pascal. In the introduction to his "Sublime and Beautiful," he lays it down that a definition ought to be the *result*, not the *text*, of a discourse or treatise. For this he has been repeatedly quoted and lauded, in particular by Dugald Stewart, who has, by the way, himself often diluted into his lemonade pages a solid idea from the same uncredited source,—thus reversing the reproach of Roscommon, and showing that

The sterling bullion of one *Gallic* line

Drawn to *Scotch* wire, does through whole pages shine.

Pascal had made the same remark of definitions, but much more intelligently, in his fragment on Geometrical method, and had, in fact, treated the whole subject—especially the distinction between the Real and the Nominal species—in a manner which British logicians fail as yet to appreciate, if we may judge by one of the latest and far the ablest of them, Mr. John Mill.

The learned reader will probably remember in more than one of the college philosophers, who immortalized North Britain towards the end of the last century, to have seen Lord Shaftesbury credited for having made the *heart* to be a test of truth, as well as the *understanding*. Pascal had long before said: *Nous connaissons la vérité non-seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur.* † But we must cut short our catalogue with one wholesale instance. In Pope's *Essay on Man* we read:—

"Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end in pain;
Some, swell'd to gods, confess even virtue vain."

* Faugère, i, 172.

† Faugère, ii, 108.

Pascal had said: "Les uns ont voulu renoncer aux passions et devenir dieux: les autres ont voulu renoncer à la raison et devenir bêtes brutes." The same idea recurs in Pope again speaking of man generally:—

"He hangs between, in doubt to act or rest—
In doubt to deem himself a god or beast,"

The Second Epistle opens with the famous line: "The proper study of mankind is man;" but Pascal had written: *L'étude de l'homme c'est le vrai étude qui lui est propre*. In a word, the whole introduction to Pope's Second Epistle is borrowed from Pascal:* nay, we may go further and say that *most* of the finest thoughts in this celebrated Essay could be pointed out in the same teeming repository. Nor is this said in disparagement of Pope, who, at the worst, did only what has been done by Shakspeare, Byron, and all the "better brothers."† Moreover, Pope was only the receiver of the stolen goods; the theft itself was probably committed by Bolingbroke—"the master of the poet and the song,"—who was at home in the French language and literature, and who, moreover, was in France at about the date of the first publication of the *Pensées*. We had almost forgotten Junius, the most successful imitator of the "Provincials," that has yet appeared. It is, perhaps, needless to remark that not only are the plan, the tone, and the general character of the "Letters" of Junius an imitation of Pascal, but that also his best sarcasms are but the razor-cuts of the keen Frenchman, torn open into a gash, in accommodation to the thicker perception and coarser fibre of the English public.

We hope to find room, at an early date, for an extended article on Pascal.

* Cf. especially Faugère, ii, 103. Our passage here inevitably recalls Shakspeare. Pascal thus apostrophizes: "Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbecile ver de terre, dépositaire du vrai, cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur, gloire et rebut de l'univers." Shakspeare, on the other hand, gives only the bright side: "What a piece of work is man; how noble in reason; how infinite in faculties; in form and moving how express and admirable; in action, how like an angel; in apprehension, how like a God; the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!"

† Compare the closing paragraph of the Twelfth Provincial with the noble and well-known stanza of our own Bryant. Pascal: "La vérité subsiste éternellement, et triomphe enfin de ses ennemis, parcequ'elle est éternelle et puissante comme Dieu même." Bryant:—

"Truth, crushed to earth, will rise again,—
The eternal years of God are hers:
But error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies, amid her worshippers."

ART. V.—THE INTERMEDIATE STATE, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

It has been recently urged with much confidence, and with some show both of argument and of critical learning, that it is the doctrine of the Bible that human beings are entirely unconscious between death and the resurrection, and that the punishment of the wicked will be annihilation. Though these errors are not new, and have before been thoroughly refuted, yet the earnestness and plausibility with which they are now propagated, seem to demand at this time a candid and thorough investigation. Most of those who hold them are materialists, denying that the soul has any existence distinct from that of the physical organization, and affirming that it is only an "attribute or result" of the latter. It will be necessary, then, as preliminary to the discussion of the topics which will be the subject of this article, to prove that the soul has an existence distinct from that of the body, and that it may have a separate existence.

I. Among the arguments for the distinct existence of the soul are these:—

1. It is distinct in its attributes and functions. Its attributes are not those of matter. The essential attributes of the latter are solidity, magnitude, and figure. The human body has these, and is therefore material. But there exist in man certain other attributes which cannot be referred to matter, and there must be a form of existence to which these pertain,—and this we call the soul. The functions of the body and those of the soul are distinct. Among the former are respiration, circulation, motion, &c.; among the latter, reasoning, conception, volition, &c.

2. The consciousness of personal identity proves the same point. During the ordinary term of human life the body is completely renovated several times, but the identity of the individual is not affected. The impressions of which he was the subject, the emotions and desires which were active in him during childhood, are fresh in the mind of the old man. The soul, which is the seat of these feelings, has not changed with the body, and he is therefore conscious that he is the identical person that he was in his childhood.

3. Again: were the soul "an attribute, accident, or result of the physical organization," we should expect that there would be more agreement than there now is between the powers and the activity of the soul and the perfection of the physical system, and that the

loss of parts of the body would, in some sense, affect the capacity of the soul. There is, doubtless, much truth in the proverb, "A sound mind in a sound body;" yet it is manifest, that there exists by no means such correspondence between the capacity and activity of the soul and the condition of the body, as there must be if the soul has no distinct existence. In this connexion it may be remarked that, if the idea which we oppose were true, it would be a reasonable inference that the soul would repose and decay with the repose and decay of the physical powers. But philosophers have in their dreams solved problems on which they had laboured in vain when awake, and, frequently, when the body is almost worn out with disease the soul has increased vigour.

4. We now refer to the teaching of Scripture on this subject, and it proves, we believe, conclusively the distinct existence of the soul. Matt. x, 28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." If the soul be an attribute or result of the physical organization, having no existence distinct from that of the body, then its destruction would occur, at the same time and by the same means, with that of the body. Then men could kill the soul. 2 Cor. v, 8, "Willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." The apostle here evidently recognises a mode of existence distinct from that of the body. It is said in reply, that in the phrase "the body," he here referred to the Church, which is called "the body of Christ" in 1 Cor. xii, 12-27, and Col. i, 18, 24. But the whole scope of the apostle's argument, from 2 Cor. iv, 10 to v, 9, shows that in the text under consideration he referred to the human body in this world, and to nothing else. The expressions "mortal flesh," (iv, 11,) "outward man," (iv, 16,) and "earthly house of this tabernacle," (v, 1,) certainly do not refer to the Church, 2 Cor. xii, 3, "Whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell." It is plain from this passage that the apostle believed that the soul had an existence distinct from that of the body, otherwise he would have known that he was still "in the body" when "caught up into paradise." We might refer also to Eccles. xii, 7; Micah vi, 7; Luke xxiii, 46; xxiv, 39; Acts ii, 31; vii, 59; xxiii, 8; 2 Cor. iv, 16, and to numerous other passages.

II. We proceed now to show that the soul is conscious between death and the resurrection.

1. The Bible teaches that the dead, both righteous and wicked, are conscious. This has been the nearly universal belief of Christians from the days of the apostles. They who oppose this doctrine refer to a number of passages, contained, with a single exception, in the Old Testament. While we believe that this part of the Bible, equally

with the New Testament, was the work of inspiration, and therefore authoritative, it is evident, we think, that its light is not so full and so clear as that of the New Testament on many subjects, and particularly those which refer to the future state. These were more clearly revealed when Christ "brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." The writers of the Old Testament generally speak of death as to its effects on the physical organization, and its results in relation to the concerns and interests of this world. They speak just as we frequently do of death and the grave. We admonish our fellow-men to work while the day lasts, because the night cometh, and that in the grave there is no knowledge or work; and so did those writers. But neither they nor we, in these expressions, assert anything for or against the unconsciousness of the soul. We do not believe, and we suppose that they did not believe, that the soul is buried with the body in the grave. We thus explain Job xiv, 12; Psa. xlix, 14; cxv, 17; Eccl. ix, 10, and Isa. xxxviii, 18, 19 as referring to physical death, and to the grave as the silent receptacle of the body after the soul has left it.

There are two passages, however, which, in the view of some, may require more extended examination. Psa. cxlvi, 4, "In that very day his thoughts perish," has been regarded by some as containing conclusive proof that the souls of the dead are unconscious. The argument depends entirely on the force of the word "thoughts." It may mean either the act, or the result of thinking. If used here in the former sense, it might favour the idea of the unconsciousness of the soul in the intermediate state, for we can hardly conceive of a conscious intelligent spirit without the act of thought. But the plain sense of the passage is this,—that in the day of a man's death his plans, purposes, and counsels are brought to nothing. The word used in the original fully confirms this explanation. It is *תבנית*, a plural noun derived from the verb *תבן*, "to mould, to forge; and trop. of the mind, which forms or moulds anything by revolving it"—*Gesenius*. The noun means, then, a device or counsel, the result, not the act, of thinking. The passage, therefore, proves nothing on the point in question.

Eccl. ix, 5, "For the dead know not anything," is a text, perhaps, quoted more frequently and with more confidence than any other, by those who deny the consciousness of the soul after the death of the body, but they always stop at the end of this clause. The wise man continues in these words, "neither have they any more a reward." "If the one clause is to have its most obvious import, no good reason can be urged why the other should not. Then we have the late doctrine of Dr. Walsh fully established, that death is the

final and utter end of the wicked,—that for them there is no judgment, no resurrection, no future punishment.”* The concluding clause of the next verse settles the meaning of the whole passage; “neither have they any more a portion forever in anything that is done under the sun.” The passage, if it proves anything in reference to the state of the soul after death, proves too much. It plainly refers to this world, and to the knowledge, interest, and portion which the dead have in its concerns.

The passage in the New Testament referred to above, is Acts ii, 34, “David is not ascended into the heavens.” We do not know that it is necessary to suppose that the souls of the righteous dead, if conscious, have “ascended into the heavens.” They may exist in a state of consciousness elsewhere, which sufficiently answers the argument from this passage.

There seems, then, to be but little, if any support in the Scripture to the idea of our opponents, while in favour of the contrary doctrine there are a number of decisive passages. We quote some of them:—

Matt. xvii, 3, “There appeared Moses and Elias talking with him.” This is explained by the writers under review in two ways. Mr. Z. Campbell says,† “This account furnishes no proof that either Moses or Elias was ever on that mountain. The whole was a vision.” He infers this from the 9th verse, “Tell the vision to no man.” The word *ὄραμα*, here rendered “vision,” might have been rendered “spectacle” or “sight;” and that this would have been the more appropriate rendering is manifest from the account, in Mark ix, 9, of what Christ said to the three disciples, “He charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen.” Mr. Storrs‡ explains the matter thus:—“As to Moses, it seems likely that he was raised from the dead, and hence at the transfiguration the kingdom of God was presented in miniature: Christ in his glory, Elias the representative of all that will be changed without dying, and Moses the representative of all that sleep in death.” This is quite plausible, but an insuperable objection to this view is that it makes Moses “the first-fruits of them that slept,” and “the first-born from the dead.” Mr. Storrs endeavours to surmount this difficulty, by saying, “It is not true, in an absolute sense, that Christ was the first-born from the dead: for Elisha raised the widow’s son. Our Lord also raised several from the dead before his resurrection.” But these cases are entirely irrelevant. It is true that these persons were restored to life, after they had really died; but none of us, not even

* J. Litch, on the Doom of the Wicked.

† “Age of Gospel Light,” p. 22.

‡ Bible Examiner.—The Intermediate State, No. 1, p. 10.

Mr. Storrs, will say that they were instances of the resurrection. They were not instances of that change which will come upon all the dead, and of which Christ's resurrection was truly and "in an absolute sense" the first-fruits, and the pledge. These persons, who were miraculously raised to life, had not received their incorruptible bodies, but were still liable, and in process of time again became subject, to death, and will be, with the rest of mankind, subjects of the resurrection. But Moses, if Mr. Storrs's view is correct,—that he, in the representation of the kingdom of God on Mount Tabor, was the representative of those who should be the subjects of the resurrection,—had been, previously to Christ, properly a subject of the resurrection, had received his "spiritual, glorious body:" then he, not Christ, was "the first-fruits" of them that slept. It is clear, then, that Moses, though his body had not yet been raised from the dead, was conscious at the time of the transfiguration.

v Matt. xxii, 32, "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." It is said that Christ used this expression to prove not the consciousness of the soul after death, but the resurrection of the dead. It is true that Christ designed to teach the resurrection of the dead; but it is equally true that he asserted that those patriarchs, though they had been physically dead for centuries, had, when he was speaking, a conscious existence. This remark of Christ, while it silenced the Sadducees in reference to the resurrection, was also fatal to their notion that a person has no conscious existence after the death of the body, and, without doubt, Christ intended to be so understood.

v The case of the rich man and Lazarus is also in point. Both had died, yet both were conscious, though the resurrection had not occurred, for the five brethren of the rich man were yet alive. It is said that this is a parable. Many commentators have, we think with good reason, considered the account in Luke xvi, 19–31 rather as a narration of what had really occurred. But if it is a parable, and even if, as Mr. Storrs,* in common with the advocates of universal salvation, explains its meaning, it refers to the relative national or moral condition and privileges of the Jews and the Gentiles after the former had rejected the Saviour, still it not merely favours but fully sustains the doctrine of the consciousness of the soul after death. Christ represents a man who had been, during his life, possessed of great wealth, and though not, it may be, immoral or vicious, yet worldly and forgetful of God; also a good man, who had been, during his life, not only deprived of temporal comforts, but

reduced to the most abject penury. He speaks of them both as having died, and as being conscious, the former in misery, and the latter in happiness. Whether he designed to illustrate the influence of present worldliness on the condition of man in the future state, or the past and future relative condition of Jews and Gentiles, it is certain that, in his illustration, he recognised the consciousness of the soul after death, and if this is a false idea, then Christ used falsehood to illustrate truth.

Phil. i, 21, "To die is gain." Mr. Storrs* explains this passage thus:—" 'For to me to live is Christ,' (is to *magnify* Christ,) and to die is 'gain.' 'Gain,' for whom? I answer, '*for Christ*;' for thereby Christ will be magnified even more than by my life." But Paul declares that to himself death would be gain, "*To me*, to live is Christ, and to die is gain." That he refers to himself, and what would be desirable in relation to himself, is evident from the 23d and 24th verses, "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better. Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." The reason of his perplexity, of his being "in a strait betwixt two," was this, that it was for the good of the Church that he should live, but for himself it was more desirable that he should die, and more desirable, because he should then be in a state of conscious existence with Christ. With his burning zeal for Christ, and his ardent love for the Church, he would have much preferred twenty years more of usefulness to the Church and the world to the same period of *unconsciousness*.

Rev. vi, 9-11, "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held: and they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? And white robes were given unto every one of them; and it was said unto them, that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled." In endeavouring to dispose of this passage, which is so conclusively in our favour, Mr. Storrs asks, "Had those souls any conscious being at the time John saw them and heard their cry? So far from it they were not born for several hundred years after John saw them." We certainly cannot see, and we think that it will be difficult for Mr. S. to explain, what his question and answer have to do with the bearing of the text on the point at issue. It does not in the least affect the argument, whether John saw, in his vision, what was then actually taking place, or what should take place after an interval of centuries. Mr. S. proceeds to show that

* Bible Examiner.—The State of the Dead, No. 2.

the scene which John viewed was the persecution of the Christians under the Papacy, and that the cry which he heard was the utterance of their feelings, while they were yet alive, in view of the prolongation of that persecution. But John, in his vision, saw these souls as *having been slain*, as being now *at rest*, and waiting till their brethren *should be slain also*. This is evident from the answer given to them; "that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed *as they were*, should be fulfilled." Mr. S. objects, that "to suppose the feelings expressed, under the fifth seal, by the martyrs were their feelings *after* they left this world, is to suppose that they were *not happy*, if they were *conscious*." We do not see that their words necessarily indicate unhappiness. They imply rather that those who uttered them longed for the judgment-day, when their blood should be avenged on their enemies, and they should be fully rewarded. We doubt not that the conscious souls of the righteous are anticipating with great longings "the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God," while the wicked are waiting for it with gloomy forebodings. There is also some argument for the idea that the soul does not sleep in the dust with the body, in the fact that in the Scripture no mention is made of its resurrection, while there are many references to the resurrection of the body.

2. We have some presumptive argument for the doctrine we advocate, in what is often witnessed at the death of Christians. When the eyes of the body are closed to all earthly objects, and the ear no longer notices the affectionate words of dearest friends, the soul seems to look into the spiritual world, and to hear seraphic music, and, as she flutters awhile on the confines of time, seems to be pluming her wings for flight. Can we suppose that she sinks at once into unconsciousness? The well-known trance of Mr. Tennent affords, at least, matter of serious thought in its bearings upon this subject.

3. It is sometimes objected to this view, that if the righteous exist after death in conscious happiness, and the wicked in conscious misery, then the state of reward and punishment has commenced, and the judgment-day will be useless. We believe that the souls of the righteous, in the intermediate state, are happy, though they have not yet fully received their reward. Paul being now "absent from the body, and present with the Lord," is happy, though he has not yet received the "crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give him at that day." Peter has not yet had "an entrance ministered unto him abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ;" but he

is not, therefore, unconscious or unhappy. So of all who have died in the faith. They have not yet been fully made "partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light," but they are happy. To be free from the cares, and trials, and uncertainty of this probationary state; from the society of wicked men, from their influence and that of the world, the flesh, and the devil; to be absolutely certain that heaven shall be their eternal home; to gaze with purified and greatly increased powers of perception on "the things which God hath prepared for them;" to unite in ascriptions of praise to God and the Lamb, will be happiness far beyond what we can experience in this world, and yet how far short of that fulness of joy which shall be theirs when the Judge shall say, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world!" We believe also that the souls of the wicked in the intermediate state are miserable, though not, in the proper sense of the word, punished, for they have not yet received their sentence. The assurance that the door of hope is closed, that they are forever lost, and the "certain fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation" will be misery. Yet it is not strictly the punishment of their sins. That will not be inflicted until they hear, from the mouth of their Judge, the terrible denunciation, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire." Of the fallen angels, mentioned in Jude 6, Mr. Storrs says, "I suppose it will be admitted by all that the fallen angels are now *tormented*; but *that is not the punishment they are to have for their sins, though it is a consequence of their sins.*" We say the same of the souls of wicked men now in hell, and with as good reasons.

III. Having presented some arguments for the consciousness of the soul between death and the resurrection, we proceed to inquire, Will the souls of both the righteous and the wicked exist forever?

1. It is generally conceded that we cannot, apart from the Scriptures, prove conclusively the immortality of the soul,—neither the metaphysical nor the moral arguments in favour of its immortality amount to demonstration.

But none who believe in the Bible will admit that the soul is essentially indestructible, in such a sense that it exists by a necessity of its own nature. It exists because God created it; and he who created, can, if he will, annihilate it. After all our metaphysical and moral reasoning upon the subject, if it can be shown that the Bible clearly asserts that God will annihilate the souls of the wicked, the question will be entirely settled in the minds of all who believe that it teaches what will be the destiny, in the future state, of the righteous and the wicked.

2. We turn then to the Bible for entire assurance on the great question of the soul's immortality; and here is assurance found. Yet, in the Bible, we think, there is no passage which can be strictly said to declare that all human souls are immortal. Some have supposed that the account of the creation of the soul, given in Gen. ii, 7, contains an intimation of its immortality. If there be in this verse such an intimation, it must be found either in the expression "the Lord God . . . breathed into his nostrils," or in the phrases, "breath of life," and "man became a living soul." If it be in the former phrase, then the idea is that God infused a portion of himself, of his own divinity, into the human body at that time. But few will admit this idea. Most of us think that there is more poetry than truth in the line of one of our hymns: "Our souls are his immortal breath." If the proof is sought in the phrases, "breath of life," and "living soul," these do not prove anything; for both of them are applied, in the first chapters of Genesis, to brutes, and prove the same thing concerning them. Thus the words in Gen. vii, 15, and in Gen. i, 20 rendered *life*, are the same with those rendered in Gen. ii, 7, "*a living soul*."

2 Tim. i, 10 has been thought by some to teach the immortality of all human souls. But the word translated immortality, as well as the scope of the context, shows that it is not the continued existence of all human beings, but the glorified condition of the saints which is referred to. The word here rendered "immortality" is ἀφθαρσία, properly "incorruption," from *a* priv. and φθείρω, to corrupt, which is used and similarly translated also in Rom. ii, 7, where its meaning cannot be questioned. It is used again in 1 Cor. xv, 42, 50, 53, 54, and translated "incorruption," and refers not to the future condition of all men, but to that of the saints; also in Sept., Wisdom ii, 23, and vi, 19, 20. The adjective ἀφθαρτος, from which ἀφθαρσία is derived, is used in several places in the New Testament, referring twice to the Deity, viz. in Rom. i, 23; 1 Tim. i, 17, and in other places to the reward of the righteous, as 1 Cor. ix, 25; 1 Pet. i, 4. Both the noun and the adjective are used in a somewhat modified sense for that which is pure and true—as in Eph. vi, 24, and 1 Pet. i, 23; iii, 4. Robinson, in speaking of this text, (2 Tim. i, 10,) says, that the phrase ζῶν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν is used here by hendiadys for ζῶν ἀφθαρτον, and that it refers to the future life and happiness of the saints. We regard the meaning of the whole passage to be this,—that Christ hath, authoritatively and more clearly than had before been done, revealed the future state of blessedness of the righteous. It is true that the pious of the earlier dispensations "desired a better country, that is, a heavenly," and "had respect unto the recompense of re-

ward;" yet there was needed a clearer and more decisive revelation of this truth, and this text affirms that Christ made such a revelation. The 9th verse plainly speaks of the followers of Christ only, and we think that it is hardly susceptible of proof that the 10th was designed to have any more comprehensive reference.

The only passages in the Bible which clearly teach the endless existence of all human beings, are those which speak of the endless happiness of the righteous and the endless misery of the wicked. If then the Bible does not teach that the punishment of the wicked shall be endless, it does not teach that they shall exist forever, and the question is resolved into this, "Shall the wicked exist forever in misery?" The Bible answers this question, we believe, affirmatively. We examine first those passages which the advocates of annihilation claim as favouring and teaching their views. Their Scripture argument is threefold. 1. That the Bible teaches that immortality is only through Christ—that they who have not faith in him, will not have immortality; 2. That the penalty of Adam's transgression was death, and that death is equivalent to extinction of being; and 3. That many passages of Scripture assert directly that the wicked will be annihilated.

1. It is said, "*that we have proof from various passages in the Bible that the immortality of the soul is only through faith in Christ.*" John x, 28, "I give unto them eternal life." 1 John v, 12, "He that hath the Son hath life," are instances. John iii, 15, 36; v, 40; xx, 31; Rom. vi, 23, and numerous other passages, are to the same purpose. If it is admitted that the phrases "*life*" in some, and "*eternal life*" in other of these passages mean only the existence of the soul forever, the question is settled. But this, the very point to be proved, is assumed by Mr. Storrs. That they mean something else, we shall show hereafter, only remarking here that the "*life*," of which John speaks in his first epistle, is something which the Christian "*hath*" in this world; but Mr. Storrs and others who believe with him understand it as not enjoyed till after the resurrection.* Rom. ii, 7, "Who seek for glory, and honour, and immortality," is also adduced as proof that the immortality of the soul is the portion only of the believer. We remark here that the words "*immortal*" and "*immortality*" are ambiguous. They may refer simply to the existence of the soul as continued forever; and in this sense we say that immortality pertains to all men. These words are also used to signify the freedom of both soul and body from that corruption which is the result of sin. In the latter sense we regard "*immortality*" as the portion only of such as are described in Rom. ii, 7.

* Storrs's Six Sermons, p. 81.

Mr. Storrs regards it as used in the former sense here, as well as in each of the four other passages in the New Testament where the word occurs. In discussing 2 Tim. i, 10, we showed from the etymology and the *usus loquendi* of the word ἀφθαρσία, here (Rom. ii, 7) rendered immortality, that it includes another idea than mere continued existence; and we might have remarked that when they would convey the idea of perpetual existence, the Greek writers, both sacred and profane, use the words ἀθάνατος for "immortal," and ἀθανασία for "immortality;" and avoid the ambiguity of which Mr. Storrs has taken advantage. Instances of this use of ἀθανασία are found in 1 Cor. xv, 53, 54; also in Plato's Phædrus 246, a, and in Lucian's Deorum Dialogi iv, 5. The use of this word in 1 Tim. vi, 16 is the same, and the doctrine of the passage is that Christ, declared in the 15th verse to be "King of kings and Lord of lords," alone hath immortality or perpetual existence, i. e. of himself independently; while angels and men, whether good or bad, received it from him at their creation. Ἀθάνατος is not found in the Bible, but its use is very frequent in the classic writers, and always in this sense of existence continued forever. It is plain, then, that this passage, on which so much stress is laid by the annihilationists, affords them no support.

2. It is said, "*that the penalty of Adam's transgression was 'death,' and that death is equivalent to 'extinction or cessation of being,' or annihilation.*" We remark in reply, that *death* does not mean *extinction or cessation of existence*, but of *life*. The whole force of this part of the Scripture argument of the advocates of annihilation depends upon the confusion of the two ideas, *existence* and *life*. Thus Mr. Storrs says, p. 19, "Die and death primarily signify to come to nothing—the extinction of life;" that is, "*extinction of life*" is the same as "*to come to nothing*" or *annihilation*. In other places he speaks of "*to cease to have existence*" and "*cessation of being*" as equivalent to the term "*death*." All will admit that the penalty of Adam's sin was "*death*;" but the point to be settled is this, Does "*death*" mean "*extinction, or cessation of existence*?" Mr. S. assumes that it does; we deny it. Life and existence are essentially different. Webster gives a good definition of the former; that it is "that state of animals and plants, or of an organized being, in which its natural functions and motions are performed." He defines the latter to be "the state of being." *Death* is the opposite of *life*, not of *existence* or *creation*. The opposite of these two is *annihilation*. As a state it is opposed to existence; as an act, to creation. Then death and annihilation are essentially different. A stone or a clod of earth exists; it has not life. Trees,

beasts, men exist; they may have life. What the essence of life is we do not know; with many of its phenomena we are acquainted. We may describe these phenomena as the performance of certain functions in consequence of an energy or tendency in that which lives. Thus a tree lives when it elaborates sap, puts forth leaves, blossoms, and fruit. When it can no longer do this, it is *dead*, though it has not ceased to *exist*. Death is not, in this case, the cessation of *existence*, but of *life*. The same is true of the life of man. We regard this as twofold, answering to the twofold distinction in our nature, that of body and soul, material and immaterial, physical and spiritual. We speak then of life, as pertaining to the body and to the soul, and the life of each is essentially distinct in functions, phenomena, and the means of extinction. That which affects and even destroys one may not affect the other. The functions of the former are those by which the physical organization is developed, matured, and renovated. The soul includes both mind and spirit, and the life of the soul is either mental or spiritual. As mind it has life, and performs the various functions of thought, emotion, volition, &c. As spirit it has also life with its appropriate functions, among which may be mentioned the appreciation of moral truth and duty, the tendency to love that which is good and pure, and especially to love God supremely, as he is supremely good and pure, the capacity of knowing, loving, serving, and living in communion with God, or rather, perhaps, the development and exercise of that capacity. When the functions of physical life have entirely ceased, the body is dead, though it still exists with all the organs to which those functions pertained. The same is true of spiritual life. When, from any cause, its functions cease, spiritual death ensues, though the soul to which those spiritual functions pertained, still exists and still has mental life. As physical life, when in perfection, is a source and means of physical enjoyment, and as intellectual life affords intellectual enjoyment, so spiritual happiness is the result of spiritual life. God designed that man should be happy in the development and exercise of the functions of spiritual life, and in its absence there can be no spiritual happiness. As man then became spiritually dead, he became miserable, and eternal death, which is only spiritual death continued forever in the future state, will always have, as its result, eternal misery. Eternal life, which is spiritual life continued through the intermediate state, and then after the reunion of the soul with its glorified body, will also have, as its result, eternal happiness. We regard the common statement, which makes eternal life and eternal happiness synonymous, and also eternal death and eternal misery, as inaccurate. The latter, in each case, is the sure result

of the former, so constantly and intimately connected, that they have been frequently confounded.

With these preliminary remarks on the nature of *death*, and particularly of *spiritual death*, which we have considered necessary as preparatory for our further discussion, we now examine the question, What was the penalty inflicted on Adam? The authors under review take the position that it was the loss of "soul-immortality," meaning thereby annihilation. There is not a passage in the Bible which sustains this position. It is claimed, indeed, by Mr. Storrs that the tree of life was the sign and the means of the continued existence of the whole man, both body and soul, and that, being excluded from that tree, he was cut off from immortality—he lost the immortality of both body and soul. That continued existence was, in some sense, dependent on access to the tree of life, seems evident from Gen. iii, 22, "Lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live forever." Archbishop Whately says, "That our first parents would have been exempt from death but for a change introduced into their nature at the fall, is by some persons taken for granted very hastily. The Scripture account in Genesis rather implies the contrary; namely, that they were to be preserved from death by the continual use of a certain medicine (as it may be called) appointed for that purpose,—'the fruit of the tree of life.'"*

The same idea is presented by Watson in his *Institutes*, and in his Sermon on "The Tree of Life." This seems a very probable view of the subject; yet we may regard access to the tree of life as of higher import, and as conferring benefits greater than this, in connexion with the life of the soul, not as the means of its continued existence, but as Watson says, in his sermon on The Tree of Life, "It was not only the means of sustaining the immortality of the body, but the pledge of spiritual life here, and of a higher and more glorious life in a future state to which man might pass, not, indeed, by death, but by translation." Excluded from the tree of life, Adam became the subject of physical death, and was cut off from the pledge and hope of that higher spiritual life in this and the future state. The latter was restored to him in the promised "Seed of the woman." If this be the import of the tree of life, and the effect of exclusion from it, there is in it no support for the idea of Mr. Storrs.

We object, also, that the penalty of the law could not have been annihilation, because that penalty was not, in any sense or degree, inflicted on Adam "in the day" of his sin. The denunciation, the penalty was, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Mr. Storrs thinks that he finds relief from the pressure of

* Scripture Revelations of the Future State.

this objection in the idiomatic form of expression used in the original. He says, "The penalty was not, 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou *shalt surely die*,' but as the Hebrew language has it, 'dying thou shalt die.' That very day the whole man commenced dying." Those who are but slightly acquainted with the Hebrew idiom, very well know that our version conveys precisely the meaning of the original, and Mr. Storrs's attempt to answer this objection entirely fails. The expression in the Hebrew is מָוֶת תָּמוּתָּ, the inf. abs. with fut. kal denoting certainty.* The same phrase is used by God to Abimelech, in Gen. xx, 7; by Saul to Jonathan, 1 Sam. xiv, 44; by Saul to Ahimelech, 1 Sam. xxii, 16; by Solomon to Shimei, 1 Kings ii, 37, 42,—in each of which cases it is manifest that certain and not lingering death was threatened.

We proceed to state in what, according to our view, the penalty inflicted on Adam consisted. It was in physical and spiritual death, the former affecting the body, the latter the soul as spirit; not annihilation in either case, but a cessation of their appropriate functions. First, Physical death. As we have said, we do not see why the body of Adam, constituted as our bodies now are, though not diseased, would not, even without the violation of a single natural law, in process of time have worn out, have died, but for the renovating power of the tree of life. Access to that tree having been cut off, Adam's assurance of continued physical life was destroyed. From being possessed of a perfectly healthful and vigorous physical system and the means of its perpetual renovation, he became the subject of disease and death. Physical death, then, came upon our race in view of Adam's sin, and we may regard it as a part of the penalty, though it was not at once fully inflicted. God, in his infinite love, delayed the complete infliction of this part of the penalty to give to Adam an opportunity for repentance. Adam, doubtless, understood the denunciation of the penalty to refer to physical death, and Paul teaches the same thing in 1 Cor. xv, 20, 22, where the statement in the 20th verse, that Christ is "become the first-fruits of them that slept," is conclusive proof that the death referred to in the 22d verse, "as in Adam all die," is physical death; else Christ was the subject of spiritual death and a spiritual resurrection, that is, of depravity and the new-birth. The other, and, as we believe, the chief part of the penalty, that which affected the soul, was inflicted in the day and at the very moment of Adam's sin. Some call this "original sin;" others, "native depravity;" we have called it "spiritual death." This Adam suffered in the day of his transgression. The functions of spiritual life at once ceased; his soul was at once alienated from

* Nordheimer's Heb. Gr., vol. ii, p. 200, and Stuart's Heb. Gr., p. 206.

God. This condition he transmitted to his posterity, so that his first-born was a fratricide, and within nine generations all his descendants, then on the earth, with the exception of a single family, had become so wicked that they were destroyed by the flood. In this transmitted tendency we find the only explanation of the manifest fact that young children exhibit, not perversity only, but depravity long before they can understand the nature or the results of their conduct. This death may be continued forever, and eternal death is not, then, impossible, though there be a continued conscious existence of the soul. It is an eternal alienation from God, an eternal cessation or absence of spiritual life. That alienation from God and an utter want of spiritual life was endured by Adam, and that it is the state of all who have not been quickened to new life by the instrumentality of the gospel and the agency of the Holy Ghost, is plainly taught in the Bible. Rom. v, 15, "If through the offence of one many be dead." 2 Cor. v, 14, "If one died for all, then were all dead." Col. ii, 13, "You, being dead in your sins, hath he quickened." So also Rom. v, 17; viii, 6; Ephes. ii, 1; v, 14; 1 Tim. v, 6; 1 John iii, 14; Jude 12, &c. The life which Christ came to bestow in this world and in the future world, is the opposite of spiritual death, and is referred to in the following among other passages. Rom. vi, 13, "As those that are alive from the dead." 1 John iii, 14, "We have passed from death unto life." 1 John v, 12, "He that hath the Son hath life." John v, 24, "Is passed from death unto life." That this is not a merely relative change in the prospects of the person who is its subject, as Mr. Storrs seems to argue,* but an absolute change in his present condition in respect to his feelings and tendencies, including, it is true, a change in his prospects, is evident, not only from the scope of the passages quoted, but from the experience of every converted man. We might refer to numerous other passages, which, by direct assertion or plain implication, teach that the life which was obtained for us by the death of Christ, and made ours through faith in him, is not the immortality of the soul, but a restoration to spiritual life in this world.

3. Our opponents claim that *many passages in the Bible teach the final annihilation of the wicked*, and we claim that many passages teach their endless punishment. These two ideas are plainly contradictory, and cannot both be taught in the Bible. We shall candidly, and with an earnest desire not to pervert or misinterpret any declaration of the word of God, examine both sets of passages, remarking here, that it will be important to distinguish between those which are designed to state definitely what the punishment of the

wicked shall be in the future world, and those which speak only in general terms of the destructive consequences of sin; and that, as we said above, while we regard the Old Testament as authority on this and other points of doctrine, we regard the teaching of the New Testament as clearer and more decisive. We notice, first, those passages which our opponents claim as favourable to their view.

They quote about thirty passages. Most of them speak of the fate of the sinner as "death," "destruction," "perishing," &c. Thus: Rom. i, 32, "They that commit such things are worthy of death." Acts iii, 23, "Every soul that will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people." 2Pet. ii, 12, "These shall utterly perish" (original, "shall be utterly corrupted") "in their own corruption." It is plain that the two last quoted, and a large number of other passages which speak of the "destruction" and the "perishing" of the wicked, mean nothing more than the death of the wicked. The same terms are used in reference to the righteous, as Isa. lvii, 1, "The righteous perisheth." Acts ix, 21, "Is not this he" (speaking of Saul) "that destroyed them which called on this name at Jerusalem?" Also Eccles. vii, 15; Ps. lxix, 4; Job ix, 22; Luke xi, 51; xix, 47. These phrases either do not prove the annihilation of the wicked in the passages in which they are spoken of, or they do prove also the annihilation of the righteous in the passages in which they are referred to. It is plain, then, that they mean simply "death," and refer in some cases to physical death, and in some cases to spiritual and eternal death—the death of the soul, which, as we have showed, is not annihilation. The passages which use these terms, in speaking of the punishment of the wicked, include nearly all that are relied on to sustain the doctrine of annihilation, and prove nothing in reference to the duration of the punishment of the wicked. There are, however, a few passages which deserve special notice, as the form of expression used in them is somewhat stronger than those just examined. It is said of the wicked, in Ps. civ, 35, "Let the wicked be no more;" in Ps. xxxvii, 10, "Yet a little while, and the wicked shall not be;" and in Job vi, 18, "They go to nothing and perish." These expressions are equivalent to death, and refer each of them to the end of the earthly existence, as an examination of the passages will satisfy any candid inquirer. If they teach the annihilation of the wicked at all, they teach that it will take place when they leave this world, and therefore exclude the idea of the resurrection and the judgment, and prove too much, even for our opponents. Ps. xevii, 3, "A fire goeth before him, and burneth up his enemies round about." Much stress is laid upon the phrase, "burneth up," as meaning complete annihilation. The psalmist is

here depicting what was then occurring, whereas the annihilation of the wicked, according to those who teach it, will not take place till the end of the world. The first three verses of this psalm are a highly poetic description of the destruction of God's enemies from the earth. The same remark is applicable to *Psa. xxxvii, 20*, which is another passage on which they very much rely. *Obad. 16*, "They [the heathen] shall be as though they had not been." To understand any prophecy we must consider its scope or design. The prophecy of Obadiah was delivered on account of the tyranny of the Edomites over the Jews, and in this verse it is said that the heathen should do the same against Edom, that Edom had done against Judah. This was accomplished a few years after, when the Babylonians, under Nebuchadnezzar, ravaged Idumea. In this verse it is prophesied of the Babylonians, who are meant by "the heathen," that they should be destroyed, not as individuals, but that nationally they should cease to exist—should "be as though they had not been." The same thing is prophesied against Edom in the 18th verse, "There shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau." It is plain that in these two verses there is no reference whatever to the future condition either of the Babylonians or of the Edomites as individuals, but to their utter extinction as nations; and in this sense the prediction has long since been fulfilled. The last passage is contained in *Mal. iv, 1*, "The day that cometh shall burn them up." This passage, doubtless, refers to the day of judgment; and if it teaches the annihilation of the wicked, it teaches also that their annihilation will take place on that day,—*"the day shall burn them up."* But our opponents admit that all the wicked will exist and suffer a period of time, after the day of judgment, more or less prolonged, according to their demerit. This passage, we think, teaches only that the punishment of the wicked—here, as frequently elsewhere in the Bible, represented figuratively by fire—will commence on the day of judgment, but does not teach anything concerning the duration of that punishment. Reference to the Hebrew corroborates this view of the meaning of the phrase "burn up." The word so translated here is *פָּהַל*, *pihel*, from *פָּהַל*, which, in the *pihel* species, according to Gesenius, means "to make burn or kindle." The same verb is used in the same species in *Psa. cvi, 18*, where it is said, "The flame burnt up the wicked," meaning Dathan, Abiram, and their company, upon whom fire from the Lord kindled. *Numb. xvi, 35*. They were not at that time annihilated, yet this text says that they were "burnt up." The same verb is used, and in the same species also, in *Psa. xcvi, 3*, already examined. Each of these passages teaches only that fire shall *kindle* upon the wicked.

We now turn to the passages which teach that the wicked shall exist forever, and endure punishment forever. There are many, both in the Old and the New Testament, which are, in our view, clear on this point. We shall discuss only those which seem to us to be decisive, and to admit of no other meaning. Matt. xxv, 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." It is said, by our opponents, that "*everlasting*" is frequently used in the Scriptures for that which has an end, and two phrases are quoted,—"*the everlasting hills*," Gen. xlix, 26; and "*the everlasting mountains*," Hab. iii, 6. Both of these will be found, by examination, to be parts of highly poetic descriptions; and the figurative use of this word, in such a connexion, is no argument against its literal use in the simple and direct statement of the punishment of the wicked as given by our Saviour. There are a number of other passages in the Old Testament in which the same word is used for that which will endure for a great length of time, but not strictly forever. The derivation of the word עוֹלָם, rendered in these passages "*everlasting*," indicates that its primitive meaning is rather "*a hidden or indefinite period of time*." It is from the verb עָלַם, "*to hide, to conceal*," and it might, even without a figurative meaning, be applied to things enduring for an indefinitely long period. The word αἰώνιος is never, we think, used in the Greek of the New Testament for that which is not absolutely eternal. The only passage in which we have any doubt, in reference to its meaning, is Rom. xvi, 25, where χρόνους αἰώνιους is translated "*since the world began*." It might have been rendered "*from eternity*," and the sense of the whole passage would be as well sustained as with the present rendering. There are more than fifty passages in the New Testament in which this word is used, and in our version translated "*everlasting*" or "*eternal*," in which no one will dispute that its meaning is absolute perpetuity. There are five passages which are pled as instances in which these words are used for that which has an end. Rev. xiv, 6, "*The everlasting gospel*." We see no impropriety in applying this epithet, in its full force, to the gospel, as its doctrines will be forever true, its hopes and promises, as well as its denunciations, will be forever realized. Mark iii, 29 speaks of "*eternal damnation*;" Heb. v, 9, of "*eternal salvation*;" and Heb. ix, 12, of "*eternal redemption*." It is said that *damnation*, *salvation*, and *redemption* are *acts*, and, as such, must have an end. These words may, indeed, refer to *acts*, which have an end, but, even in this sense, the epithet eternal would not be inappropriate, as their results will continue forever. But these words may also mean *states of being*, and are so used in the Scriptures; as such they may be continued forever.

The remaining passage is Heb. vi, 2, where "eternal judgment" is spoken of. It is said that *judgment* is completed on the great day, and therefore cannot be eternal in the sense of endless duration. If the word *judgment* is to be here referred to the act of judgment, the epithet *eternal*, in its strict sense, would not be inappropriate, as the results of that act will be forever experienced. But the word *judgment* is used, in the Scriptures and elsewhere, for the infliction of judgment, and is then equivalent to punishment, e. g. Gal. v, 10. The word *κρίμα*, here rendered *judgment*, is often translated damnation, and condemnation, in some cases implying, and in others directly referring to, punishment. There is no doubt that it may be taken in this sense here, and the rendering might with propriety have been everlasting punishment. This verse, then, is not an exception to the ordinary use, and that for which we contend, of the word *αἰώνιος*, but an instance of it, and is in our favour. In these five passages, then, as well as in more than fifty others which are undisputed, "eternal" and "everlasting" mean that which has no end. If this text (Matt. xxv, 46) is an exception, it is the only exception. Again: it is contrary to all fair principles of interpretation that a word should be used in the same sentence, and in contrasting the destinies of two classes of persons, in one case implying duration really endless, and, in the other, duration not really endless, without some intimation that the meaning of the word, in the two clauses, is not the same. These considerations are to us conclusive, and Mr. Dobney* feels the force of them, for he says, (pp. 213, 214,) "Let it be cheerfully granted, then, that the word everlasting must, in each part of this text, be understood in its largest, widest sense, as denoting an absolute eternity. Let this be conceded. And I not only concede it—I affirm it and believe it." But he reconciles it with his doctrine of annihilation in this way. He first claims that "this text is perpetually misquoted. Our Lord is represented as saying, 'These shall go away into everlasting misery,' (or torment;) whereas he says nothing of the kind. I affirm as strongly as any man that the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment; but then I deem it my duty to say, as our Lord said, 'punishment.' I have not the presumption to correct *his phraseology* in order to harmonize it with my notions. But orthodoxy does this. And it is only by substituting 'misery' or 'torment' for 'punishment,' that this text can be made to support the popular doctrine." One would think, from reading the above passage, that Christ spoke the English language, for "punishment" is said to be "*his phraseology*." Is Mr. D. ignorant of the fact that "punishment" is only a secondary

* An English advocate of the doctrine of annihilation.

meaning of the word *κόλασις*; and that suffering, or torment, comes nearer to its primitive meaning, which is "cutting or pruning," from *κολάζω*, "to mutilate, to prune;" and that the same word is rendered torment in 1 John iv, 18, "Because fear hath torment?" Having shown, as he thinks, (but incorrectly,) that everlasting punishment, and not torment, is referred to, he proceeds to prove that there may be everlasting punishment where there is not even everlasting consciousness, as follows: "It must also be allowed that in case God should really destroy the incorrigible, literally destroy them, so that they forever cease to be, this infliction of death would be punishment. * * * * And then surely a complete, and final, and irretrievable destruction, a destruction which is forever, is to all intents an everlasting destruction. And so everlasting destruction would be everlasting punishment." (P. 215.) We answer, that so far from such a destruction as Mr. D. speaks of—namely, a blotting out of existence, the putting an end to all thought, and feeling, and consciousness—being a punishment, it would be a release from punishment. Such a destruction would be an unspeakable boon to the angels now "reserved in everlasting chains under darkness," and to wicked men, at any stage of their suffering in hell; whether before or after the judgment-day. Were self-destruction possible, they would avail themselves of it at once. We utterly deny the propriety of the use of the term everlasting in such a case; for certainly that punishment from which there is escape, either by a change of condition or by a cessation of existence, has an end—it is not everlasting. This passage, then, is we think, conclusive, and did no other declaration of the word of God unequivocally teach the endless punishment of the wicked, we might rest the doctrine on this single text.

Mark iii, 29, "Is in danger of eternal damnation;" and Heb. vi, 2, "Eternal judgment," punishment, have been already noticed, and are clear proofs.

Matthew xxv, 41, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." What this fire is we learn from Rev. xx, 10, "And the devil, that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and ever." It is said that the beast and false prophet are symbolical beings, and therefore the lake of fire and brimstone are symbolical, and have no real existence. This may be; and it is not of the least consequence to our argument whether the fire and brimstone are literal or not. If symbolical, they symbolize suffering, and that continued *forever and ever*, which expression is never used for any thing less than endless duration.

Mark ix, 48, 49, "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched. For every one shall be salted with fire." In answering the argument from this passage one says,—these are figurative expressions. We admit that there are used here vivid figures; but figures are designed to convey ideas, and the idea illustrated by these is clearly eternal suffering. This is clear from the parallel passage in Matthew xviii, 8, where the expression is "everlasting fire." Another says that the fire shall not be quenched till the object cast into it is consumed. But this is adding to the word of God, and comes not very appropriately from those who claim to be literalists, and who object so strongly to any departure in others from the literal statement of the Scripture, or addition to it. The 49th verse plainly shows that those cast into the unquenchable fire will be, not consumed by it, but preserved in it. "For every one shall be salted with fire, and [or even as] every sacrifice shall be salted with salt." As flesh, designed for sacrifices, is to be salted to preserve it from putrefaction, so "every one shall be salted [that is, preserved] with fire."

2 Thess. i, 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord." Mr. Storrs explains this passage thus, (speaking of sinners,)—"Too filthy to be in the sight of a holy God, as they eternally must be if immortal, he destroys them out of his presence, purifies his universe from the filth of sin and sinners." He considers the phrase "the presence of the Lord," as used in its widest sense, viz., that of ubiquity. Mr. Dobney, commenting on the same passage, shows very conclusively that it is not to be taken thus:—"The phrase, 'the presence of the Lord,' was a very ancient one; as was also another and often equivalent one, 'the glory of the Lord,' by which was generally meant that bright luminous cloud of overwhelming splendour which we commonly call the 'Shekinah,' the well-known *symbol of the divine presence*. Sometimes fire is represented as coming forth from this 'presence of the Lord,' or from 'the glory,' either to consume the sacrifice, as in Lev. ix, 23, 24, or to punish the guilty, as in Lev. x, 2; Numb. xvi, 19-35. Remembering, then, the manner in which the Jewish writers used these two phrases, we see with what perfect propriety the apostle could use the peculiar language of the text, to denote that the destruction of the ungodly would be caused by an all-devouring agency, proceeding forth from the Judge, who comes with the 'glory' of the Father." The literal rendering of the original, we think, shows that "the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power" is referred to, as it shall be displayed on the judgment-day. The original is "Οἵτινες δίκην τίσουσιν, ὀλεθρον αἰώνιον, ἀπὸ

προσώπου τοῦ Κυρίου," &c., and we translate it thus, "Who shall suffer [literally, "pay"] the penalty, eternal ruin, from the presence of the Lord," &c. The 10th verse shows that this event is to take place on the judgment-day. It cannot, then, be the annihilation of the wicked, even according to Mr. Storrs, who thinks that the wicked will be annihilated at different periods, more or less remote from the judgment-day, in proportion to the heinousness of their sins. Mr. Dobney attempts, in connexion of this verse, as in reference to Matt. xxv, 46, to reconcile annihilation with everlasting destruction and punishment,—but unsatisfactorily, as we have shown.

Psa. xlix, 8; Isa. xxxiii, 14; Jer. xvii, 4; Dan. xii, 2, and numerous passages from the New Testament, in addition to those already examined, might be discussed in their bearings upon this subject. But our limits will not permit this, and the passages above commented on are conclusive.

The points discussed in this paper are exciting much interest in some parts of the country. The views of the writers noticed have been embraced and promulged by a large number of persons who have been very zealous in disseminating them, and with considerable success. They refer constantly and, often, very plausibly to the Scriptures, in sustaining their views, and it has seemed to us desirable that all who believe in the doctrines of the gospel as of the highest importance in their influence on human conduct and destiny, should be prepared to meet these men, particularly on the Scriptural ground of those doctrines. If the thoughts and arguments contained in this paper shall be of service to any in giving direction or assistance in their inquiries, it will have accomplished its purpose. It might have been well to have enlarged on some points, and to have developed more fully several of the arguments; but it has been our wish to present in one view, and within the limits of a single article, the truths of the consciousness of the dead in the intermediate state, and the eternal existence of all human beings after the judgment-day. These points are so connected, that such a presentation seemed desirable. We have accordingly suggested the course of argument which, in our view, will be most effective, with the hope that we may at least assist the investigations of those interested in these subjects.

ART. VI.—HUNGARY AND KOSSUTH.

Hungary and Kossuth: or, an American Exposition of the late Hungarian Revolution.

By REV. B. F. TEFFT, D. D. 12mo., pp. 378. Philadelphia and New-Orleans: John Ball. 1852.

THOUGH the author of this book observes in his preface, that "it is not intended to be either a history of Hungary, or a biography of Kossuth," yet its title is not calculated to excite more curiosity than its contents will gratify. With the exception, perhaps, of the interior of Africa, Paraguay under the rule of Dr. Francia, or the empire of Japan, but few countries were less known to the world than Hungary before her recent struggle for freedom. With an enslaved press, and beleaguered about by a circumvallation of despotism nearly a thousand miles broad, her sighings for freedom were unheard, and her sufferings comparatively unknown. But in her recent conflict the tread of armies shook the continent; and when Hungary, solitary and alone, set the battle in array against the combined energies of European despotism, the jar of the collision roused the nations and challenged the attention of the world.

It is not wonderful, however, that the merits of this Hungarian movement have not been well or generally understood. A rigid censorship of the press within the Austrian dominions, and the anti-liberal instincts of neighbouring nations, with the labours of hireling pens in England, if not in America, have combined to suppress the truth, and give currency to the absurd charge, that the Hungarian revolution was a war of races, originating in the desire of the Magyars to usurp the supremacy and oppress, if not enslave, the other tribes. The luminous pages of Dr. Tefft expose this stale slander, and show it to be an invention of Austrian manufacture. Before proceeding with an examination of the work itself, it is due to the author to state, that it is not a hastily-prepared production, written with the hope that it might float into public favour upon the current of Kossuth's personal popularity, but the result of patient and laborious research, commenced in 1842, and continued for several years; and that the book was in press before it was known that the world-renowned Magyar would visit this country. We shall now proceed to give a summary of its contents.

Hungary and Transylvania were the Pannonia and Dacia of the ancients. The original inhabitants were probably the old Cimmerians mentioned in Greek and Latin fables. Posidonius makes them of Cimbric or German origin. About the year 640 before

Christ a Scythian tribe conquered Dacia, the present Transylvania, and dispossessed the vanquished people. The conquerors, in turn, were themselves subdued by the Sarmatians, about the middle of the first century of the Christian era. Pannonia, the present Hungary, was then a Roman province, having been subdued by Tiberius in the reign of the emperor Augustus; and the wild Sarmatians, flushed with recent conquest, soon pushed their incursions within the territories of Rome, when, coming in contact with the disciplined legions of the empire, they were driven back with great slaughter. The war was prosecuted at intervals with varying success for fifty years, until, at the beginning of the second century, the emperor Trajan achieved a final conquest of the country, and Dacia became a Roman province.

For a hundred and fifty years the wealth and taste of the empire were lavished upon this new possession, and fortifications were built, cities founded, roads made, and bridges erected, in so substantial a manner that their remains are still visible to the modern traveller. At this period the Goths, another race of barbarians, issuing from the vast plains beyond the Vistula, and along the shores of the Baltic, appeared on the borders of Dacia and Pannonia. Attracted by the evidences of wealth and luxury spread out before them, they swept down from the slopes of the Carpathians, and entering Dacia with chivalrous gallantry, encountered and overwhelmed the enervated legions of Rome, and this beautiful province was thenceforth as a jewel shorn from the diadem of the Cæsars. A century and a quarter terminated the reign of the Goths, who were vanquished by the Huns, a hideous race, born on the confines of far-distant China, where they had established an empire whose history can be traced backwards for fourteen centuries. Before the military prowess of these fierce Tartar hordes, the throne of China had trembled, and the terror of their arms had spread from the Yellow Sea to the confines of Europe. Overmatched at length by the policy and strength of the Chinese monarchs, the Tartar empire fell, a part of the people remaining the subjects of China, while the more independent and brave seized their arms and began a long and perilous emigration to the west. Before reaching a desirable place of settlement, this multitude separated into two divisions, one of which halted on the banks of the Upper Volga, while the other settled on the fruitful plains of Sogdiana, between the Aral and the Caspian, where, under the name of Magyars, they resided for more than five hundred years, and through a politic amalgamation with the Caucasian tribes around them, lost most of their Tartar characteristics, and assumed the appearance and manners of the European races.

Meanwhile the first division of the emigrating Tartars, dissatisfied with the sterility of their country, again took up the line of march in search of a milder climate and more generous soil. They finally reached the Carpathians, and under the leadership of the brave Rugilas, and afterwards of the renowned Attila, rushed through the mountain passes to the easy conquest of the Goths, and fixed by their complete success the name of Hungary upon the conquered country.

After the separation of the great body of the emigrating Tartars, the two divisions entirely lost sight of each other for more than five centuries. In the interim, the Magyars of the Caspian had grown numerous and powerful, while their brethren of Hungary had undergone many misfortunes, by which their power had been completely broken. Towards the close of the ninth century, the Magyars sent out a colony to the west, to explore the country and seek a more desirable theatre of action for the nation. This colony reached the Carpathians, and crossing into Hungary found themselves opposed by a mixed race of people made up of unknown tribes who came out to dispute their progress. They had reached the land of their kindred, but their relationship could not be discovered. The contest that ensued was of short duration;—the Magyar valour was invincible, and Huns, Goths, Sarmatians, and Scythians, under the general name of Slaves, submitted to their sway, and the Magyar rule commenced in Hungary. From that period the Magyar has been the ruling race in Hungary; and the present people of that name are the descendants of the emigrants from the Caspian, and remotely from the northern frontiers of China.

The Magyars have always been passionately attached to civil liberty, and when they were about to set out in search of a new home, a general assembly of the people was called, in which the political wants of the nation were discussed, and a constitution adopted containing the essential elements of republicanism. They also elected a head chief or commander, styled Oberhaupt or Duke; and under the command of Almos they set out upon their wanderings. Like Moses, Almos was not permitted to enter the promised land, but Arpad, his son and successor, led the Magyar host in its attack upon Hungary, and after the conquest divided the land among his followers. Arpad, and three of his successors, ruled over a prosperous and happy people, and during this period no essential changes were made in the Hungarian constitution; but the renowned St. Stephen, who succeeded, having become a convert to Christianity, was persuaded by the pope to usurp the regal title. The new convert listened to the advice of the infallible successor of St. Peter, and against the violent opposition of his pagan subjects he commenced and com-

pleted a thorough revision of the Hungarian constitution. Still the monarchy established by Stephen, though hereditary, was a limited one, in which the prerogatives of the crown and the rights of the subject were strictly and clearly defined.

The first connexion of the house of Hapsburg with the Hungarian government, occurred toward the close of the 13th century, when Andrew the Third, of Hungary, married Agnes, the daughter of Albert and granddaughter of the celebrated Rodolph. Andrew was the last male representative of the house of Almos, and in his death, at the beginning of the 14th century, the dynasty of Almos became extinct. Charles Robert, duke of Anjou, who was grandson, on the female side, of a predecessor of Andrew, was elevated to the throne. He was followed by eight successors, who traced their descent in precisely the same way from the line of Hungarian kings. His granddaughter Maria, who succeeded her father Louis the Great, married Sigismund of Germany, who became, in right of his wife, King of Hungary, and by election Emperor of Germany. Elizabeth, daughter of Sigismund and Maria, married Albert of Austria, who was elected King of Hungary in right of his wife, and afterwards made Emperor of Germany.

Matthias Corvinus, elevated to the throne in 1457, was the first of the Hungarian kings who had no connexion with the line of her ancient sovereigns. Uladislaus, the second of that name, succeeded Matthias, and toward the close of his life connected his country to the house of Hapsburg by a double union. He married his son to Maria, and his daughter to Ferdinand, the grandchildren of Maximilian of Austria, and thus prepared the way for the subjugation of his country. His son Louis II., husband of Maria, who succeeded, having been killed in battle, in 1525, Ferdinand, the husband of his sister, laid claim to the vacant throne; but the Hungarian national assembly, which had strongly opposed the matrimonial alliance with Austria, refused to acknowledge his claims, and elevated John Zapolya to the throne by a unanimous election. The pretensions of Ferdinand were not, however, to be so easily set aside. The widow of the late king was his sister, and Charles V., Emperor of Germany, was his brother, and both were disposed, and the latter quite able, to give him efficient support. Ferdinand invaded Hungary, defeated Zapolya in a decisive battle, and was elected and acknowledged king. A long and bloody war succeeded between the rival monarchs, which ended in a treaty, styled the "peace of Grosswardcin," by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease, and that the country should be divided between them, Ferdinand ruling in the west, and Zapolya in the east, of Hungary. It was also agreed that

should Zapolya die during the armistice, he should be succeeded by his son Sigismund. Zapolya died in 1540, and Ferdinand in 1564, leaving the western division of the country to his son, and acknowledging the right of Sigismund to the eastern part. Old causes of contention were revived, and long years of strife and bloodshed followed. Thousands of the best citizens of Hungary, who had risen to defend their constitutional liberties, were slaughtered in a war of extermination, until finally Leopold I., toward the close of the 16th century, compelled the trembling diet to proclaim his son Joseph *hereditary* King of Hungary. The brutal and infamous means employed to crush the nation and accomplish this end exceed in savage barbarity the bloodiest acts of the buccaneers of the Spanish Main. A stern determination to crush, by any means, the Hungarian people, and blot out, if possible, even the remembrance of their constitution, was visible in the policy of the Austrian cabinet until the reign of Ferdinand II. In the mean time Luther had lighted the torch of the Reformation, and the doctrines proclaimed by him and his coadjutors had found an eager welcome among the Magyars of Hungary, and a new element was thus added to the causes of contention that had so long agitated and distressed this unhappy country. During this reign Rome commenced against the doomed Magyars one of the bloodiest persecutions recorded in the annals of Protestantism. The gloomy and relentless Ferdinand let loose all the hellish machinery of Jesuitism and the unbridled cruelty and licentiousness of a mercenary soldiery upon the helpless Protestants of Hungary. Devastation, ruin, despair, and death filled the land. Long-suffering finally came to an end, and once more the Magyar spirit was in a flame; seizing their arms in their fierce indignation they dashed like the resistless avalanche upon the imperial armies, overwhelmed and drove them beyond the frontiers of the kingdom. The thoroughly-aroused Hungarians halted not until they reached Vienna, where they encountered the Austrian commander-in-chief, and vanquished his army under the walls of that city. The national assembly having been convened, solemnly proceeded to depose Ferdinand, who they declared had forfeited all pretensions to the throne by violating his coronation oath and trampling upon their constitution. By equally-solemn action, the vacancy occasioned by the deposition of Ferdinand was filled by the election of Gabriel Bethlen to the throne, who for nine years was acknowledged and obeyed as their legal sovereign. Upon the death of Bethlen, in 1629, the suffrages of the nation bestowed the crown of St. Stephen upon George Rákoczy. Thus was the line of the Hapsburg succession broken by the lawful authority of the

people. No sooner had the Hungarian army retired from Vienna, than Ferdinand began to devise means to recover his lost power. Satisfied of his own inability to reconquer Hungary, he sent a petition to the King of Spain, in which he assured his Catholic majesty that the conflict with Hungary was a holy war, undertaken and prosecuted for the honour of the true faith, and for the suppression of heresy, and concluded by begging assistance in men and money. The Spanish king embarked heartily in his cause, and the solicited assistance was granted; but the Hungarians were so well united, and showed so stern a countenance, that Ferdinand prudently acknowledged the new sovereign, and concluded with him a truce for twenty years. During the "Thirty years' war" Austria found herself occupied with concerns of even deeper moment than the subjugation of Hungary, and the Magyars, comparatively unmolested, were suffered to maintain their independence; but the peace of Westphalia again secured to the emperor the possession of this much-coveted country. The Jesuits again commenced their machinations against the Protestant portion of the population, employing but too successfully all their influence to induce the emperor to relight the fires of persecution in Hungary. The frightful scenes of other years were renewed, until the patience of the people was exhausted and an abortive effort made to throw off the yoke of Austria. The outbreak was charged by the Jesuits upon the Protestant teachers, and the whole weight of Austrian indignation was felt by this class. Churches and school-houses were pulled down by soldiers aided by Popish mobs, and two hundred and fifty Protestant clergymen were sold as galley slaves to the government of Naples at fifty crowns apiece.

Once more the Hungarians rose upon their persecutors, and under the conduct of Emeric Tökölyi, both a statesman and a soldier, succeeded in driving the Austrians from the land. Again the thunder of Hungarian cannon was heard in Vienna, and at the gates of that city, vanquished and craven Austria granted to Hungary all that she demanded. The emperor relinquished his pretended hereditary right to the throne, published a general amnesty, and, in a word, did anything and everything his Hungarian subjects desired. His reward was a truce of six months granted him by the brave Tökölyi. During the continuance of this truce, the emperor sent a secret envoy to the Turks to beg assistance, a whining petition for the same purpose to the German empire, and still an ambassador to Poland with the same object in view; and then despairing of relief fled from his own court. His intrigues, however, were not in vain. Sobieski, King of Poland, the greatest general of his age, deceived by his lying representations, came to his aid; and the Turks, for a reward,

treacherously siezed Tökölyi, and sent him in chains to Constantinople. The revolution was suppressed, and Hungary again a fettered captive.

The latest effort of Hungary to throw off the Austrian yoke previous to the recent revolution, occurred in the early part of the 18th century. Its specific object was to oppose the claim maintained by Leopold I. of hereditary right to the crown. The leader in this movement was Francis Leopold Rákoczy, the history of whose achievements possesses all the charms of romance. A profound statesman, a gallant soldier, a brilliant and persuasive orator, forced to seek assistance for his bleeding country in foreign lands—returning again to renew the conflict,—his whole history has been so accurately reproduced in that of Kossuth, that the Austrians themselves have compared the latter to the former. The same lofty integrity, the same far-seeing statesmanship, the same passionate and undying devotion to Hungary, the same burning zeal in her cause that characterize the noble Kossuth, marked the character of the earlier patriot.

The effort of the chivalrous Rákoczy, though for a time splendidly successful, issued in disaster and ruin, and a night of gloom gathered over the Magyar land to be disturbed only in our own times.

From the connexion of the house of Hapsburg with Hungary, the leading object of Austria appears to have been the utter extinction of the Magyar nationality. This is transparent in her policy for successive centuries. The civil and religious privileges of the Hungarians were first destroyed, then an exterminating warfare was waged against their language and national manners and customs. The use of the Hungarian language was prohibited in legal assemblies and courts of justice, and even mechanics and peasants, who were acquainted with no other tongue, were made liable to extraordinary penalties for employing it even in their own families or in the ordinary transaction of business: so that literally a large proportion of the people were condemned to be mute, or employ the language of signs. The dress of the people, from the magnate to the peasant, was made the subject of frequent imperial edicts, and to turn down the shirt collar, to wear the Hungarian frock coat, or the Magyar *kalpag*, or native cap, was made a crime, to be punished by the judges with penalties usually enforced against heinous or capital offences.

By the constitution her diet or national assembly was the source of all law to Hungary. It was the prerogative of the crown to summon this body, but the law required that it should be convoked at least once in three years. Finding this body sometimes rather refractory, from the disposition of its members to exercise the right

of free speech and action, it had been the policy of the Austrian sovereigns to omit calling it together, and to govern the nation by imperial edicts. This artifice had been practised so habitually that at the death of Francis I., in 1832, the Hungarian constitution was in effect a dead letter, and as unregarded by the Austrian ministry as if it had never existed.

Wishing to settle such questions as might affect the succession, Francis, in anticipation of his demise, had, after a long interval,* summoned a diet, which met the very year of his death. The spirit of reform was paramount in this diet,—the lower house having a large majority of democratic members, and several of the leading minds of the nation imbued with the same political faith, occupying seats in the house of magnates. Thus constituted, the diet had no sooner assembled than it began to agitate bold and radical reforms, which at once brought it into collision with Ferdinand, the successor of Francis. The first measure discussed in the diet was the emancipation of the peasants, who from time immemorial had been a disfranchised and degraded race. Dr. Tefft states that a law to this effect was passed; but Paget, who was present and heard the debates, says that after it had been eleven times passed by the lower house, and eleven times rejected by the magnates, it was finally put off to another diet.† This diet, however, unquestionably did much to elevate the nation. The language of the country was restored, a national literary institution established, extensive internal improvements projected, and generally a course of legislation pursued in accordance with the progress of the age, and the spirit of enlightened liberty. These measures, so well calculated to sap the foundation of absolutism in Hungary, were of course steadily opposed by the Austrian government. In vain, however, was everything done that the most consummate political craft, unrestrained by any regard for common decency or honour, could devise to quench the rising spirit of republicanism among the Hungarians. After a stormy session the diet was finally prorogued, and another summoned in 1835.

The French revolution of 1830, and the expulsion from France of the elder branch of the Bourbons; the Polish revolution, and the final conquest of Warsaw by Russia, thus extinguishing the last hope of the free in that unhappy land; the separation of Belgium from Holland, with the concurrent circumstances, had sown broadcast

* Dr. Tefft observes, in a foot note, "Paget says (Hungary and Transylvania, vol. i, p. 129) *twenty-five years*; but the traveller is in a mistake. There were diets in 1807, 1812, and 1825." If Dr. T. will refer to the London edition of Paget, vol. i, p. 160, John Murray, 1860, he will find the diet of 1825 noticed.

† Vide Paget, vol. i, p. 163.

among the nations the seeds of a harvest that had sprung up rapidly and was now fast approaching maturity. The spirit of inquiry abroad among the masses, foreshadowed coming disturbance. Berlin and Vienna possessed the elements of conflagration. The period seemed propitious for Hungary, and the majority of the diet of 1835 were made of sterner stuff than to quail in the hour of emergency.

The Baron Wesselényi Miklos, a man of rare intellectual abilities, of great energy of character, and gifted with the most impassioned eloquence, was the acknowledged leader of the opposition or democratic party in the house of magnates. Failing to check the current of reform by other means, Austria sought to intimidate the liberal party by arresting its leader. Dr. Tefft states that he was arrested for words spoken in debate in the diet on the question of granting equal rights before the law to the oppressed peasantry; but other, and apparently impartial, authorities affirm that the language for which he was arrested was used by him at a county-meeting, held at Szatmar, in Eastern Hungary, when the electors were met to frame instructions for their deputies as to the vote they should give in the diet on this important question. In the course of his speech he alluded to the policy so universally charged against the Austrian government in Hungary—of exciting the nobles against the peasants, and the peasants against the nobles; of teaching each to regard the other as their natural enemies, in order by division to weaken both, and thus strengthen herself—and he stigmatized in strong terms so treacherous a policy, the ultimate object of which could only be the degradation and slavery of the whole country.* Where the words were spoken is a question of slight importance, for that Austria was ready with the strong hand to suppress the freedom of debate in the diet is conclusively proved in the case of Balogh, the member for Bárs. This deputy having declared in his place "that he should not consider himself guilty of any great crime if he adopted the very words of Wesselényi," he was included in the prosecution, and both were put on trial for their lives.

In the diet of 1832, Kossuth first appears in the moving panorama of Hungarian history. He was not a regular member, but sat as the proxy of an absent deputy, and as such was only charged with very subordinate duties. His rare abilities, however, early made him distinguished in the councils of the nation, and he soon undertook to publish a report of the debates and proceedings of the diet,

* Paget, vol. i, p. 31. An Austrian account falsely states that the Baron was arrested for addressing a regiment of hussars in the Austrian service and telling them that their allegiance was at an end.

that their constituents might have some idea of how the representatives performed their duty. The government, in spite of the law of Hungary and of the protests of the diet, prohibited the publication of the debates, and enforced a rigid censorship of the press. For a while Kossuth evaded the prohibition by having his sheet lithographed; but his press being seized, he resorted to the expedient of employing an immense number of secretaries, and issuing his paper in manuscript.

In the arrest of Wesselényi, the Austrian cabinet had made a false step which they would gladly have retraced. Private overtures were made to him, promising him immediate pardon if he would ask for it: but they were indignantly rejected. The trial of the impeachment therefore went on, and as the judges were the creatures of Ferdinand, the Baron was condemned, and sentenced to an imprisonment of three years in a dungeon.

Nearly at the same time Kossuth with others was arrested, and as there was no law in the civil code by which they could be punished, it was suspended in their case, and they were tried by a court-martial and sentenced to different periods of imprisonment. Kossuth, who had been imprisoned for some time preceding his trial, was sentenced to protracted* confinement in one of the dungeons of the fortress of Old Buda.

In 1841 the prisoners were released; but when they issued from confinement, their condition revealed the cruel and relentless character of the treatment they had received. The secrets of their prison-house were written upon their persons. The firm constitution of Kossuth was irrecoverably broken; three of his companions were languishing in the last stages of mortal disease, another was a maniac, and the great Wesselényi was entirely blind. The imprisonment of Kossuth added immeasurably to his popularity. He was universally regarded as a martyr to the liberty of the press, and in 1846 a petition for the abolition of the censorship was circulated in Vienna, and when presented to the emperor, a few days after its appearance, it had the signatures of more than two thousand well-known citizens of the capital.

No sooner had Wesselényi and Kossuth rallied in some measure from the effects of their imprisonment, than they went forward with renewed vigour in the cause of Hungarian emancipation. The former traversed the kingdom, addressing the people, and proclaiming in words of wondrous eloquence the doctrines of liberty and re-

* We have been unable to determine precisely the term of Kossuth's imprisonment. Paget says he was condemned to four years' confinement, in addition to two years passed in prison previous to trial.

publicanism. He was everywhere received with idolatrous enthusiasm, the people carried the blind old man from place to place in their arms, and the land soon rocked with the throes of coming revolution. Kossuth zealously seconded the efforts of Wesselényi through the columns of a political newspaper, the editorship of which he had undertaken.

Notwithstanding the combined influence of the gold and power of Austria, Kossuth was elected a member of the diet of 1847, for the city of Pesth. His power as a debater, his profound sagacity as a statesman, and his personal popularity, had already given him a commanding position in the diet, when both Vienna and Presburg were electrified by the news of the French revolution of February, 1848. On the succeeding day he delivered his memorable speech on the finances and the state of the monarchy, concluding with proposing an "Address to the Throne," urging a series of important and radical reforms. He finished his speech with these significant words:—"I prophesy it in the feeling of my truthful and faithful loyalty to the royal house; that that man will be the second founder of the house of Hapsburg who will reform the system of government on a constitutional basis, and re-establish the throne of his house on the liberty of his people."

Strange as it may appear, the first overt act in the Hungarian revolution took place in Vienna. Kossuth's demand for a constitutional government had found an echo in the hearts of the patriots of the capital, and men had begun to exercise the inalienable rights of freemen without molestation. Political questions were freely discussed, the public press began to speak with boldness; and before a single prohibitory statute had been repealed, the people had practically won a constitution. Desirous that the rights they had asserted should be confirmed by the government, on the 13th of March a vast multitude of the citizens of Vienna moved in procession to the palace, to request from the emperor his express confirmation of the newly-recovered rights they had assumed and begun to exercise. The imbecile monarch dared not meet his long-oppressed people, but trembling with unmanly fears, he fled in terror and consternation, and concealed himself in some subterranean passages in the rear of the palace. No persuasions could induce him to leave his burrow, but from his concealment he treated with his subjects, and granted them all they required. Thus peaceably was the revolution achieved which overthrew Metternich and his cabinet, and secured to the people the liberty of the press, trial by jury, and the promise of a liberal constitution.

When the news of these movements reached the diet, a deputation

was appointed, with Kossuth at its head, to proceed at once to Vienna and wait upon the emperor, with the demand for the restoration of the Hungarian constitution and the creation of a separate cabinet for Hungary, to be composed of Hungarians, and whose sole business should be to attend to the affairs of that country alone. The emperor yielded every demand, and the cabinet was created upon the spot. In this cabinet Kossuth held the post of minister of finance, the position of difficulty and importance.

On the 16th of March the constitution granted by the emperor was duly proclaimed by authority, amid the wildest demonstrations of joy. By this constitution the emperor confirmed his recent concessions, and gave the right to the citizens to bear arms and organize a national guard. The whole series of reformatory measures received the royal signature on the 11th of April. The new Austrian cabinet madly endeavouring to wrest from the people their newly-won privileges, the national guard rose in rebellion, and the emperor fled from his capital to Innspruck, amid the mountains of the Tyrol, leaving his cabinet to their fate. At the risk of being tedious, we venture to place on record the very language in which Ferdinand confirmed and sanctioned these changes: "Having graciously listened to, and graciously granted the prayers of our beloved and faithful dignitaries of the Church and of the State, magnates and nobles of Hungary and its dependencies, WE ordain that the before-mentioned laws be registered in these presents, word for word; and as we consider these laws and their entire contents, both separately and collectively, fitting and suitable, we give them our consent and approbation. In exercise of our royal will, we have accepted, adopted, approved, and sanctioned them, assuring at the same time our faithful states, that we will respect the said laws, and cause them to be respected by our faithful subjects."

Having thus far lost ground at every step in the struggle, the Hapsburg government resorted to the policy of weakening the opposition by exciting jealousies between the different races of the Hungarian population. Emissaries were scattered through the country, who succeeded in stirring up a spirit of hostility among the Servians and Croats against the Hungarian ministry. This hostility soon assumed a warlike aspect, and under the Baron Jellachich, who had just been appointed Ban or Lord of Croatia, it broke out into open revolt. The emperor when appealed to solemnly denounced the course of the Ban, summoned him to appear before him to answer for his conduct, and when he refused, gravely deposed him from office and declared him a public enemy. It clearly appears, however, that Jellachich was acting under express, though secret, instructions

from the Austrian cabinet. Perfectly acquainted with the nature of the game he was directed to play, he continued, notwithstanding his deposition, to hold his power, and soon let loose his soldiers upon the inhabitants of southern Hungary. The diet, though beginning to suspect the duplicity of the monarch, waited for his authority before despatching a small force which speedily defeated and drove the invaders from the country. A word of explanation may reveal the secret of Austria's duplicity. Without compulsion she would concede nothing to liberal principles; under the pressure of adverse circumstances she would yield anything to the just demands of her people, with the mental resolution of reclaiming her concessions whenever she could do it with safety. All her concessions to Hungary, and to her own people, were made when her prospects in Italy were threatening and gloomy. The King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the King of the Two Sicilies had broken with her, and circumstances seemed to threaten still greater disasters. Austria was then willing on any terms to conciliate Hungary; but when the imperial forces had been victorious in Italy, and a great reaction had taken place throughout Europe in opposition to democracy, the time had come for Austria to throw off her disguise and act openly against Hungary. Early in September, Jellachich, having visited the emperor at Innsbruck, was openly acknowledged by the court, and the decree of deposition revoked. He at once invaded Hungary, but was met by the Magyars, defeated and driven out of the country in less than three weeks. The Magyars had in truth opposed the Ban by the express command of their king, who at the same time, as Emperor of Austria, had secretly authorized the Ban to invade Hungary; and when the Magyars had defeated and expelled him from their territory, the monarch at once published an edict dissolving the Hungarian diet, ordering the Magyar forces to obey Jellachich as their commander, proclaiming martial law in Hungary, and appointing the Ban military dictator of the country!

By this crowning act the duplicity of Austria was demonstrated, and after another vain effort to avoid the appeal to arms by negotiation, the diet declared itself permanent, and appointed Kossuth governor and president of the committee of safety. Driven to the wall, with no alternative but resistance or utter extinction, Hungary resolved to maintain her position by arms. Austria was prepared for the conflict. The position of affairs in Italy made it safe to withdraw a large part of her army from that country and concentrate her strength for the approaching strife with Hungary. After a brief but bloody struggle in Vienna, the patriots in that city were put down, and leaving the axe and the halter to complete the work, the Austrian

army, 120,000 strong, moved upon Presburg. A significant event transpired at this stage of the drama. The imperial cabinet felt themselves embarrassed by the frequent pledges, proclamations, and oaths by which the emperor had bound himself to observe and respect the recent laws passed by the national assembly, and to maintain, preserve, and defend the liberties and integrity of Hungary. These pledges could not be denied, and they would not be forgotten by the world. To avoid this embarrassment, Ferdinand was induced to resign the sceptre, and his brother Francis Charles, the next heir to the throne, renouncing his right in behalf of his son, Francis Joseph, a youth of nineteen, he was immediately proclaimed. The new emperor, it was pretended, was not bound by the pledges of his predecessor, and as he refused the coronation oath imposed upon her kings by the constitution of Hungary, no obstacles in the opinion of the unscrupulous Austrian cabinet now prevented the progress of events.

We cannot detail, nor is it necessary, the particular events of the war. Hungary was unprepared with an army or military supplies, but she had Kossuth. In the perilous emergency this extraordinary man exhibited marvellous energy and resources. Gathering around him Bem, Görgey, Dembinski, Damjanitch, Perczel, Klapka, and other distinguished men, many of whom were gray-haired veterans bearing the scars of a hundred fights, an army was soon levied and prepared to take the field. For a time every encounter was a victory for the imperialists, every step a triumph. Pesth was abandoned, and the seat of government removed to Debreczen. Here, amid gloom and disaster, the strong Magyar heart spoke to the world in the declaration of Hungarian independence, which was proclaimed on the 19th of April, 1849. Then followed a series of splendid manœuvres and brilliant actions universally disastrous to the Austrians. On every point they were driven back in total discomfiture and rout, until, at the beginning of May, the Hungarian territory was unpolluted by a hostile foot, save a few garrisons, which were so surrounded and shut up that they could not escape.

The result of this campaign and the general prospects of the war at its close may be inferred from the Austrian manifesto of the first of May, announcing the intervention of Russia:—"The insurrection in Hungary," it states, "had grown to such an extent that the emperor had been induced to appeal to the assistance of his majesty the czar of all the Russias, who generously and readily granted it to a most satisfactory extent." The immense Austro-Russian army, under the command of the infamous Haynau, moved upon Hungary early in June. The conflict, though short, was desperate and sanguinary;

but the issue could not be doubtful when the gigantic weight of Russia was thrown into the scale against exhausted Hungary.

A brief campaign dispersed or destroyed the Hungarian forces, and at the end of three months Kossuth resigned his power into the hands of Görgey, and Görgey surrendered himself and his army of 24,000 men to the Russians. This ended the war.

Kossuth and a few faithful companions fled towards the Turkish frontier, and sought the protection and hospitality of the Sultan. Russia and Austria peremptorily demanded the surrender of the fugitives, Count Stürmer, the Austrian minister at Constantinople, and M. de Titoff, the Russian envoy, both declaring that the escape of a single refugee would in the estimation of their governments constitute a *casus belli*. The Porte had at first returned a decided negative to the demand for their surrender, but wavered when this menacing language was employed by the representatives of the two powers. Though the English government had shown a warm sympathy for Austria during her troubles, and even given her assurances of support, yet at this juncture Sir Stratford Canning, the British minister at Constantinople, took a noble stand in behalf of the hunted fugitives, and strongly urged the Sublime Porte inflexibly to adhere to its refusal to deliver them up. The course of the British minister was fully sanctioned by the government at home, and Lord Palmerston distinctly advised Sir Stratford Canning, that should Russia and Austria attempt to enforce their demand, Great Britain would afford to the Turkish government "the moral and, if necessary, the material aid it required." And to be prepared for prompt action, in case of emergency, Sir William Parker, commanding in the Mediterranean, was ordered "to proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in order to take his squadron up to Constantinople, should he be invited by the Sultan through Sir Stratford Canning." The English admiral was also directed to receive on board one of the vessels of his squadron any of the fugitives whom Turkey might desire to place beyond the reach of their enemies.

While the Turkish government hesitated, and it was yet uncertain what might be her final reply to the demands of Russia and Austria, Kossuth and his companions were advised to abjure the Christian religion, and by taking the turban avail themselves of the fundamental law of Moslemism, that any fugitive embracing the Mohammedan faith might claim the protection of the government. Bem, Kmetty, Stein, and others, yielded to the temptation and embraced Islamism; but Kossuth adhered to his integrity. His noble answer, when interrogated, won for him, in our estimation, the greenest leaf in the chaplet that binds his brow, and should be recorded as an illustration

of the martyr spirit that animates him. "My answer," said he, "does not admit of hesitation. Between death and shame the choice can neither be dubious nor difficult. Governor of Hungary, and elected to that high place by the confidence of fifteen millions of my countrymen, I know well what I owe to my country, even in exile. Even as a private individual I have an honorable path to pursue. Though once the governor of a generous people I leave no inheritance to my children. They shall at least bear an unsullied name. God's will be done. I am prepared to die!"

The interposition of our own government, earnestly seconded by that of Great Britain, procured the release of Kossuth and his companions in exile, and early in September of last year he embarked on board the steam frigate *Mississippi*, which had been placed at his disposal by the President of the United States, and left the *Dardanelles* for America. His subsequent career need not be traced; it is known and read of all men.

It is due to Dr. Tefft to state, that to him belongs the honour of originating the first public movement made in this country to procure the release of the imprisoned refugees. Having expressed his views of the duty of our government in their behalf, in a lecture delivered first in Cincinnati, and afterwards in Springfield, the Doctor was invited by both houses of the General Assembly of Ohio to lecture on the same subject before them at Columbus, the capital of the State. He complied; and the lecture made so favourable an impression both upon the citizens of Columbus and the General Assembly of Ohio, that in a public meeting the former passed a resolution and forwarded it to the seat of the federal government, urging upon the president of the United States and upon Congress the duty of exercising "their utmost power to procure the liberation of Kossuth, his associates and family, at the earliest practicable period." Resolutions embracing the same sentiments were passed in the General Assembly, after a brilliant discussion of the subject, and also forwarded to the president, and to their senators and representatives in the Congress of the United States. In addition to thus setting in motion the plan that has resulted in the release of the illustrious exile from captivity, Dr. Tefft has now given to the world a historical work, that will add materially to his own literary fame, while it will enbalm the noble Magyar forever in the memories and hearts of patriots and Christians.

The discreet reserve maintained by Kossuth during his imprisonment in Turkey, encouraged among his enemies the belief that upon his release he would retire to private life, hopeless of the emancipation of his country; and under this impression the tongue of slander

was for a time comparatively silent. But no sooner did he tread the deck of the Mississippi, under the protection of our flag, and begin to foreshadow his future plans, than the minions of absolutism took the alarm, and instantly every engine was set in motion to counteract his efforts, by stigmatizing his character. An attempt was made to prejudice the mind of the American people against him, by subsidizing our agents abroad, and circulating under their sanction unfavourable representations of his character and conduct, which, scattered broadcast by the press, should shut the hearts of the masses against his appeals, and deprive him of public sympathy. It is not affirmed that money was directly employed to accomplish this purpose, but it can scarcely be doubted that influences of some sort so operated upon our representatives in the Mediterranean, that they forgot the respect due to themselves, as well as their duty to their country, and the guest it delighted to honour. It is mortifying to contemplate the picture, and contrast the cowardly malice of civilians, the weakness of naval officers, with the noble self-respect of the distinguished exile.

From that moment the most reckless and unscrupulous assaults have been made upon Kossuth: From motives not difficult to discern, several of his colleagues in the Hungarian ministry have been induced to unite in this onset. He is represented by one as the champion of aristocratic oppression, and denounced by another as a socialist; a third party accuses him of being vacillating and unprincipled, while a fourth condemns him as self-willed and ungovernable.

Thus the charges of his enemies against him neutralize each other; and while absolutism employs ribald pens to destroy him, and hounds upon his footsteps the red republican and the haughty aristocrat, who once bowed to the might of his genius, the object of their vituperation prosecutes his self-denying mission, and demonstrates, by his undying devotion to his beloved Hungary, the sincerity of his motives and the integrity of his heart. Meanwhile the people of the father land gaze with mingled admiration and hope upon his luminous pathway among the nations, identifying the future prosperity of Hungary with his success, and refusing to despair while he outrides the tempest and bears aloft the torch of liberty.

At the hazard of wearying the patience of our readers we append a few remarks, for which we could not find an earlier place without disturbing the current of the narrative. It will have been seen that the right of the Magyars to their country was that of conquest, confirmed by undisturbed possession from time immemorial; the right of Ferdinand to the throne was not hereditary, but was conferred

by the suffrages of the people; the right of the present sovereign is the right of conquest alone, as he has never been elected by the Hungarian people, or taken the coronation oath. When the Magyars, in obedience to the commands of their king, had taken arms against the Ban of Croatia, and driven him beyond the boundaries of their territory, their king in effect deserted the cause he had sworn to defend, joined the Ban with an Austrian army, and openly invaded their country. In consequence of this cruel and unlawful invasion, and because the young emperor openly refused to receive the crown of St. Stephen in the legal manner, by swearing to maintain the separateness and integrity of the nation, Hungary declared herself independent. She was fully justified in her action.*

Görgey bears the stigma of a traitor. Our author has consigned him to infamy; and Kossuth himself says, "I raised Görgey from the dust that he might earn for himself immortal renown and for his country freedom; and he became Hungary's cowardly executioner." The surrender of himself and his army at Villagos, is regarded as proof of his treason. But we are not entirely satisfied with the evidence. That he more than once differed in opinion with Kossuth on important questions is indisputable, and that he sometimes followed his own judgment in opposition to the governor's wishes, is equally clear; but that he ever disobeyed his express order, or failed to put forth his best efforts for the salvation of Hungary, or violated his allegiance, does not appear. With respect to the final surrender it would seem that Görgey only yielded when resistance had become entirely hopeless; and it has never been considered treasonable in an officer to make the best terms in his power with his enemy, when he can no longer contend with the faintest hope of success. We are inclined to think that the towering ambition and military pride of Görgey, which could not brook a superior in Kossuth, a civilian, as governor, shortened the war; but with the immense power of Russia banded with Austria, arrayed against Hungary single-handed and alone, the conflict could have had but one termination.

When the Austrian army was driven out of Hungary, in April, 1849, it is understood that Kossuth advised an advance upon Vienna, arguing that the capture of the capital, and the consequent rallying of the patriots in Austria, would place Hungary in a position to

* "As soon as he attacks the constitution of the State, the prince breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the people become free by the act of the sovereign, and see nothing in him but an usurper who would load them with oppression. This truth is acknowledged by every sensible writer, whose pen is not enslaved by fear or rendered venal by interest."—*Vattel's Law of Nations*, b. i, ch. iv, § 51.

dictate terms to her adversary. But in this plan he was opposed by Görgey, who declined to advance with the strong fortification of Buda in his rear. The army, of whom Görgey was the idol, sustained him in his views, and Kossuth seems to have wanted either the inclination or the power to control him. It is affirmed that Görgey never possessed the entire confidence of Kossuth, and that even his appointment to the chief command was more a matter of necessity than of choice. In making up an impartial verdict, however, it must not be forgotten that at the crisis of Hungarian affairs, Kossuth resigned his own unlimited authority into the hands of Görgey, an act difficult to reconcile with his own integrity, had he then believed him to be a traitor. The world has, however, passed judgment upon Görgey, and though his sentence seems to us severe, it is probably irreversible.

The future of Hungary, and indeed of all Europe, appears gloomy and cheerless. A sad and disheartening reaction has taken place since the commencement of the Hungarian struggle. If Russian bayonets do not bristle along the Rhine or on the boulevards of Paris, the prediction of Napoleon has become history, and continental Europe is Cossack. The history of Russia is a history of aggression. Sprung from a band of Baltic pirates, unknown to the world till about the middle of the ninth century, she at this moment rules directly with an iron sceptre over the half of Europe, the whole of northern Asia and north-western America, countries equal in extent to one-seventh of the habitable globe, while the insidious power of her diplomacy is paramount in all the courts of continental Europe.

Light and darkness are not more antagonistic than the principles of democracy and absolutism. In the end the one must extinguish the other. We talk of the progress of free opinions, and amuse ourselves with visions of a better time coming, while a night of absolutism is settling upon the nations. It becomes those who have yet the forms of liberty to ponder well the lessons of history, and learn wisdom and duty from the experience of the past. "A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth himself, but the simple pass on and are punished."

While the noble Kossuth pleads with a prophet's voice among us the cause of his bleeding country, and the eyes of patriot millions look for sympathy and aid to constitutional England and free America, they will be recreant to the law of nations,* to humanity and to God, if they hesitate to say to the onward tide of absolutism, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed!"

* Vide Vattel, Book ii, ch. i, § 1, 2, 3, 4.

ART. VII.—METHODIST PREACHING.

IN accordance with an intimation in our January number, we resume the subject expressed in the above title, premising, as we then did, that our remarks shall be of the freest character. If they should even be deemed desultory we shall not complain, for our "ideal" of a periodical work like this, supposes its interest to consist in the variety and collocation of its articles—their variety as well of style as of topics.

In our description of the "Early Methodist Preaching," we enumerated among its characteristics, its *extempore address*, its *aim at direct results*, its *style*, and its *topics*,—the latter as being almost exclusively the vital, elementary truths of revelation. The results, the really magnificent results, of this preaching, as witnessed throughout our continent, are, we alleged, proofs of its potency and appropriateness to the times. It was not only correlative to the times, but also and especially to the ecclesiastical system of Methodism—its ministerial methods—its incessant labours, its itinerancy, &c. It was a product jointly of the times and the system. While we contended that its essential excellencies should be retained, we admitted that our own times require some modifications of it. What are these modifications? What, in more general terms, should be the *characteristics* and *methods* of our preaching in these times? This question expresses, precisely enough, the subject of the present paper, extending it beyond the homiletic traits enumerated to the ecclesiastical peculiarities which justified them. The current demands for improvement take in both, especially in our large cities; and in examining these demands we must have reference to both.

To those who have read our preceding article on the subject, we need not say that our predilections for the "primitive school of Methodist preaching" are strong: we shall not dissemble, that in admitting the expediency of its modification, in some portions of the Church, and in describing what that modification should be, we shall be as much inclined to guard its old honour and excellencies as to concede to the proposed improvements. We shall attempt rather to show the limits than the urgency of the latter. We confess a conviction of the importance of some of these improvements, and yet no little jealousy of them; and our ensuing remarks will show the influence of both sentiments—perhaps in a juster appreciation of the subject than we could otherwise entertain. But to the question.

These times require, we think, more *varied preaching* than was
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usual among our primitive "Itinerants,"—a more thorough treatment of the details of Christian doctrines and duties. The recency of the nation, the wide dispersion of its population, the necessarily long journies of our early preachers, and the absence of thoroughly organized or permanent congregations, except in few places, led them to confine their discourses to comparatively few topics; these, as we have said, were the most essential, the vital truths of the gospel, answering summarily the question, "What shall I do to be saved?" They entered a town or village, "sounded the alarm," held up the cross, and were gone. They were wise in this course—that which was most needed was said, though many things were left unsaid. They were driving, in all haste, the ploughshare through the fallow ground, and scattering broadcast the good seed; the time for minuter work in the field, for dressing and training the crop, would come they knew, and God would, meanwhile, they believed, raise up appropriate labourers for that necessity. They were the *Legio Fulminea*—the "Thundering Legion,"—whose duty it was to break and scatter the ranks of the enemy, and to pursue and shout onward in the rout, scaling ramparts, penetrating fastnesses, but leaving the spoils of the conquered field to the "reserve" which were yet in the distance. The latter have come up; they have gathered the trophies, and now devolves upon us the task of defining the conquered territory, of fortifying it against future losses, of dividing, subdividing, and rightly governing its provinces.

There is not mere rhetoric, but historic truthfulness in this view of the heroic mission of our primitive ministry. At the risk of a slight but not irrelevant digression, let us glance here a little further at its character, for its character is no insignificant illustration of its preaching. In all sobermindedness we do not believe its chivalry, and even romance, are rivalled in modern history, at least since the days of the Crusades. These stalwart evangelists were abroad, thundering through the land, when the storms of the Revolution were coming on, and while they were bursting over the country. Those who know intimately the early Methodist history, will doubt whether Washington and the *sans culottes* army of Valley Forge, endured more hardships, or exhibited more heroic characteristics than Asbury and his invincible itinerant cohorts. Asbury himself exceeded Wesley in his annual travels. His tour almost yearly was from Maine to Georgia, by way of the West, when a few log-cabins only dotted Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee; when not one Methodist chapel, if indeed any other Protestant church, was to be seen beyond the Alleghanies; and when he had to be escorted from one settlement or fortified post to another by armed men. He averaged

six thousand miles a year, mostly on horseback, on recent roads or through forests. During forty-five years of ministerial labour in this country his travels were equal to the circumference of the globe every four years! And yet this glorious old bishop, who ordained more men to the ministry than any Prelatical Bench of the nation,* and who in his personal traits and achievements, as well as the later results of his labours, is unquestionably the first ecclesiastical personage in the American annals, has never yet been *named* in any of our national histories, and probably has not been known to our Ramsays, Bancrofts, Hildreths, or Goodriches.

And he was but a representative of the itinerant ministry of that day. Those great times produced such great men as Lee, who journeyed with two horses, one for a relay when the other should be fatigued; Pickering, with a district that swept from the extremity of Cape Cod, around to the centre of Vermont; Hedding, travelling through the storms of winter, from Long-Island Sound to the Canada line; Soule, braving the Borean terrors of the Maine forests; Bangs, Coate, Worster, Sawyer, Dunham, Coleman, traversing the wildernesses of Canada; M'Combs, Merwin, Roszel, Sharp, Boehm, Wells, Cooper, Garrettsen, Mills, Smith, and hundreds of others, who incessantly went to and fro "crying aloud and sparing not," through the Middle States; Dunwody, Peirce, Dougherty, Kennedy, Capers, and many others, equally noble, the heroes of Southern Methodism. And then there were the staunch men of oak, the sons of thunder, in the West, McKendree, Roberts, Young, Blackman, Burke, Larkin, Quin, Finley, Cartwright, Collins, &c., the leaders of the memorable old "Western Conference," when it was the only one beyond the mountains—when it reached from *Detroit to Natchez*, and each of its districts comprised about two of the modern Western Conferences. Alas for the man whose heart does not palpitate at the contemplation of such men, and such indomitable energy! Theirs was a hardihood, a heroism which old Sparta would have applauded with the clash of her shields as cymbals. The success of Methodism has often been referred to as a marvel—a knowledge of the men who composed its first ministry explains the mystery.

Our history—not merely our Church history, but our national history—has an obligation yet to discharge towards these men. They laid the moral foundations of most of the American States. They

* He presided in 224 annual conferences, and consecrated 4,000 ordinations. He began his labours with 600 members in the American Methodist Church, and fell at last at the head of 212,000, who have since multiplied to a million and a quarter.

marched in the van of emigration bearing aloft the cross, and they were almost its only standard-bearers throughout the first and most trying period of our ultramontane history. When the tide of population began to sweep down the Western declivities of the Alleghanies, and during the forming period of the States of the Mississippi Valley, they were in motion everywhere, evangelizing the rude masses, and averting barbarism from the land.

Such were the men, such the circumstances of our first ministry. And under such circumstances it was wise, we repeat, to limit, as they did, the range of their pulpit instruction, to those topics which were most adapted to the immediate salvation of their hearers. Beyond these topics they did occasionally venture, as we have admitted, but in very restricted excursions—in sallies against some of the polemical dogmas of the day—Calvinism especially—or in defence of some of the important practical ordinances of the gospel; their preaching however consisted of few though powerful sermons, and aggregately, of the truths which relate to personal conversion.

These truths we must continue to reiterate, but not so *exclusively* as did our fathers. Inevitable circumstances—nay, very salutary circumstances—have intervened, and require of us a greater amplitude and detail of religious instruction, in the older sections of the country at least. Our cause has consolidated. There is scarcely a town or village in the denser sections of the nation where the Methodist chapel does not appear. Nearly all our church edifices in the Atlantic States have been erected or renovated within twenty-five years;* they contain now stated congregations and thoroughly organized societies, who, habitually assembling within their walls, cannot be edified, much less satisfied, with repetitious exhortations on obvious or familiar topics. The preciousness of such topics will redeem them, to a great extent, from the defects of the preacher; but there may be an intolerable excess of a good thing. Men cannot subsist on honey or milk, but need other, though it be inferior nourishment. A man can live better habitually on the varied constituents of the potato than on pure wheat. The axe may be necessary to fell the forest or cleave the rough mass, but more delicate and varied implements are needed to work it into useful wares.

But before entering into the details of the modification thus rendered necessary, let us define it more carefully; for we would not extend it too far, and there is more danger, we fear, of exaggerating than

* This has been a work of vast enterprise and expenditure; could its statistics be presented, we doubt not they would exhibit the liberality of the denomination in a striking light, and relieve greatly the unfavourable comparison sometimes made between its other philanthropic contributions and those of sister sects.

of depreciating it. The glory of the primitive school of Methodist preaching has not yet departed; its day, its necessity still exist, and must continue to exist on our own continent *for generations*.

First. It is needed still to no inconsiderable extent in our Atlantic communities. Our old and mature Churches may require the proposed improvements, but all around them are moral wastes, which, instead of being recovered, are absolutely growing more desert year by year. Let us not think, then, that we require in our large cities only educated and polished preachers and restricted modes of labour; these we must have, but we yet need there, as much if not more than in the first days of Methodism, voices "crying in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord"—men who will "circuit" these cities as did our fathers, and, like them, preach continually and powerfully the primary truths of religion among the neglected populace.

We would emphasize the assertion, for there is, we fear, a tendency to a very opposite opinion. The city mission is a happy idea of the times, especially as an adjunct of a local pastorate; but we do not consider it, as usually conducted, an appropriate appendage to our own system, or anything like an adequate substitute for our old *city itinerancy*. Our first preachers did in cities precisely the work which city missionaries now do, and with how much greater success! All our urban Methodism sprang from their labours. They erected their first batteries in the neglected and impoverished localities. They gathered converts into their small bands, without the invidious association of a "mission to the poor." They offered themselves to the poor; the poor virtually, though informally, accepted them as their *chosen* pastors, and spontaneously formed a tacit contract, a self-respectful habit of supporting them. These first "city missions" are now become wealthy and intelligent "city stations," and require indeed a modified ministerial treatment; but if the field for such labours remains—nay, is tenfold more ample and urgent—why is not the old ministerial apparatus, with all its powerful attributes, as appropriate as ever? Where is the reason for a change? not assuredly in the moral condition of our suburban masses; not in the necessary ministerial regimen, for certainly none could be more appropriate than the pastoral methods of our fathers. *All the original conditions of Methodist ministerial labour exist, we assert, in our present large communities, only vastly augmented.* What then, we again ask, has occasioned the change in our ministerial treatment of the poor? What else than the *illusion* which has come over us with our growing prosperity, that because our Churches, originally founded among the poor, have outgrown their first humble spheres,

therefore Methodism has necessarily changed its relative position to the destitute populace; it must now look chiefly after the comfort and intelligent treatment of its well-housed children, and send out only an occasional messenger to pick up the foundlings of the highway and convey them into a neighbouring shelter ycleped "a city mission chapel." This is not right; this is recreance to the old chivalric honour of our ministry—it is recreance to the honour of our Master in heaven.

The figure, like most figures, may be somewhat an hyperbole, for, thanks be to God, we still to a great extent preach the gospel to the poor; but is not this change coming over us? Is it not one of the most serious liabilities of our cause? While our intelligent city Churches are demanding a different class of preachers and an improved style of preaching, and also important changes in our ministerial methods, let them be reminded that the vast destitute masses around them require still the old methods, the old class of preachers and preaching—that none, since the apostolic missionaries, could more precisely meet their deplorable necessities.

The *Legio Fulminea*, whose task we said it was to break the ranks and take the ramparts of the enemy, are, then, still needed even here in our cities, where our own fortifications display their completed proportions and victorious flags; for even here many a hostile fortress stands in juxtaposition with our defences; the very citadel is yet in possession of the foe, in most of our large cities, and the circumvallations—the suburbs—are crowded with his forces. We assert that all these demoralized regions should be invaded by "Itinerant Methodist Preachers," as the cities were at first. Methodist families would be found scattered among them, as then; these would take in the evangelist, and open their doors for preaching, as then; converts would multiply, as then; lay assistants would rise up, classes and societies would be formed, and these would grow into self-supporting Churches, as then. Why not? Is there any imaginable reason why not now as well as then? And is there not for such labours now a great vantage ground, which our fathers had not, in the aid which our existing Churches can afford them?

The above has been the historical process of Methodism from the beginning—it is the process of its present success in its foreign mission fields, and is precisely what is needed in this its domestic missionary work. An English friend, who is familiar with the Wesleyan Missions, gives, in a communication to the writer, the following summary view of their *modus operandi*:—

"As soon as any number of his hearers 'receive the truth in the love of it,' our missionary unites them into a 'class' under the care of a 'leader.' And thus

the hedge of discipline is placed round this cultured spot, and assistance and sympathy given to these 'babes in Christ.' The pastoral care is divided with these leaders, who watch over the little flocks in the absence of the missionary. Then, as soon as divine grace has drawn forth and sanctified the abilities of his converts, the missionary finds out who among them have an aptitude for exhortation; he licenses them to 'exhort;' afterwards, if they improve, to 'preach;' then a 'circuit plan' is formed, a place provided where a congregation can meet on the Sabbath, and there this 'native preacher' in his turn, 'of the ability which God giveth,' speaks to the people 'all the words of this life.' Such preachers multiply and improve, while the missionary directs their studies, and oversees the whole machinery—preachers, leaders, classes, schools, prayer-meetings, &c., until often such circuits rise, like those in the Friendly Isles, Africa, &c., to have 20 or 30 chapels, and 50 to 100 'local ministers.' Some of these chapels, too, are able to accommodate from 1,500 to 2,000 persons; most of them are well filled, and some of them are crowded. Of the 8,226 'assistants' there are only 843 who are *salaried*, and these give their whole time to the work, as catechists, school teachers, &c. The rest being chiefly local preachers, interpreters, &c., give their services gratuitously.*

Now this we affirm has been the universal process of Methodism until within a few years; and what we complain of is, that the Churches founded by precisely such means, now that they have become isolated and self-supporting, are generally repudiating this effective plan as obsolete, though all their adjacent fields—nay, the very interjacent fields; often, indeed, their immediate precincts—demand just such energetic labours, and demand them, in most of our large cities, *more urgently than ever before*. "Exhorters" are hardly known among us any more; the "Local Ministry" is falling into comparative disuse; "Itinerancy" in our cities is being abandoned: meanwhile, the populace are perishing in their moral destitution, and we obtrude upon them an occasional "city missionary" as an apology for the sacrifice of our once powerful and still needed methods.

We contend, then, that whatever improvements we may propose in our standard of ministerial qualification and modes of ministerial labour, we should still have, even here in our ripest fields, a large proportion of just such labours in and out of the pulpit, as pertained to the first school of Methodist preachers—its same summary themes, the same direct style, *ad populum*, the same aim at immediate results, the same effective methods.

Second. We shall still need them also, to a great extent, in that large field, the "*Provincias Internas*" of our territory, lying between the Atlantic margin and the later settlements of the West where the "circuit system" is not yet generally broken into stations. Throughout this vast region Methodism is flourishing, and will, in less than twenty-five years, be consolidated into great strength. Its ministry is now improving, but might still faster improve as the

* Rev. William Butler, now of New-England Conference.

increasing supply of candidates allows a more discriminating choice. Taking it as a whole, it is the noblest sphere for the advancement of both our ministry and Churches now occupied by us; but our primitive ministerial characteristics and methods are still appropriate to it, and could not advantageously be modified, except by such improvements as should not essentially change them.

Third. The vast unsettled portions of the continent, from the Mississippi to the Pacific, and from the Great Slave Lake to the Gulf of California, will afford them a magnificent theatre during as long a period, at least, as the Church has yet recorded in its annals.

We must be permitted to delay on this part of our subject, though in no wise proportionately to its importance.

There are several considerations respecting the settlement of this grand area which should be borne in mind. The population which is to flood it, and is now pouring into it, will be *more largely foreign* than were the earlier migrations of the country. A very considerable proportion of the first settlers in the new territories were from the older States, and they carried with them better notions of religion and morals, than come to us now from Europe. He must be of dull vision who does not see the moral liabilities to the nation which must arise from this transposition of demoralized European masses into the almost boundless region mentioned. More than half of the continent is now, and quite suddenly opening into a stupendous moral battle-field, and men, as mighty as those we have described, are needed for the conflict.

Again: this population will, for some years, probably be as much, if not more *dispersed* than were the earlier emigrations, and will therefore require our primitive ministerial modes of energetic labour and travel to supply it. It no longer maintains a frontier margin, continually thickening though extending, but throws itself into detached positions, anywhere and everywhere, so it but finds local attractions. The north-west territories, the Great Salt Lake, Texas, New-Mexico, Oregon, California—these are its diverse resorts. The whole western extent of the continent is in fine thrown open, the last barrier has fallen,* and the European masses are entering it with a rush. Our “itinerants” must, in old style, with horse and saddle-bags, rush on with them, mingling in the mighty *melée*, and bearing up in its very front, if possible, the ensign of the cross.

Were these stupendous migrations to be more consolidated,

*The greatest impediment, the prepossession of the ground by the Indians, may be said to be about removed. There are now about 418,000 in all our limits; most of these are the enervated aborigines of our Pacific and Mexican domains; the estimated number inhabiting our “unexplored territories” is but 30,000.

some formidable moral consequences would result, but they would be more accessible to our moral agencies. Coincident, however, with the accessions to our population have been the extensions of our territorial area, and the coming multitudes are still to be scattered as have been the preceding hordes. In 1790, the number of persons to the square mile in the United States was nine; twenty years later, it was precisely the same, though the aggregate population had increased from five millions to more than seven. In 1840, we had fourteen to the square mile, but the ratio diminished to twelve—a gain of only *three* since 1790. According to intimations from the census office the ratio has fallen still lower, to seven and twenty-two hundredths, giving one and three quarters *less* to the square mile than in 1790! The statistics of this article, throughout, were prepared before the details of the late census appeared. The latter will, probably, as in this instance, add to the force of our reasoning. And can we predict that this coincident extension of territory and people will not continue, thus giving a general dispersion to our population, and an almost indefinite missionary field for the Christian energies of the country?

They mistake egregiously who think the primitive ministerial system of Methodism is done with in this country: *there is at this hour opening a larger field for it than ever.* While we contend for modifications in the consolidated portion of the Church, in order to adapt them to the greatest effectiveness there, we affirm, and we mean literally what we affirm, that they have not yet done one-half their allotted work in the land.

Further: while this new population will be more entirely *foreign*, and, from the amplitude of the area and freer access to it, more *dispersed*, it will also be vastly more *multitudinous* than our immigrations have heretofore been. It is sublime, we were about to say appalling—this amazing growth of a nation—this exodus of the European peoples into our mighty wildernesses. We could once estimate somewhat its ratios, but now it almost defies our calculations. A few years ago it was ascertained that our western frontier line moved onward at the rate of about thirteen miles a year; and this march of a nation, extending from the Northern Lakes to the Mexican Gulf,—bearing with it all the ensigns of the highest civilization and liberty—felling the forest, dispelling at every step actual aboriginal barbarism, planting fields, building cities, erecting temples and schools, constructing canals and roads of iron,—was considered one of the sublimest spectacles in the history of man; but now the line of march is broken, as we have said, into detached columns, which have taken the extreme points of the field, and the evercom-

ing accessions meet no obstruction, and observe no rules of progression. It is quite probable, that during the next five years the average annual arrivals of foreigners will amount to half a million—they are now fast verging to 400,000! What practicable Christian agencies can meet the wants of these foreign hosts? Can we think for a moment of abandoning in this vast region any of the effective apparatus of Methodism, under such circumstances? It has been estimated that during the current decade there will be introduced into the West, a foreign population equal to the whole present population of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. We repeat, the prospect is appalling. The thoughtful man, who reminds himself of the ignorance and moral corruption of these European hordes, can hardly suppose that the better moral characteristics of the nation, already sadly degenerating, can survive the contagion of such overwhelming vice, or the better institutions of the republic withstand such a flood of semi-barbarism. One thing we must be sure of, viz.:—That every moral resource at our command will be needed, to maintain, in its present relative status, the moral and intellectual position of the country.

It is to the West, we say, that this overwhelming flood sweeps, and thither moves with it the power of the nation—the political forces which will take their moral character from these multitudes, and impart it to us all. The centre of representative population is continually tending westward. In 1790, it was twenty-two miles east of Washington; it has never been east of the national metropolis since, and never can be again. At the census of 1800, it had been transferred to thirty miles west of Washington; in 1820, it was seventy-one miles west of that city; in 1830, one hundred and eight miles. Its westward movement from 1830 to 1840, was no less than fifty-two miles—more than five miles a year. It is now probably in Ohio. During about fifty years it has kept nearly the same parallel of latitude, having deviated only about ten miles South, while it has advanced about two hundred miles west. Thus move the political destinies of the country into what we have described as the arena of its moral and religious conflicts.

With this territorial enlargement and increased accessions of European population, the national population, indigenous and foreign, is destined to swell into aggregate magnitudes truly amazing—magnitudes which it would seem must hopelessly transcend any moral provision we can make for them. If the ratios of our increase hitherto can be relied on, the population of the United States, in 1860, will be more than *thirty-one millions*; in 1870, more than *forty millions*; in 1900, more than *one hundred mil-*

lions, exceeding the whole present population of England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark. A step further in the calculation presents a prospect still more surprising: by 1930—less than eighty years hence—this mighty mass of commingled races will have swollen to the stupendous aggregate of *two hundred and forty-six millions*, equalling the present population of all Europe. According to the statistics of life, there are hundreds of thousands of our present population—one twenty-ninth at least—who will witness this result.

It is hardly possible to restrain the pen from uttering the spontaneous and overwhelming reflections which these statistics suggest; but we leave them in their own startling significance.

Such, then, according to the mathematics of the argument, is the domestic field of evangelic labour opening before us. These calculations have no episodic irrelevancy here. We have chosen to present them, as far more relevant than general remarks. They sustain with startling force our position, that the energetic "itinerant" methods of our early ministry—its methods in the pulpit and out of it—are still needed; that there is a larger field for them now in our own country than there ever has been. We shall need, for generations, Circuits and Districts, and stout-hearted and staunch-bodied men to travel them; and let those who think they see the expediency of amending our system, in respect to "itinerancy," the "presiding eldership," &c., to suit it to our denser communities, (an expediency we are not disposed to deny,) be reminded that they should so direct their efforts as to meet a comparatively local want without inflicting a general disaster.* We have so often drawn this admonitory inference in the course of these remarks, that doubtless the reader thinks it sufficiently reiterated, but it presents itself to our attention with peculiar impressiveness. We deem it the capital lesson of our cause at this moment. Ideas of innovation are becoming rife among us; many of them are wise, the true signs of healthy progress, and few men have affirmed them more decidedly than the writer of this article; but with them seems generally entertained a vague and, as we have shown, most fallacious impression, that the primitive ministerial system of Methodism is fast becoming incompatible with the wants of the times—that its day is about past. It is all-important that this impression should be rightly qualified, that especially our intelligent and influential members in the

* We believe our ecclesiastical system is capable of such local accommodations without injury to its general harmony. The chief difficulty to desirable improvements among us, is our fear of them. Our fathers adapted the system to their times: we lack their courage.

older States, who can appreciate Methodism in its general capacities, as well as in its local success, should be impressed with the conviction that it has been thus far but approximating its providential mission, and that the grandeur of its general designs may still merit almost any local inconveniencies. The statistical arguments we have presented cannot fail, if examined, to arrest the attention of the Church, and to convince it that it may still move on in its old triumphant march to new, and grander fields of conflict, and that all its faithful adherents should still be willing to make magnanimous sacrifices for its success.

It can well however be admitted, that some of the desired modifications, both of its ecclesiastical system and its homiletic character, may be made; and having now accomplished what we proposed, as a chief design of this paper, viz., "to show rather the *limits* than the urgency of such changes," we proceed to admit and state some of the homiletic improvements demanded. We have said that the times require, especially in the older sections of the Church, more *varied preaching* than was common in our early ministry.

First. It should be varied by a larger range of *practical instruction*. If we except some of the main points of practical divinity, the Methodist pulpit will, we think, be found more deficient in this respect, than any other evangelical ministry in the land. This is a quite explicit remark, we know, and may be an attractive target for animadversions, but we nevertheless affirm it. Let it be observed, however, that it refers not so much to the *importance* as to the *variety* of our practical preaching. Precisely here lies the great defect of our present ministrations, and it needs plain dealing and speedy correction. Wince not, brother itinerant, at a few outright references to it, even though you should not concur in them. Frankness will not hurt us; and in a work like this, if anywhere, honest individual opinions, though even erroneous may be respectfully admitted. You will not, after what has been said, question our high estimation of the Methodist ministry—the men of genius or special talent scattered through its ranks, excel, we believe, in number and power those of any other American pulpit; the fathers we have described as a heroic host; their successors, who have been educated by similar circumstances, in the severer fields of our work, are still, as a body, rare and powerful men; but is there not a large class—their successors in the maturer fields—a class which is fast becoming our aggregate ministry there—who, without special talents, are also without the heroic characteristics of the fathers? And is it not the case that there is in this growing class many of mere indolent mediocrity—men of little study, little variety, and little thoroughness of instruction, and who not unfrequently

attempt to substitute physical for intellectual energy in the pulpit? These assuredly are not the men needed by our matured Churches of this day, especially amidst the sectarian rivalries of the cities and larger villages. Their limited topics may be as good as those of the fathers, but their local circumstances are different. What variety they possess soon becomes exhausted; and is it not often apparent that their subjects, however intrinsically good, are but hackneyed props upon which to hang "First," "Secondly," and "Thirdly," the hasty ex-cogitations of Saturday night or Sabbath morning.

Practical training, we repeat, practical training in the details of Christian duty is the present want of Methodism, and for two reasons.

The first is, the promiscuous character of our people. It is not a denominational detraction, but a denominational honour that our Churches have hitherto been chiefly composed of the poorer classes, those who most need the gospel, and who, when properly trained by it, become its best examples; but this honourable fact has devolved upon us a peculiar responsibility,—the promiscuous masses we have gathered together need specially careful instruction. Under the ministrations of the fathers they were initiated into the great truths and the personal experience of religion. The elementary truths of religion, accompanied with a sound religious experience, are doubtless a better guarantee of Christian morals than thorough training in the latter without the former; but the one cannot supersede the other. Nor is it necessary for our argument to admit that serious derelictions are more common among us, than among other sects; it is sufficient to affirm the importance of the practical divinity of the Scriptures on the one hand, and on the other, that among us too exclusive a devotion to the consolatory or admonitory aspects of the gospel—too hortatory a style—have too much limited our practical instructions.

Another reason for improvement in this respect is, that the great variety of the practical themes of the gospel would afford more variety to our preaching, and therefore more attraction to our congregations. The restricted pulpit range of our first preachers, however suitable to their modes of labour, has too much uniformity for ours. An attempt to relieve the tameness of this uniformity of thought by energy of feeling or declamation, may partly succeed—especially in connexion with good pastoral habits—it may sometimes render it tolerable to a popular audience through a two years' appointment; but it will not make up for the defective training of the people, and must in the "long run" fail to interest, if it does not alienate, our more intelligent families.

How rich is the variety of practical themes for the pulpit! The practical bearings of repentance, the practical applications of faith; prayer—private, family, social, public; public worship; the observance of the Sabbath; baptism; the Lord's supper; modes of personal effort for the salvation of men; charity to the poor; charity to religious opinions; serial lectures on the historical characters of the Scriptures; the relations of pastors and people; and the large range of practical counsels appropriate to husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, &c.—assuredly he who with such themes, and their sublime relations to time and eternity, fails of varied interest in the pulpit, must be inexcusable. It is on these very themes that the multitudinous assemblies under our care most need instruction.

✓ *Second.* For the same reasons our preaching should be *varied* with more *doctrinal instruction*. Do we mistake in saying that the charge of vagueness applied to our practical instruction is applicable to our doctrinal preaching—not to the importance of its subjects, but their variety? Is there not even among us a tacit dislike to doctrinal themes in the pulpit, owing in part, it may be, to the virulence with which distinctive doctrines are liable to be discussed, or the too habitual devotion of some preachers to them, notwithstanding our denominational tendency to the contrary?

Whatever truth God has revealed should be proclaimed by his ambassadors; but are there not many such truths which have never been discussed by some who read these lines, and who have grown gray in the pulpit?

It is to be feared that some of those doctrines which we deem most vital to Christianity are most neglected, so far as their elucidation or defence is concerned. The Athanasian views of the Godhead we identify with the very essence of orthodoxy; but how seldom are these doctrines discussed in our pulpits. Our dialectics have not much to do with them indeed, but our Bible has, and the Scriptural illustration and demonstration of truths so fundamental cannot certainly be unimportant.

Here again we have an ample field for *variety* of pulpit themes—God and his attributes; Christ, his Godhead, his offices; the Holy Spirit, his Divinity and work; the atonement; repentance; faith; justification; regeneration; sanctification; the resurrection; future judgment; rewards and punishments; the spirituality and immortality of the soul; the nature and reality of experimental religion, &c.

The objection—a tacit if not an uttered one—that doctrinal preaching would tend to a speculative if not worse spirit in the Church,

ought not to be admitted for a moment—it is a slander on the truth of God. There may indeed be dialectic gymnastics attempted in this sublime arena—polemic farces, at which devils as well as men may recreate themselves; but the same may be said of experimental and practical divinity—no perversions of doctrine have been more monstrous than the recorded delusions of practical and inward religion.

On the contrary, the great doctrines of revelation rightly presented would form the most substantial basis for our practical instructions, and premises for the most powerful motives of personal religion. The good sense of the preacher of course must be their guarantee against abuse; but it is to be supposed that he who is counted worthy of this ministry should not be lacking in common sense, or the reverent appreciation of such impressive themes.

Third. There is another class of subjects not usually comprehended in our practical divinity, but having a secondary relation to it, at least, which, occasionally and judiciously treated, would increase much the variety of our pulpit themes, and afford instruction and interest to our congregations. Among these we would include first the great modern schemes of evangelization, such as Sunday schools, missions, tracts, Bible societies. The pastor, especially the “stationed” pastor, should make himself familiar, not merely with the general character of these enterprises, but with their leading data, if not their detail, at least so far as they are connected with his own denomination; not vague declamation will suffice for them—he can show their substantial value only by substantial facts. It is thus only that he can train his people to a practical interest in them. The Churches which are most familiar with these institutions are those which most liberally sustain them, and it cannot be doubted that their fuller representation in our pulpits would soon effect an appreciable change in their success among us. Do we mistake in saying that these great interests of modern Christianity are lamentably neglected by our general ministry, so far as their appropriate representation in the pulpit is concerned? Our periodicals and special agents cannot supersede this service.

Again: we would include in the present class of pulpit themes, those special addresses to the young, the aged, to females, to citizens on the ethics of their political relations, &c., which occasionally form interesting and instructive series of discourses in the modern pulpit. Important principles of Christianity are applicable to these subjects, and, rightly discussed, they may become the special occasions of most special appeals of the truth.

To these we would add, occasionally at least, other topics—those

which arise from adventitious questions of the day, or public interests indirectly related to religion or morals. Pauperism, intemperance, gambling, education, patriotism, great national occasions or anniversaries, the moral aspects of political events, the uses and abuses of wealth, the moralities of business life, war, with the practical peace questions, and even "colonization" and "slavery," if you please. We can only refer to these varied classes of subjects. They present an almost endless scope, and the preacher who avails himself of them prudently, can hardly fail to render his pulpit attractive to the people. We say *prudently*, for doubtless there is a liability to imprudence here. Such secondary topics should have but a secondary place in his instructions. They should be used merely as an occasional digression from the more essential themes of the gospel. They have nevertheless their claims and their appropriate seasons.

It is a misfortune for our argument that the non-evangelical pulpit of the day has dealt so largely in these collateral topics, finding in them a relief from the less congenial themes of true religion; let not this abuse, however, militate against the due use of such important subjects. They need not interfere with, but may be sanctified by, our very highest evangelism, and it may be affirmed that we can hardly train our people to the highest standard of Christian intelligence and enterprise without their occasional discussion in the pulpit. Let us put away the thought that such a discussion of them would interfere with the fervency of our piety or our usual revivals. The objection would give to the revilers of fervent piety and revivals a formidable argument. Our sister evangelical Churches which are most addicted to these discussions, not only take the lead in philanthropic enterprises, but abound in genuine revivals. Our own more energetic spirit should not lag behind them in either respect.

We have thus indicated some of the modifications which these times demand in our preaching, especially in the older communities, where our congregations are not only stunted, but abound in intelligence and resources that require such improved treatment. What an effect on our ministrations, in such communities, would a general endeavour after this improved and varied preaching soon produce! More thorough habits of study would be formed; an improved style both of thought and address, more deliberate and exact methods in the desk, would follow; the whole intellectual tone of our pulpit would be elevated. It would, in fine, be a partial but most salutary process of self-education to our ministry, and, combined with their old distinctions, such as we have described, would soon enable them to out-rival their competitors in the larger cities, and thus stop effectually that relative declension of our cause which, according to our

own reports, has been taking place in most of them within a few years. We insist, as we did in our former article, that those old distinctions, or whatever of them may now be desirable, can be combined with these improvements. Not an iota of our moral power need be sacrificed.

It is hoped that, while we urge these improvements as appropriate to our general ministry, it is not necessary to guard our remarks against a prejudiced construction. It is admitted that there are scattered all through our ranks individual men who have surveyed thoroughly, in both the study and the pulpit, these large fields of thought, and who even stand before the public on their most advanced grounds. Honour be upon such men, for most of them owe their success to their own unaided endeavours, sustained amidst the most trying ministerial responsibilities which have been known since the days of the apostles. Our ministry has also not been without a class of men pre-eminent even above these, for reputation at least, men of renown in the Church, representative men, who have been masters of not only the great themes of the pulpit, but of the highest ability for their discussion. The names of Summerfield, Bascom, Cookman, Fisk, and Olin, have had few contemporary rivals in sister Churches, and other names, not yet rendered sacred by death, will hereafter be added to the list. All this we admit, and yet deem the preceding observations applicable to our general ministry.

Thus much, then, for the *improvement of our preaching*; but this implies also a correspondent *improvement of the preacher*. We have alluded to the effect which such an elevated standard of pulpit instruction would have on his own intellectual character. With our candidates, however, we should anticipate this improvement, and our pre-requisites should be such as to secure it. The remark is not only applicable to the older sections of the Church, but in part to the most recent; for it has pleased God so to multiply our candidates throughout the connexion, as to allow a very considerable discrimination in their selection, were we but disposed to adhere to our legitimate and economical modes of labour. Were it not for the absurd policy (for such we must be allowed to call it) of breaking up our circuits into hardly self-supporting "stations," and of gradually abolishing the local ministry, instead of a want we should now, probably, have an excess of candidates.* A single western conference

* These unfortunate changes are also ascribed to the "demands of the times," a very convenient but fallacious excuse for something worse. It will hardly be pleaded that Methodism in America is in advance of English Methodism in the intelligence or good taste of its people; the latter, however, finds no difficulty in

(Illinois) received last year *forty-four* probationers, making its list of candidates *seventy-two*, and more numerous by twenty-seven than its whole list of effective members! Another conference received twenty-five, giving it a probationers' list of forty-four; another twenty-three, giving it forty-seven candidates; another twenty-one, giving it thirty-three. The itinerant ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church (North and South) now numbers six thousand five hundred men; the Roman Catholics report but about one thousand one hundred; the Protestant Episcopalians about one thousand five hundred; the Congregational orthodox about one thousand six hundred; the old-school Presbyterians about two thousand; the new-school one thousand five hundred; the Baptists about five thousand one hundred.* These comparative statements show that Methodism is prolific in its resources of men if not of other means for its ministry. The supply would be up to its necessities if not above them, we repeat, were it not for the late impolitic deviations from its old and successful itinerant plans; and even as it is, we believe that with suitable aids and encouragements, such as other denominations provide, we could, even now, command a superabundance of candidates.

This fact is worthy of special remark. It is quite unique in the current history of the American Churches. While our sister denominations are universally lamenting the decrease of their theological students, we rejoice amidst multiplying candidates.† The fact is full of providential significance; it corresponds with what we have said of the great providential mission yet awaiting Methodism in this land; it corresponds further with the new demands of our cause which have been stated. For the latter we should avail ourselves of it in two ways.

First. We should be more choice in our selections from these increasing candidates. Would that we could impress the remark upon our conferences. Let us learn that piety, though the chief, is not the only qualification for the ministry—that *gifts* as well as *graces* are required by our own standards; and that now, more

keeping up itinerancy and a powerful constantly-working local ministry, in both country and city. We hope the old metropolis of American Methodism, Baltimore, will hesitate long to follow the example of our other cities in these "reforms." There are advantages in the change, but how dearly are they paid for!

* This includes all its preachers, whether pastors or not. If our local preachers were included in the estimate of the Methodist ministry, its amount would be more than trebled.

† Our only theological school, while yet in its infancy, has grown to be numerically the third in the nation, and will undoubtedly soon be the first.

than at any other period of our history, is this double criterion both necessary and practicable. We certainly are not yet as cautious in this respect as our circumstances require; energetic zeal without ability, if successful in its first efforts, or under special circumstances, is too readily taken as the certain pledge of enduring usefulness; and the untrained novice is urged into the conference, to be too often an encumbrance ever after, suffering himself as well as inflicting suffering on the Church for the ill-advised urgency of his brethren.

Further: This increasing supply of men should lead to more delay in their admission to the ministerial service, and thereby secure better preparation for it. This policy would be wise even in such conferences as suffer somewhat through lack of labourers. The precipitancy with which we have pressed young men into our laborious ministry has been a crying evil. It has sent hosts of them to premature graves. It has inflicted upon many physical disabilities which have subtracted from their usefulness through life. It has occasioned a startling ineffective list, which draws upon the resources of the Church for support, and suffers notwithstanding, amidst our very altars. There are now *five hundred and eleven* superannuated and supernumerary preachers, reported in our minutes—nearly *one-eighth* of our whole ministry.* Our ministerial tables of mortality have scarcely a parallel. Nearly half of all the Methodist preachers whose deaths have been recorded, fell before they were thirty years of age. The time spent in the itinerant work by 672 has been ascertained: 199 spent from 2 to 5 years; 209 from 5 to 12; 129 from 12 to 25; 90 from 25 to 40; 32 from 40 to 50; and 13 from 50 to 61. *About two-thirds died after twelve years' itinerant service.*

Much of this astonishing mortality is attributable to the haste with which we have urged youthful labourers into our hard service. What a waste of not only health and life, but of usefulness has this blindly-zealous policy occasioned. There are apologetic considerations connected with the subject we know, but none which fully justify us.

We have amended in this respect, but not sufficiently. Few sights could be more impressive than an assembled Methodist conference, for it presents the best example of what moral heroism is yet extant in our world; but there are painful detractions from the scene. It is scattered over with pallid and decayed men, who ought to be in the prime of manly vigour. It is composed too much, and, we fear, increasingly, of immature men,† whose juvenile and yet

* This includes not the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

† Bishop Soule, some years since, in a published letter referred with emphatic regret to this fact.

often enfeebled aspect, seems out of place there—men who have too early been subjected to the labours and anxieties of our ministry, and who find that they can make up for their deficient preparation only by the sacrifice of their health. Better for them, in body and mind, would it be did we retain our old circuits, for these would require fewer mental resources, and supply invigorating bodily exercise; but appointed, as they mostly are, to isolated and hardly self-supporting stations, amidst the rivalries of older sects how can they sustain their positions without sacrificing themselves?

This offering of human hecatombs at our altars should cease, and should cease right speedily—whatever plea of necessity for it once existed, has virtually ceased. Our younger candidates should be reserved—recognised, but reserved—on a Wesleyan “reserve list” if you please, and aided in their intellectual preparation for the work in such manner as to relieve them afterwards from the pressure under which so many now sink.

And this should be the case, we repeat, not only in the older but also in the more recent fields of our ministerial work. In arguing that the later fields will still indefinitely demand our old homiletics and old methods, we have not implied that the intellectual advancement of the ministry was to be confined to the older conferences—assuredly not! If genuine ability is anywhere needed, it is in the great arena which has been described as now opening for the final moral conflicts of the country; and such ability not only in natural rudeness, but cultivated and even accomplished, may find there a most appropriate field of exertion, and find also in the severities of our itinerant methods congenial occasions of heroism and self-sacrifice.

There is, we fear, still lingering among us, and only half latent, a fallacious apprehension that intellectual improvement, pushed to any considerable advancement in our ministry, would be hurtful to its old purity and energy. We forget that Methodism, like the Reformation, modern missions, and almost every other great movement of the evangelical world, had its birth in an institution of learning. “It sounded its first trumpet,” says some one, “and commenced its triumphant march over the world, from within the gates of a university.” Most of its great leaders were learned men. Wesley, its founder and legislator, was the Fellow of a college; Charles Wesley, its psalmist, was a collegian in the same university; Coke, its first American bishop, and the founder of its missions, bore the highest title of the learned world; Benson was a university student; Fletcher was the president of a theological school; Clarke was a master of universal knowledge.

Among our own great names are those of Ruter, Emory, Fisk, Olin, and others of the dead and the living. Were these men unfitted for the demands of Methodism by their intellectual culture? Were they less devoted, less useful, less faithful to the peculiar duties of our system than their uneducated fellow-labourers? And would a ministry generally composed of just such men be unsuitable for even the hardest demands of our work? No, no; mental capacity does not imply moral incapacity. Methodism is compatible with large minds, as well as large hearts, and can employ them on the sublimest scale of their powers. We soberly believe that such minds, imbued with the evangelical spirit, can find nowhere else a more congenial sphere of self-devotion and self-development. Men of less capacity have been signally useful among us, but it has been appropriately asked, "What would be the standing of Methodism at this moment, if the mass of our ministry had added to their natural powers the acquired talents of such men?" Its banners would in all probability be waving over most of the world.

Let us then heed those indications of Providence which call upon us better to supply our candidates with qualifications for their work. In meeting our present necessities, let us select such as are maturest in mind and body—not always the most talented or the most devoted; for these, if feeble or young, may be prematurely sacrificed, but, in either case, may be rendered more useful by a preparatory delay.

The extraordinary fact of our large (though, for unnecessary reasons, still deficient) supply of preachers, and the convenience which, with right management, it offers for a "reserve" corps, should, we think, receive extraordinary attention from the Church. Few facts in our history have been more available for the fuller development of our ministerial energies. Our wise men should study to turn it to advantage, devising for this purpose most "liberal things." Such, too, is the popular demand among us for the intellectual improvement of the ministry, notwithstanding the "half-latent" prejudice mentioned, that it cannot be doubted the Church would respond with the promptest generosity to any plan for the benefit of its younger ministry—the ministry to which it is to commit its children, and with which are associated therefore its tenderest solitudes.

But what plan shall we adopt for this preparatory training?

Presuming that we have thus far carried along with us the concurrence of most if not all our readers, it might only mar the influence of this article to conclude it with a discussion of debated plans of ministerial improvement. However slight may be that influence, we would have it unimpaired on the subjects thus far treated, for we deem them among the paramount Methodist questions of the

day. Relying, however, on the forbearance which we have already bespoken for honest, though they should be erroneous, opinions, when advanced in a periodical like this, where, if anywhere, inquiry should find both freedom and courtesy, we shall venture to submit a few suggestions on the question just proposed.

First, then, we think a *reserved list* should be kept by each conference, bearing the names of candidates who may not be immediately prepared for the ministry, and especially of promising young men who, even if the conference is not abundantly supplied, should nevertheless be reserved for better preparation and riper years, as this policy would be an economical one in the result. Such a relation of candidates to the conference, however slight, would be better than none at all. Though not admitted, they would at least be recognised. A tie, now unknown among us, would connect them with the "regular ministry," and not be without a partial influence. Whether this delay leads them to our institutions of learning, or to continue yet awhile in secular business, they will be more inclined to bear in mind and prepare for their destined work; their reading and local exercises in preaching, would have more habitual reference to it.

Second. We should provide a *course of study* for this reserved corps. A course of study for our local preachers has been repeatedly called for, and would tend much to elevate this branch of our ministerial service. The same course would do for reserved candidates, and brethren who design to remain in the local ranks. A modification of our present conference course, might suffice. The success of any such requirement must, however, depend upon its *authoritative* character; it should, therefore, be subject to the official care of the presiding elder, and accompanied with regular examinations, in the presence of either the quarterly conference or a committee of its ministerial members. Some sort of *system*, in other words, with *personal responsibilities*, is necessary if we would have the design effective; and those who may object to our further suggestions, should see that something precise and practicable, on the plan here mentioned, be provided as the only security against further demands.

Third. Many of the best minds among us think the time has come in which the Church should require higher literary prerequisites, and provide means for the better *education of candidates*, or at least of such as have not themselves the means. The cardinal religious denominations of the country have such provisions in the form of "Education Societies." They are important features in the philanthropic finances of some of these denominations. It has been complained that, though no Church has more promising claimants of such aid than ours, and none needs it more, yet none has

shown less disposition to provide it. Men now in our own ministry, it is said, have been compelled to receive assistance from the Education Societies of sister Churches. If the comparative paucity of our resources, or the urgency of other interests, have heretofore excused us from this claim, it is contended we cannot plead the excuse any longer. We now abound in resources, and it cannot be doubted that any financial project, sanctioned by our leading minds, and proposing an obvious advantage to the Church, can command any necessary liberality from it: its popularity and success will indeed generally be proportionate to the generosity and greatness of its designs. Has the time come, then, for the formation of an "Education Society" among us, for the better preparation of our ministerial candidates—a great, a denominational society, which shall take rank by the side of our leading financial schemes? This project need not involve the question of theological schools, nor any particular standard of ministerial training. It could, like similar societies in other Churches, provide merely a given annual appropriation for the support of candidates in our academies or colleges, subject to few and general restrictions. Personally we are not prepared to say how far such an institution would be applicable to the present circumstances of the denomination; so strong, however, is the demand for educated, or at least intellectual men, for the pulpits of our Atlantic churches, that it is believed our people would take no ordinary interest in it, provided it were projected on a scale of commanding proportions.

Fourth. There are not a few among us who believe that *institutions expressly for theological education* are appropriate to our present circumstances. Whether justly or otherwise, there is also in the Church a vast amount of not only popular but intelligent opposition to such institutions. The primitive Methodist preachers, as we have described them, were, it is justly affirmed, the mighty men of their day, but they came not forth from theological seminaries. It is replied, on the other hand, that they were providentially raised up for their times—that the times have changed, not in respect to the work, but the workmen—that Providence which especially fitted them for their times, now indicates that we should ourselves aid in their preparation. The first preachers of Christianity, it is argued, were miraculously qualified for this work, but when the early exigencies of the Church were past, miraculous gifts ceased, and the task of providing pastors was devolved upon the Church; and, continues the argument, you might as well contend that your missionaries need not study the language of China, in order to preach there, because the apostles had the miraculous gift of tongues, as to object to theologi-

cal education, because they or the first preachers of Methodism were not academically trained.

The advocates of the theological schools complain that they have not been favoured with a fair hearing through our leading organs. Whatever may be the opposition of the reader to their scheme, we are sure he will be willing to hear them impartially. To silence this charge, as well as to present candidly their views, we cannot do better than to give the following rather ardent quotation from one of the most enthusiastic among them.

"Such institutions," he says, "were not considered by the founder of Methodism to be foreign to its genius and interests. In the very first conference he ever held, he himself proposed such a measure; the proposition was repeated in the second session, and was never lost sight of by the Wesleyan connexion during the long interval that elapsed before its resources enabled it to embody the design in its present noble seminaries. The success of the measure has demonstrated its wisdom. . . . Have not our circumstances as a Church changed? Are we not able to afford our ministry the intellectual qualifications which once they could not obtain but by special endowment? And is it not clear, from the whole history of Providence, that when such ability exists, its special interposition ceases? It would be a curse on the world for Divine Providence to supersede the necessity of our self-dependence as individuals, or as communities. Our fathers are passing away. Providence supplies us no more with such men, and thereby clearly indicates our duty to qualify our ministry according to the means which he gives us. He will still call men to his work, but we must open the way for them. We propose not to *make* preachers of his word, but only to aid those whom he has evidently called to preach it. Who dares object to such a proposal? Providence has led us along from one improvement to another, until now this great want stands in our way like a mountain, with its summit glorious with light. We cannot pass round it; let us, then, go over it, that our ministry may, like Moses, come down to the people with their brows radiant with its brightness. . . . Under our old system the repetition of a few well-studied subjects could take the place of fifty under our present arrangement. This is no deduction from the old system—it was one of its best points of adaptation to an uneducated ministry. But now we fix untrained men in small stations, amid the closest competition, where they are overburdened with pastoral duties, which were unknown to our fathers, and expect them to maintain our cause with success among a population the most enlightened on the globe. How is it possible for a young man without discipline, without a knowledge of books or of men, to furnish instruction for two years under such circumstances? A few of our most vigorous minds may nerve themselves for the necessities of such a position, but the mass of the ministry must necessarily fall into the rear of the educated ministries of other sects. . . . It is objected that education will pervert our young men. This is one of those vandal sentiments which I hardly know how to discuss. Is it a question, in this day, whether education is favourable or injurious to virtue? Why, then, have we not waited for its decision before establishing our academies and colleges? Are we afraid that Methodism in particular cannot consist with intelligence? Then it cannot be true, and the sooner we discover our delusion, the better. Methodism is compatible with intelligence. Some of the greatest intellects have grown up under its influence; its glorious theology and mighty system are suited to the highest minds, and in no other Church can a great mind have freer scope for its powers. But how does this objection agree with fact? Have our learned men been

perverted? Have they not been among the holiest and most useful men in our Church? Did learning corrupt Wesley, Fletcher, Coke, or Benson? Whose memory is more sacred among us than Fisk's? And was he perverted by learning? Was Ruter, who left the presidency of a college for the sufferings of a missionary, one of the examples from which this objection is drawn? Was Emory another? Our most learned men have been our holiest men. They have been the staunchest friends of our doctrines and our discipline, because their capacious minds have the better comprehended their excellence. And is not this the case with the young men who come into the ministry from our learned institutions? Where do you find better pastors and more devoted preachers than they? It is mortifying that Methodism should still be trammelled and enervated by such petty prejudices. We Methodists do not yet comprehend the sublimity and promise of our cause. We have been deluded by the impression that ours is a particular, and not a general system—that it is applicable to a particular class, but not to all classes. Methodism is universal in its adaptation. We are bearing up unconsciously before the world the ensigns of the Millennium. Our doctrines and measures have been transforming other sects; they are to reach the savage and the sage, the slave and the sovereign. We believe it, because we believe they are the truth. Give, then, to Methodism a free action. Let it appropriate to itself all auxiliaries, especially learning. Its gigantic plans are suited for gigantic powers. Throw the energies of a sanctified and educated ministry into its potent system, and it will produce results which we have not yet imagined. Once more: it is asserted that 'the history of theological schools, in all ages, shows their influence to be corrupting.' If we object to theological schools because they have been abused, we may also object to nearly every other great measure. Episcopacy was observed in the early Church as much as theological schools; must we abandon it on that account? The press has been foully abused; are we therefore to turn it out of our Book Concern? Religion has been perverted in every detail; shall we therefore turn atheists? The reason of the corruption of theological schools was the corruption of all knowledge. Theological, like all other schools, will, of course, be affected by the intellectual state of the age in which they exist. It was the general prevalence of the New Platonism that introduced error into the Alexandrian school. But it introduced it everywhere else also. It infected Philo the Jew, and Longinus the Pagan, as well as Origen the Christian. It was the introduction of the Aristotelian dialectics that produced the metaphysical absurdities of the schools of the middle ages; but they infected every other department of knowledge, alike with theology. They were the intellectual characteristics of the times, deluding the monk in his secluded meditations, as well as the student in the school. But we live in a different age; science is now more thoroughly verified; a new mode of inquiry has been introduced, which will never allow a similar confusion of knowledge. There may be new corruptions in theology, but they cannot originate as did those upon which the objection is founded; they will be such as will be more likely to be prevented than favoured by knowledge. Theological schools have, indeed, like all other good institutions of religion, been corrupt; but, like all others, they have also been blessed. It would seem, from history, that Providence has wedded religion and knowledge, and signalized their union in most of the great events of the Church. The first rays of returning daylight, after the dark ages, streamed forth upon the world from the cloisters of the University of Wittenberg. It was from its gates that Martin Luther came forth, with the Bible in his hands, to summon the world to its moral resurrection. It was from the University of Geneva that Calvin, at the same time, was sounding the alarm among the Alps. And where did the next great revival of Christianity take place? It was among the theological students of Oxford. Yes! Methodism, now so fearful of ministerial education, first awoke in the cradle of English learning. It sounded its first trump, and commenced

its march over the world, in the gates of a university. Where did the first conception of foreign missions, from the American Churches, originate? Within the walls of a theological school; and from that school have gone to the pagan world a greater number of devoted men than from any other source in our land. The theological school at Basle, in Switzerland, has been one of the greatest fountains of religious influence that is in Europe. The one at Geneva is now the chief instrumentality in restoring the principles of the reformation to Switzerland and France. The great defenders of religion have nearly all been educated theologians. Science has no legitimate tendency to evil; it is the echo of the same voice which speaks in revelation. Revelation itself has as often been used for the support of error, as science; and the one must be rejected on the same ground that the other is."

After this long insertion, we hope there will be no charge of timid partiality on the question, against this journal at least. The extract certainly has ardour enough, if it has not an excess of argument. We leave our readers to judge of the latter. They are as competent as ourselves to distinguish between its logic and its rhetoric.

It is due to the advocates of this measure to say, that they are of various opinions respecting it. Some of them think that departments of theological instruction, suitable for the preparation of ministerial candidates, can be connected with our academies and colleges. Others, though very few, we suppose, advocate a high theological seminary, modelled after the best in other Churches, and requiring considerable preparatory, if not collegiate, training—a proposition which appears to us practically absurd in the present circumstances of our ministry. Others, and doubtless the greatest number, propose separate seminaries, on the plan of the "Wesleyan Theological Institutions," which shall be adapted to the actual wants of the student, whatever may be the deficiencies of his education, and shall combine with their intellectual advantages thorough training in such social and pastoral habits as may especially befit his future office: they would have them be "schools of the prophets,"—ministerial households, maintained under a strictly-religious regimen, and excluding the perverting influences and invidious prejudices which they allege would affect our young candidates in common academies or colleges. Such is the experiment now being made among our brethren of the eastern States.

We have thus attempted to show what was the *character of our primitive ministry*; how far its *preaching and methods* are still needed; what *improvements*, homiletic ones at least, are desirable; and some of the *means* by which it is proposed to secure these improvements. Our cause has reached a maturity and magnitude in this nation which give no little importance to such questions, and we dismiss the subject with the conviction that, however we have failed to do it justice, it cannot fail to command the interest of our readers.

ART. VIII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) SOME years ago we used to see, every now and then, a paragraph in the papers, mentioning the apparition, in some out-of-the-way corner of the world, of a German lady, who was said to have visited all lands and seen all strange people. The stories told of her often appeared apocryphal, yet the lady was no *myth*, but a very substantial Austrian female, who has recently convinced mankind of her reality, by printing a book describing her travels, part of which is now offered us in "*A Lady's Voyage round the World: a selected translation from the German of IDA PFEIFFER.*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 302.) Though the continuity of the narrative is broken by the method of selection adopted by the translator, the book abounds in curious peeps into odd places. It is not every lady that has doubled the Cape, attended Queen Pomare's court-balls, eaten rice with Chinese mandarins, attended mosque in Delhi, watched the excavations at Nimroud, and gone to prison in Asiatic Russia.

(2.) MR. BOHN continues the publication of his several excellent libraries with praiseworthy promptness. Among the recent issues, we have in the "Scientific Library," "*Petrifactions and their Teachings*, by G. A. Mantell, LL. D." (12mo., pp. 496.) The work was primarily intended as a hand-book for visitors to the Gallery of Organic Remains of the British Museum, and as an explanatory catalogue for the scientific student of those remains; but it also answers for those who never have seen or shall see the Museum, as an illustrated account of its contents. The "Classical Library" is enriched by a "*Literal version of Lucretius*, by Rev. J. S. WATSON, to which is added the poetical version of John Mason Good," (12mo., pp. 496,) affording to the mere English reader a better opportunity of knowing Lucretius than has ever before been offered. In the "Illustrated Library," we find a "*History and Description of Modern Wines*, by CYRUS REDDING," (12mo., pp. 440,) which describes the wines of various countries, and informs the uninitiated how they can be *manufactured* to order. In the "Standard Library," we have "*Vasari's Lives of the Painters*," vol. iv. A supply of all the Libraries is constantly kept on hand by Bangs, Brother & Co., New-York.

(3.) CONFIRMATIONS of the general veracity and accuracy of HERODOTUS accumulate with every year's additions to our knowledge of ancient history, and no library, even of the most moderate pretence, can afford to be without a copy of his work. We are therefore glad to announce a neat reprint of Beloe's translation, (New-York: Bangs, Brother & Co., 13 Park-Row, 1852; 8vo., pp. 488.) This edition is enriched by a life of Herodotus, by Leonard Schmitz, LL. D., and has all of Beloe's notes, with a copious index. It is got up in excellent style, both as to printing and binding.

(4.) THE LORD'S PRAYER has been the subject of many learned treatises both in ancient and in modern times, but its unfailing abundance, and its marvellous adaptation to the exigencies of each successive age and of every new development of humanity, make new expositions constantly desirable. We welcome, therefore, a volume of "*Lectures on the Lord's Prayer*, by WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 12mo., pp. 241,) which are marked by the same characteristic clearness of conception, soundness of exposition, and eloquence of style, that distinguish the other works of the same writer heretofore noticed in this journal.

(5.) WE announce with pleasure the second number of Neander's Practical Expositions, namely, "*The Epistle of James, practically explained*," (New-York: L. Colby, 1852; 12mo., pp. 115.) Not intended as a critical commentary, its exegesis is yet founded upon a strong scientific basis, and it penetrates into the meaning of special passages with a skill that is only surpassed by the comprehensiveness with which it grasps and sets forth the scope of the Epistle as a whole. Mrs. Conant does the work of translation at once gracefully and accurately.

(6.) WE are late in receiving, and therefore in acknowledging, "*Isaiah translated and explained*, by JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER," (New-York: John Wiley, 1851; 2 vols., 12mo.) The work is an abridgment of the author's larger critical commentary on Isaiah, which is now out of print. It has not been rewritten, but contracted by simple omission. In its present form the work is admirably adapted to popular reading, while it still remains the best commentary on Isaiah for theological students in our language.

(7.) "*An Address delivered before the Sterling Medical College*, by EDWARD THOMPSON, M. D., D. D., President of the Ohio Wesleyan University," (Columbus: 1851,) is an earnest appeal to medical men to cultivate *logic*—an appeal pre-eminently needed. No books are worse written, both as to logic and style, than the medical books of the present generation, unless, perhaps, the law-books. Dr. Thompson's address is full of sound thoughts, expressed in admirable language.

(8.) THE "*Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers,) continues to appear at regular intervals. The narrative grows in interest, if that be possible, and the illustrations are as numerous and beautiful as ever. A more attractive family book of history has never been issued in this country. Nineteen parts have appeared—a few more will complete the work.

(9.) SINCE Bunyan's Pilgrim, we doubt whether a better allegory has appeared than "*Salander and the Dragon, a Romance of the Hartz Prison*, by F. W. SHELTON, M. A." (New-York: John S. Taylor, 1852; 18mo., pp. 250.) We have read it through at a sitting, and few of our readers who take it up will fail to do likewise. The fearful results of *slander* are illustrated in a most striking and effective style. We commend the book, to young and old, as one that will enchain their attention while it will fix a great moral lesson upon their hearts.

(10.) THE usages of Methodism are becoming a common topic of discussion and criticism, both in and out of the Church. We could not hinder this if we would, and would not if we could. No mere *usages* can be permanent in stereotyped forms—unless stereotyped by death. We have before us an excellent "*Discourse delivered in the Clinton-street Methodist Episcopal Church, Newark, N. J.*, by Rev. L. D. BARROWS," the object of which is to show that Methodism excels other Churches in its "self-sacrificing spirit for the salvation of the race." (Mr. Barrows calls this "*the distinctive feature of Methodism*;" but surely he does not mean to assert that other Churches are *entirely* destitute of it.) This spirit of self-sacrifice is shown in three leading features of Methodism; namely, class-meetings, church-building, and itinerancy. On the first of these heads the discourse is clear, pointed, and convincing; on the second, it is somewhat obscure and hesitating. Mr. Barrows does not wish to advocate "an inferior order of church-building," but deprecates "expensive" churches. Closer definition is necessary to make his views *practical*. So too he appears to justify pewed churches *for New-England*, but to oppose their introduction anywhere else. The third head is treated very vigorously.

(11.) WE welcome most cordially the first volume of Putnam's Semi-monthly Library for Travellers and the Fireside; namely, "*Home and Social Philosophy*," (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 1852; 12mo., pp. 263,) which is the first series of a classified reprint of Dickens's "Household Words." The distinctive characteristics of the "Semi-monthly Library" are, a periodical issue, so that the books can be mailed; size and form, fitting the books for the traveller's pocket as well as for the book-case; excellence in the selection of matter, and *low price*. The present volume affords a large collection of delightful reading for *twenty-five cents*. We trust this series will take the place, to a great extent, of the yellow-covered works which are hawked about our steam-boats and railroad cars; and that Mr. Putnam's taste and enterprise will be amply rewarded by a large sale.

(12.) WE have received the sixteenth and seventeenth numbers of Mayhew's "*London Labour and the London Poor*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers,) in which the *scavengery* of the great metropolis is treated in very full detail. It were heartily to be wished that the municipal authorities of some great cities nearer home than London would take a leaf out of Mr. Mayhew's book on the subject of *clean streets*.

(13.) REV. J. O. CHOULES passed some months in Europe last year with three of his pupils. The boys kept a journal, and wrote a number of letters to a friend at home, which are now gathered into a neat volume, under the title of "*Young Americans Abroad; or, Vacation in Europe*," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 18mo., pp. 371,) which will be very acceptable to youthful readers.

(14.) "*Memories of the Great Metropolis; or, London from the Tower to the Crystal Palace*," by F. SAUNDERS." (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 12mo., pp. 311.)

The design of this volume is to furnish a compact manual for visitors to the British metropolis. It has the accuracy of a Guide-Book without its dryness; and abounds in precisely the kind of information which a cultivated traveller most desiderates. And for stay-at-home travellers, who make their excursions only through the medium of books, we recommend this volume, as one which, by its pleasant, easy, and yet scholarly talk about the famous spots of London, will be to them a most entertaining and instructive companion.

(15.) THE value of Dr. Lardner's elementary treatises on physical science has been long known to teachers and students. New editions of the "*Mechanics*," the "*Hydrostatics*," and the "*Optics*," have just been issued by MESSRS. Blanchard & Lea, of Philadelphia; and the three books are also bound up in one strong thick volume of 750 pages, forming the best and most complete manual on these subjects extant, to our knowledge. Full questions for examination adapt the work to use as a text-book in schools and colleges.

(16.) ANOTHER volume of Schmitz and Zumpt's classical series is now offered, viz., "*Eclogæ ex Q. Horatii Flacci Poematibus*," (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 1852; 18mo., pp. 311.) The text is founded on Orelli's. The commentary was begun by the late Dr. C. G. Zumpt, and finished by his son A. W. Zumpt. The work is done in the same spirit of care and discretion that characterizes all the books of this excellent series. It is a sad pity they are not better printed and on better paper: though these advantages are probably incompatible with the very low price at which the books are sold.

(17.) THE second volume of the reprint of the "Young Christian Series," is "*The Corner Stone*, by JACOB ABBOTT." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 380.) The work is designed to illustrate the fundamental truths of Christianity in clear and plain style, free from technical terms, and adapted to general use. CHRIST is justly made the centre of the Christian system in this admirable work, and the great truths of religion are set forth as they naturally connect themselves with his history. Mr. Abbott's peculiar power of graphic description, as well as of pure narrative, find abundant scope in a work of this plan.

(18.) WE have heretofore once or twice commended "Woodbury's Method with German," and have now to record a high tribute to its merit in the issue of a work avowedly modelled after it, viz., "*A New Method of Learning the French Language*," by LOUIS FASQUELLE, LL. D., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Michigan." (New-York: M. H. Newman, 1852; 12mo., pp. 499.) The work, like Woodbury's, combines both the analytic and the synthetic modes of teaching, giving in Part I. the rules in the most simple form, applying them at once, and introducing the idioms of the language gradually, so as not to present too many difficulties at once; and in Part II. a tolerably ample Grammar of the language. The work is done everywhere with conscientious thoroughness.

(19.) "*Sinfulness of American Slavery*, by Rev. CHARLES ELLIOTT, D. D." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1850; 2 vols., 12mo.) By some mishap this book has not reached our table till a very late period; so that our tardiness in noticing it is not our own fault. The author was appointed by the General Conference of 1848, to write the History of the Church for the preceding four years—a requirement which obviously involved a survey of the subject of slavery. His resources for this survey are ample; indeed, few libraries can be so rich in the literature of the subject as Dr. Elliott's, if we may judge from the full list of authorities appended to the second volume; and no man could be more patient and diligent in the study of authorities. Dr. Elliott never undertakes the investigation of a subject that he does not sift thoroughly. No book, pamphlet, or even newspaper article of value, can escape his ever-watchful vigilance. So it has been in the case before us. These two volumes are a complete repertory of facts on the subject of Slavery in its relations to the moral law. Another volume, on "Servitude and Slavery," is in preparation; and the three are intended to show that the "Scripture neither sanctions nor tolerates slavery: that the regulations of the Mosaic code referred to *servitude*, so as to prevent it from running into slavery." The history of the Methodist Episcopal Church from 1844 to 1848 will follow the third volume.

The work before us is divided into six parts, of which Part I. treats of "American Slavery and the African Slave trade," and shows that in principle the two are identical. Dr. Elliott, however, is careful to discriminate between *guilty* and *innocent* slaveholders:—

"Some may become the legal owners of slaves by will or inheritance. Others, though convinced of the sinfulness of the system, may not have it in their power to set their slaves free, for the present, and they hold them in order to do them the greatest good possible. Such, certainly, cannot be placed in the list of transgressors or sinners: otherwise, one person, by his act, can make another a sinner; or one can be made a sinner by the act of another—which is absurd. Such employ the mere legal tenure to emancipate the slave, and prevent him from becoming a slave for life, and his posterity after him; or he employs this legal tenure to do the slave all the good he can, although he cannot set him free.

"There are others who love slavery and the laws which authorize and protect it. They daily strive to render that law more stringent. They use their power over the slave for their own benefit, without regard to the rights of man or the law of God; and they resist the annulment of slave laws."

Part II. shows that slavery deprives men of their natural rights, personal liberty, property, education, religious privileges, marriage, &c. Part III. exhibits, in strong colours, the injuries inflicted by slavery. Part IV. treats of its contrariety to the Christian Scriptures: Part V. of its effects on the master, the slave, and the community: and Part VI. offers a number of observations on the duty and practicability of emancipation. It will be seen from this brief statement, that in the volumes before us, and in those that are to follow, Dr. Elliott proposes an extensive survey of the whole subject, which, like his great work on Romanism, will afford in itself a treasury of facts and arguments on the matter of which it treats.

(20.) "*The Iliad of Homer, with Notes for the use of Schools and Colleges*, by JOHN I. OWEN, D. D." (New-York: Leavitt & Co., 1851; 12mo., pp. 740.)

The text is reprinted from Wolf's, with occasional variations. In the preparation of the notes Professor Owen has in this, as in all his text-books, consulted the *real* wants of students, preserving a just mean between the two extremes of meagreness and prolixity. Prefixed to the text is a summary of each book, affording the student a general view of the plan of the poem. A brief grammatical Index, and a more copious historical one, add greatly to the value of the edition for the use of students. The type is of the beautiful Porsonian cut—and the whole getting up of the work is admirable.

(21.) AMONG many indications of evil to the Church, the demand for works of practical religion is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. "*A Wreath Around the Cross*, by Rev. A. MORTON BROWN," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 18mo., pp. 313,) is intended to exhibit Scripture doctrine through the medium of Scripture facts—"to elevate the Cross above all, and to plead with all classes to look to Jesus." It is accompanied by a recommendatory preface from Rev. J. A. James.

(22.) THE "*True Practice of Religion*, from the Dutch *Shorter Doctrine of Practice*, by Rev. EWALDUS KIST, D. D." (New-Orleans: John Ball, 12mo., pp. 448.) Of the writer of this book we know nothing, except that he wrote some volumes of sermons, besides this manual of practical religion, which has long enjoyed an extensive circulation in Holland. It would be a most excellent *vade-mecum* for Christians of all classes, were it less Calvinistic in its groundwork.

(23.) MR. LAYARD has done a most excellent service to that large portion of the reading public which was precluded from purchasing his "*Nineveh and its Remains*," by its high price, in preparing "*A Popular Account of Discoveries at Nineveh, abridged by the author from his larger work*." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 360.) The plan pursued in the abridgment has been to omit the second part of the original work, and to introduce the principal Biblical and historical illustrations into the body of the narrative. This last is a great improvement, and makes the abridgment a better book for general readers than the original. The work is beautifully got up, and profusely illustrated, and is yet sold at a remarkably low price.

(24.) "*Wesley and Methodism*, by ISAAC TAYLOR." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 12mo., pp. 328.) In this work Mr. Taylor abandons the line of spiritual pathology, and takes to that of criticism and prophecy. An extended review will be offered as soon as possible.

(25.) "*Lectures on the History of France*, by the Right Hon. Sir JAMES STEPHENS, Professor of Modern History, in the University of Cambridge." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 8vo., pp. 710.) In publishing this volume, Sir James Stephens disclaims any pretence of entitling himself to a place in that small and illustrious company of historical writers to which Mr.

Macaulay and Mr. Hallam belong. Indeed, it is only a wonder that he would put before the public, under any circumstances, a work so rapidly executed as to be necessarily imperfect. But it is a course of lectures, not a history, and as such it is to be judged. Appointed to his professorship in 1849, Sir James delivered the first twelve lectures in this volume in the spring of 1850, and the remaining twelve in the summer of 1851. They are printed, because, strange to say, no other introduction to the History of France, worthy of the name, or fitted to accompany young students in listening to a lecturer, exists in our language. And for general readers they possess all the attractions which have made the author's contributions to the Edinburgh Review so popular—viz., breadth of view, clearness of statement, and animation of style. The book, large as it is, and abounding in discussion as well as narrative, is everywhere readable. In view of all its qualities, it is worthy of a place in every library.

(26.) "*The Successful Merchant: Sketches of the Life of Mr. Samuel Budgett*, by WILLIAM ARTHUR, A. M." (New-York: Lane & Scott, 16mo., pp. 420.) This is the biography of a man who commenced trade at ten years of age by picking up a horse-shoe and selling it for a penny—and ended at fifty-six, as one of the largest merchants of the West of England. The book is full of attraction: the reader who takes it up will hardly be inclined to lay it down till he has finished its perusal. Mr. Arthur is known as the author of "*A Mission to Mysore*," in which he showed great power of description and capacity for clear and pleasant narrative; and these qualities are strikingly displayed in the work before us. The book is valuable, not only as a narrative, but also for its valuable reflections on *commercial morals*, a subject prolific of interest in all times, and which never needed thorough discussion more than now.

* * A large number of notices are necessarily omitted.

ART. IX.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

We have received the third volume of "*Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament*," completing the work. (London: Bagsters, 8vo., 656 pp.) It will, as the author modestly hopes, prove acceptable to the growing class of theological students who are alive to the tendencies of the age, as "a contribution towards a full understanding of the questions connected with the department of Introduction." Dr. Davidson has not that highest skill of authorship—the selection of just the points on which perspicuity and completeness depend, and the apt subordination of all others to these—

but he works laboriously and faithfully, and puts his readers in the way of forming independent judgments on many questions, which, without his aid, it would require the study of many books to master. We hope the work will soon be reprinted in America.

THE Wesleyan agitation in England has given rise to many discussions of mere transient interest, but it has also called forth some writings of more permanent value. Among these are "*The Pblity of Wesleyan Methodism, exhibited and defended*" by GEORGE SMITH, F. A. S., (author of the

Patriarchal Age, the Hebrew People, &c.) which consists of two lectures, giving a historical review of the rise, progress, and present state of Wesleyan Methodism, and a careful comparison of all its leading peculiarities with the teaching of Holy Scripture. Mr. Smith has also published a treatise on "*The Doctrine of the Pastorate, considered with special reference to Wesleyan Methodism.*" (Svo., 123 pp.) The work treats of the Divine Institution, the Religious Responsibilities and the Scriptural Claims of the Christian Ministry; and although it was suggested by the controversies of the times, it avoids polemics as much as possible, aiming rather to present a portable summary of Christian teaching on the subject of the ministry.

A MANUSCRIPT of Wiclif's in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, has been recently published under the title of "Three Treatises of John Wiclif, D. D.,—I. On the Church and her Members: II. On the Apostasy of the Church: III. On Antichrist." (Dublin.) The work is edited with notes and a glossary by J. H. Todd, D. D.

THAT veteran writer, Faber, who has kept his pen at work with restless activity for half a century, has just offered to the world what he calls his "last, and perhaps his dying, performance" in the "*Many Mansions of the House of our Father, spiritually discussed and practically considered,*" in which he maintains that this earth from first to last is the exclusive theatre of all which concerns the human race.

PROF. JACOB has published, in Berlin, a volume of "*Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, von Dr. A. NEANDER,*" (268 pp., 8vo.,) containing a number of addresses and essays, theological, moral, and historical.

"*A Brief History of the Wesleyan Missions on the Western Coast of Africa,* by William Fox," (London, 1851,) is a handsome 8vo. volume of 624 pages. Why it should be called a "brief history," we are at a loss to imagine: for a more wearisomely prolix book we have rarely seen. Yet in spite of this grave fault the book abounds in interest. It contains a full account of the slave-trade, past and present, a description of the principal European settlements on the African coast, a sketch of all that has been done by the Wesleyan Missions there, with biographical accounts of all the Missionaries (Wesleyan) who have died in that important field of labour. As the

author was himself two years in this perilous service, he is well acquainted with the coast, and has penetrated farther into the interior than any European now living; he is well entitled to speak on the subject, and we bespeak for him an attentive and favourable hearing.

ULLMANN'S "*Gregory of Nazianzum*" has been translated by G. V. Cox, M. A., and published in a neat 12mo. volume by Parker, London. (318 pp.) We regret to say that it does not include the dogmatic part, or the statement and examination of Gregory's theological opinions; but it is yet a most interesting and instructive biography, furnishing a valuable contribution to the ecclesiastical history of the fourth century.

We have repeatedly spoken of the excellence, in its peculiar line, of the "*Journal of Sacred Literature,*" (London: R. B. Blackader,) edited by John Kitto, D. D., and are now glad to announce to our readers that arrangements have been made for its regular distribution in this country, at a comparatively low price. Messrs. Crosby, Nichols & Co., Boston, have been appointed general agents for the work, and will supply it at \$1 25 per number, or at \$5 00 per annum. Subscriptions are also received by C. S. Francis & Co., New-York. The following statement of the contents of the number for January, 1852, will give an idea of the general scope and aims of the Journal. Art. I. treats of the "Relative authority of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures of the Old Testament," and gives a high, yet well-sustained estimate of the value of the Septuagint version—not indeed as *inspired*, but as of use to correct the Hebrew original whenever there is good ground to believe it is corrupted. The writer carefully investigates all the citations of the Old Testament in the New, and gives us the following result:—

Of the 225 quotations contained in the New Testament Scriptures, there are,—

1. Quotations agreeing *verbatim* with the Septuagint, and agreeing also with the Hebrew..... 129
2. Quotations agreeing with the Septuagint *verbatim*, except that a synonymous word occurs once in two or three lines; or some other equally trifling variation exists..... 39
3. Quotations agreeing, either *verbatim*, or nearly so with the Septuagint, but differing in sense, more or less, from the Hebrew..... 22

Total Septuagint quotations..... 190

4. Quotations agreeing neither with the Hebrew nor the Greek..... 27
 5. Quotations agreeing with the Hebrew, but not with the Septuagint... 8

Art. II. on "the Ministry of Angels," reviews in order the principal passages of Scripture relating to the subject. Art. III. "Solomon's Song," is reprinted from an article by Prof. Stowe in the American Biblical Repository for April, 1847. Art. IV. is a candid examination (in fact the only intelligent and candid one that we have seen) of Mr. Forster's book on the Sinaitic Inscriptions, ("The one primal language, &c., by Rev. C. Forster.") Art. V. discusses the "Serpent" of Genesis, and endeavours to show that it is to be regarded as a name of Satan, and not as descriptive of the creature in whose form he appeared, or which he used as an instrument in the temptation. Art. VI. is the conclusion of an elaborate and erudite article on the "Rephaim," commenced in the October number of the Journal. Art. VII. treats of the "Characteristics of Miracles," with special reference to the claims of the Popish Miracles, (so called.) Art. VIII. is a review of Ferguson's "Palaces of Nineveh and Persepolis restored;" and Art. IX. of Fairbairn's Exposition of Ezekiel. Art. X. is a critical examination of Matt. v, 21, 22. The number closes with Correspondence, Notices of Books, and a large amount of valuable literary and theological intelligence.

THE thirty-third volume of the "Library of the Fathers, translated by members of the English Church," (London: J. H. Parker,) contains the first part of Chrysostom on the Acts; and the thirty-fourth volume gives Chrysostom's Homilies on St. Matthew, Part III.

"Pool's Annotations on the Holy Bible" (in three volumes imperial octavo) has heretofore been sold at three guineas; but the publishers announce an edition to be ready early in June, equal in all respects to that now on sale, for one guinea and a half to all purchasers who shall apply before the first of May, (R. B. Blackader, 13 Paternoster Row, London.)

We have received a copy of "The Chronological New Testament, in which the Text of the Authorized Version is newly divided into Paragraphs and Sections, with the Dates and Places of Transactions marked, the Marginal Renderings of the Translators,

many parallel illustrative Passages printed at length, a brief Introduction to each Book, and a running Analysis of the Epistles." (London: R. B. Blackader, 13 Paternoster Row.) The project of issuing such an edition had its origin in a conviction that something could be done to make our invaluable English version more intelligible to devout students of the word of God, by helps in arrangement and printing. The divisions into chapters and verses (being entirely of human origin) have, in this edition, been retained solely for the purpose of reference, — custom having sanctioned their use; but they have been made subordinate to another arrangement into paragraphs and sections, according to the subject-matter; and these sections have, by means of figures placed over each, been put into chronological order. An index is supplied at the end showing where any section is to be found. Quotations from the Old Testament have been distinguished by being printed in capitals, and speeches have been denoted by inverted commas.

MR. T. K. ARNOLD has just issued a "*First Hebrew Book*," (London, Rivington, 12mo., 250 pp.) which has many good points to recommend it to the use of beginners in Hebrew. Another book (which, however, we have not seen) gives promise of utility to students, viz.: "*An Analysis and Critical Interpretation of the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis*, preceded by a Hebrew Grammar and Dissertations on the Genuineness of the Pentateuch and on the Structure of the Hebrew Language. By the Rev. W. Paul, A. M." 8vo., 520 pp.

DR. ROBINSON'S "*Greek Lexicon to the New Testament*" has been reprinted in England—and has also been abridged there "for the use of schools and students."

WE have noticed Mr. Conant's excellent translations of Neander's Practical Exposition of Philippians and James, and now observe that both have been translated, at the same time, in Edinburgh, by Rev. Alexander Napier.

DR. JAMES THOMSON'S Expository Lectures on St. Luke are now completed in three volumes, 8vo. (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black.)

THE third volume of Clark's "Foreign Theological Library" (Edinburgh) for 1851, has Olshausen and Wiesinger's Commentary on Philippians, Titus, and 1st Timothy. The fourth volume has Hengstenberg on

the Revelation of St. John, vol. I. This work has now been going on for six years,—each year with increased success. Subscriptions are still received—seven guineas for seven years' issues up to the end of 1852.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the principal European Theological Journals:—

Kittó's Journal of Sacred Literature, for January:—I. The Relative Authority of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures of the Old Testament: II. The Ministry of Angels: III. Solomon's Song: IV. The Voice of Israel from the Rock of Sinai: V. The Serpent: VI. The Rephaim: VII. Characteristics of Miracles: VIII. Ancient Oriental Palaces: IX. The Last Vision of Ezekiel: X. Reconsidered Texts—Correspondence.

Eclectic Review, for January:—I. Early Independency: II. Homeopathy, a Topic of the Day: III. Memoir of Bishop Stanley: IV. Walpole's Assassins of the East: V. Francis's History of English Railways: VI. Life and Writings of Dr. Chalmers: VII. Prentice's Personal Recollections—The Manchester School of Politics: VIII. A Page of French History, December, 1851. February:—I. Railways to India: II. The Lives of the Saints: III. Military Memoirs of Colonel Skinner: IV. Maurice on the Old Testament: V. Sir John Richardson's Arctic Expedition: VI. D'Israeli's Lord George Bentinck: VII. Napoleon and War: VIII.

Humboldt's Cosmos: IX. The Projected Parliamentary Reform. March:—I. The Genius and Writings of Bunyan: II. Liberia and American Colonization: III. Sir James Stephen's Lectures on French History: IV. The Poetical Works of J. Edmund Reade: V. Bishop Philpotts: VI. Lord Mahon's History of England: VII. Hildebrand and the Excommunicated Emperor.

Prospective Review, for February:—I. John Sterling, Carlyle, and Hare: II. National Education: III. Ethics of the Voluntary System—Spence's Social Statics: IV. *Violenzia*—a Tragedy: V. Bailey's Theory of Reasoning: VI. *Norica*; or, Tales of Nürnberg from the Olden Time.

Among the new works in theology and kindred topics recently announced on the continent are the following, viz.:

Geschichte der Kirche von der französischen Revolution bis auf die Gegenwart, von Jos. Ign. Ritter, Prof. d. Theol. an der Univ. Breslau. (155 pp., 8vo.) Bonn, 1851.

Der welthistorische Zweifel, oder: Ist Gott nur Idee oder objective Realität? Von K. F. E. Trahnndorff. Mit einem Vorwort von Dr. R. Stier. (200 pp., 8vo.) Barmen, 1852.

Martha und Maria. Die innere Mission und die Kirche, von Bruno Lindner, Dr. u. Prof. d. Theol., u. Fröhprediger zu St. Pauli in Leipzig. (94 pp., 8vo.) Leipzig, 1851.

AMERICAN.

MOSES STUART died at his residence, Andover, Mass., on Sunday evening, January 4th, 1851. There have been greater men and greater theologians in America, but none whose services to theology have been so numerous and so timely. In more senses than one Moses Stuart not only marked, but made an epoch in American and even in English theology.

Born at Wilton, Conn., in 1780, he passed his early years on a farm, gathering such knowledge as an inquisitive mind could pick up from observation and from scanty books. At fourteen years of age he went to the Norwalk academy, and there, of his own motion, commenced the study of Latin. At seventeen he entered the Sophomore class of Yale College, and soon distinguished himself by his industry in study and by versatility of talent. The course of study at Yale was then meagre enough, but he made the most of it. In 1799 he graduated

with the highest honours of his class, and soon commenced the study of law, which he prosecuted for two years, occupying himself, at the same time, in school-teaching. In 1802 he was admitted to the bar, and soon after assumed the duties of a tutorship in Yale College, and taught there for a year or more. The following account of his conversion we take from the *New-England*, (Feb., 1852.)

"At the time of his admission to the bar, inquiries and studies of another sort were already beginning to engross his attention.

"President Dwight was accustomed in those days to read occasionally at evening prayers, a chapter from the translation in Macknight on the Epistles. Something in that exercise had interested Mr. Stuart; and he began to study the Scriptures on the Sabbath, borrowing for that purpose from the President a volume of Macknight. As he read, an interest deeper than any merely intellectual inquiry was excited: his religious consciousness was beginning to

be awakened. Presently his Sabbath-day study of the Scriptures was continued into the week; his ardent and impetuous mind felt itself grappling with infinite realities; religion had become to him a matter of immediate inquiry; his personal reconciliation to God was to him the greatest of all concerns, and the foremost of all duties. He saw in Christ, as in a glass, the glory of God; and thus his views of life and of the world, and all his plans of activity in life, were changed. After a little study of theology under the guidance of President Dwight, and the writing of a single metaphysico-theological dissertation, which, with a text prefixed, was made to answer as a sermon at his examination for licensure, he was duly "approved" by the Association, and commended to the Churches as a candidate for the ministry of the Gospel. Having written another sermon, (from 2 Kings ii, 12,) he began to preach. This was about the close of the year 1804."

In 1806 Mr. Stuart was ordained and called to the charge of the First Congregational Church in New-Haven, in which he succeeded the venerable Dr. Dana. His preaching was (it is said) like a new revelation to the people; his earnestness, freshness, freedom from all mere clerical trammels—and above all, his spirituality and zeal, soon breathed new life into the congregation. He served this church four years, and during that time more than 200 names were added to its list of members. In 1809 the foundations of the Theological Seminary at Andover, (the first school of the kind in America,) were laid, and Mr. Stuart was invited to the Professorship of Sacred Literature, which he accepted, with few qualifications, however, except industry, talent, and energy. The following statements are taken from Prof. Park's discourse on the death of Prof. Stuart, as reported in the *Congregationalist*.

"In January, 1810, he was inaugurated Professor of Sacred Literature in this Theological Seminary. His knowledge of the Hebrew then enabled him to translate, with the aid of Parkhurst's Lexicon, only five or six chapters of Genesis and a few Psalms. His acquaintance with the Greek language was far from being extensive. He was to be a self-made man. In about two years he prepared a Hebrew Grammar without the points, for the immediate use of his pupils. They were obliged to copy it day by day from his written sheets. In the third year he published it, at his own expense. To print a Hebrew Grammar was then a strange work. He was compelled to set up the types for about half the paradigms of verbs with his own hands. He taught the printers their art. Is he not

fitted termed the father of Biblical philology in our land? That grammar he afterwards enlarged and improved in successive editions, and the labour which he has expended upon it would have filled up half the life of an ordinary man.

In consulting Schleusner's Lexicon he met, here and there, a German word. No one could explain to him its meaning. His curiosity was aroused. At an exorbitant price he obtained the apparatus for German study, and in a single fortnight had read the entire Gospel of John in that language. Self-taught, he persevered through Seiler's *Biblische Hermeneutik*, and this work introduced him to the wide range of German literature. He felt himself to be in a new world. It was that one volume which, through the generosity of the trustees of the institution, enabled him to fill our library with the richest collection of German treatises then in the land. For ten years, he performed the rugged work of a pioneer, and in his maturer life he often said, that he did not know how to begin the study of the Bible until he was forty years old. For forty years he had been in the wilderness. He entered late in life upon the promised possession. Nor was he merely alone in the efforts of the first ten years of his professorship. To have been simply friendless would have been to him a relief. But the suspicions of good men were excited with regard to the results of his German study. He endured the whisperings of his brethren. Many of them met him with an averted face. Dark predictions were uttered concerning him, but he kept his eye fixed upon the distant goal. Morning after morning, he sallied forth from his house at five o'clock, through rain, hail, snow, storm, and as his attenuated figure breasted the winds of our cold winters, it seemed a type of his spirit, encountering manfully the opposition not of foes only, but of friends. The time at length arrived for developing the influence of his communion with the Teutonic mind. The Unitarian faith had acquired a dominant influence in our commonwealth. Buckminster and Channing had commended it by the graces of their style, and by the beauties of their character. The celebrated Baltimore sermon had begun to attract a general admiration. At this crisis, Prof. Stuart published his *Letters to Dr. Channing*. The first edition was exhausted in a single week. Two other editions rapidly followed. His opponents admitted and admired his learning. His friends confessed their error in resisting his German progress. They felt the importance of it for the Church. Before his day, scarcely one of our divines was acquainted with German literature. He has made it common. With a great sum, he obtained for us this freedom."

Of Prof. Stuart's long career at Andover, as teacher and author, we have not room to

speak at length. No man ever taught with greater success—not because he was more learned or more accurate than all others, for in these respects he had his superiors; but because he possessed that most precious of gifts for a teacher—the power of inspiring his pupils with his own enthusiasm. His scholars number fifteen hundred men, scattered over all the earth as preachers, teachers, and missionaries: and of them all, few could be found to forget their obligations to the spirit and the teachings of Moses Stuart. With broken health he worked on unremittingly year after year—studying with the ardent zeal of youth up to old age—ever vigorous, hopeful, and delighting in his work. He was able of late years to devote but three or four hours of each day to work—but it was *work*, and its fruits remain. His published works amount to twenty-three or four volumes, besides many hundred pages of reviews, essays, and pamphlets. Compelled in 1813 by wasted health to relinquish the active duties of his professorship, he still continued to study and to write, and but a few days before his death he corrected the final proofsheets of a Commentary on the Book of Proverbs. A fall on the ice, followed by a severe cold, confined him to his bed, and typhus fever set in. In a few days it was clear that his work was done.

"When asked whether he retained his confidence in the great system of truth which he had defended, his emphatic reply was, 'Yes.' 'Have you any doubts with regard to your former principles?' His answer was, 'No. I have long since learned,' he said, 'that feelings in religious experience are deceptive. I look mainly to my life for my evidence. I think my first aim in life has been to glorify God, and that I have been ready to labour and suffer for him.'

"When afflicted with severe pains he loved to repeat the words, 'Wearisome days and nights hast thou appointed unto me.' He had thought of death long and carefully. He was familiar with it. He was ready for it. It was less even than a Sabbath day's journey. When he heard the hope expressed that his last sickness would be unto life, and not unto death, he replied, 'Unto the glory of God, but unto death. I am prepared to die. Lord, have mercy, but thy will be done!'

A critical survey of Professor Stuart's works will be, for us, a pleasant duty at a fitting time.

MESSRS. DERBY and MILLER, Auburn, N.Y. propose to publish the "Complete Works of JAMES ARMINIUS, D. D.," partly from Nichols's translation, and partly in a new translation by the Rev. W. R. Bagnall, M.A., of the New-England Conference. The whole work will be comprised in two octavo volumes of 500 pages each, well printed on fair type, and bound in cloth, and will be sold at the low price of \$5.00 per set.

The following is the *Table of Contents*:
 I.—ORATIONS—1. The object of Theology.
 2. The Author and End of Theology.
 3. The Certainty of Sacred Theology.
 4. The Priesthood of Christ. 5. On reconciling Religious Dissensions among Christians. II.—A Declaration of his Sentiments on Predestination, Divine Providence, the Freedom of the Will, the Grace of God, the Divinity of the Son of God, and the Justification of Man before God; delivered by ARMINIUS before the States of Holland. III.—The Defence of ARMINIUS against thirty-one Articles, in which he was charged with Novelty and Heresy on the subject of Religion. IV.—The Answers of ARMINIUS to nine questions proposed to him, with the other Professors of Divinity at Leyden, by the Curators of the University. V.—Twenty-five Public Disputations or Lectures on some of the principal subjects of the Christian Religion; delivered in the University of Leyden. VI.—Seventy-nine Private Disputations on the principal articles of the Christian Religion, commenced by ARMINIUS as the ground-work of a Body of Divinity. VII.—A Dissertation on the true and genuine sense of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. VIII.—A Letter to Hippolytus a Collihus on the Divinity of the Son of God, the Providence of God, Divine Predestination, Grace and Free-Will, and Justification. IX.—Twenty-nine Articles, to be diligently examined and weighed. X.—A Letter to JOHN WYTENBOGAARD, on the Sin against the Holy Ghost. XI.—The friendly discussion of ARMINIUS and FRANCIS JUNIUS concerning Predestination. XII.—An Examination of the Treatise of WILLIAM PERRINS, a distinguished Calvinistic writer of England, on the mode and order of Predestination, and the extent of Divine Grace. XIII.—An Analysis of the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

WE are glad to see a "*Manual for Missionaries and Superintendents of Missions under the care of the Methodist Episcopal Church*," prepared, we presume, by the Missionary Secretary and published in pamphlet form by order of the Board. It contains a fund of practical details in regard to the qualifications and duties of missionaries and their relations to the Board and to the Church.

THE "Annual Report of the Sunday-School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church" shows a gratifying increase in the usefulness of that excellent institution, and in the general work of Sunday schools during the past year. As usual, the New-Jersey Conference takes the lead in the amount of contributions to the funds of the Sunday-School Union. The statistics for the year fall below the real facts—yet they show an increase of 635 schools, of 8,721 officers and teachers, of 43,722 scholars, and of 143,475 volumes in libraries. This interest may now be regarded as thoroughly established in the affections of the Church.

The Sunday-School Union has also issued "A Brief Exposition of the Character, Operations, and Claims of the Sunday-School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church," which will serve a most useful purpose in making known the extent of our Sunday-school operations and their relations to the Church in all its branches.

Rev. H. J. Fox and Rev. W. B. Hoyt are preparing a volume under the title of "A Quadrennial Register of the Methodist Episcopal Church and Universal Church Gazetteer," the plan and importance of which may be inferred from the following outline of its prepared contents:—A Map of the Territory included within the Bounds of the Methodist Episcopal Church, with Conference and District Boundaries, and the location of the Stations; the important parts of the Discipline, with Dates of the Alterations and Modifications; Outlines of the History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Colleges, Theological Schools, Seminaries, Missionary Society, Sunday-School Union, Book Concern, Church Papers, Periodicals, &c., Annual Conferences, Dates of Formations, Names of Officers, Presiding Elders, Deacons, those on Trial, Station, Numbers in Society, Monies raised by Districts, per member. General Information of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; Wesleyan Church; Canada Church; Smaller Wesleyan denominations; other Churches; Laws of the different States, affecting Ministers or the Church—as on Taxes, Marriages, Trustees, &c., &c.

The work will appear soon after the close of the next General Conference.

We continue our summaries of the contents of American Theological Journals:—

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) January:—I. Fairburn's Typology of Scripture: II. Origin of the Sabbath: III. Interpretation of Scripture: IV. Designation and Exposition of the Figures of Isaiah: V. The Fulness of Time: VI. Or-

der of the Principal Events which are to precede Christ's Coming.

Brownson's Review, (Boston,) for January:—I. Christianity and Heathenism: II. Willitoft, or the Days of James I., a Tale: III. Piratical Expedition against Cuba: IV. Continental Prospects: V. Sick Calls; from the Diary of a Missionary Priest.

Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, for January:—I. English Infidelity: II. Ralph Waldo Emerson: III. Egyptian Archaeology: IV. Jewish Sacrifices: V. Pulpit Hermeneutics: VI. The Rule of Faith.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) January:—I. Resurrection of the Body: II. The Sin-Offering: III. Hebrew Criticisms: IV. The Four Gospels and the Hegelian Assaults upon them: V. Kingdom of Congo and the Roman Catholic Missionaries: VI. Theology of Richard Baxter: VII. New England Theology.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) for January:—I. Value of the Christian Fathers: II. Haliburton, Hildreth, and the North American Review: III. American Episcopate before the Revolution: IV. Church Lands in Vermont: V. Biographical Notice of Rev. William Crosswell, D. D.: VI. Humphrey's History of the Propagation Society.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for January:—I. Doctrine of Original Sin: II. Episcurus: III. Distinguishing Features of the Baptist Denomination: IV. Unity of the Race in its Higher Relations: V. Permanency of American Institutions: VI. Works of Dr. Williams: VII. Robert Southey.

Messrs. Lane & Scott are about to publish two valuable works, one in the department of Biblical Literature, "A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels, consisting of a combined and parallel arrangement, on a new plan, of the narratives of the four Evangelists, according to the authorized translation; and A Continuous Commentary, with brief notes subjoined. With a Supplement, containing Extended Chronological and Topographical Dissertations, and a complete Analytical Index. Illustrated by Maps and Engravings. By James Strong, A. M.:" the other a work of great interest to the Methodist Episcopal Church, viz., "The Economy of Methodism Illustrated and Defended: in a Series of Papers. By T. E. Bond, Sen., M. D."

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

THE eighth and concluding volume of the translation of "Schlosser's History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth till the overthrow of the French Empire, with special reference to Mental Cultivation and Progress" has appeared in London. It is furnished with copious indexes to the whole work.

B. G. TEUBNER, Leipzig, announces a new edition of Sophocles from the text of Dindorf, with a Latin version. The first volume contains Ajax, Electra, Oedipus Rex; the second, Oedipus Coloneus, Antigone, Trachiniae, Philoctetes. The whole work costs about \$2.

MR. ARCHIBALD ALISON is preparing for publication "The History of Europe, from the Fall of Napoleon in 1815 to the re-establishment of Military Government in France, in 1851."

By the provisions of the last copyright agreement between France and England not only are reprints of English Copyright Works in France, but even the introduction of those from America, Holland, or any other country prohibited. This measure will materially affect the publishers of the United States, and will prove eventually, perchance, of service in bringing about a similar treaty between the American and English governments.

WE have received a prospectus for a new edition of the writings of the Dutch Philosopher, Hemsterhuys, under the title "*Œuvres Philosophiques de François Hemsterhuys, nouvelle édition, augmentée de plusieurs pièces inédites, de notes et d'une étude sur l'auteur et sa philosophie, par L. S. P. Meyboom, Docteur en Théologie.*" The work will be published at Utrecht, and completed in three volumes, with portrait, at \$3 50.

THE following sketch of editors and contributors to some of the English Reviews, is taken from a recent number of the *London Critic* :—

Although THE EDINBURGH still preserved a title which seemed to connect it intimately with Scotland, it had, sometime before 1812, ceased to be in any sense a Scotch Review. Not only was it published in London, but its editor was an Englishman, and never in any way very peculiarly Scotch, especially under the influence of a

light cosmopolitan thinker like Jeffrey, it was now in no way to be distinguished from the professedly English *Quarterly*, save by the difference of its political tone. But in 1842 there happened an event which shook Scotland from its circumference to its centre. In the May of that year, two or three hundred members of the General Assembly took sad and solemn leave of their old ecclesiastical parliament, and, with Dr. Chalmers at their head, set up the "Free Kirk." The chief "organ" of the disruption was an Edinburgh newspaper called *The Witness*, conducted with considerable nerve and talent by Hugh Miller, of *Old Red Sandstone* notoriety, a man great no less in theology than in geology, whom his native abilities and Lady Gordon Cumming, of Altyre, herself geological, and mother to the South African lion-hunter, had helped up from a very humble obscurity. *The Edinburgh*, of course, looked coldly, and *The Quarterly* inimically on the seceders; and the friendly zeal in their behalf of Mr. John Robertson, in the pages of *The Westminster*, was of too purely secular a kind for the chiefs of the Free Kirk. After two years, when it had been found that the most potent furtherer of the secession was not any minister, however eloquent, or any layman, however influential, but a mere newspaper like *The Witness*, it was resolved to start a quarterly organ, and to call it THE NORTH BRITISH REVIEW. Noblemen and gentlemen, enthusiastic for the Free Kirk, like the Marquis of Breadalbane, and Mr. Campbell of Monzie, subscribed funds. Mr. Blackie, the Glasgow publisher, and Mr. Cowan, the Edinburgh paper-maker, gave their aid. It was this Mr. Cowan that ousted Macaulay at the last Edinburgh election. He guaranteed the carrying on of the speculation for a certain period.

A Dr. Welch, who had suffered losses in the cause of the Free Kirk, who was a writer in *The Edinburgh Review*, and the biographer of Dr. Thomas Brown, was selected as the editor. Indeed, it was something done to him that heated the Free Kirk enthusiasm so as to boil over and form *The North British Review*. Dr. Welch, when the disruption took place, was "Moderator," that is, President or Speaker of the General Assembly, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, and Secretary, with a salary of five hundred pounds per annum, to the Scotch Bible Board. At the secession he of course cheerfully surrendered the Moderatorship and the Professorship, but saw no reason to surrender the lucrative Secretaryship, of which, however, Sir James Graham took the liberty of forcibly relieving him. Whereon *The North*

British was hastened into existence. Welch was a man of ability and tact, and began operations with a promising staff of veterans and others. He did not fall into the error which, in his circumstances, might have easily been committed, that of making his review too theological. His great gun, Dr. Chalmers himself, fired off articles chiefly on politico-economical subjects, his first being one on Sterling's *Philosophy of Trade*; but his most famous was that on Morell's *History of Philosophy*, which was considered as an annihilating manifesto against Continental speculation. In physical science, the biographies of its heroes, and books of scientific travel, Sir David Brewster, the noted *savant*, was mainly depended on; he wrote the papers on Cuvier, Humboldt's *Cosmos*, Watt, Cavendish, and the like, and is still a contributor. Hugh Miller led off his series of performances by a vivid paper in which herring-fishing was made poetical. Mr. Moncreiff, now lord advocate, reviewed Jeffrey's *Essays*, the first of a set on the light literature of the day. Dr. Henge, of Glasgow, recommended "Christian Union," and Welch himself dealt with Archbishop Whately. Among the early contributors too, if we are not mistaken, was Dr. Samuel Brown, of Edinburgh, a singular and gifted individual. With the zeal of an old alchemist, (but with a purer enthusiasm,) he has been occupied many years in endeavouring to effect the mutual transmutation of some of the primary chemical elements, and by some of the good people of Edinburgh is looked upon as one in search of the philosopher's stone. He is a man, however, of sane, clear, and subtle understanding, of varied accomplishments, and deeply versed in his own science, the chair of which, in the Edinburgh University, he narrowly missed attaining. He sometimes lectures with success in public; he published, a good many years ago, a series of tracts by "Victorious Analysis," with a high and beautiful meaning, and more recently the tragedy of *Galileo Galilei*; and so he lives on there, in Edinburgh, with one believing and helpful disciple, a life of scientific romance in an age of scientific prose. But to return. In religion, the aid had been secured of the well-known Isaac Taylor, the author of *The Natural History of Enthusiasm*, and of *Wesley and Methodism*. So that, on the whole, *The North British Review* started under very good auspices, and with very fair promises of success.

Dr. Welch died the year after he had commenced the labours of editorship, and it passed into the hands, for a short time, of Mr. E. Maitland, an Edinburgh advocate, whence it was received by Dr. Hanna, the biographer and son-in-law of Dr. Chalmers; so that three of our chief reviews were being conducted by sons-in-law of distinguished men—*The Quarterly*, by Mr. Lockhart, a son-in-law of Sir Walter Scott's;

The Edinburgh, by Mr. Empson, a son-in-law of Lord Jeffrey's; *The North British*, by Dr. Hanna, a son-in-law of Dr. Chalmers'; while a son of James Mill was editing *The London and Westminster*. So powerful, even in literature, is the hereditary principle! Somewhat more than a year ago, *The North British* ceased to be edited by Dr. Hanna, and was transferred to Professor Fraser, its present conductor. This gentleman is the son of an Argyleshire minister, was educated for the Scotch Church, at the Edinburgh University, where he was a favourite student of Dr. Chalmers, whom he followed into the Free Kirk to become professor of Logic in its metropolitan college. In England, as well as in Scotland, *The North British* is said to be doing well among reviews, not at present a very prosperous class of publications. In politics, its principles are liberal; it recognises the interest and importance of the new social theories, without committing itself to any of them. It acknowledges the right of the State to supervise industrial arrangements, and tends towards the advocacy of a general system of education; altogether its religious views are orthodox, without, however, being sectarian. In addition to the contributors already named, we can mention that most shrewd and hearty observer, Mr. Samuel Laing, the Norway tourist; Principal Cunningham, and Professors Fleming and McDougall, of Edinburgh; Dr. Hamilton, the earnest minister of the National Scotch Church in Regent's Square; Dr. Kitto, versed in Palestine; Thomas de Quincey, who has contributed some half-dozen articles or so, among them a striking one on Pope; the Rev. Charles Kingsley, the author of *Alton Locke*, whose hand we recognised mauling Festus-Bailey; and Mr. Anthony Panizzi, the Librarian of the British Museum, who writes upon Italian literature and Italian affairs, and in a review of Sir Harris Nicolas's *Nelson Despatches*, is said to have "settled" the question whether our naval hero was right or wrong in hanging some Neapolitan prince or other. Indeed, the library of the British Museum sends more than one contributor to *The North British*. Thus Mr. John Jones lately explained in its pages the system pursued in his own department, and there, too, figures Mr. Coventry Patmore, whose ingenious and subtle essays on architecture are, we confess, more to our taste than his poetry. Last, not least, among the contributors to *The North British*, is Mr. David Masson, a searching and meditative writer, chiefly on social topics, yet the critic, too, of Wordsworth and Carlyle's *Latter-Day Pamphelets*. But stop—we are forgetting one of the cleverest articles that have been recently published in any review—that on "The Literary Profession," which appeared about a year ago, and is from the pen of a Mr. John W. Kaye, of whom we are likely to hear more.

It had been one of the designs of *The North British* to secure the support of the English Dissenters, but this was soon found to be impossible. Stimulated by the appearance of *The North British*, some wealthy English Dissenters founded THE BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, the first number of which came out in February, 1845, then, as now, under the editorship of Dr. Vaughan. The doctor is the Principal of the Lancashire Independent College, a leader of the Congregational dissenters, and formerly preached in a chapel at Kensington. He writes a great deal in his own review, and chiefly with the aim of diminishing the influence of such living authors of renown as he considers, from their insinuating scepticism, dangerous to the faith of the rising generation. The more marked of his papers in this branch are those on Theodore Parker, Emerson, and Carlyle. Yet an article from his pen in one of the earliest numbers of his review, entitled, "The Priesthood of Letters," said a good many things which were looked on by his friends as far too bold. In theological and biblical literature he has had the assistance of Dr. Davidson, likewise of the Independent College. In political and social economy, a good deal has been done by that striking mediocrity, Mr. Edward Baines, the editor of *The Leeds Mercury*. Mr. Edwards, formerly of the British Museum, and now at the head of the Manchester Free Library, contributed an instructive paper on public libraries. And here, too, in these dashing sketches of Macaulay, Carlyle, and D'Israeli, do we not once more recognise the hand of the omnipresent Mr. Lewes?

The same month of the same year that witnessed the birth of *The British Quarterly*, welcomed to the light the first number of THE PROSPECTIVE REVIEW, the organ of English Unitarianism, as the other is of orthodox dissent. This small and modest-looking publication has been and is managed by a trio of Lancashire Unitarian ministers, the Rev. John James Tayler of Manchester, and the Rev. Messrs. Thom and Martineau of Liverpool. In general talent, although it is of a refined rather than of a vigorous kind, Mr. Tayler is considered to stand at the head of his class; and certainly none of his brethren have produced a work displaying as much acumen as his *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*, although as sermons many Unitarians would rank Mr. Martineau's *Endeavour after the Christian Life* higher than Mr. Tayler's *Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty*. But we must leave these questions of precedence to more competent judges, and conclude with saying, that while *The Prospective*, by the nature of the case, circulates almost exclusively among the set of whose doctrines it is the organ, yet it occasionally contains articles on neutral topics which, from their calm elegance of style and dis-

criminating intellectuality, might be perused with pleasure by even the most orthodox.

The contents of the chief English Reviews in General Literature since our last, are as follows:—

Edinburgh Review, for January:—I. Genius and Writings of Descartes: II. Bishop Philpotts: III. Recent Progress of Legislation: IV. Church Music: V. International Copyright: VI. Palgrave's History of Normandy and England: VII. Ordnance Map of England: VIII. The Expected Reform Bill.

Irish Quarterly Review, for December:—I. Haliburton's English in America: II. Maria Edgeworth: III. A Glance at the Past and Present Condition of Ireland—the Exodus: IV. Celtic Records of Ireland: V. Mr. Dempsey's Experiences of the Landed Interest: VI. The Poor Law in Ireland: VII. Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelists:—*March*:—I. History of the Streets of Dublin: II. D'Israeli's Biography of Bentinck—Free Trade and No Trade: III. Mitford's Literary Recollections: IV. Maturin: V. Sam Slick's American Humour: VI. Irish Church History.

London Quarterly, for January:—I. Russian and German Campaigns: II. Kew Gardens: III. Physiognomy: IV. Junius: V. Highland Destitution and Irish Emigration: VI. Sir Robert Heron's Notes: VII. Italy: VIII. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

Westminster Review, January:—I. Representative Reform: II. Shell-fish—their Ways and Works: III. The Relation between Employers and Employed: IV. Mary Stuart: V. Latest Continental Theory of Legislation: VI. Julia Von Krüdner as Coquette and Mystic: VII. The Ethics of Christendom: VIII. Political Questions and Parties at Home: IX. Contemporary Literature of England: X. Retrospective Survey of American Literature: XI. Contemporary Literature of America: XII. Contemporary Literature of Germany: XIII. Contemporary Literature of France.

Among the new works in Classical and General Literature recently announced in England are the following:—

History of the Whig Ministry of 1830 to the Passing of the Reform Bill, by J. A. Roebuck, M. P. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Life in Bombay, and the neighbouring out-stations. Royal 8vo., with numerous Illustrations:—

The Earl of Albemarle's Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham and his Contemporaries. 2 vols., 8vo. :—The Invasions and Projected Invasions of England. By E. S. Creasy, M. A. Post 8vo. :—Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan. Collected and edited by A. Sayous. 2 vols. 8vo. :—The Court and the Desert; or, Priests, Pastors, and Philosophers. With an Introduction, by the Rev. Dr. Croly. 3 vols. :—Alfred the Great and his Place in the History of England. By Dr. R. Pauli. Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by Thomas Wright, Esq., F. S. A., &c. Small 8vo. :—Roughing it in the Bush; or, Life in Canada. By Mrs. Moodie, (Sister of Miss Agnes Strickland.) 2 vols. :—Scenes and Adventures in Central America. Edited by Frederick Hardman, author of "Peninsular Scenes and Sketches," "The Student of Salamanca." Small 8vo. :—History of England and France under the House of Lancaster. With an Introductory View of the Early Reformation. 8vo. :—Grote's History of Greece. Vols. IX and X. From the Restoration of the Democracy at Athens, down to the Accession of Philip of Macedon, B. C. 403-359. Maps. 8vo. :—Modern India. A Sketch of the Civil System, and our Present Position. By G. Campbell, Bengal Civil Service. 8vo. :

—The Illustrated Classical Manual of Mythology, Biography, and Geography, designed for the Youth of both Sexes. By W. Smith, LL. D. 200 Woodcuts. Post 8vo. :—The Grenville Papers. From the Archives at Stowe; including Mr. Grenville's Political Diary. Edited by Wm. Jas. Smith, formerly Librarian at Stowe. 2 vols., 8vo. :—Lives of the Friends and Contemporaries of Lord Chancellor Clarendon. Illustrative of Portraits in his Gallery. By Lady Theresa Lewis. 3 vols., 8vo. :—Modern India: a Sketch of the Civil Administration of India. With some Account of the Natives and Native Institutions. By George Campbell, Bengal Civil Service. 8vo. :—The First Years of the American War. By Lord Mahon. Forming vols. 5 and 6 of his History of England. 8vo. :—King Gustavus Vasa; his Adventures and Exploits. With Extracts from his Correspondence and Chronicles of his Reign. Portrait, 8vo. :—Notes on Public Subjects, made during a Tour in the United States and Canada. By Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, Esq. Post 8vo. :—The Political Works of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. With an Original Memoir of his Life, brought down to the Present Date, drawn from Authentic Sources, Critical Notes, &c.

X.—RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

A MOVEMENT in favour of Lay Delegation in the judicatories of the Church has been going on for some months back. For the information of our readers, and, still more, with a view to preserve the facts for the use of the future historian of the Church, we present a summary account of all that has been done from the beginning of the movement until now.

In obedience to the call of a Committee of Nine, (appointed at a preparatory meeting,) a large and respectable meeting of the male members of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the city and county of Philadelphia was held in the Union church, Thursday evening, December 11th, 1851.

At this meeting the following preamble and resolutions, after discussion, were adopted by a very large majority :—

Whereas, to secure success in any great enterprise, it is deemed highly important that due respect be paid to the mind and spirit of the age upon which it is expected to make an impression :

And, whereas, in religious as well as civil governments, it is both prudent and wise to make changes and modifications to meet the wants and necessities of the times, as they may be indicated by the march of intellect and the progress of knowledge :

And, whereas, the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church was doubtless formed under the indications of Providence, and was admirably adapted to the times and circumstances in which it originated; yet, inasmuch as these have vastly changed, and equal rights, interests and dependencies, in civil, religious and social compacts,

are amongst the great principles of the age in which we live, we believe the indications of Providence are no less clear, that some alteration in its polity is essential to the accomplishment of its great mission to "spread Scriptural holiness over these lands."

And, whereas, it is self-evident that the efforts and energy in any department of life are generally in proportion to the responsibility belonging thereto, and, applying this principle to the Church, it is equally evident that a lay representation in its councils would more certainly secure a division of the responsibilities between the ministry and laity, and thereby arouse to greater activity and usefulness the Church, greatly increase its future prosperity, and secure the honour and glory of God:

And, whereas, it behooves all men, everywhere and under all circumstances, to ask direction at the hand of Infinite Wisdom, and seek the benefit of the counsel of the wise and prudent; we therefore deem it important, in so grave a matter as a fundamental change in the government of our Church, to obtain, as far as practicable, the aid of the united wisdom and prayers of our brethren throughout the Methodist connexion; therefore,

1st. *Resolved*, That a committee, to consist of twenty persons, be appointed by the chairman of this meeting to act as an Executive Committee, whose business it shall be to adopt the necessary measures to call a General Convention, to be held in the city of Philadelphia, on Wednesday, the 3d day of March, 1852, to consist of delegates from the various stations and circuits within the bounds of our Church, to take into consideration the propriety of petitioning the General Conference, to be held in Boston, in May next, for such action in their body assembled as will secure the introduction of lay delegates into our Conferences, and such other modifications in the government of our Church, as the wisdom of the convention may suggest or agree upon.

2d. *Resolved*, That we not only disavow all intention to interfere with the episcopacy or the itinerancy of our Church, but hereby declare our determined purpose to advocate and sustain them both.

3d. *Resolved*, That we love, honour, and respect the ministry of our Church, and hesitate not in declaring our purpose to sustain them in their high and holy calling, by our sympathies, our prayers, and our means; and we sincerely invite them to co-operate with us in seeking the change contemplated.

4th. *Resolved*, That the editors in connexion with the Methodist Episcopal Church be requested to publish these proceedings, and also the call for a Convention, as provided for by the first resolution.

The Committee subsequently issued the following:

Address to the Ministry and Laity of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States.

DEAR BRETHREN,—The undersigned, having been appointed a Committee under a resolution adopted at a meeting of male members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in the City and County of Philadelphia, held on the eleventh day of December, 1851, at the Methodist Episcopal Union Church, in the city aforesaid, deem it due to you, as well as to themselves, to make a brief exposition of the nature and objects of the present movement.

It is well known that the laity of our Church have no voice in making and modifying the laws by which, as Church members, they are governed. It is also known to many of you that this exclusion of the laity from a share in the government of the Church has been a source of discontent and agitation among its members for many years. The division which occurred in 1844, and the events which have followed that division—among which an alarming diminution in the membership of the Northern Church is not the least significant—have given new activity to this long-continued dissatisfaction.

Fearing a wide-spread disaffection in the Church, which would result in supineness, alienation, and indifference to interests, over which the laity have no control, and deeply solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of our Zion, a few of the brethren in this city assembled together to deliberate upon the propriety of adopting such measures as offered the best promise of putting this subject forever at rest. Believing that "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety," they invited five members from each station in this city to unite with them; and the meeting, thus constituted, appointed a committee of nine to call a public meeting of all the male members of the Church in the City and County of Philadelphia. At this public meeting, after a free discussion, the preceding resolutions were adopted by a large majority.

By reference to the first resolution, it will be perceived that it is no part of the duty of the undersigned to dictate to their brethren the course to be pursued by them in this movement, but simply to invite them to send delegates to a general convention of the Church to take into consideration the propriety of petitioning the next General Conference to make such changes in the law of the Church as the proposed convention may recommend.

It will, of course, devolve upon the convention to set forth its reasons for the changes which it may agree upon, and the undersigned do not feel called upon to enter upon any argument in anticipation of its action. But, as they have reason to believe that the movement is not generally understood—that it is even regarded by some of their brethren as dangerous, radi-

cal, and revolutionary, and that it will result in discord and schism—they feel bound most solemnly to disclaim any intention of marring the peace or mutilating the integrity of the Church. They go still further, and not only disclaim all interference with the episcopacy and itinerancy of the Church, but they declare their determination to advocate and sustain them both. So far from taking any step which might excite prejudice or distrust in the mind of the laity towards the ministry, it is their earnest wish to allay and remove these by bridging the gulf which separates the two orders; so far from threatening to withdraw their support from the ministry, they declare their purpose to sustain them in their high and holy calling, by their sympathies, their prayers, and their means; and so far from wishing to exclude them from participation in this movement, they cordially invite their co-operation in seeking the contemplated change.

The undersigned are met at the outset with the argument that the Church has prospered under its present form of government, and has been instrumental, under God, in bringing more than a million of souls into the fold of Christ, and that it is, therefore, unwise to disturb an organization which has worked out such glorious results. They submit, in reply, that these results have been attained, *not in consequence* of the exclusion of the laity from the councils of the Church, but *in spite* of it. They are more justly attributable to the doctrines of the Church, which address themselves to the hearts and consciences of the people, to its itinerancy, its class and prayer meetings, its mourners' bench, its earnest ministry, its zealous laity, and its facilities for reaching the poor. If the Church, by these means, has accomplished so much, with a form of government so opposed to the genius of our political institutions, how much more might it have done for the salvation of men and the glory of God, if, with the same doctrines and usages, it had had the advantage of a constitution more in harmony with the spirit of our age and people! Without detracting from the veneration felt by all Methodists for the founder of our Church, we should do well to remember that Mr. Wesley dictated our form of ecclesiastical government at a time when the principles of civil freedom, and particularly the right of the people to govern themselves, were not so well understood as at present. He formed his system of Church polity in accordance with monarchial ideas; but since that time, the great experiment of self-government has been made in this country, and what was then regarded as a doubtful trial, has now become a demonstrated fact.

The undersigned do not deny that the condition of the early members of the Church may have been such as to justify the ministry in assuming the entire legis-

lative, judicial, and executive control; but that state of things has passed away; and, advancing with the steady progress of knowledge, the laity have attained to a degree of intellectual capacity which qualifies them to render valuable aid to their clerical brethren in the councils of the Church. They respectfully submit that the tutelage of infancy is not adapted to the condition of manhood, and that every institution should, from time to time, so modify its laws as to conform to the progressive movements of civilization. Changes to suit the exigencies of progress are written on every page of our country's history. The constitutions of nearly all the thirteen States, which originally composed our confederacy, though adapted to the wants of the period in which they were framed, have been revised and altered to meet the necessities of the present age. And while the governments of our sister Protestant Churches have been so constructed as to harmonize with our National and State institutions, the Methodist Episcopal Church alone remains indifferent to the improvements going on around it, and pertinaciously adheres to an obsolete and unprogressive system. The undersigned believe that all civil, social, and religious organizations are capable of self-government. Justice at least requires that those who *pay*, should be represented in the councils of those who *expend*.

The undersigned furthermore submit that the movement in which they are engaged, so far from being *radical, revolutionary, and dangerous*, is eminently *conservative, peaceful, and safe*. It proposes that all the usages of the Church, which have been the springs of its prosperity, shall be sacredly preserved. It contemplates no action except by the firm friends of the Church, through its legally constituted legislature, to whose wisdom they appeal, and to whose authority they submit. It throws no firebrand of dissension within the hallowed gates of our Zion, but offers to spread oil upon the troubled waters of agitation and controversy. It disclaims all motives of ambition, and seeks the sole object of benefitting the entire Church, by drawing more closely the bonds of brotherhood between the ministry and laity. It promises to aid the ministry, by sharing its responsibilities; to infuse new energy into the laity, by giving them a direct interest and influence in the work of the Church; and to remove an objection to our polity which has driven multitudes of its most valuable members out of the Church, and prevented multitudes more from uniting with it.

The undersigned cannot suppose, for a moment, that a question of so much importance, submitted to so large a body, embracing almost every variety of mental constitution, will be acted upon without opposition. But may they not hope it will

receive from their brethren a calm and dispassionate investigation? They are far from believing that evil is the necessary result of the discussion of a great question; but they can readily see that indulgence in unholy tempers and unkind epithets, in place of a brotherly interchange of views, may result in injury to our beloved Zion. They, therefore, earnestly exhort their brethren throughout the connexion to endeavour, in the consideration of the measures proposed, to present to the Church, and to the world, the sublime spectacle of a vast brotherhood exhibiting in their discussions the legitimate fruits of our holy Christianity: "on earth peace, and goodwill toward men."

In conclusion, the undersigned submit for your consideration and action the following preamble and resolution, with their earnest prayers to the great Head of the Church, that he will so direct your hearts and minds, that your deliberations shall promote the triumphs of his gospel, and the "spread of Scriptural holiness over these lands."

Whereas, at a meeting of the members of the several Methodist Episcopal churches, in this city and county, held at Union church, the 11th December, it was deemed advisable to call a convention, to be composed of delegates from the different circuits and stations throughout the connexion; said convention to be held in this city, on the 3d of March next, to take into consideration the propriety of presenting a memorial to the next General Conference, asking for such a change in the government of our Church as will secure the introduction of lay delegates into our Conferences: therefore,

Resolved, That we recommend to the several circuits and stations throughout the Church to appoint lay delegates in such way as may be most convenient, either by separate action of the circuits and stations, or by a general meeting in such cities where there are more than one station. Provided, that not more than five delegates shall be sent from any circuit or station; but, when no appointment be made in any circuit or station, it may be represented by any member or members of the society, not exceeding five; said delegates being, in every case, at least twenty-one years of age, and three years a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

W. H. ALLEN,
J. J. BOSWELL,
JOHN WHITEMAN,
W. P. TILDEN,
P. R. McNEILLE,
T. K. COLLINS,
S. ASHMEAD,
JOHN HUFF,
CHAS. B. HARE,
M. CRAMER,

THOMAS W. PRICE,
ANTHONY NULL,
EPHRAIM CLARKE,
J. B. DAKE,
COLSON HIESKELL,
J. B. CHRISMAN,
A. GUNNINGS,
W. P. HACKER,
D. H. KOLLOCK,
C. PERRINE,
W. W. PIDGEON.

The Convention, thus summoned, met in the Nazareth Methodist Episcopal Church, Philadelphia, on Wednesday morning, March 3d, 1852. After devotional exercises the names of delegates were called, when about one hundred and twenty answered—representing the following churches, viz.:

St. John's Church, Philadelphia—Liberty-st. Church, Pittsburg—Sanctuary Church, Philadelphia—Ovid Church, Seneca Co., N. Y.—Wharton-street Church, Philadelphia—Chelsea Church, Mass.—Pacific-street Church, Brooklyn—Ebenezer Church, Philadelphia—Burlington Church, New-Jersey—Eighth-street Church, Philadelphia—Nazareth Church, Philadelphia—Beaver-street Church, Alleghany City—Twelfth-street Church, Philadelphia—South Common Church, Alleghany City—Smithfield-street Church, Pittsburg—First Church, Pottsville—Madison-street Church, New-York City—Niagara-street Church, Buffalo—Swan-street Church, Buffalo—Paul-street Church, Buffalo—Western Church, Philadelphia—Wesley Chapel, Washington City—Trinity Church, Philadelphia—Salem Circuit, Ohio—Kensington Church, Philadelphia—Washington-street Church, Brooklyn—Prospect-street Church, Paterson, N. J.—Ebenezer Church, Manayunk—Salem Church, Philadelphia—Mount Zion Church, Manayunk—Vestry-street Church, N. Y.—Cohocksink Church, Philadelphia—Chester Church, Pa.—Norwich Church, Vermont—Asbury Church, Philadelphia—Lehman's Chapel, Pa.—Carlisle Church, Pa.—Haddington and Monroe, Pa.—North Russell-street Church, Boston—Second Church, Pottsville—Central-street Church, Newark—Clinton-street Church, Newark—Franklin-street Church, Newark, N. J.—Putnam Station, Ohio—Union Chapel, Cincinnati—Havana Station, N. Y.

Of these delegates, part were chosen by the Churches named, and part were volunteer delegates; how large the proportion was of each, we have been unable to ascertain.

The Officers of the Convention were chosen as follows:—

President—W. H. Allen, of Girard College. *Vice-Presidents*—Colson Heiskell, of Philadelphia; W. G. Deale, of Washington City; John B. Shea, of Pittsburg; Lewis B. Loder, Brooklyn; Saml. Walker, of New-York; F. H. Root, of Buffalo; Jabez Pratt, of Boston; Dr. W. P. Tilden, of Philadelphia; W. G. Lord, of Newark; Prof. C. E. Blumenthal, of Carlisle. *Secretaries*—John B. Chrisman and George J. Hamilton, of Philadelphia; H. S. Gilbert, New York; and Saml. Norment, of Washington City.

The Convention remained in session two days, and finally passed the following preamble and resolutions:—

Whereas, This Convention is deeply impressed with the responsibility it has assumed, but is nevertheless confidently assured, as the result of its observation and information from various parts, of the extended work of Methodism, that the time has fully come when the expediency of change in our Church policy is clearly indicated by that Providence which it was always the glory of our Church, in its earlier history, to watch and follow; and

Whereas, We, as members of that Church, feel that our happiness and our hopes are identified with the prosperity and effectiveness thereof, in carrying out the great object of its mission to spread the Scriptures—holiness through all lands; and

Whereas, We believe that the feature in our Constitution which invests the clergy of our Church exclusively with legislative and governmental powers and prerogatives, is by no means essential to its prosperity, but contrariwise, very detrimental, furnishing a prolific cause of murmurings, contentions and disaffections to our own members, and a bar to the increase which, under other circumstances, would accrue to our Church; the thoughtful and considerate, in very many instances, declining to place their religious interests where they can exert no controlling influence—to say nothing of the want of resemblance to all other Protestant Churches, which, without an exception, recognise the right of the laity to participate in making and modifying the laws by which they are governed, leaving the Methodist Episcopal the only Protestant Church in the United States which refuses the co-operation of the laity in its legislative councils; and

Whereas, We verily believe that not only greater effectiveness will be secured by the change sought, a fruitful source of contentions and just cause of complaint removed, and the fair proportions and arrangements of our Zion, in comparison with other Protestant Churches, stand out in a prominent and advantageous position, but all the financial, benevolent, and charitable enterprises growing out of our economy, vastly promoted, and a fair and full remuneration to our preachers and their families rendered certain, as it ought to be. Therefore,

1. *Resolved*, That this Convention do hereby declare, that in their deliberate judgment, the Constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church ought to be so amended as to admit the introduction of lay delegates into the General and Annual Conferences, under such restrictions as shall not conflict with the rights of the clergy in their appropriate ministerial and pastoral duties and privileges; yet so as to secure effectually the voice and influence of the laity in the legislative or rule-making department of the Church.

2. *Resolved*, That the Convention do hereby respectfully petition the General Conference to give this subject the thought and attention which its importance requires, and in accordance with the spirit and aim of the first resolution, so to modify the Discipline of our Church, as to provide for lay delegations in our General and Annual Conferences.

3. *Resolved*, That, desiring as well to save the time of the General Conference, as to facilitate the object we seek, we suggest the following general plan as, in our judgment, fully meeting the case:—First, That every circuit or station should be allowed annually, at the last Quarterly Conference for the year, or otherwise, to elect one lay delegate (who, by virtue of his election, shall be a member of the Annual Conference, with the right to vote on every question except in passing the character, or, on the trial of a preacher) for every effective minister in full connexion whom such circuit or station supports. Secondly, That the delegates thus elected, join their clerical brethren in an election at such time and in such manner as the Discipline may prescribe, in electing delegates, clerical and lay, in equal numbers, to the General Conference; the expenses of all the delegates, lay as well as clerical, to be paid as such expenses are now paid.

4. *Resolved*, That the members of this Convention are now, as they ever have been, strongly attached to the itinerancy and the episcopacy of our Church, and they earnestly recommend the General Conference to adopt any measures that may be found necessary to strengthen the latter, and perpetuate the former, as they regard them both as a great means of our past success, and essentially necessary to our future prosperity.

5. *Resolved*, That in advocating lay representation in the councils of our Church, we most earnestly disclaim any intention of marring the peace, or mutilating the integrity of the Church; and though we are most firmly convinced of the propriety of the movement, and most conscientiously believe that if carried out, it would prove one of the greatest possible blessings to the Church, yet whatever may be the immediate result, we shall not cease to love and cherish the Methodist Episcopal Church and its doctrines, and we shall ever respect its constitutional authorities, and acquiesce in the expressed wishes of a majority of its members.

A Committee was appointed to lay before the General Conference the Memorial and Resolutions of the Convention, and to advocate the object set forth in them to the best of their ability. The same committee was authorized to correspond with the Churches.

We have thus given a sketch of this convention and its results, and are happy to note the Christian temper and spirit in which its proceedings appear to have been conducted. As yet, the Church at large has shown little sympathy with the movement. As far as can be gathered from any signs that have yet appeared, the Methodists of the United States, as a body, are fully satisfied with the present organization of the Church.

CONGREGATIONALISM, as a system, cannot go along with missionary activity. The theory breaks down inevitably when aggressive movements are needed. A new illustration is afforded in a recent call for a General Convention of Congregationalists proposed by the General Association of New-York. We extract the following passages from the "Circular."

DEAR SIR,—At the meeting of the General Association of New-York held in Brooklyn, in September last, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:—

"Resolved, That this Association respectfully suggest to Congregational ministers and Church members in the United States, the propriety of holding a General Convention or Council, to consider the relations of the Congregational Church polity to Home Missions, and generally to the spread of the gospel in this country.

"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to correspond with Congregationalists in other States relative to the time and means of calling such a Convention, to co-operate with similar committees that may be raised in other States, and in any event to issue a call for such a convention in the spring of 1852."

In bringing this subject to your notice, we would respectfully invite your attention to the following considerations, that led to the proposal of a GENERAL CONVENTION OF CONGREGATIONALISTS.

The work of Home Missions, so long conducted with harmony and efficiency by the union of Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the American Home Missionary Society, is in danger of being compromised by the denominational spirit now becoming rife at the West, and by the relations of the A. H. M. S. to slaveholding Churches. This is evident from the action of ecclesiastical and ministerial bodies and conventions at the West, and from the animadversions of prominent and responsible individuals upon the policy of the A. H. M. S. Many whose views are entitled to much consideration, are of opinion that the Home Missionary Society is unequal in the distribution of its funds, and that it is unduly committed to the support of slaveholding

Churches: others, no less eminent for wisdom and piety, are firm in the conviction that the A. H. M. S. is administered with strict impartiality; and that in sustaining the pastors of slaveholding Churches it is doing its part for the removal of slavery, by the meliorating influence of the gospel. In these circumstances it is thought that a fraternal conference of the friends of Home Missions in the East and the West, would contribute to remove misunderstanding, and to settle the principles upon which this work should be conducted. Such a conference is proposed to be held in the year 1852, at some point from Albany to Cleveland, inclusive, to be composed of ministers and members of Congregational Churches, delegated either by ministerial or ecclesiastical bodies, or by particular Churches; the object of the convention being prayer and conference with respect to the great work of Home Missions, and the promoting of acquaintance, sympathy, and harmony among those of like faith, engaged as labourers or helpers in that work.

Such a convention is rendered more important by the fact that urgent appeals are made from the West to the East for aid in the erection of church edifices. It should be carefully considered whether this shall become a regular department of Christian benevolence.

As an index of the views of the body in which this proposal originated, we give the following extract from a report adopted in 1850:—

"While, for the sake of harmony and efficiency in the Churches of our body, as well as for the general good, we recommend the relinquishment of all *ecclesiastical* unions whatever, we would no less strongly urge the continued co-operation of Congregationalists with Christians of other denominations, in the work of Home Missions, as conducted by the American Home Missionary Society. A divisive movement in that direction would be injurious to the cause of Christ, and particularly disastrous to those by whom it should be begun. Let the principles of our order be diffused by books, discourses, and newspapers; and let Congregational Churches be planted and sustained distinctively as such, wherever that is the wish of the people; but let no movement be made, and no organization formed to propagate Congregational-ISM upon missionary ground."

Will you please lay this matter before your district Association, or other ministerial body, at its next meeting, and invite its advice and co-operation, by a committee of conference, or by correspondence with us?

Your brethren in Christ,
 JOS. P. THOMPSON,
 HENRY W. BEECHER,
 DRUCK C. LANSING.

